Trivy was the initial entry point for the litellm 1.82.7/8 supply-
chain compromise (March 2026):
Late Feb: attacker exploited a misconfigured pull_request_target in
Trivy's CI -> stole the aqua-bot PAT.
Mar 19: attacker force-rewrote 76 of 77 tags in
aquasecurity/trivy-action (and all 7 in setup-trivy) to
point at malicious commits. Anyone using a tag ref
(`@v0`, `@v0.69.4`, `@latest`) auto-pulled the trojan.
Mar 24: litellm's CI ran the trojaned Trivy unpinned -> the
payload exfiltrated PYPI_PUBLISH from the runner ->
attackers published the malicious litellm wheels.
A security scanner has the same broad runtime read access as
deployment tooling -- by design. That's exactly what made it the
ideal pivot. Our prior `aquasecurity/trivy-action@v0.36.0` was a tag
ref, the same shape that hit litellm, and Aqua's remediation does
not eliminate the meta-attack class (next compromise restarts the
clock). Removing rather than re-pinning.
Coverage we lose, and how we backfill:
- cross-ecosystem CVE: already covered by OSV-Scanner (NVD + GHSA
+ GitLab + RustSec feeds).
- secret detection: already covered by TruffleHog + the new
GitHub Actions pinning verifier.
- OS package CVEs: not relevant for a Python package + Tauri
desktop app.
- IaC misconfig (Dockerfile / k8s / Tauri config): the one unique
Trivy value-add. Unfilled for now; revisit with checkov / kics
if/when we ship a Dockerfile or k8s manifests.
Also pinned the two remaining third-party actions to commit SHAs
(was a tag ref, the exact thing the GHA pinning verifier flagged):
- step-security/harden-runner: a5ad31d (= v2.19.1)
- trufflesecurity/trufflehog: 17456f8 (= v3.95.2)
Dependabot's github-actions ecosystem will auto-bump these SHAs.
Refs: https://docs.litellm.ai/blog/security-update-march-2026https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/24/detecting-investigating-defending-against-trivy-supply-chain-compromise/
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