unsloth/studio/backend/tests/test_llama_cpp_tool_loop.py
Michael Han e1e38419df
Studio: permission levels for chat tool calls (Ask, Approve for me, Off, Full access) (#7079)
* Studio: permission levels for chat tool calls (Ask, Approve for me, Off, Full access)

Replace the Bypass permissions on/off toggle with a four level permission
selector, available in Settings > General (new Permissions section above
Notifications), the chat settings panel, the composer plus menu, and a new
always visible composer pill.

Levels:
- Ask for approval: every local tool call pauses for allow/deny.
- Approve for me: only calls detected as potentially unsafe pause; the
  python/terminal sandbox stays on.
- Off: never pauses; sandbox stays on (previous default behavior).
- Full access: never pauses and the sandbox is disabled. Still requires
  the danger confirmation and is never restored across reloads.

Backend adds permission_mode to the OpenAI compatible and Anthropic
passthrough payloads and threads it through both tool loops. Auto mode
uses a fail closed classifier in tools.py: terminal commands must be on
a read only allowlist with no redirection or substitution, python code
is AST scanned for writes, exec, process and network use, MCP tools
auto run only with read only style names. Unknown tools always ask.

Legacy bypass_permissions and confirm_tool_calls keep their exact
behavior for existing API callers.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio permissions: Off is a plain toggle below Full access

Off moves to the bottom of the level menu with a short description and
acts as the feature-off state: the composer pill is hidden entirely
while Off, and reselecting the active level toggles back to Off.

* Studio permissions: higher contrast composer pill text

The permission pill uses a foreground based grey instead of the shared
muted pill color, so it reads darker in light mode and lighter in dark
mode. Full access keeps the danger yellow.

* Studio permissions: panel dropdown layout and shorter tooltip

Chat settings panel: the Bypass permissions label sits on one line with
a full width dropdown underneath, styled like the other panel selects.
Tooltip shortened and wording uses Unsloth instead of Studio.

* Studio permissions: harden auto-mode unsafe detection

Extend the Approve for me classifier to catch write and exec paths that
slipped through:
- terminal: sort -o, tree -o, xxd -r, find -exec/-execdir/-ok/-delete
  and find -fprint/-fprintf/-fls now ask; plain read-only forms still
  auto-run. awk is no longer allowlisted since its program can write and
  call system().
- python: from-imports of mutating names (from os import remove [as rm])
  and star imports now ask.

Found by a fuzz and edge-case simulation matrix; pinned in
test_permission_mode.py.

* Studio permissions: split multi-line terminal commands in auto detection

A shell runs each line as its own command, but shlex reads newlines as
whitespace, so "ls\nrm -rf x" demoted rm to argument position and
auto-ran. Normalize newlines and CR to separators, and treat any all
separator token as a command boundary so runs of blank lines still
split. Found by the simulation matrix; pinned in tests.

* Studio permissions: address review feedback on auto-mode detection

Auto-mode (Approve for me) safety classifier hardening:
- Python: flag any reference to a mutating attribute, not only direct
  calls, so indirect refs (f = os.remove; f(x)) and aliases ask. Detect
  Path.open(mode) write modes and wrap the AST walk to fail closed.
- Terminal: match attached short output flags (sort -o/tmp/out) and keep
  find context across grouping parens so find ( -delete ) asks.
- Both: ask before reads that escape the sandbox workdir via parent
  traversal or hit credential paths (.ssh, .aws, id_rsa, .pem, etc.).

permission_mode plumbing:
- Fold permission_mode=full into bypass_permissions at the request model
  so route-level confirm-gate guards see it as bypass.
- Reject ask/auto on the Anthropic Messages server-tools path, which has
  no confirmation channel (mirrors the confirm_tool_calls rejection).
- Keep forced RAG autoinject in auto mode: the safe search_knowledge_base
  retrieval never gates, so derive the skip from the real confirm need.
- Reset all local preferences now also clears the legacy confirm key so a
  reset restores the fresh default instead of the old level.

Regression tests added for each case.

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* Studio permissions: close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 2

Auto mode ("Approve for me") let a few mutating calls through as safe:

- os.open(...) always creates/writes a descriptor, so treat it as unsafe
  even though builtin open in read mode stays safe.
- fd -x/--exec/-X/--exec-batch runs a command per match; scan for these
  alongside find's -exec/-delete.
- tempfile writes artefacts and hands back writable handles, so importing
  it now asks.
- Calling the result of a call (getattr(os, "remove")("x"), partials) is a
  dynamic target the AST can't vet, so fail closed.
- An MCP tool whose name pairs a read verb with a mutating one
  (get_or_create_issue, read_and_delete_file) no longer auto-runs on the
  read prefix alone.

Also fold permission_mode="off" into confirm_tool_calls=False on both
request models so the non-stream route guard sees the disabled gate, and
drive the Confirm tool calls toggle off permission_mode="ask" so auto no
longer shows it on.

* Harden auto-mode classifier and normalize bypass to full for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for a few cases it previously auto-ran:
- os.open via an os alias (import os as o; o.open(path, O_CREAT))
- pathlib symlink_to / hardlink_to / link_to
- importlib.import_module dynamic imports
- os.mkfifo / os.mknod / os.utime

Also fold bypass_permissions into full when a stale ask/auto permission_mode
is sent alongside it, so the Anthropic route guard no longer 400s those legacy
callers. Adds classifier and request-model regression tests.

* Close more auto-mode classifier gaps for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for cases the review surfaced:
- builtin open aliased to a name (f = open; from builtins import open as w)
  or looked up dynamically (globals()['open'])
- pickle / marshal / shelve / dill deserialization
- io.FileIO write handles
- sort --compress-program (runs an external program)
- MCP names carrying save/archive/submit/commit/push/sync/register verbs

Also refine the attribute open() write check so an explicit read mode
(ZipFile.open(name, "r")) stays auto while os.open flags still ask. Adds
test coverage for each case.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

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* Close three more auto-mode gaps for PR #7079

- rg runs an arbitrary program per file via --pre / --hostname-bin, so
  "Approve for me" now asks for those flags (rg is on the read-only
  allowlist).
- A path-qualified command token (./ls, /tmp/cat) is an arbitrary
  executable, not the trusted utility its basename matches, so it asks
  before running.
- A direct /chat/completions caller that sets permission_mode ask/auto
  but omits the legacy confirm_tool_calls flag now self-enables the
  confirmation gate, so tools can no longer run ungated on that path.

Adds classifier and request-model tests for each case.

* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 3 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for cases the latest pass surfaced:
- short-option clusters bundling a write flag (sort -uo out => -u -o)
- procfs reads that leak a process env/args/memory
  (cat /proc/self/environ, /proc/PID/cmdline, maps)
- env-assignment prefixes that change command lookup/loading
  (LD_PRELOAD=x ls, PATH=. ls, IFS=x ls); benign FOO=1 cmd stays auto
- os.open imported as a bare callable (from os import open as o)

Also drops ps from the safe terminal allowlist: its BSD environment
flags (ps auxe, ps eww) dump a parent process's unscrubbed env and
cannot be flag-parsed reliably, so ps always asks now. Adds classifier
tests for each case.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 4 for PR #7079

Terminal (Approve for me now asks for these):
- cd dropped from the safe allowlist: cd /; cat etc/passwd moves the
  shell out of the session workdir so a later relative read escapes it
- env -C/--chdir (workdir escape) and -S/--split-string (builds a fresh
  command line); wrapper flags are now checked
- /etc//passwd and /etc/./passwd normalize to /etc/passwd before the
  sensitive-path scan
- a sensitive path split across an assignment and an argument
  (p=/etc; cat $p/passwd) via best-effort NAME=value expansion

Python:
- builtins.exec / builtins.eval attribute calls (dynamic code execution)
- destructured open aliases (f, _ = (open, print); f('out', 'w'))
- a sensitive path composed from literals (os.path.join('/etc','passwd'),
  '/etc' + '/passwd')
- ZipFile/TarFile write modes (ZipFile(name, 'w')); the reader stays auto

Adds classifier tests for each case.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 5 for PR #7079

Terminal (Approve for me now asks for these):
- procfs reads hidden by shell quotes (cat /proc/$PPID/enviro''n) or
  quoted/nested-variable assignments (p="/proc/$PPID"; cat $p/environ):
  quotes are stripped and NAME=value prefixes expanded before the scan
- LESSOPEN/LESSCLOSE, which make less run an input preprocessor command

Python:
- os.chdir / os.fchdir, which move the cwd so a later relative read
  escapes the sandbox workdir
- sensitive paths composed via a pathlib / chain (Path('/etc') / 'passwd')
  or an f-string of literals (f'/proc/{pid}/environ')
- runpy (import) and runpy.run_path / run_module, which run arbitrary code

Adds classifier tests for each case.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 6 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these:
- a mutating callable reached through a getattr alias
  (rm = getattr(os, "remove"); rm("f")): calls through a getattr-bound
  name fail closed
- compound MCP tool names carrying clone/checkout/comment/fork/tag/
  invite/share, which start with a read verb but still mutate
- a sensitive path hidden behind a glob (cat /e??/passwd,
  cat /e[t]c/passwd): a ? / * / [..] token is matched against the
  sensitive-file set and bracket classes are de-obfuscated; benign
  globs (ls *.py) stay auto

Also run first-pass RAG retrieval in off mode: like auto, off never
prompts, so a direct caller passing a stale confirm flag should not lose
document retrieval (both tool loops).

Adds classifier tests for each case.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 7 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these:
- __builtins__.exec / __builtins__.eval (dynamic code via the dunder)
- terminal reads that hide a credential path behind a backslash escape
  (cat /et\c/passwd)
- read-named MCP filesystem calls pointed at a credential path
  (mcp__fs__read_file {"path": "/etc/passwd"})
- compound MCP names carrying append / prepend
- open aliased through a subscript or builtins attribute
  (f = globals()["open"]; f = builtins.open) then called to write
- open(..., **{"mode": "w"}) where a kwargs splat hides the write mode
- a sensitive path with a dynamic segment (open(f"/etc/{name}"),
  os.path.join("/etc", name)); /tmp/{name} stays auto
- urllib3 networking

Also stop folding permission_mode ask/auto into confirm_tool_calls for
external-provider requests: that branch rejects confirm_tool_calls with
tools, and the mode only governs local tool calls. Local requests still
self-gate. Adds tests for each case.

* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 8 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these:
- dbm on the unsafe-module list: dbm.open(file, "c"/"n") creates files,
  and importing the family signals a persistence writer
- reads of ~/.azure and ~/.config/gh credential stores (Azure/GitHub
  tokens), in terminal, MCP arguments, and Python literals
- compound MCP names carrying upsert / assign

Adds classifier tests for each case.

* Gate secret mounts and fix the composer pill count for PR #7079

- Add Docker/Kubernetes secret mount dirs (/run/secrets,
  /var/run/secrets) to the sensitive-path checks, so Approve for me asks
  before reading injected credentials (terminal, MCP args, Python).
- Count the always-visible permission pill in the composer's compact
  threshold so labels collapse at the intended width instead of
  overflowing by one pill.

Adds classifier tests for the secret mount paths.

* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 10 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these:
- qualified pathlib constructors (pathlib.Path('/etc') / name), folded
  the same as bare Path(...), so a dynamic sensitive path is detected
- open aliased through an annotated assignment (f: object = open;
  f('out', 'w')), tracked like a plain assignment
- recursive searches rooted at an absolute path (grep -R TOKEN /home,
  rg TOKEN /, fd pattern /etc), which read host files outside the
  sandbox tree; sandbox-relative searches stay auto

Adds classifier tests for each case.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 11 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these terminal reads, which bash would
expand into a sensitive path only after the classifier had approved:
- a glob that resolves into a secret mount or credential dir
  (cat /r?n/secrets/hf_token, cat /root/.s??/id_rsa)
- a recursive search rooted at a tilde home (grep -R TOKEN ~root,
  grep -R TOKEN ~/logs)
- a brace expansion that builds a credential path (cat /etc/pass{w,}d)
- a default/alternate parameter expansion that builds one
  (cat /etc/pass${x:-wd})
- an input redirection that hides a glob (cat </e??/passwd)

And these python calls:
- a str.format-built sensitive path (open('/etc/{}'.format('passwd')))
- writer methods that persist to disk without open() (numpy.save,
  Image.save, plt.savefig, DataFrame.to_csv, json.dump)

Segment-wise directory matching keeps benign globs (ls /home/*/projects)
auto. Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 12 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these too:
- a terminal read whose parent traversal hides behind a redirection with
  no following space (cat <../../notes)
- a python read whose path is built with str.join
  (open(''.join(['/etc', '/passwd']))), told apart from os.path.join
- a dynamic-code builtin reached through an alias
  (from builtins import eval as e; e(...); x = builtins.exec; x(...))

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 13 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these too:
- a recursive search whose root is hidden behind an assignment
  (p=/; grep -R TOKEN $p): the recursive-root test now runs on the
  assignment-expanded tokens as well
- a python read whose sensitive path is split through a literal variable
  (base = '/etc'; open(base + '/passwd')), including via an f-string
- numpy ndarray.tofile, which persists without open()
- a sequence brace read (cat /etc/pass{w..w}d), expanded alongside the
  comma brace form before the sensitive-path scan

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 14 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these python reads that assemble a sensitive
path in a form the fold did not yet recognize:
- a pathlib object reused through a name (p = Path('/etc'); p / 'passwd')
- old-style percent formatting ('%s/%s' % ('/etc', 'passwd'))
- Path.joinpath ('/etc'.joinpath('passwd'))
- a bytes path literal (open(b'/etc/passwd'))

And these terminal reads, which bash expands into a sensitive path only
after the classifier had approved:
- a substring parameter expansion off an assignment
  (p=passwd; cat /etc/${p:0:6})
- an ANSI-C quoted path (cat $'/etc/pass\x77d')
- a glob into an Azure or GitHub CLI config dir
  (cat /home/*/.az?re/..., cat /home/*/.config/g?/...)

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 15 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these terminal reads, which bash expands into
a sensitive path only after the classifier had approved:
- a per-thread procfs env alias (cat /proc/$PPID/task/$PPID/environ)
- a recursive root behind a default parameter (grep -R TOKEN ${root:-/home})
- a path built by pattern replacement (p=passXd; cat /etc/${p/X/w})

And these python reads:
- a pathlib .parent/.parents chain that escapes the session workdir
  ((Path.cwd().parent / 'other' / 'notes').read_text())
- a sensitive path resolved through glob (glob.glob('/e??/passwd')[0])

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 16 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these terminal reads, which bash expands into
a sensitive path only after the classifier had approved:
- a case-modifying parameter expansion (p=PASSWD; cat /etc/${p,,})
- a mutating find action hidden behind an assignment (f=-delete; find . $f)
- a glob assembled through an assignment (g=e??; cat /$g/passwd)
- a POSIX bracket class glob (cat /etc/pass[[:lower:]]d)

And these python reads/writes:
- a glob pattern folded from a literal variable
  (base='/e??'; glob.glob(base + '/passwd'))
- a directly imported os.path.join (from os.path import join; join('/etc', 'passwd'))
- a directly imported writer (from numpy import save; save(...))
- an aliased pathlib constructor (from pathlib import Path as P; P('/etc') / 'passwd')

The find/fd and glob scans now run on the assignment/parameter-expanded
command, and pathlib/join/writer import aliases are tracked. Adds
regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

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* Close auto-mode gaps from review round 17 for PR #7079

Two fixes:
- Gate sqlite3 in auto mode. sqlite3.connect(path) creates or mutates a
  database file (and runs DDL/DML) with no open()/writer attribute for
  the AST checks to catch, so treat the module like dbm and ask.
- Only self-enable confirm_tool_calls for Studio's own tool loop. The
  ask/auto fold previously set confirm on every non-provider request,
  including a plain client-tool passthrough (client-supplied tools that
  Studio does not execute), which then tripped the local-tool
  streaming-confirm route guard and rejected the passthrough. Restrict
  the fold to requests that actually ask Studio to run tools
  (enable_tools / enabled_tools / mcp_enabled).

Adds regression tests for the sqlite3 write and for the passthrough vs
tool-loop confirm behavior.

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* Close auto-mode gaps from review round 18 for PR #7079

Classifier (auto mode asks for these):
- os.open through a module alias (import os as o; o.open(...)); os/posix
  aliases are tracked like the literal module name.
- less/more pagers, whose escapes (+cmd, !shell, -o/--log-file, LESSOPEN)
  can run a command or write a file the command-name allowlist cannot
  see, so they are no longer auto-approved.
- a read-named MCP tool carrying a mutating query
  (query_database {"query": "DELETE FROM runs"}); DML/DDL statements are
  matched as whole statements so a natural-language query that merely
  contains "delete" stays safe.
- ML persistence helpers (save_pretrained / save_file / save_model /
  save_weights / save_lora / save_checkpoint) that export weights to disk.

Route:
- Honor CLI-forced tools when deriving the confirm gate. When a process
  policy (unsloth run --enable-tools) opens the local tool loop without a
  request-level tool signal, a permission_mode ask/auto request now
  derives confirm at the route (GGUF and safetensors paths) so the mode
  still gates the call, and a non-streaming ask/auto request is rejected
  rather than running unprompted. A plain client-tool passthrough (no
  local loop) is unaffected.

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 19 for PR #7079

Approve for me now asks for these too:
- a terminal read whose path is built by indirect parameter expansion
  (x=passwd; p=x; cat /etc/${!p})
- a bash /dev/tcp or /dev/udp redirection, which opens a network socket
  (cat </dev/tcp/host/port)
- a python read via pathlib's receiver-plus-pattern glob
  (Path('/etc').glob('passw?'))
- a python read whose sensitive root passes through a normalizer
  (os.path.abspath('/etc'), Path('/etc').resolve())
- a pickle-backed loader that can execute code on load
  (torch.load, joblib.load, pandas.read_pickle), tracked through module
  import aliases
- compiled code wrapped into a callable (compile(...) + types.FunctionType)

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

* Honor unset permission_mode as ask across the local tool loop for PR #7079

Three gaps where an omitted permission_mode did not behave as the
documented default ("ask"):

- The frontend only sent permission_mode / confirm_tool_calls /
  bypass_permissions when a tool pill was on. A process policy
  (unsloth run --enable-tools) can open the tool loop with no pill, so
  the backend never saw the selected gate. Send the three permission
  fields at the top level of every local chat payload instead.

- The backend read payload.confirm_tool_calls directly at the
  pre-switch guard and both late per-backend derivations, so an unset
  mode fell through as no-gate even for an explicit ask/auto. Add
  _permission_mode_confirm(payload): explicit confirm_tool_calls wins,
  explicit ask/auto engage the gate, off/full never prompt, and an
  unset mode defaults to ask only where realizable (streaming), keeping
  the legacy no-gate run for non-streaming unset requests.

- A forced ask/auto tool loop (CLI --enable-tools) with no stream now
  400s at the pre-switch guard before evicting the resident model,
  matching the existing confirm-without-stream rejection.

Adds test_permission_mode_confirm_derivation covering the derivation
truth table.

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* Declare permission_mode and bypass_permissions on the local chat request type

The previous change moved permission_mode, confirm_tool_calls and
bypass_permissions to the top level of the local chat payload. They had
lived inside a conditional spread, which is not subject to excess
property checking, so the fields were never declared on
OpenAIChatCompletionsRequest. At the top level tsc flagged
permission_mode as unknown (TS2322), failing the frontend build and
every job whose Studio install builds the frontend.

Add permission_mode and bypass_permissions to the request interface
(confirm_tool_calls was already present).

* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 21 for PR #7079

Auto mode ("Approve for me") now asks for these too:
- a pathlib read built from a concrete constructor (PosixPath, WindowsPath
  and their Pure* forms), which the folder previously ignored so
  PosixPath('/etc') / 'passwd' lost its /etc root and ran unprompted
- a terminal or python read of the ssh host keys under /etc/ssh, which
  the sensitive-path regex only covered for passwd/shadow/sudoers
- a read whose path variable is reassigned: the whole-tree pre-scan kept
  the last binding, so base = '/etc'; open(base + '/passwd'); base = 'data'
  folded to data/passwd and ran even though execution reads /etc/passwd;
  any multiply-bound name now folds to the escape sentinel and asks

Also stop the pre-switch guard from rejecting a plain client-tool
passthrough. permission_mode only implies the confirm gate for Studio's
own local tool loop (enable_tools / enabled_tools / mcp_enabled); a
non-streaming client-tool passthrough that carries permission_mode
ask/auto (confirm_tool_calls left unset by the validator) must forward to
the provider branch. Only an explicit confirm_tool_calls=True still forces
the local-confirm rejection there.

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

* Fix permission-pill compaction count and Full-access confirm sync for PR #7079

Two frontend consistency issues in the permission-level UI:

- The composer collapses tool pills to icons above four, but the count
  left out the permission pill, which renders in every mode except off.
  With one optional pill also shown the row reached five pills without
  collapsing and could overflow. Count the pill when it is visible
  (permission_mode != off).

- Entering Full access via setPermissionMode('full') or
  setBypassPermissions(true) left confirmToolCalls at its previous value,
  so a Full-access run (which sends confirm_tool_calls=false) could still
  report confirmations as enabled in response metadata. Set
  confirmToolCalls false at both entry points.

* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 23 for PR #7079

Auto mode ("Approve for me") now asks for these too:
- a command using an abbreviated GNU long option that reaches a
  write/exec action (sort --out= for --output, env --ch= for --chdir,
  fd --base-dir= for --base-directory); a prefix of an unsafe long flag
  now fails closed
- printf -v NAME, which assigns to a shell variable, so
  printf -v PATH %s .; ls can rewrite PATH and run ./ls unprompted
- fd --base-directory / --search-path, which move the search root
  outside the session workdir without any positional slash token
- an MCP tool whose compound read name carries a copy-style mutator
  (read_and_copy_file, get_and_snapshot_volume): copy, duplicate,
  import, export, download, backup, restore, snapshot, mirror

Also treat an omitted permission_mode as its documented default ("ask")
on the Anthropic Messages server-tool path. That branch has no
confirmation channel and already rejects explicit ask/auto, so an
omitted mode now falls into the same rejection instead of silently
running server tools unprompted, unless the caller opted out with
confirm_tool_calls=false (the legacy equivalent of "off"). off/full and
that opt-out still run; the two routing tests that relied on the old
implicit run now set permission_mode="off".

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

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* Refine permission gating from review round 24 for PR #7079

Four fixes from the latest review:

- Anthropic Messages server tools: an omitted permission_mode no longer
  rejects a request that only runs safe server tools (web_search), so
  existing Anthropic callers keep working. It still rejects an omitted
  mode when a local tool (terminal/python) is selected, and an explicit
  ask/auto is still rejected outright. off/full and a
  confirm_tool_calls=false opt-out always run.

