a00fe86c13* Studio: read model text as utf-8 so umlauts survive on Windows Chat rejects or mangles non-ASCII on Windows: "ä ö ü" in a prompt, a chat template, or a model path comes back as mojibake, or the load dies with UnicodeDecodeError. open() and Path.read_text() fall back to locale.getencoding() when no encoding is passed. On Windows that is the ANSI codepage (cp1252, cp932, cp1251, ... by system locale), never UTF-8. Hugging Face writes these files as raw UTF-8, so every read of one decodes with the wrong codec: - tokenizer_config.json, which holds the chat template. Templates routinely carry -> arrows, smart quotes and CJK, so this is the common path into chat - config.json and adapter_config.json - modules.json, Ollama manifests, and the .py sources the remote-code scanner reads before a model is allowed to load The llama-server and embedding-server stdout readers have the same problem via subprocess(text = True); they now decode utf-8 with errors = "replace" so a stray byte cannot kill a log reader. Encoding arguments only, no logic changes. tests/test_chat_text_encoding.py covers a config.json and a chat template holding umlauts, arrows and CJK, plus the remote-code scanner reading a source file with umlauts. Those pass anywhere the locale is already UTF-8, so a fourth test re-runs the readers under -X warn_default_encoding and fails on any platform if an encoding argument goes missing again. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: name utf-8 explicitly on the remaining text I/O, with an AST guard (#7465) * Studio: name utf-8 explicitly on the remaining text I/O Follow-up to the model-text reads in #7467, covering the rest of the backend: system probes (nvidia-smi, amd-smi, powershell, git, node), package installers, /proc and /sys readers, and internal marker files (pid, install id, bootstrap password, Colab credentials). Same reason as #7467. open(), Path.read_text()/write_text() and subprocess(text = True) fall back to locale.getencoding(), which on Windows is the ANSI codepage rather than UTF-8. These paths are mostly ASCII today, so this is hardening, not a live bug. Encoding arguments only, no logic changes. Adds tests/test_text_io_encoding.py: an AST guard walking every backend source and asserting text I/O names its encoding, so the class of bug cannot creep back in one call at a time. 275 files. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Catch aliased subprocess and positional Path.open, migrate legacy JSONL The guard only matched a receiver literally named subprocess, so worker.py's `import subprocess as _sp` hid three text = True installs that decode pip output with the ANSI codepage. It also skipped any .open() with more than one positional argument, though Path.open takes buffering/encoding/errors/newline positionally. Resuming a scrape written by an older release is the other half: those JSONL lines are in the locale codepage, so the UTF-8 preload raised, the dedup keys were silently forgotten and duplicates were appended to a now mixed-encoding file. Decode with the locale codepage as fallback and rewrite as UTF-8 before the append handle opens, since Windows cannot replace a file it holds open. * Stream the JSONL preload and keep a torn line from relabelling the shard Reading the whole shard to migrate it was wrong twice over. These files reach gigabytes on a large scrape, so the preload now streams line by line and the rewrite streams through a temp file. Worse, one interrupted append used to condemn the file: the whole-file UTF-8 decode failed, every byte was retried as cp1252, and the rewrite persisted mojibake over records that were fine. A line now counts as legacy only if the locale codepage both decodes it and yields valid JSON, which a torn UTF-8 line does not. Damaged lines are skipped and copied through byte for byte. When the rewrite cannot be written at all, the append handle opens with the legacy encoding rather than mixing UTF-8 into the file. install_wheel takes run = subprocess.run as a parameter, so the guard cannot see it. Both wheel installs there now name their encoding. * Decide the shard's encoding from the file, not one line at a time Some byte strings parse both ways. cp1251 `Р°` is D0 B0, which is also valid UTF-8 for `а`, so a UTF-8-first parse quietly showed the wrong text instead of migrating it. A line now yields both readings, and the file decides. Any line that parses under the codepage but not as UTF-8 is unambiguous evidence, and ambiguous lines then follow that verdict, which is enough for any real shard: ordinary Cyrillic or Japanese prose is invalid UTF-8 several times per line. Keys for ambiguous lines are re-derived from the legacy reading during the rewrite. A shard is undecidable only if every line is ambiguous, and nothing can tell those apart. latin-1 is also tried