- Pre-switch confirm-without-stream guard: use
  _explicit_studio_tool_loop_requested (the same predicate the
  passthrough router uses) instead of the policy-inclusive
  _effective_enable_tools, so a process --enable-tools policy no longer
  turns a client-tool passthrough into a local-loop rejection.

- Auto mode now asks for `uniq INPUT OUTPUT`: uniq writes its second
  file positional, so a second positional (numeric flag values skipped)
  is treated like `sort -o`. A lone `uniq file` or piped `... | uniq`
  stays safe.

- MCP mutation check now strips SQL comments before matching, so
  DELETE/**/FROM and UPDATE/**/users (comment-as-whitespace) no longer
  slip past the DML/DDL denylist.

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

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* Close auto-mode gaps from review round 25 for PR #7079

Auto mode ("Approve for me") now asks for these Python cases too:
- a bare archive constructor with a write mode (from zipfile import
  ZipFile; ZipFile('out.zip', 'w')), tracked through import aliases like
  the zipfile.ZipFile attribute call already was
- a dynamic lookup aliased through getattr (g = getattr;
  rm = g(os, 'remove'); rm('file')), not just direct getattr(...) calls
- a callable that wraps open or a writer via functools.partial
  (w = partial(open, mode='w'); w('out.txt')), which hides the write mode

Also:
- Always-safe tools (render_html) stream their early provisional canvas
  card in auto mode again. The provisional-card guard mirrored the raw
  confirm flag, which suppressed the early card under Approve-for-me; it
  now reuses the auto-mode safety decision (is_always_safe_tool).
- The assistant-ui composer no longer counts the permission pill toward
  its collapse threshold when the level is Off (the pill renders null
  there), matching the other composer.

Adds regression tests for each case and its safe counterpart.

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* Align permission-mode confirm guards with the router (review round 26)

Three pre-switch confirm-gate checks disagreed with how the tool
loop actually enters, so a valid request could 400 (or an invalid
one could evict the resident model) at the wrong point:

- The /chat/completions pre-switch guard only looked at explicit
  request fields, so a process --enable-tools policy that forces the
  loop on (request omits enable_tools, no client tools) slipped past
  it and only 400ed after _maybe_auto_switch_model had swapped the
  model. It now mirrors the router's own loop-entry gate
  (_effective_enable_tools or mcp, tool_choice="none" disabling it
  unless explicitly asked) while still deferring to client-tool
  passthrough, so the policy-forced case is caught before the switch.

- The ChatCompletionRequest full/off fold treated enabled_tools by
  itself as a local-loop request and set confirm_tool_calls=True.
  The router never starts the loop on enabled_tools alone (it only
  filters which tools run), so a non-streaming passthrough carrying
  client tools plus enabled_tools 400ed instead of routing verbatim.
  The fold now keys off the same enable_tools / mcp_enabled signals.

- The Anthropic /v1/messages unsupported-mode rejection (ask/auto,
  or an omitted mode selecting terminal/python) ran inside the
  post-switch server-tools block, so an invalid request evicted the
  resident model before the 400. It now runs before the auto-switch,
  determined from the requested server tools, like the neighboring
  malformed- and mixed-tool guards.

Adds regressions for each: a policy-forced non-streaming ask/auto
guard rejection that never reaches the switch, an enabled_tools-only
passthrough that keeps confirm unset, and an Anthropic rejection that
precedes _maybe_auto_switch_model.

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* Close auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 27 for PR #7079

Auto mode ("Approve for me") now asks for these host-mutating or
host-reading cases it previously ran unprompted (the sandbox does not
jail filesystem reads, and terminal commands can change host state):

- Destructured string literals fold into the scanned path now, so
  base, leaf = ('/etc', 'passwd'); open(base + '/' + leaf).read()
  resolves to /etc/passwd and asks, like the single-assignment form
  already did. The tuple/list unpacking branch tracked only aliases to
  open; it now also binds literal and folded-path elements.
- pathlib name rewrites fold to the rewritten path:
  Path('/etc/x').with_name('passwd').read_text() (and with_stem /
  with_suffix) spell no literal /etc/passwd but resolve to it, so they
  are folded and caught. Benign in-sandbox rewrites stay safe.
- hostname NAME (or -F/--file, -b/--boot) sets the hostname, so a
  positional or a set flag asks; bare hostname and the display flags
  (-f/-i/-I/...) stay read-only.
- date -s/--set STRING and the bare MMDDhhmm... positional set the
  system clock and now ask; the display forms stay read-only (+FORMAT,
  -u/-R, and -d/-r/-f whose following value is skipped so date -d
  tomorrow is not mistaken for a clock-setting positional).

Adds regression rows for each gap and its safe counterpart.

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* Close more auto-mode classifier gaps from review round 28 for PR #7079

Auto mode ("Approve for me") now asks for these cases too:

- Mapping-style %-formatted paths. '/etc/%(f)s' % {'f': 'passwd'} folds
  to /etc/passwd and asks; a dynamic value or a non-literal mapping
  leaves the NUL marker so /etc/<dynamic> still fails closed. The path
  folder previously handled only tuple/scalar % right-hand sides and
  returned None for a dict, hiding the sensitive segment.
- A read-named MCP database tool carrying PostgreSQL COPY. COPY ... FROM
  bulk-loads a table and COPY ... TO writes a server-side file, so both
  are matched as mutating queries like DELETE/UPDATE already were. A
  'copy' substring in a column name stays safe (word boundary).
- logging file handlers. logging.FileHandler('out.log', mode='w') (and
  the default append mode, RotatingFileHandler/TimedRotatingFileHandler/
  WatchedFileHandler, and the bare from-import form) create or truncate
  a file like open(..., 'w'), so they are classified as writer calls.
  StreamHandler / NullHandler and logging reads stay safe.

Adds regression rows for each gap and its safe counterpart.

* Fix writer aliases, GraphQL mutations, and auto server tools (review round 29)

- Auto-mode Python: an aliased writer or archive constructor is tracked
  like the existing open alias, so from numpy import save; s = save;
  s('out.npy', arr) (and z = ZipFile; z('a.zip', 'w'), incl. the
  destructured forms) ask instead of running the write unprompted. A
  benign builtin alias (x = len) stays safe.
- Auto-mode MCP: a read-named tool carrying a GraphQL mutation now asks.
  query_graphql {"query": "mutation { deleteIssue(id: 1) }"} matches a
  leading mutation keyword (GraphQL uses # comments, so it scans the raw
  payload); GraphQL read queries stay safe.
- Anthropic /v1/messages: permission_mode "auto" no longer 400s a
  safe-only server-tool selection. auto only needs a confirmation
  channel for an unsafe call, so like the omitted default it runs for
  web_search / RAG / render and rejects only when a gate-needing local
  terminal/python tool is selected. ask still always rejects (it asks
  per call, which this passthrough cannot honor). The rejection stays
  ahead of the model auto-switch.

Adds regression rows/cases for each.

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* Gate asyncio spawn, net clients, default-captured open; allow safe-only auto (round 30)

Auto-mode Python now asks for more process/network/write vectors:
- asyncio process spawners (asyncio.create_subprocess_exec/shell and a
  loop's subprocess_exec/shell) run an arbitrary program without the
  terminal blocklist, so they gate like os.system/subprocess.
- stdlib network clients imaplib / poplib / nntplib / xmlrpc(.client) /
  webbrowser open outbound connections the sandbox does not namespace
  off, so their import asks like the other network modules.
- a callable captured as a function or lambda parameter default
  (def f(o=open): o('out', 'w')) now binds that parameter into the same
  alias set, so the later write through it is gated. A benign default
  (o=len) stays safe.

Also, permission_mode "auto" no longer 400s a non-streaming local tool
request whose selection is always-safe-only (web_search / RAG / render).
auto only prompts for a classifier-flagged call, so a safe-only auto
request needs no stream, while ask, an explicit confirm_tool_calls=true,
MCP, and an unrestricted or unsafe selection still require it. Applied
via a shared _confirm_gate_needs_stream helper at the pre-switch, GGUF,
and safetensors confirm-stream guards; the loop's per-call confirm flag
is unchanged.

Adds regression rows/cases for each.

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* Catch brace-glob paths and attribute writer aliases; unfold auto (round 31)

- Terminal auto mode now runs the glob-sensitive scan over every
  expansion candidate, so a brace-expanded glob (cat /e{t,}c/pass?d,
  which bash expands to /etc/pass?d and then globs to /etc/passwd) asks.
  Brace expansion alone spells no literal /etc/passwd and the glob only
  resolves once the brace group is expanded, so scanning both together
  is required. A benign brace + glob stays safe.
- Python auto mode now tracks a mutating attribute captured as a plain
  name: s = np.save; s('out.npy', arr) binds a writer alias, a captured
  .open bound method (p = Path('out').open; p('w')) fails closed on any
  call since its mode position varies, and z = zipfile.ZipFile is gated
  like the bare import. A benign attribute alias (x = np.mean) stays safe.
- permission_mode "auto" is no longer folded to confirm_tool_calls=true
  on the request model. Folding it defeated the safe-only-selection
  exception in _confirm_gate_needs_stream (an explicit confirm forces
  stream=true), so a non-streaming safe-only auto request was rejected.
  Leaving it unset lets the route apply the exception; the mode still
  drives the loop's per-call gate. "ask" still folds (it gates every
  call).

Adds regression rows/cases for each.

* Harden SQL/GraphQL/writer classification and passthrough guards (round 32)

MCP argument mutation detection (read-named query tools):
- CREATE DDL now matches modifiers and the broader object set, so
  CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW, CREATE UNIQUE INDEX, CREATE TEMP TABLE,
  CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW and CREATE FUNCTION ask.
- Stored-procedure invocation (CALL proc(...), EXEC/EXECUTE) and VACUUM
  ask; a natural-language "call me back" stays safe via the trailing
  "(" / ";" / end lookahead.
- GraphQL # comments are stripped before the mutation match, so
  mutation # note\n { deleteIssue(id: 1) } no longer hides the mutation.

Python auto-mode classification:
- numpy.memmap / open_memmap and pandas ExcelWriter / HDFStore create or
  truncate a file on construction, so they gate like open(..., "w").
- asyncio networking (asyncio.open_connection, loop.create_connection /
  create_server and unix variants) opens outbound connections/listeners
  the sandbox does not isolate, so it gates like socket.connect.

Terminal auto-mode: file -C / --compile writes a compiled magic database.

Routing:
- A JSON-schema response_format is guided-decoding passthrough, not a
  local tool loop, so a --enable-tools policy no longer 400s a
  non-streaming ask/auto structured-output request at the confirm guard.
- An explicit confirm_tool_calls=False opts out of the Anthropic Messages
  server-tool gate entirely (it wins over the mode, mirroring
  _permission_mode_confirm and the GGUF path), so it runs even under ask.

Adds regression rows/cases for each.

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* Track path-ctor aliases, exempt empty selection and safe safetensors card (round 33)

- Python auto mode now propagates path constructor / join aliases, so
  assigning Path or os.path.join to another local name is still folded:
  P = Path; (P('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text() and j = os.path.join;
  open(j('/etc', 'passwd')) ask, while a benign /tmp alias stays safe.
- _confirm_gate_needs_stream now distinguishes an omitted enabled_tools
  (None, all tools) from an explicit empty list ([], no tools). An empty
  selection runs no built-in tool and cannot prompt, so a non-streaming
  auto request with enable_tools=true, enabled_tools=[] is no longer
  400ed under a --enable-tools policy.
- The safetensors provisional render_html card now uses permission_mode:
  render_html is always safe and never prompts, so its early canvas card
  streams under auto (which ships confirm_tool_calls=true) instead of
  being suppressed, matching the GGUF path's is_always_safe_tool exemption.

Adds regression rows/cases for each.

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* Extend auto-mode classifier: SQLite mutations, more net/xattr/compressed writers

Additional fail-closed gaps found by a fresh adversarial pass, each with a
reproduction and a benign control:

- MCP read-named tools now ask on SQLite-flavored writes the base DML/DDL regex
  missed: ATTACH / DETACH DATABASE, a write-form PRAGMA (PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL
  / user_version=42 / foreign_keys(0), while the read-form PRAGMA journal_mode
  stays safe), and load_extension() which loads and runs an arbitrary shared
  library.
- Python auto mode now gates the remaining asyncio network entry points
  (start_server, open_unix_connection, loop.create_datagram_endpoint,
  sock_connect), os.setxattr / os.removexattr metadata writes, the gzip / bz2 /
  lzma single-stream writers (GzipFile / BZ2File / LZMAFile, mode-gated like
  ZipFile so a read stays safe), pandas to_xml, and the websockets client.

Benign controls (SELECT 1, read-form PRAGMA, asyncio.sleep, gzip read, numpy
read, natural-language "attach"/"analyze") stay safe. Regression rows added to
test_permission_mode.py.

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* Close follow-up auto-mode gaps: SQLite/GraphQL variants, more writers and net

A fresh adversarial pass on the previous round found consistent extensions of
the same fail-closed rules, each reproduced with a benign control:

- MCP read-named tools: DROP / ALTER now cover the same broad object set as
  CREATE (DROP FUNCTION, ALTER INDEX, DROP MATERIALIZED VIEW); ATTACH is caught
  without the optional DATABASE keyword via its quoted-path form; a
  schema-qualified write PRAGMA (PRAGMA main.user_version=1) is matched; and a
  GraphQL mutation carrying directives (mutation M @audit { ... }) is treated as
  a mutation.
- Python auto mode: os.startfile (Windows program launch), asyncio
  start_unix_server, and the socketserver framework now ask; a gzip/bz2/lzma
  open imported under an alias (from gzip import open as gopen) is gated like
  builtin open; and a dynamic path prefix that can form a sensitive absolute
  root (open(chr(47) + "etc/passwd"), open(os.sep + "etc/passwd")) is treated as
  sensitive, while a dynamic prefix with a benign suffix stays safe.

Benign controls (read-form PRAGMA, natural-language "attach ... as", "drop the
idea", SELECT dropped_at, query @cached, gzip read alias, dynamic prefix +
data/file suffix) stay safe. Regression rows added to test_permission_mode.py.

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* Gate GNU time -o, basicConfig/methodcaller/fileinput, and more SQL mutations

Another adversarial pass surfaced further consistent fail-closed gaps, each
reproduced with a benign control:

- Terminal: GNU time -o/--output/-a/--append truncate or append to a file with
  timing output; time is a wrapper, so the flag is checked before the wrapped
  command like env -C.
- Python auto mode: logging.basicConfig(filename=...) opens a log file for
  write; operator.methodcaller("write_text"/...) hides a writer method behind a
  string and is now treated as dynamic dispatch (like getattr/partial);
  fileinput.input(..., inplace=True) rewrites a file in place (the default read
  form stays safe).
- MCP read-named tools: UPDATE now matches quoted, bracketed, and
  schema-qualified targets (UPDATE "users" / public.users / ONLY public.users /
  [users] / `users` SET); SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE/DUMPFILE writes a server file;
  and state-changing SQL functions inside a SELECT (pg_terminate_backend,
  setval, pg_write_file, lo_export, ...) ask.

Benign controls (time ls / time -p, basicConfig(level=), methodcaller("upper"),
fileinput read, NL "update ... set", setval_col column, PL/pgSQL SELECT INTO
var) stay safe. Regression rows added to test_permission_mode.py.

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* Tighten auto-mode classifier comments

Collapse the multi-line rationale blocks in the permission classifier to one or
two lines each without dropping the exploit each branch closes. Comments and
whitespace only (no code change); the classifier tests are unchanged and pass.

* Retry transient SSE stalls in the tool-calling smoke probes

The tool-calling job flaked with a bare "TimeoutError: timed out": the
server-side python/bash probes stream over post_sse(), which (unlike
post()) had no transport-level retry, so a single stalled stream on a
shared CI runner hard-failed the whole step even though function calling
had already passed.

post_sse() now mirrors post(): a transport-level stall (stream open or a
mid-stream read timing out) is retried once with a fresh request capped
at 300s, while HTTP status errors still surface immediately. The
Linux _run_tool_probe caps each attempt at 360s and treats a stall that
outlives the retry as a failed attempt (rotate to the next seed) instead
of raising, and the web_search probe uses the same 360s cap. A genuine
server wedge still fails (the retry also times out), so real regressions
are not masked. Applied to the Linux, macOS, and Windows inference-smoke
workflows, which share the probe.

* Close five more auto-mode classifier gaps from review

Each reproduces with a benign control:

- Path constructor aliased through an attribute (P = pathlib.Path) now folds
  like the bare-name alias, so (P('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text() asks while a
  /tmp alias stays safe.
- Callable defaults that are not plain names now bind the parameter: an
  attribute writer (def f(s=np.save)), an archive constructor, a captured .open,
  and partial(open, mode='w') fold like the equivalent assignment; a benign
  default (np.mean) does not.
- A dynamic piece inside a sensitive name (open('/et' + chr(99) + '/passwd'),
  which folds to '/et\x00/passwd') now asks: the literals around each dynamic
  segment are matched against a credential target with the segment as any run of
  non-separator chars, so an all-dynamic ('1 + 1') or segment-spanning
  (a + '/' + b) path stays safe.
- MCP read-named tools now ask on REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW and REINDEX; a
  'refresh' column or natural-language 'refresh' stays safe.
- A writer/open alias handed to a higher-order invoker (map(open, names, modes),
  starmap(np.save, ...)) is gated even without a direct call site; a benign
  map(len, ...) is unaffected.

Regression rows added to test_permission_mode.py.

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* Default tool pills off on model load so tool execution is opt-in

resolveToolsEnabledOnLoad turned the web-search and code pills on for
any tool-capable model when the user had expressed no preference. Default
them off instead, so tool execution is enabled only when the person
clicks the pill to turn it on; a saved preference (on or off) is still
honoured, so a user who already enabled tools keeps them on.

* Gate mark/subscribe MCP verbs and qualified higher-order writer invokers

- A read-prefixed MCP tool name carrying mark / subscribe / unsubscribe
  (get_and_mark_read, get_and_subscribe) now asks; a 'mark' substring inside
  one token (list_bookmarks) stays safe.
- The higher-order writer check now also fires for a qualified invoker
  (itertools.starmap(open, ...), functools.reduce(open, ...)), matching the
  bare-name map/filter form; the writer-check on the first arg keeps a benign
  itertools.starmap(len, ...) or itertools.chain(...) safe.

Regression rows added to test_permission_mode.py.

* Close more auto-mode gaps and align the ask confirm fold across paths

Each classifier change reproduces with a benign control:

- MCP read-named tools now ask on reply / notify verbs (get_and_reply_email,
  list_and_notify_users), on catalog writes COMMENT ON / SECURITY LABEL / LOCK
  TABLE and CREATE|DROP|ALTER POLICY, and on state-changing PostgreSQL functions
  inside a read-shaped SELECT (nextval, set_config, pg_notify, the advisory-lock
  family). A 'comment' column, a 'locks' table, and a 'nextval' column prefix
  stay safe; the natural-language NOTIFY/SET ROLE statement forms are left out
  because SET/NOTIFY overlap ordinary prose.
- Python auto mode now gates loader.exec_module (runs a module's code), archive
  extractall (zip-slip file writes), the ensurepip / venv modules (install pip /
  build an environment), and pydoc.writedoc. The Hugging Face login token
  (~/.cache/huggingface/token and stored_tokens) is now a sensitive path, while
  the rest of that cache (model data) stays readable.
- ChatCompletionRequest no longer overwrites an explicit confirm_tool_calls=false
  when permission_mode='ask': the fold only self-enables the gate when the flag
  is unset, so an explicit opt-out wins on the chat path exactly as it already
  does via _permission_mode_confirm and the Anthropic pre-switch guard.

Regression rows added to test_permission_mode.py.

* Gate sort -T, xxd outfile positional, and the legacy HF token path

- sort -T / --temporary-directory writes spill files to a caller-chosen dir,
  so it joins -o / --output in sort's unsafe-flag set.
- xxd [infile [outfile]] writes its second positional, like uniq; xxd now uses
  the same second-positional-write handling (xxd in.bin out.hex asks, xxd
  in.bin and xxd -c 16 in.bin stay read-only).
- The sensitive-path regex now also covers the legacy ~/.huggingface/token
  location (optional leading dot), not just ~/.cache/huggingface/token; an
  unrelated dir like myhuggingface/token stays safe.

Regression rows added to test_permission_mode.py.

* Catch multi-char SQL mutation targets, globbed credential names, digit outfiles

Three fail-open gaps in the auto-mode classifier, each with a benign control:

- SQL: the trailing word boundary on the MCP mutation regex meant a bare \w
  stopped at the first character, so TRUNCATE users, GRANT SELECT ON t, and
  REVOKE ALL ON t (multi-character names) slipped through while single-letter
  targets matched. Match the whole identifier instead, and accept an explicit
  AS alias on UPDATE (UPDATE users AS u SET). The implicit-alias form is left
  out because it is indistinguishable from the prose "update <noun> <noun> set".
  A truncate_log column and a grants table stay safe.
- A glob that resolves to a credential basename anywhere (cat ~/.huggingface/tok?n
  -> token, cat proj/.netr? -> .netrc, cat repo/.aws/cred*) now asks; the fixed
  target list only covered a handful of home paths. notes/dra?t.txt and
  token_counts.tx? stay safe.
- uniq / xxd counted file positionals but skipped every numeric token to ignore
  a flag value, so a file literally named with digits (uniq 123 out) hid the
  output positional. Track each command's value-taking flags and consume only
  the value, so uniq -f 2 in stays safe while uniq 123 out asks.

Regression rows added to test_permission_mode.py.

* Isolate the permission-mode loop tests from process-global state

The loop-driving tests (auto/off/full/bypass) drove run_safetensors_tool_loop
against a process-global approval registry (state.tool_approvals._pending)
keyed by a single shared session id, and read os.environ. Other backend test
modules mutate both, some at import time, so in the full-suite ordering a stale
pending approval or a leaked env var could make the loop deny or skip a call
these tests expect to run. It passed when the file ran alone but failed only in
the complete tests/ run on CI.

Add an autouse fixture that snapshots and restores os.environ and the approval
registry around each test, and give every _drive call a unique session id so a
leaked approval can never collide. Attach a compact event-stream dump to the
loop assertions so any residual full-suite-only failure reports what the loop
actually did instead of a bare diff.

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* Studio: harden auto-mode classifier for recursive listers, sort file lists, aliased invokers, single-member extract

Close four fail-open gaps in is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call:
- terminal: tree/du (always recursive) and ls -R rooted at an absolute or
  tilde path now ask, matching the existing grep/rg/find recursive-read gate;
  relative walks stay safe.
- terminal: sort --files0-from=F reads the file list named in F, so it can
  read arbitrary host files indirectly; added to sort's unsafe flags.
- python: track aliases of the higher-order invokers (m = map;
  from itertools import starmap as sm) so an aliased invoker handed open/a
  writer is still gated; a benign callable (map(len, ...)) stays safe.
- python: single-member archive extract (ZipFile/TarFile.extract) writes to
  disk like extractall and is vulnerable to a crafted member path, so gate it.