after the locale codepage, so a scrape carried from Windows to a UTF-8 machine still has a reading rather than none. Requiring valid JSON, not just a decode, keeps that from claiming torn lines. * Weigh the whole shard, and never lose a record on the fallback path One structurally valid JSON line carrying a stray 0x96 parses as cp1252, so a single-line verdict let it relabel a healthy shard and mojibake every good record in it. Each line with non-ASCII bytes now votes: parsing only under the codepage is evidence for legacy, parsing as UTF-8 is evidence against, since codepage text rarely forms valid multibyte UTF-8. Ties leave the file alone. When the migration cannot be written the append handle uses the legacy codepage, and errors = "replace" quietly turned characters it cannot hold into question marks while write() still reported success. That path now escapes to \uXXXX instead, which is ASCII, so every codepage holds it and json.loads returns the exact characters. Nothing needs replacing, so errors = "strict" is safe. stream_installer runs sys.executable, so its output is now decoded as UTF-8 by utf8_child_env rather than read as the ANSI codepage. * Only rewrite a shard we can attribute, and append ASCII when we cannot latin-1 was doing too much work. It reads any byte, so it gave a moved shard a reading, but it is the right text only for cp1252: cp1251 Привет came back as Ïðèâåò and the rewrite made that permanent. The codepage is now trusted only when it is the locale's, and an untrusted reading is never written back. That leaves three cases where the file holds bytes UTF-8 cannot read and we are not converting it: no codepage to attribute it to, ambiguous lines outvoting the unambiguous ones, and a preload that could not read the file at all. All three used to append UTF-8 into it. They now append pure ASCII, which every ASCII-compatible codepage stores identically, so the file keeps decoding exactly as it did and no record is lost. Keys from the two readings are also kept apart. A damaged line in a healthy shard was marked seen through its codepage reading, so the retry that would have replaced the unreadable record was refused as a duplicate. * Let the flash-attn install stub take the kwargs the installer now passes _run_kwargs gained encoding and errors, so the one stub in this file that spelled its signature out rejected the call. The other four here already take **kwargs; this one now matches. * Do not let a stuck temp file mask the migration failure unlink() on the failure path could raise in its own right, on a stale .utf8.tmp directory or a temp another process holds. That escaped the constructor instead of returning False, so the caller never reached the ASCII append fallback that keeps the shard single-encoding. The pip fallback in install_wheel also spawns a Python child, so it gets utf8_child_env like the probe above it already had. The uv and nvidia-smi children are native binaries, where PYTHONIOENCODING would do nothing. * Stop converting legacy shards; the encoding that wrote them is unknowable trusted only ever meant that the bytes parse under this machine's codepage, which for a single-byte codepage is nearly always true. A cp1251 shard opened on a cp1252 Windows box decodes cleanly and would have been rewritten with Привет as Ïðèâåò. That is the fourth way this rewrite could corrupt a shard, and the common cause is that a file's encoding cannot be recovered from its bytes. So the rewrite is gone. The shard is left exactly as found, and appends are pure ASCII whenever it holds bytes UTF-8 cannot read, which is what actually delivered the no-mixed-encoding guarantee the rewrite was added for. Dedup keys still come from whichever reading parses, since ids are ASCII either way. This also removes the temp file, so there is no longer any file mode or ACL to carry across. * Scan the sandbox shim; it is shipped code, not a build artifact sandbox_site is on the sandboxed child's PYTHONPATH for every Python run (tools.py:332, 2660), so excluding it let two unannotated text calls through in code we ship. Both read and write the remap sidecar, which holds file paths. The exclusion list is meant for build output only, so the directory comes off it and the two calls name their encoding. * Force the worker's pip children to UTF-8, and read DBCS keys with a DBCS codec The three installer calls run sys.executable -m pip with an inherited environment, so the parent decoded UTF-8 while the child emitted the ANSI codepage. They now go through utf8_child_env like the other Python children. Two tests asserted no env kwarg was passed as a stand-in for no HIP flag being injected. They now assert the flag itself, which is the guarantee they were written for and does not depend on how the env is delivered. Separately, latin-1 cannot stand in for a double-byte