Also update the stale _FakeExecuteTool in test_permission_mode.py to accept
the thread_id keyword that run_safetensors_tool_loop now forwards to
execute_tool after the main merge, which had broken the five tool-loop tests.

Adds regression rows covering each gap plus benign controls.

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* Studio: normalize unknown permission_mode to 'ask' instead of a 422

The request models validated permission_mode with Literal[ask, auto, off,
full], so an unrecognized value from a newer UI/client was rejected with a 422
before the tool loops could apply their unknown -> ask fallback
(safetensors_agentic.py:464, llama_cpp.py:9001). That made the intended
forward-compat degradation unreachable at the API boundary for both Chat
Completions and the analogous Anthropic field.

Accept a plain string on both ChatCompletionRequest and AnthropicMessagesRequest
and normalize in a before-validator: None stays unset, the four known modes pass
through, and any other value degrades to the safest gate ('ask'), matching the
loops. Adds a regression test covering unknown/None/known across both models.

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* Studio: close five more auto-mode classifier gaps

- terminal: xargs is no longer a safe wrapper. It appends arguments read from
  stdin that the scan never sees, so `echo -o out /etc/passwd | xargs sort`
  forwards to `sort -o out /etc/passwd` (a write + sensitive read) while only
  the allow-listed literals are visible. Any xargs command now asks.
- terminal: ionice -p/-P/-u change the I/O priority of an already running
  process / group / user instead of forwarding to a wrapped read-only command,
  so `ionice -c 3 -p <pid>` now asks. ionice -c 3 <cmd> stays safe.
- MCP: gate ALTER SYSTEM, which persists PostgreSQL server configuration and was
  not one of the DDL objects the mutation detector matched.
- MCP: a credential noun in a read-named tool (read_secret, list_tokens,
  get_credentials, fetch_api_key) is a sensitive disclosure, so it asks even
  without a mutating verb or a path/SQL argument. Scoped *_key nouns keep a
  primary_key / keyboard lookup safe.
- render_html: no longer unconditionally safe. A static canvas still auto-runs,
  but one whose HTML/JS reaches the network (fetch/WebSocket/remote script) asks,
  since it can egress under the canvas CSP when artifact network access is on.
  Its early provisional card is suppressed under the auto confirm gate, and the
  confirm-without-stream guard now requires a stream when render_html is
  selectable.

Adds regression rows and benign controls for each, and updates the render_html
provisional-card and confirm-gate tests to the new behavior.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: extend auto-mode gates for indirect file lists, dynamic lookups, HTML network loads, and Anthropic render_html

Follow-ups on the previous classifier round:

- terminal: wc/du/find --files0-from (and find's -files0-from primary) read a
  NUL-separated list of input paths from a file, the same indirect mechanism as
  sort --files0-from, so a crafted list reads arbitrary host files past the
  literal path/root checks. Gate them like sort.
- python: a namespace lookup through a dict-style call (f =
  __builtins__.__dict__.get('open'), globals().get('open'), vars(x).get(...))
  can return open/eval/a mutator, so poison the bound name like getattr/subscript
  lookups already are. An ordinary dict .get or os.environ.get stays safe.
- render_html: broaden the network detector so a canvas that loads a resource
  via CSS url()/@import, srcset, or a root-relative (/path) or protocol-relative
  (//host) src/href is treated as networked, not just fetch/WebSocket/remote
  script. Relative ./x and url(#id)/data: refs stay static/safe.
- Anthropic /v1/messages: drop render_html from the unprompted-safe server-tool
  set. Since it can prompt (networked canvas) and this channel invokes the loop
  without confirm, selecting it under ask/auto/omitted now rejects like
  terminal/python; off/full (or an explicit confirm opt-out) run it.

Adds regression rows and benign controls for each, plus an Anthropic route test.

* Studio: close six more auto-mode classifier gaps

- terminal: a glob that expands to a project .env (cat .e?v) now asks; .env
  joins the sensitive glob-basename set, matching the literal-path gate.
- python: an open bound onto an attribute (box.f = open; box.f('out','w'))
  is tracked by attribute name, and open invoked via .__call__
  (open.__call__('out','w'), unwrapped to the underlying callable) is gated,
  so neither slips past the name-based open-alias checks. Benign attribute
  callables and .__call__ on non-writers stay safe.
- python: a namespace lookup via .get/.pop/.setdefault already covered the
  builtins case; unchanged here.
- MCP: a mutating HTTP verb in a method/verb argument (get_url
  {"method": "DELETE"|"POST"|"PUT"|"PATCH"}) now asks, so a generic HTTP
  tool cannot mutate an external service unprompted; GET/HEAD stay safe.
- MCP: a credential/secret environment-variable value (get_env
  {"name": "OPENAI_API_KEY"}) is treated as a sensitive read via the same
  credential-noun match used for tool names; PATH/HOME stay safe.
- render_html: self-navigation sinks (location.assign/replace, window.open,
  assigning a URL to (window.)location(.href)) join the network detector, so a
  canvas that navigates itself to an external URL asks; location.reload() /
  history.back() stay static.

Adds regression rows and benign controls for each.

* Studio: gate obfuscated canvas egress, sensitive-dir iteration, and MCP metadata-host reads

- render_html: strip block comments before the network scan so fetch/*x*/(...)
  cannot hide egress, and match bracket-access forms (window['fetch'](...),
  self['open'](...)). Line // comments are left alone so the // in an https URL
  is not eaten. A comment-only canvas stays static.
- python: enumerating a directory outside the sandbox (Path('/etc').iterdir(),
  os.scandir('/etc'), os.listdir('/home'), os.walk('/')) reads host filenames
  the direct /etc/passwd checks would prompt for, so gate it when the target dir
  folds to an absolute/tilde/sensitive path; a relative dir stays safe and an
  unresolved dynamic dir is left to other checks.
- MCP: a read-named HTTP tool pointed at a cloud-metadata / link-local host
  (fetch_url {"url": "http://169.254.169.254/..."}, metadata.google.internal)
  reads instance credentials, so classify those URL arguments as sensitive,
  mirroring the sandbox SSRF blocklist; ordinary and localhost URLs stay safe.

Adds regression rows and benign controls for each.

* Studio: gate meta-refresh navigation, pandas HTML/markdown exporters, absolute glob roots, and checksum verify mode

* Studio: gate starred open writes, builtins.__import__, computed render_html sinks, and procfs fd reads in auto mode

* Studio: gate remote worker canvases, huggingface_hub downloads, and write callables passed to user helpers in auto mode

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Unsloth <michaelhan@Michaels-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
2026-07-15 06:07:21 -07:00