codepage while recovering dedup keys: cp932 表 is 95 5C, and the trail byte reads as a JSON backslash, so the record failed to parse and its id was forgotten, appending a duplicate on resume. cp932, cp936, cp949 and cp950 are tried too. The reading is still only ever used for keys, which are ASCII and identical whichever codec parses. * Require more than one legacy line before trusting its dedup keys A shard whose valid records are all ASCII casts no UTF-8 votes, so a single damaged line won the vote by itself, its key was remembered, and the retry that would have replaced the unreadable record was refused. One such line is genuinely undecidable: a legacy record with one accented character and an ASCII record with one stray byte are the same shape. Reading it as damage costs a duplicate; reading it as legacy loses the record for good. Only one of those is recoverable, so it is now read as damage. A real legacy shard has a legacy line for every record carrying an umlaut, so its dedup is unaffected. * Append ASCII whenever the shard already holds non-ASCII bytes The gate asked whether any line was undecodable as UTF-8, which misses a shard where every legacy line happens to be valid UTF-8 too. A cp1251 shard of Р° records is bytes D0 B0 throughout, so appending 世界 as UTF-8 left a file where cp1251 reads the old records correctly and the new one as mojibake, and UTF-8 does the reverse. No single decoding recovered the whole scrape. The gate is now simply whether the shard holds any non-ASCII byte at all, which covers both cases and is easier to reason about: if what is already there reads differently under different encodings, do not add more bytes that do. Appending ASCII costs only \uXXXX escapes, which json.loads turns back into the exact characters, and it leaves the new record correct under either reading. * Skip the two Linux-gated flash-attn tests off Linux _should_try_runtime_flash_attn_install ends in sys.platform.startswith( "linux"), and the threshold test one line above already asserts exactly that, so the two tests that drive _ensure_flash_attn_for_long_context past the gate cannot pass anywhere else: the call returns before it reports a status. They were written on Linux and only surface once the suite actually runs on Windows or macOS, where both fail on an empty status list. This PR is about making the backend behave on Windows, so its own suite should be runnable there. * Fail closed when a KFD topology node does not decode This PR pins that read to utf-8, which turns an undecodable byte into UnicodeDecodeError. That is a ValueError, not an OSError, so it slips past the handler one line below and escapes a helper whose docstring promises to fail closed on any unreadable node. The caller would then lose the whole HIP-order map on a machine that has AMD GPUs, and the reason the helper fails closed is that dropping a node shifts every later ordinal and lets a similar-capacity GPU pass the total-size guard while showing another card's usage. Widening the handler is the same one-line change main already made in #7487, so the two agree and the eventual merge is clean. * Tighten the comments added in this branch * Treat an undecodable marker and undecodable metadata as malformed, not fatal Two more places where pinning the decode changed the failure mode. A UnicodeDecodeError is a ValueError, so neither `except OSError` nor `except (JSONDecodeError, OSError)` catches it, and both sites had a documented fallback that stopped being reached. An undecodable .transport marker used to read as an unknown value, and the caller then safely purged and restarted the partial download. It now aborts prepare_cache_for_transport instead, so the transfer fails rather than retrying. Undecodable .meta.json used to fall back to the file's own name, the same way invalid JSON does. It now aborts URI construction for the entire unstructured seed, so one corrupt byte in original_filename takes out the whole dataset. Both handlers are widened, matching the KFD fix earlier on this branch. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Widen two more decode guards, and pin the kernel installer's pipe Same shape as the ones already fixed here: the read was pinned to UTF-8 while the handler around it still only catches OSError, and UnicodeDecodeError is a ValueError. hf_cache_snapshot_dir answers whether a model is already on disk, and the offline embedding checks turn a raise into a 500. A torn refs/main used to decode into a nonsense commit and miss the snapshot dir; it now skips that cache root and keeps looking. _remove_pid_file runs first in _graceful_shutdown, so a corrupt studio.pid raising there abandoned the inference, export, training and tunnel children the rest of that function exists to kill. ssm_runtime's source-build path builds its subprocess kwargs in a dict and splats them through _run_with_heartbeat, so neither the encoding guard nor the earlier sweep saw the text = True in it: pip's output was still decoded with the Windows ANSI codepage, where a non-ASCII path or a compiler diagnostic mojibakes or raises over an install that was going fine. It now pins the same utf-8/replace pair install_wheel uses, and the HIP branch extends that env rather than replacing it. The guard learned the dict-literal shape and reddens on the old code (ssm_runtime.py:253). * Tighten the comments around the UTF-8 text I/O pins Collapse the multi-line rationales added with the encoding pins down to a line or two each, drop what the code already says, and use one wording for the repeated child-env note. * Do not let an unreadable bootstrap password stop startup, and narrow the kwargs guard ensure_default_admin calls _load_bootstrap_password for every existing admin and the lifespan calls that with no handler, so pinning the decode turned a damaged or pre-pin .bootstrap_password file into a backend that will not start. We write that file ourselves in UTF-8, so a byte that will not decode belongs to a file whose plaintext is worthless anyway; it now reads as no bootstrap password, the same answer as an absent file. A readable one still loads. The new kwargs check also judged every dict literal in the tree, so an unrelated payload carrying "text": True would have been reported as subprocess configuration with a misleading message, and a dict that fills in its encoding on a later line would have been reported too. It now only judges a dict that actually reaches a call, either splatted through a name or written at the call site, and treats a later kw["encoding"] assignment as satisfying it. The ssm_runtime shape it was written for is still caught, and a test pins both directions. * Stop reading a UTF-8 record a second time _read_line always parsed the line under the codepage as well, even when it had already read as UTF-8. Both callers take the UTF-8 reading when there is one and never look at the other, so on a healthy shard the second parse is pure waste, and this file reads all of one on every resume of a scrape it expects to reach gigabytes. Measured on 200,000 records, 76 MB: 1.96s before, 0.81s after, so the double reading was costing 2.8x. The early return is limited to a record, since the key lookup deliberately falls through to the codepage reading when UTF-8 yields something that is not one. A line UTF-8 cannot read still tries the codepage, latin-1 and the double-byte encodings as before, which is what the second reading is for. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Pin the scanned source fixture's line endings test_remote_code_scan_reads_non_ascii_sources compared a file's contents against the string it wrote, but wrote it in text mode, so Windows translated the line ends on the way out and the read back differed by a carriage return. That is the writer's doing, not the encoding the test is about, and it was the one failure on the Windows runner that belonged to this branch. The fixture now writes with newline = "" so the bytes on disk are the string on every platform. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Trim the newer comments to their point Shorten the widened-guard and state store notes added since the last pass, and collapse the line-ending note on the scanned source fixture. * Read the scraper checkpoint as UTF-8 only, never as a codepage A checkpoint holds nothing but base64 cursors and booleans, so one written by an older locale-encoded release is byte-identical to a UTF-8 one and already reads back. The codepage fallback can therefore only ever contribute non-ASCII: if a single-byte reading of the file were all ASCII, the UTF-8 read would have succeeded first. So the only file it changes the answer for is a damaged one, and there it turns a safe reset into a resume on a mojibaked cursor. GitHub answers that with INVALID_CURSOR_ARGUMENTS at HTTP 200, gh_client returns the partial document, and the scraper reads zero nodes and an empty pageInfo, which marks the stream done. Every later resume then skips it entirely. Reading UTF-8 only restores the earlier behaviour of dropping a checkpoint that will not decode, which re-scrapes from the first page while the writers dedup the replay. The shard scan below keeps its codepage reading; those records do carry non-ASCII. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Gate the remaining tilelang install tests to Linux _tilelang_platform_supported() returns False off Linux, so _ensure_tilelang_backend returns before the install and the subprocess mock these six assert on is never called. They fail on macOS runners for that reason alone. The rest of the file already carries this marker; these were missed. * Gate the Windows-incompatible worker and ROCm tests Two different gates, because the production code has two. The causal-conv1d and flash-linear-attention installers bail out on sys.platform == 'win32' alone and run everywhere else including macOS, so those cases get not_on_windows; marking them linux_only would skip tests that legitimately pass off Linux. The DRM and KFD readers return early unless platform.system() is Linux, and their fixtures build a fake sysfs tree needing PCI addresses like 0000:00:02.0 as directory names, which Windows cannot represent, so those get linux_only. The two visible-utilization cases failed for a different reason: on Windows get_visible_gpu_utilization takes the AMD adapter branch ahead of the torch fallback under test, and probing it imports torch, which the runner lacks. Stubbing that branch empty leaves every other platform unchanged. * Treat unparseable JSON nesting as a parse failure, and guard os.fdopen json.loads answers nesting it cannot descend with RecursionError, a RuntimeError, so _parse let it escape where the catch-all it replaced discarded the record. Both callers run _parse outside any further handler, so one damaged checkpoint or shard line aborted the scraper at startup. The encoding guard also missed os.fdopen, which is open() on a descriptor and takes the same locale default in text mode. It flags exactly the two text-mode calls that were left unencoded; the swap lock file's reader was already pinned to UTF-8 while its writer still used the codepage. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Write the non-ASCII source fixture without a 3.10-only argument Path.write_text() only grew newline in 3.10, and pyproject declares requires-python >=3.9, so this raised TypeError there. open() takes the same argument on every supported version and pins the bytes on disk the same way. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Tighten encoding comments * Follow subprocess calls through callable aliases in the encoding guard --------- Co-authored-by: Unsloth <michaelhan@Michaels-MacBook-Pro.local> Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: danielhanchen <unslothshared@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Unsloth <michaelhan@Michaels-MacBook-Pro.local> Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: danielhanchen <unslothshared@gmail.com>
365 lines
15 KiB
Python
365 lines
15 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
|
|
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
|
|
|
|
"""Consent gate for loads that would execute model repo code.
|
|
|
|
The LOAD-path counterpart to the capability probes (which read raw config and
|
|
never need remote code). A deliberate load calls ``evaluate_remote_code_consent``
|
|
right before passing ``trust_remote_code=True``, and decides by the severity of a
|
|
static scan of the repo's ``auto_map`` ``.py``:
|
|
|
|
* No ``auto_map`` in any config (model/tokenizer/processor) -> nothing runs; allow.
|
|
* CRITICAL (reverse shell, IMDS, credential theft, droppers) -> hard block, never
|
|
approvable, even first-party (defends a compromised trusted repo).
|
|
* HIGH/MEDIUM (subprocess/exec/eval/network/b64decode, or a large embedded blob) ->
|
|
block but user-approvable: the dialog pins approval to the scanned ``fingerprint``.
|
|
Applies to EVERY repo; first-party is not a blanket bypass.
|
|
* ``auto_map`` present but unscannable (gated/offline/listing failure) -> fail
|
|
closed: hard block, since we cannot verify or fingerprint unseen code.
|
|
|
|
Hardening + consent, not a sandbox: static patterns are evadable, so subprocess /
|
|
venv isolation remains the containment layer.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
|
from typing import Optional
|
|
|
|
from loggers import get_logger
|
|
|
|
from utils.security.remote_code_scan import (
|
|
CRITICAL,
|
|
HIGH,
|
|
MEDIUM,
|
|
REMOTE_CODE_CONFIG_FILES,
|
|
RemoteCodeUnscannable,
|
|
remote_code_fingerprint,
|
|
repo_remote_code_files,
|
|
scan_remote_code_files,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
logger = get_logger(__name__)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@dataclass
|
|
class RemoteCodeDecision:
|
|
"""Outcome of the consent gate for one (model, trust_remote_code) load."""
|
|
|
|
model_name: str
|
|
has_remote_code: bool
|
|
blocked: bool
|
|
fingerprint: Optional[str]
|
|
max_severity: Optional[str]
|
|
findings_summary: str
|
|
reason: str
|
|
findings: list = field(default_factory = list) # structured [{severity,file,check,evidence}]
|
|
approvable: bool = True # False only for CRITICAL (user cannot override)
|
|
|
|
def response_payload(self) -> dict:
|
|
"""Machine-readable detail for the frontend. ``error_kind`` splits a
|
|
user-approvable prompt (``remote_code_consent_required``) from a CRITICAL hard
|
|
block (``remote_code_blocked``).