2918 lines
107 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
"""Focused tests for the GGUF llama.cpp agentic tool loop.
These tests drive ``LlamaCppBackend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools``
with fake llama-server SSE streams. They require no model, subprocess, GPU,
or network access.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import copy
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
_BACKEND_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
if _BACKEND_DIR not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, _BACKEND_DIR)
from core.inference.llama_cpp import (
_MAX_REPROMPTS,
_PROVISIONAL_ARGS_MIN_CHARS,
LlamaCppBackend,
)
from state import tool_approvals
from state.tool_approvals import TOOL_REJECTED_MESSAGE, resolve_tool_decision
def _sse(delta: dict) -> str:
return "data: " + json.dumps({"choices": [{"index": 0, "delta": delta}]}) + "\n"
def _done() -> str:
return "data: [DONE]\n"
def _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams: list[list[str]], payloads: list[dict]):
backend = LlamaCppBackend.__new__(LlamaCppBackend)
backend._process = object()
backend._healthy = True
backend._port = 48847
backend._api_key = None
backend._effective_context_length = 4096
backend._supports_reasoning = False
backend._reasoning_always_on = False
backend._reasoning_style = "enable_thinking"
backend._supports_preserve_thinking = False
@contextlib.contextmanager
def fake_stream_with_retry(
_client,
_url,
payload,
_cancel_event,
headers = None,
first_token_deadline = None,
):
payloads.append(copy.deepcopy(payload))
yield type("FakeResponse", (), {"status_code": 200, "chunks": streams.pop(0)})()
def fake_iter_text_cancellable(
response,
_cancel_event,
first_token_deadline = None,
):
yield from response.chunks
monkeypatch.setattr(backend, "_stream_with_retry", fake_stream_with_retry)
monkeypatch.setattr(backend, "_iter_text_cancellable", fake_iter_text_cancellable)
return backend
def _tool_names(payload: dict) -> list[str]:
return [
(tool.get("function") or {}).get("name")
for tool in payload.get("tools", [])
if (tool.get("function") or {}).get("name")
]
def _patch_monotonic(monkeypatch, values: list[float]) -> None:
import core.inference.llama_cpp as llama_cpp_mod
it = iter(values)
last = values[-1]
def fake_monotonic() -> float:
nonlocal last
try:
last = next(it)
except StopIteration:
pass
return last
monkeypatch.setattr(llama_cpp_mod.time, "monotonic", fake_monotonic)
def _structured_tool_call(tool_name: str, arguments: dict, call_id: str) -> list[str]:
return [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": call_id,
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": tool_name,
"arguments": json.dumps(arguments),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
def test_structured_tool_call_after_visible_preface_is_executed(monkeypatch):
"""llama-server may emit content first and then native delta.tool_calls.
Studio must not drop that tool call after it has streamed the preface.
"""
tool_call_id = "call_render_late"
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": "Here is the canvas.\n\n"}),
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": tool_call_id,
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"arguments": json.dumps(
{
"code": "<html><body><div>red</div></body></html>",
"title": "Simple Red Square",
}
),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
second_stream = [
_sse({"content": "Done."}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, second_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "Rendered HTML canvas: Simple Red Square."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"description": "Render HTML.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {"code": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["code"],
},
},
}
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Make a red square."}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
content_events = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert content_events[0]["text"] == "Here is the canvas.\n\n"
first_content_index = next(
i for i, event in enumerate(events) if event.get("type") == "content"
)
actual_tool_start_index = next(
i
for i, event in enumerate(events)
if event.get("type") == "tool_start" and event.get("arguments", {}).get("code")
)
assert first_content_index < actual_tool_start_index
assert calls == [
(
"render_html",
{
"code": "<html><body><div>red</div></body></html>",
"title": "Simple Red Square",
},
)
]
assert any(e.get("type") == "tool_end" and e.get("tool_name") == "render_html" for e in events)
# The second llama-server request should include the assistant preface
# plus the structured tool call, preserving OpenAI-compatible ordering.
assert len(payloads) == 2
assistant_messages = [m for m in payloads[1]["messages"] if m.get("role") == "assistant"]
assert assistant_messages[-1]["content"] == "Here is the canvas.\n\n"
assert assistant_messages[-1]["tool_calls"][0]["id"] == tool_call_id
assert assistant_messages[-1]["tool_calls"][0]["function"]["name"] == "render_html"
def test_streamed_reasoning_answer_emits_backend_summary(monkeypatch):
stream = [
_sse({"reasoning_content": "I am thinking."}),
_sse({"reasoning_content": " Still thinking."}),
_sse({"content": "Final answer."}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
_patch_monotonic(monkeypatch, [100.0, 110.0, 172.0, 172.0])
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "answer"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
content_texts = [e["text"] for e in events if e["type"] == "content"]
# Reasoning streams live during BUFFERING instead of arriving as one block:
# each reasoning delta is emitted immediately, wrapped in <think>.
assert content_texts[0] == "<think>I am thinking."
assert content_texts[1] == "<think>I am thinking. Still thinking."
# The final event closes the block and appends the answer.
assert content_texts[-1] == "<think>I am thinking. Still thinking.</think>Final answer."
summary_index = next(
i for i, event in enumerate(events) if event["type"] == "reasoning_summary"
)
final_content_index = max(i for i, event in enumerate(events) if event["type"] == "content")
assert summary_index < final_content_index
assert events[summary_index]["duration_ms"] == 62000
def test_reasoning_streams_incrementally_with_tools(monkeypatch):
# Regression (DeepSeek "thinking doesn't stream"): with a tool/pill active the
# tool-loop generator must stream reasoning token-by-token like the no-tool
# path, not accumulate it and dump one buffered <think> block.
stream = [
_sse({"reasoning_content": "Step one."}),
_sse({"reasoning_content": " Step two."}),
_sse({"reasoning_content": " Step three."}),
_sse({"content": "Done."}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
_patch_monotonic(monkeypatch, [1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 4.0])
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "think then answer"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
reasoning_stage = [
e["text"]
for e in events
if e["type"] == "content"
and e["text"].startswith("<think>")
and "</think>" not in e["text"]
]
# One live emission per reasoning delta -- not a single dump.
assert reasoning_stage == [
"<think>Step one.",
"<think>Step one. Step two.",
"<think>Step one. Step two. Step three.",
]
final = [e["text"] for e in events if e["type"] == "content"][-1]
assert final == "<think>Step one. Step two. Step three.</think>Done."
def test_reasoning_only_reply_matches_no_tool_path_with_tools(monkeypatch):
# A reasoning-only turn (whole answer in reasoning_content, no content, no
# tool) with a tool active streams the reasoning live, then resolves to the
# bare reasoning text -- identical to the no-tool generate_chat_completion
# path -- so the non-streaming drain still returns it as `content`, not an
# empty answer.
stream = [
_sse({"reasoning_content": "The capital of France is Paris."}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
_patch_monotonic(monkeypatch, [1.0, 5.0, 5.0])
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "just think"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
content_texts = [e["text"] for e in events if e["type"] == "content"]
# Reasoning streamed live during BUFFERING (the fix).
assert content_texts[0] == "<think>The capital of France is Paris."
# Resolves to bare reasoning, matching the no-tool sibling.
assert content_texts[-1] == "The capital of France is Paris."
def test_reasoning_before_structured_tool_closes_think_block(monkeypatch):
# Regression: reasoning streamed live during BUFFERING must be closed with
# </think> before a structured tool_call drains, so consumers without a
# reasoning extractor (Anthropic /v1/messages) never receive an unclosed
# <think>. Mirrors the is_match (XML tool signal) path.
tool_stream = [
_sse({"reasoning_content": "Let me search."}),
*_structured_tool_call("web_search", {"query": "weather"}, "call_1"),
]
final_stream = [
_sse({"content": "It is sunny."}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [tool_stream, final_stream], payloads)
_patch_monotonic(monkeypatch, [1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 4.0])
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool", lambda name, arguments, **_kwargs: "sunny"
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "weather?"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
tool_start_index = next(i for i, e in enumerate(events) if e["type"] == "tool_start")
content_before_tool = [e["text"] for e in events[:tool_start_index] if e["type"] == "content"]
# Reasoning streamed live, then closed before the tool -- balanced block.
assert content_before_tool[0] == "<think>Let me search."
assert content_before_tool[-1] == "<think>Let me search.</think>"
def _replay_route_reasoning_extractor(cumulatives: list[str]) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Replay the route's cumulative suffix-diff + reasoning extractor (the
shared core of routes/inference.py gguf_stream_chunks and the tool-loop
consumer) over content snapshots. Returns (visible, reasoning)."""
from routes.inference import _ResponsesReasoningExtractor
extractor = _ResponsesReasoningExtractor(parse_think_markers = True)
prev_text = ""
visible: list[str] = []
reasoning: list[str] = []
for cumulative in cumulatives:
new_text = cumulative[len(prev_text) :]
prev_text = cumulative
if not new_text:
continue
reasoning_delta, visible_delta = extractor.feed(new_text)
if reasoning_delta:
reasoning.append(reasoning_delta)
if visible_delta:
visible.append(visible_delta)
final_reasoning, final_visible = extractor.finish()
if final_reasoning:
reasoning.append(final_reasoning)
if final_visible:
visible.append(final_visible)
return "".join(visible), "".join(reasoning)
def test_reasoning_only_route_output_matches_no_tool_path(monkeypatch):
# Parity contract: a reasoning-only reply must reach the client identically
# whether tools are on or off. Both generators stream <think> live then
# resolve to the bare reasoning text; the route's suffix-diff + extractor
# must therefore produce the same (visible, reasoning) split for both.
stream = [
_sse({"reasoning_content": "The capital"}),
_sse({"reasoning_content": " of France is Paris."}),
_done(),
]
tool_backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [list(stream)], [])
_patch_monotonic(monkeypatch, [1.0, 2.0, 2.0])
tool_cumulatives = [
e["text"]
for e in tool_backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "capital of France?"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
if e.get("type") == "content"
]
no_tool_backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [list(stream)], [])
no_tool_cumulatives = [
y
for y in no_tool_backend.generate_chat_completion(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "capital of France?"}],
)
if isinstance(y, str)
]
# Both paths stream the reasoning live with the same leading shape. (Raw
# yield lists aren't compared verbatim: the tool path emits a pre-existing
# duplicate trailing event that the route's suffix-diff dedupes.)
assert tool_cumulatives[:3] == no_tool_cumulatives[:3]
# The contract that matters: identical route-level output.
tool_out = _replay_route_reasoning_extractor(tool_cumulatives)
no_tool_out = _replay_route_reasoning_extractor(no_tool_cumulatives)
assert tool_out == no_tool_out
# Pin the shared contract so a change to either path shows up here.
_visible, reasoning = tool_out
assert reasoning == "The capital of France is Paris."
def test_reasoning_before_bare_json_tool_closes_think_block(monkeypatch):
# _drain_silently sibling of the structured-tool close: a bare-JSON tool call
# with a live reasoning prefix must also close </think> before draining, and
# must never leak the drained call text as content.
tool_stream = [
_sse({"reasoning_content": "Searching now."}),
_sse({"content": '{"name":"web_search","arguments":{"query":"weather"}}'}),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [
_sse({"content": "It is sunny."}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [tool_stream, final_stream], payloads)
_patch_monotonic(monkeypatch, [1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 4.0])
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool", lambda name, arguments, **_kwargs: "sunny"
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "weather?"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
tool_start_index = next(i for i, e in enumerate(events) if e["type"] == "tool_start")
content_before_tool = [e["text"] for e in events[:tool_start_index] if e["type"] == "content"]
assert content_before_tool[0] == "<think>Searching now."
assert content_before_tool[-1] == "<think>Searching now.</think>"
# The bare-JSON call text was drained, never surfaced as content.
assert not any('"name"' in t for t in content_before_tool)
def test_consumed_tool_final_pass_emits_latest_reasoning_summary(monkeypatch):
tool_stream = [
_sse({"reasoning_content": "Need a render."}),
_sse(
{
"content": '<tool_call>{"name":"render_html","arguments":{"code":"<html>ok</html>"}}</tool_call>'
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [
_sse({"reasoning_content": "Now synthesize."}),
_sse({"content": "Final from tool."}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [tool_stream, final_stream], payloads)
_patch_monotonic(monkeypatch, [200.0, 201.0, 203.0, 300.0, 400.0, 405.0, 405.0])
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
return "Rendered HTML canvas: Done."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "render then answer"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "render_html"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
summaries = [event for event in events if event["type"] == "reasoning_summary"]
assert [event["duration_ms"] for event in summaries] == [2000, 5000]
final_summary_index = events.index(summaries[-1])
final_content_index = next(
i
for i, event in enumerate(events)
if event.get("type") == "content" and "Final from tool." in event.get("text", "")
)
assert final_summary_index < final_content_index
def test_repeat_render_html_nudge_is_not_user_visible_error(monkeypatch):
"""A repeated render_html call is an internal no-op, not a visible card."""
first_stream = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_first",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"arguments": json.dumps(
{
"code": "<html><body>first</body></html>",
"title": "First",
}
),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
repeat_stream = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_repeat",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"arguments": json.dumps(
{
"code": "<html><body>repeat</body></html>",
"title": "Repeat",
}
),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Short note."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, repeat_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "Rendered HTML canvas: First."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"description": "Render HTML.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {"code": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["code"],
},
},
},
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}},
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Make a red square."}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 2,
)
)
assert calls == [
(
"render_html",
{"code": "<html><body>first</body></html>", "title": "First"},
)
]
assert _tool_names(payloads[1]) == ["web_search"]
actual_tool_starts = [
event
for event in events
if event.get("type") == "tool_start" and event.get("arguments", {}).get("code")
]
tool_ends = [
event
for event in events
if event.get("type") == "tool_end" and event.get("tool_name") == "render_html"
]
assert len(actual_tool_starts) == 1
assert len(tool_ends) == 1
assert len(payloads) == 3
render_tool_messages = [
message
for message in payloads[2]["messages"]
if message.get("role") == "tool" and message.get("name") == "render_html"
]
assert len(render_tool_messages) == 1
internal_nudges = [
message
for message in payloads[2]["messages"]
if message.get("role") == "user"
and "Do not call render_html again" in message.get("content", "")
]
assert len(internal_nudges) == 1
def test_render_html_success_drops_tool_schema_before_final_pass(monkeypatch):
first_stream = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_first",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"arguments": json.dumps({"code": "<html>ok</html>"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
return "Rendered HTML canvas: Done."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Render this."}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "render_html"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 3,
)
)
assert len(payloads) == 2
assert "tools" not in payloads[1]
assert any(event.get("type") == "content" and event.get("text") == "Done." for event in events)
final_user_messages = [
m.get("content", "") for m in payloads[1]["messages"] if m.get("role") == "user"
]
assert not any("used all available tool calls" in message for message in final_user_messages)
def test_non_consecutive_duplicate_web_search_is_internal_noop(monkeypatch):
first_search = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_search_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
python_call = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_python",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "python",
"arguments": json.dumps({"code": "print('ok')"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
duplicate_search = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_search_2",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Final answer from gathered data."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(
monkeypatch,
[first_search, python_call, duplicate_search, final_stream],
payloads,
)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return f"ok:{name}"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}},
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}},
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search gpus in 2026 prices and use python"}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 3,
)
)
assert calls == [
("web_search", {"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
("python", {"code": "print('ok')"}),
]
assert [
event.get("tool_name")
for event in events
if event.get("type") == "tool_start" and event.get("tool_name")
] == ["web_search", "python"]
assert [
event.get("tool_name")
for event in events
if event.get("type") == "tool_end" and event.get("tool_name")
] == ["web_search", "python"]
assert not [
event
for event in events
if event.get("tool_call_id") == "call_search_2"
and event.get("type") in {"tool_start", "tool_end"}
]
assert len(payloads) == 4
assert _tool_names(payloads[3]) == ["web_search", "python"]
duplicate_nudges = [
message
for message in payloads[3]["messages"]
if message.get("role") == "user"
and "already completed successfully" in message.get("content", "")
]
assert len(duplicate_nudges) == 1
def test_duplicate_web_search_noop_allows_distinct_followup_tool(monkeypatch):
first_search = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_search_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
duplicate_search = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_search_2",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
python_call = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_python",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "python",
"arguments": json.dumps({"code": "print('ok')"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Final answer from gathered data."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(
monkeypatch,
[first_search, duplicate_search, python_call, final_stream],
payloads,
)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return f"ok:{name}"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}},
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}},
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search gpus in 2026 prices and use python"}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 4,
)
)
assert calls == [
("web_search", {"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
("python", {"code": "print('ok')"}),
]
assert [
event.get("tool_name")
for event in events
if event.get("type") == "tool_start" and event.get("tool_name")
] == ["web_search", "python"]
assert [
event.get("tool_name")
for event in events
if event.get("type") == "tool_end" and event.get("tool_name")
] == ["web_search", "python"]
assert not [
event
for event in events
if event.get("tool_call_id") == "call_search_2"
and event.get("type") in {"tool_start", "tool_end"}
]
assert len(payloads) == 4
assert _tool_names(payloads[2]) == ["web_search", "python"]
duplicate_nudges = [
message
for message in payloads[2]["messages"]
if message.get("role") == "user"
and "already completed successfully" in message.get("content", "")
]
assert len(duplicate_nudges) == 1
def test_repeated_duplicate_noop_transitions_to_final_pass(monkeypatch):
first_search = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_search_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
duplicate_one = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_search_2",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
duplicate_two = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_search_3",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Final answer from first search."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(
monkeypatch,
[first_search, duplicate_one, duplicate_two, final_stream],
payloads,
)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "result"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search gpus"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 10,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "gpu prices 2026"})]
assert [event.get("tool_call_id") for event in events if event.get("type") == "tool_end"] == [
"call_search_1"
]
assert len(payloads) == 4
assert "tools" not in payloads[-1]
assert any(
event.get("type") == "content" and event.get("text") == "Final answer from first search."
for event in events
)
def test_same_turn_duplicate_web_search_is_internal_noop(monkeypatch):
same_turn_duplicates = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_search_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
},
{
"index": 1,
"id": "call_search_2",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_search",
"arguments": json.dumps({"query": "gpu prices 2026"}),
},
},
]
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Final answer."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [same_turn_duplicates, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "search-result"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search gpus"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 2,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "gpu prices 2026"})]
assert [event.get("tool_call_id") for event in events if event.get("type") == "tool_end"] == [
"call_search_1"
]
assert not [
event
for event in events
if event.get("tool_call_id") == "call_search_2"
and event.get("type") in {"tool_start", "tool_end"}
]
def test_same_turn_repeated_render_html_does_not_emit_second_provisional_start(monkeypatch):
same_turn_render_calls = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_html_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"arguments": json.dumps({"code": "<html>one</html>"}),
},
},
{
"index": 1,
"id": "call_html_2",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"arguments": json.dumps({"code": "<html>two</html>"}),
},
},
]
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Final answer."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [same_turn_render_calls, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "Rendered HTML canvas: One."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "render html"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "render_html"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 2,
)
)
assert calls == [("render_html", {"code": "<html>one</html>"})]
assert [
event.get("tool_call_id")
for event in events
if event.get("type") == "tool_start" and not event.get("arguments")
] == ["call_html_1"]
assert not [
event
for event in events
if event.get("tool_call_id") == "call_html_2"
and event.get("type") in {"tool_start", "tool_end"}
]
assert len(payloads) == 2
assert "tools" not in payloads[1]
render_nudges = [
message
for message in payloads[1]["messages"]
if message.get("role") == "user"
and "Do not call render_html again" in message.get("content", "")
]
assert len(render_nudges) == 1
def test_disabled_tool_call_is_internal_noop(monkeypatch):
disabled_python = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_python_disabled",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "python",
"arguments": json.dumps({"code": "print(1)"}),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "I cannot run Python here."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [disabled_python, final_stream], payloads)
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
raise AssertionError(f"unexpected tool execution: {name} {arguments}")
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "run python"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert not [event for event in events if event.get("type") in {"tool_start", "tool_end"}]
assert len(payloads) == 2
disabled_nudges = [
message
for message in payloads[1]["messages"]
if message.get("role") == "user" and "not enabled" in message.get("content", "")
]
assert len(disabled_nudges) == 1
def test_render_html_success_does_not_reprompt_render_html_intent(monkeypatch):
"""After render_html succeeds, do not force another render_html call.
The post-tool model pass can say it will use render_html again without
emitting a tool call. That should be accepted as a final model mistake,
not turned into repeated internal re-prompts after the canvas already
exists.
"""
first_stream = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_first",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"arguments": json.dumps(
{
"code": "<html><body>first</body></html>",
"title": "First",
}
),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
]
post_tool_stream = [
_sse({"content": "I will now use render_html again."}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, post_tool_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "Rendered HTML canvas: First."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"description": "Render HTML.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {"code": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["code"],
},
},
}
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Make a red square."}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert len(payloads) == 2
assert len(calls) == 1
assert any(
event.get("type") == "content" and event.get("text") == "I will now use render_html again."
for event in events
)
def test_internal_reprompt_attempts_do_not_duplicate_visible_text(monkeypatch):
"""No-tool re-prompt attempts should not concatenate into the UI."""
# One initial response plus one stream per re-prompt; derive the count from the shared cap.
streams = [[_sse({"content": "I will use render_html now."}), _done()]]
streams += [
[_sse({"content": "Understood. I will use render_html now."}), _done()]
for _ in range(_MAX_REPROMPTS)
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
raise AssertionError(f"unexpected tool execution: {name} {arguments}")
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"description": "Render HTML.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {"code": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["code"],
},
},
}
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Make a red square."}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
content_texts = [event.get("text", "") for event in events if event.get("type") == "content"]
assert content_texts == ["I will use render_html now."]
assert len(payloads) == _MAX_REPROMPTS + 1
def test_forced_reprompt_plain_final_answer_is_visible(monkeypatch):
"""A hidden forced re-prompt may fall back to a plain final answer."""
streams = [
[_sse({"content": "I will use render_html now."}), _done()],
[
_sse({"content": "No tool is needed. Final answer: use a red square."}),
_done(),
],
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
raise AssertionError(f"unexpected tool execution: {name} {arguments}")
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Make a red square."}],
tools = [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"description": "Render HTML.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {"code": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["code"],
},
},
}
],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
content_texts = [event.get("text", "") for event in events if event.get("type") == "content"]
assert content_texts == [
"I will use render_html now.",
"No tool is needed. Final answer: use a red square.",
]
assert len(payloads) == 2
def test_internal_reprompt_disabled_when_auto_heal_disabled(monkeypatch):
streams = [[_sse({"content": "I will use render_html now."}), _done()]]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
raise AssertionError(f"unexpected tool execution: {name} {arguments}")
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"description": "Render HTML.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {"code": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["code"],
},
},
}
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Make a red square."}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 1,
auto_heal_tool_calls = False,
)
)
content_texts = [event.get("text", "") for event in events if event.get("type") == "content"]
assert content_texts == ["I will use render_html now."]
assert len(payloads) == 1
def test_internal_reprompt_disabled_when_nudge_tool_calls_false(monkeypatch):
# Explicit nudge_tool_calls=False disables the plan-without-action
# re-prompt even with Auto-Heal on (None keeps the default-on behavior).
streams = [[_sse({"content": "I will use render_html now."}), _done()]]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
raise AssertionError(f"unexpected tool execution: {name} {arguments}")
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"description": "Render HTML.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {"code": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["code"],
},
},
}
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Make a red square."}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 1,
auto_heal_tool_calls = True,
nudge_tool_calls = False,
)
)
content_texts = [event.get("text", "") for event in events if event.get("type") == "content"]
assert content_texts == ["I will use render_html now."]
assert len(payloads) == 1
def test_auto_heal_disabled_parses_well_formed_xml_when_tools_enabled(monkeypatch):
streams = [
[
_sse(
{
"content": '<tool_call>{"name":"web_search","arguments":{"query":"x"}}</tool_call>'
}
),
_done(),
],
[_sse({"content": "done"}), _done()],
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "result"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
auto_heal_tool_calls = False,
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "x"})]
assert not any(
event.get("type") == "content" and "<tool_call>" in event.get("text", "")
for event in events
)
def test_textual_mistral_marker_not_leaked_when_inline_with_preface(monkeypatch):
# Textual Mistral ``[TOOL_CALLS]`` inline with visible preface: the DRAINING flush must use the
# shared parser patterns (which know ``[TOOL_CALLS]``); the legacy set leaked the marker to clients.
streams = [
[_sse({"content": 'Let me search. [TOOL_CALLS]web_search{"query":"cats"}'}), _done()],
[_sse({"content": "done"}), _done()],
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "result"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "cats"})]
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all("[TOOL_CALLS]" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
assert any("Let me search." in t for t in content_texts)
def test_textual_llama_python_tag_marker_not_leaked(monkeypatch):
# Same leak class for the Llama-3 built-in ``<|python_tag|>NAME.call(...)`` form.
streams = [
[_sse({"content": '<|python_tag|>web_search.call(query="cats")'}), _done()],
[_sse({"content": "done"}), _done()],
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "result"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "cats"})]