|
|
"""
|
|
return {
|
|
"error_kind": (
|
|
"remote_code_consent_required" if self.approvable else "remote_code_blocked"
|
|
),
|
|
"model_name": self.model_name,
|
|
"has_remote_code": self.has_remote_code,
|
|
"approvable": self.approvable,
|
|
"fingerprint": self.fingerprint,
|
|
"max_severity": self.max_severity,
|
|
"findings": self.findings,
|
|
"findings_summary": self.findings_summary,
|
|
"reason": self.reason,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# trust_remote_code runs auto_map from ANY of these configs (model/tokenizer/
|
|
# processor), so all of them gate consent (scanning only config.json/tokenizer would
|
|
# miss a custom-processor VLM). The list lives in remote_code_scan so the gate and
|
|
# scanner stay in lockstep.
|
|
_REMOTE_CODE_CONFIG_FILES = REMOTE_CODE_CONFIG_FILES
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _config_has_auto_map(model_name: str, hf_token: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[bool]:
|
|
"""Whether any config (model/tokenizer/processor) declares an ``auto_map`` the load
|
|
would execute. Reads raw JSON with ``hf_token``; returns None when a config is
|
|
unreadable (transient/auth) so the caller treats it as "unknown" and scans, False
|
|
when the repo genuinely ships none.
|
|
|
|
GGUF-inertness is the LOADER's property, decided upstream by the caller's ``is_gguf``
|
|
check, not here. Every path that reaches this helper (export, training, non-GGUF
|
|
inference) loads via ``from_pretrained``, which imports ``auto_map`` even for a
|
|
``.gguf``-only repo, so a GGUF-classified repo id MUST still be scanned. Only a direct
|
|
``.gguf`` FILE reference is inert (a genuine single-file llama.cpp load).
|
|
"""
|
|
# A direct .gguf FILE loads via llama.cpp (auto_map inert). A bare repo id ending in
|
|
# .gguf can still ship safetensors + auto_map, so it falls through to the scan.
|
|
if _is_direct_gguf_file_ref(model_name):
|
|
return False
|
|
configs = _load_remote_code_configs(model_name, hf_token)
|
|
if configs is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
if not any(bool((cfg or {}).get("auto_map")) for cfg in configs):
|
|
return False
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _is_direct_gguf_file_ref(model_name: str) -> bool:
|
|
"""Whether ``model_name`` names a specific ``.gguf`` FILE (llama.cpp), not a repo:
|
|
a local ``.gguf`` path or a remote ``org/repo/.../file.gguf`` (>= 2 slashes). A bare
|
|
``org/name.gguf`` is a repo id that can still ship safetensors + auto_map, so it
|
|
falls through to the scan.
|
|
"""
|
|
name = model_name or ""
|
|
if not name.lower().endswith(".gguf"):
|
|
return False
|
|
try:
|
|
from utils.paths import is_local_path
|
|
if is_local_path(name):
|
|
return True
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
pass
|
|
# Remote: a file reference is repo_id ("org/name") + filename => >= 2 slashes.
|
|
return name.count("/") >= 2
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _load_remote_code_configs(model_name: str, hf_token: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[list]:
|
|
"""Read every config that can declare ``auto_map`` (model/tokenizer/processor) as
|
|
raw dicts. Returns the configs present (``[]`` when all 404, a definitive "no
|
|
auto_map"), or None when one is unreadable (transient/auth) so the caller scans.
|
|
The 404-vs-error split matters: real absence is "allow"; unreadable is "unknown".
|
|
"""
|
|
import json
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
from utils.paths import is_local_path, normalize_path
|
|
|
|
if is_local_path(model_name):
|
|
root = Path(normalize_path(model_name)).expanduser()
|
|
configs = []
|
|
for name in _REMOTE_CODE_CONFIG_FILES:
|
|
p = root / name
|
|
if p.is_file():
|
|
configs.append(json.loads(p.read_text(encoding = "utf-8-sig")))
|
|
return configs
|
|
|
|
from huggingface_hub import hf_hub_download
|
|
from huggingface_hub.utils import EntryNotFoundError
|
|
from utils.hf_cache_settings import active_hf_hub_cache
|
|
|
|
configs = []
|
|
for name in _REMOTE_CODE_CONFIG_FILES:
|
|
try:
|
|
p = hf_hub_download(
|
|
repo_id = model_name,
|
|
filename = name,
|
|
token = hf_token,
|
|
cache_dir = active_hf_hub_cache(),
|
|
)
|
|
except EntryNotFoundError:
|
|
continue # genuine 404 -> truly absent
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
# Transient/auth failure is not "absent" -> fail closed to "unknown" so
|
|
# the caller scans (a tokenizer/processor-only auto_map must not slip by).
|
|
return None
|
|
configs.append(json.loads(Path(p).read_text(encoding = "utf-8-sig")))
|
|
# Every config was read or a genuine 404 -> an empty list is a definitive
|
|
# "no auto_map", not "unknown".
|
|
return configs
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.debug("auto_map check could not read config for %s: %s", model_name, exc)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def evaluate_remote_code_consent(
|
|
model_name: str,
|
|
hf_token: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
*,
|
|
trust_remote_code: bool,
|
|
approved_fingerprint: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
trusted_org: Optional[bool] = None,
|
|
subject: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
) -> RemoteCodeDecision:
|
|
"""Single-repo consent; thin wrapper over the for_targets form. ``trusted_org`` is
|
|
accepted for backward compatibility but no longer changes the decision.
|
|
"""
|
|
return evaluate_remote_code_consent_for_targets(
|
|
[model_name],
|
|
hf_token,
|
|
trust_remote_code = trust_remote_code,
|
|
approved_fingerprint = approved_fingerprint,
|
|
subject = subject,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _fingerprint_target_key(target: str) -> str:
|
|
"""Namespace key for a target in the combined fingerprint. The pin is over CODE
|
|
BYTES, not the repo-id spelling: the scan canonicalizes a cached repo's casing while
|
|
workers pass raw input, so lowercase Hub ids (keep local paths as-is) or ``Org/Model``
|
|
vs ``org/model`` would fingerprint differently and reject a valid approval.
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
from utils.paths import is_local_path
|
|
if is_local_path(target):
|
|
return target
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return target
|
|
return target.lower()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def evaluate_remote_code_consent_for_targets(
|
|
targets,
|
|
hf_token: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
*,
|
|
trust_remote_code: bool,
|
|
approved_fingerprint: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
subject: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
) -> RemoteCodeDecision:
|
|
"""Decide whether a ``trust_remote_code=True`` load may proceed, over every repo whose
|
|
code the load would execute. A LoRA load runs adapter AND base code, so all targets
|
|
are scanned as ONE unit and pinned by ONE fingerprint over the union of their ``.py``
|
|
-- one approval covers every repo, and a base-only fingerprint can't leave an
|
|
adapter's own ``auto_map`` unreviewed. On ``blocked``, the caller surfaces
|
|
``response_payload()`` and retries with ``approved_fingerprint`` if the user accepts.
|
|
|
|
When ``subject`` is given, a prior approval by that user can skip the DIALOG (never the
|
|
scan): the stored fingerprint seeds the authoritative content check below, so an
|
|
unchanged repo auto-approves while any change re-prompts. A genuine approval is
|
|
recorded for next time.
|
|
"""
|
|
targets = [t for t in dict.fromkeys(targets) if t]
|
|
primary = targets[0] if targets else ""
|
|
|
|
if not trust_remote_code:
|
|
return RemoteCodeDecision(
|
|
primary, False, False, None, None, "", "trust_remote_code disabled"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Persistent per-user approval: seed the stored fingerprint so the authoritative scan
|
|
# below auto-approves an unchanged repo (skips only the prompt, never the scan). Gated so
|
|
# it cannot weaken the scan: the approval must match the current scanner ruleset, and a
|
|
# resolvable commit SHA must match the approved revision (a moved repo re-prompts; a None
|
|
# SHA relies on the fingerprint). The fingerprint and the CRITICAL block still apply.
|
|
caller_approved_fingerprint = approved_fingerprint
|
|
if subject:
|
|
from utils.security import remote_code_approvals
|
|
|
|
_ak = remote_code_approvals.approval_target_key(targets)
|
|
_stored = remote_code_approvals.lookup(subject, _ak)
|
|
if _stored is not None and _stored.scanner_version == remote_code_approvals.SCANNER_VERSION:
|
|
_sha = remote_code_approvals.resolve_combined_sha(targets, hf_token)
|
|
if _sha is None or _sha == _stored.commit_sha:
|
|
approved_fingerprint = approved_fingerprint or _stored.fingerprint
|
|
|
|
# Gather executable .py from every target that ships auto_map. A definitively
|
|
# auto_map-free target contributes nothing; an unreadable config is scanned anyway.
|
|
# If ANY target's code is present but unscannable, fail the whole load closed.
|
|
combined: dict = {}
|
|
has_remote_code = False
|
|
for target in targets:
|
|
if _config_has_auto_map(target, hf_token) is False:
|
|
continue
|
|
has_remote_code = True
|
|
try:
|
|
files = repo_remote_code_files(target, hf_token = hf_token)
|
|
except RemoteCodeUnscannable:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Blocking trust_remote_code load of '%s': remote code present (auto_map) "
|
|
"but could not be downloaded and scanned.",
|
|
target,
|
|
)
|
|
return RemoteCodeDecision(
|
|
target,
|
|
True,
|
|
True,
|
|
None,
|
|
None,
|
|
"Remote code is present (auto_map) but could not be downloaded and "
|
|
"scanned. Retry when the repo is reachable and the correct Hugging Face "
|
|
"token is set.",
|
|
"blocked: remote code could not be scanned",
|
|
approvable = False,
|
|
)
|
|
# Namespace filenames by (casing-normalized) target so two repos' same-named
|
|
# files stay distinct and the pin tracks code, not the repo-id spelling.
|
|
target_key = _fingerprint_target_key(target)
|
|
for filename, body in files.items():
|
|
combined[f"{target_key}\0{filename}"] = body
|
|
|
|
if not has_remote_code:
|
|
return RemoteCodeDecision(
|
|
primary, False, False, None, None, "", "no auto_map; trust_remote_code is a no-op"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if not combined:
|
|
# auto_map declared but no executable .py (e.g. GGUF repo) -> nothing to scan -> allow.
|
|
return RemoteCodeDecision(
|
|
primary,
|
|
False,
|
|
False,
|
|
None,
|
|
None,
|
|
"",
|
|
"auto_map declared but no executable code present; trust_remote_code is a no-op",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
result = scan_remote_code_files(combined)
|
|
fingerprint = remote_code_fingerprint(combined)
|
|
sev = result.max_severity
|
|
|
|
# CRITICAL is never approvable; a fingerprint pins approval for lower severities only.
|
|
approvable = sev != CRITICAL
|
|
approved = (
|
|
approvable and approved_fingerprint is not None and approved_fingerprint == fingerprint
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if sev == CRITICAL:
|
|
blocked, reason = True, "blocked: scan found CRITICAL patterns"
|
|
elif approved:
|
|
blocked, reason = False, "approved by fingerprint"
|
|
elif sev == HIGH:
|
|
# HIGH is user-approvable but must pin the fingerprint via the dialog, for every
|
|
# repo including first-party (a compromised trusted repo still needs review).
|
|
blocked, reason = True, "blocked: scan found HIGH patterns; approval required"
|
|
elif sev == MEDIUM:
|
|
# MEDIUM (e.g. a big embedded base64 blob) also pins approval like HIGH, so a
|
|
# direct API caller can't run flagged code by just setting trust_remote_code=True.
|
|
blocked, reason = True, "blocked: scan found MEDIUM patterns; approval required"
|
|
else:
|
|
blocked, reason = False, "allowed: no high-risk patterns"
|
|
|
|
if blocked:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Blocking trust_remote_code load of '%s': scan severity %s (fingerprint %s)",
|
|
primary,
|
|
sev,
|
|
fingerprint[:12],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Persist a genuine user approval (caller supplied the matching fingerprint, not a cache
|
|
# seed) under the current scanner version, so the unchanged repo is not re-prompted until
|
|
# the code or the ruleset changes.
|
|
if approved and subject and caller_approved_fingerprint == fingerprint:
|
|
from utils.security import remote_code_approvals
|
|
remote_code_approvals.record(
|
|
subject,
|
|
remote_code_approvals.approval_target_key(targets),
|
|
commit_sha = remote_code_approvals.resolve_combined_sha(targets, hf_token),
|
|
fingerprint = fingerprint,
|
|
max_severity = sev,
|
|
scanner_version = remote_code_approvals.SCANNER_VERSION,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return RemoteCodeDecision(
|
|
primary,
|
|
True,
|
|
blocked,
|
|
fingerprint,
|
|
sev,
|
|
result.summary(),
|
|
reason,
|
|
findings = result.findings_payload(),
|
|
approvable = approvable,
|
|
)
|