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all("<|python_tag|>" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_reprompted_tool_call_still_streams_final_answer(monkeypatch):
"""Suppression ends once a forced re-prompt actually calls a tool."""
streams = [
[_sse({"content": "I will use render_html now."}), _done()],
[
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": "call_forced",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"arguments": json.dumps(
{
"code": "<html><body>forced</body></html>",
"title": "Forced",
}
),
},
}
]
}
),
_done(),
],
[_sse({"content": "Final note after tool."}), _done()],
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "Rendered HTML canvas: Forced."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
tools = [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "render_html",
"description": "Render HTML.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {"code": {"type": "string"}},
"required": ["code"],
},
},
}
]
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Make a red square."}],
tools = tools,
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert len(calls) == 1
content_texts = [event.get("text", "") for event in events if event.get("type") == "content"]
assert content_texts == ["I will use render_html now.", "Final note after tool."]
assert len(payloads) == 3
def test_confirm_tool_calls_allow_executes_gguf_tool(monkeypatch):
streams = [
_structured_tool_call("python", {"code": "print(1)"}, "call_py"),
[_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()],
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "OK"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.llama_cpp.new_approval_id", lambda: "approval-1")
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.llama_cpp.begin_tool_decision",
lambda *_a, **_k: object(),
)
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.llama_cpp.wait_tool_decision", lambda *_a, **_k: "allow")
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "run python"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
confirm_tool_calls = True,
session_id = "sess",
)
)
starts = [event for event in events if event.get("type") == "tool_start"]
assert len(starts) == 1
assert starts[0]["approval_id"]
assert starts[0]["awaiting_confirmation"] is True
assert calls == [("python", {"code": "print(1)"})]
assert any(event.get("type") == "tool_end" and event.get("result") == "OK" for event in events)
def test_confirm_tool_calls_close_after_prompt_cleans_gguf_slot(monkeypatch):
approval_id = "approval-close"
streams = [_structured_tool_call("python", {"code": "print(1)"}, "call_py")]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda *_a, **_k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError("tool should not run")),
)
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.llama_cpp.new_approval_id", lambda: approval_id)
with tool_approvals._lock:
tool_approvals._pending.clear()
gen = backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "run python"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
confirm_tool_calls = True,
session_id = "sess",
)
try:
assert next(gen)["type"] == "status"
start = next(gen)
assert start["type"] == "tool_start"
assert start["approval_id"] == approval_id
with tool_approvals._lock:
assert approval_id in tool_approvals._pending
finally:
gen.close()
with tool_approvals._lock:
assert approval_id not in tool_approvals._pending
assert resolve_tool_decision(approval_id, "allow", session_id = "sess") is False
def test_confirm_tool_calls_skips_gguf_rag_autoinject(monkeypatch):
streams = [[_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()]]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
def fail_autoinject(*_args, **_kwargs):
raise AssertionError("RAG autoinject must not run before approval")
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.build_rag_autoinject", fail_autoinject)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "use docs"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "search_knowledge_base"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
confirm_tool_calls = True,
session_id = "sess",
rag_scope = {"thread_id": "t1"},
)
)
assert any(event.get("type") == "content" and event.get("text") == "Done." for event in events)
def test_confirm_tool_calls_deny_skips_gguf_tool_and_retry_can_execute(monkeypatch):
same_call = _structured_tool_call("python", {"code": "print(1)"}, "call_py")
streams = [
same_call,
_structured_tool_call("python", {"code": "print(1)"}, "call_py_retry"),
[_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()],
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "OK"
decisions = iter(["deny", "allow"])
approvals = iter(["approval-1", "approval-2"])
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.llama_cpp.new_approval_id", lambda: next(approvals))
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.llama_cpp.begin_tool_decision",
lambda *_a, **_k: object(),
)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.llama_cpp.wait_tool_decision",
lambda *_a, **_k: next(decisions),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "run python"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 2,
confirm_tool_calls = True,
session_id = "sess",
)
)
starts = [event for event in events if event.get("type") == "tool_start"]
ends = [event for event in events if event.get("type") == "tool_end"]
assert len(starts) == 2
assert [event["result"] for event in ends] == [TOOL_REJECTED_MESSAGE, "OK"]
assert calls == [("python", {"code": "print(1)"})]
def _streamed_structured_tool_call(
tool_name: str,
arguments: dict,
call_id: str,
frag: int = 24,
) -> list[str]:
"""A structured tool call whose arguments arrive token-by-token across many
deltas (id + name on the first delta), mirroring how llama-server streams a
large tool-call argument such as a full HTML/code file."""
args_json = json.dumps(arguments)
fragments = [args_json[i : i + frag] for i in range(0, len(args_json), frag)] or [""]
chunks = [
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": 0,
"id": call_id,
"type": "function",
"function": {"name": tool_name, "arguments": fragments[0]},
}
]
}
)
]
for fragment in fragments[1:]:
chunks.append(_sse({"tool_calls": [{"index": 0, "function": {"arguments": fragment}}]}))
chunks.append(_done())
return chunks
def test_large_python_tool_call_emits_early_provisional_start(monkeypatch):
"""Regression: a large streamed tool-call argument surfaces a provisional
tool card BEFORE the full arguments finish, so the UI shows progress during
generation instead of a frozen 'Generating...'. (The bug: only render_html
surfaced early; python/terminal/etc. were silent until the call completed.)"""
big_code = "total = 0\n" + "\n".join(f"total += {i}" for i in range(120))
args_json = json.dumps({"code": big_code})
assert len(args_json) > _PROVISIONAL_ARGS_MIN_CHARS
first_stream = _streamed_structured_tool_call("python", {"code": big_code}, "call_py_big")
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "OK"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "write code"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
tool_starts = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_start"]
provisional = [e for e in tool_starts if not e.get("arguments")]
real = [e for e in tool_starts if e.get("arguments", {}).get("code")]
# Exactly one provisional (empty args) and one real (full args), same id so
# the frontend reconciles them into a single card.
assert len(provisional) == 1, tool_starts
assert provisional[0]["tool_name"] == "python"
assert provisional[0]["tool_call_id"] == "call_py_big"
assert provisional[0]["provenance"].get("provisional") is True
assert len(real) == 1
assert real[0]["tool_call_id"] == "call_py_big"
# The provisional card appears before the real (completed) tool_start.
assert events.index(provisional[0]) < events.index(real[0])
assert calls == [("python", {"code": big_code})]
assert any(e.get("type") == "tool_end" and e.get("tool_name") == "python" for e in events)
def test_auto_mode_render_html_suppresses_provisional_card_under_confirm(monkeypatch):
"""render_html is no longer unconditionally safe (a networked canvas asks), so
with confirm_tool_calls set under permission_mode="auto" its early provisional
card is suppressed; the real full-argument tool_start still fires and a static
canvas runs without a prompt."""
args = {"code": "<html>" + "x" * 80 + "</html>"}
first_stream = _streamed_structured_tool_call("render_html", args, "call_rh")
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", lambda name, arguments, **_k: "OK")
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "make a card"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "render_html"}}],
confirm_tool_calls = True,
permission_mode = "auto",
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
tool_starts = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_start"]
provisional = [e for e in tool_starts if not e.get("arguments")]
# The confirm gate now suppresses the early provisional card for render_html.
assert provisional == [], tool_starts
real = [e for e in tool_starts if e.get("arguments")]
assert real and real[0]["tool_name"] == "render_html"
# A static canvas is classified safe, so it still runs without an approval gate.
assert real[0].get("awaiting_confirmation") in (False, None)
def test_small_python_tool_call_has_no_provisional_start(monkeypatch):
"""A small tool-call argument finishes streaming instantly, so it keeps the
existing behavior of a single (real) tool_start with no provisional card."""
first_stream = _structured_tool_call("python", {"code": "print(1)"}, "call_py_small")
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", lambda *_a, **_k: "OK")
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "x"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
tool_starts = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_start"]
assert [e for e in tool_starts if not e.get("arguments")] == []
assert len([e for e in tool_starts if e.get("arguments", {}).get("code")]) == 1
def _streamed_parallel_tool_calls(specs, frag: int = 24) -> list[str]:
"""Two or more structured tool calls, each streamed token-by-token across
deltas, one index fully before the next, mirroring how llama-server streams
several parallel tool calls whose arguments are large."""
chunks: list[str] = []
for index, (tool_name, arguments, call_id) in enumerate(specs):
args_json = json.dumps(arguments)
fragments = [args_json[i : i + frag] for i in range(0, len(args_json), frag)] or [""]
chunks.append(
_sse(
{
"tool_calls": [
{
"index": index,
"id": call_id,
"type": "function",
"function": {"name": tool_name, "arguments": fragments[0]},
}
]
}
)
)
for fragment in fragments[1:]:
chunks.append(
_sse({"tool_calls": [{"index": index, "function": {"arguments": fragment}}]})
)
chunks.append(_done())
return chunks
def test_parallel_large_tool_calls_each_emit_provisional_start(monkeypatch):
"""With parallel tool use enabled (the default), every streamed large tool
call surfaces its own provisional card, not just the first one, so the UI
shows progress for each call as its arguments stream."""
big_code = "total = 0\n" + "\n".join(f"total += {i}" for i in range(120))
big_cmd = "echo start\n" + "\n".join(f"echo line {i}" for i in range(60))
assert len(json.dumps({"code": big_code})) > _PROVISIONAL_ARGS_MIN_CHARS
assert len(json.dumps({"command": big_cmd})) > _PROVISIONAL_ARGS_MIN_CHARS
first_stream = _streamed_parallel_tool_calls(
[
("python", {"code": big_code}, "call_py"),
("terminal", {"command": big_cmd}, "call_term"),
]
)
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "OK"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "do both"}],
tools = [
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}},
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "terminal"}},
],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
provisional = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_start" and not e.get("arguments")]
assert sorted(e["tool_call_id"] for e in provisional) == ["call_py", "call_term"]
assert all(e["provenance"].get("provisional") is True for e in provisional)
# Both calls actually executed (parallel tool use is enabled by default).
assert sorted(name for name, _ in calls) == ["python", "terminal"]
def test_parallel_disabled_suppresses_provisional_for_later_calls(monkeypatch):
"""When parallel tool use is disabled the downstream truncates to the first
call, so only the first streamed call may surface a provisional; a later
call must not get a card that could never reconcile or be closed."""
big_code = "total = 0\n" + "\n".join(f"total += {i}" for i in range(120))
big_cmd = "echo start\n" + "\n".join(f"echo line {i}" for i in range(60))
first_stream = _streamed_parallel_tool_calls(
[
("python", {"code": big_code}, "call_py"),
("terminal", {"command": big_cmd}, "call_term"),
]
)
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "OK"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "do both"}],
tools = [
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}},
{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "terminal"}},
],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
disable_parallel_tool_use = True,
)
)
provisional = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_start" and not e.get("arguments")]
assert [e["tool_call_id"] for e in provisional] == ["call_py"]
# Only the first call executes when parallel use is disabled.
assert calls == [("python", {"code": big_code})]
# The lone provisional is closed exactly once (no dangling card).
closing = [
e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_end" and e.get("tool_call_id") == "call_py"
]
assert len(closing) == 1
def test_connect_error_during_tool_call_closes_provisional_card(monkeypatch):
"""If llama-server drops mid tool-call after a provisional card is shown, the
loop must close that card before surfacing the error so the UI never leaves a
tool spinning forever."""
import httpx
big_code = "total = 0\n" + "\n".join(f"total += {i}" for i in range(120))
fragments = _streamed_structured_tool_call("python", {"code": big_code}, "call_py_err")
# Drop the trailing [DONE]; raise a connection error after the fragments
# stream (and after the provisional card has been emitted).
fragments = fragments[:-1]
def raising_stream():
for chunk in fragments:
yield chunk
raise httpx.ConnectError("connection lost mid stream")
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [raising_stream()], payloads)
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", lambda *_a, **_k: "OK")
collected: list[dict] = []
raised = False
gen = backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "write code"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
try:
for event in gen:
collected.append(event)
except RuntimeError as exc:
raised = True
assert "Lost connection" in str(exc)
assert raised
provisional = [e for e in collected if e.get("type") == "tool_start" and not e.get("arguments")]
assert len(provisional) == 1
assert provisional[0]["tool_call_id"] == "call_py_err"
# The provisional card is closed before the error propagates.
closing = [
e
for e in collected
if e.get("type") == "tool_end" and e.get("tool_call_id") == "call_py_err"
]
assert len(closing) == 1
# The closing card is marked as an error, not an empty success, so the UI
# renders it as failed.
assert "Error" in (closing[0].get("result") or "")
def test_empty_tool_call_id_does_not_emit_provisional_card(monkeypatch):
"""llama.cpp can stream a tool call whose id is an empty string. A provisional
card keyed by "" cannot reconcile with the real tool_start (the frontend mints
its own id per event), so it must not be emitted -- otherwise the empty card
would dangle. The real call must still execute normally."""
big_code = "total = 0\n" + "\n".join(f"total += {i}" for i in range(120))
assert len(json.dumps({"code": big_code})) > _PROVISIONAL_ARGS_MIN_CHARS
# Same large streamed call as the provisional test, but with an empty id.
first_stream = _streamed_structured_tool_call("python", {"code": big_code}, "")
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Done."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "OK"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "write code"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
# No provisional card (empty-args tool_start) was surfaced for the empty id.
provisional = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_start" and not e.get("arguments")]
assert provisional == []
# The real call still executes despite the missing id.
assert calls == [("python", {"code": big_code})]
def _streamed_content(text: str, frag: int = 4) -> list[str]:
"""Stream content token-by-token like llama-server; ``frag`` sets the chunk size."""
chunks = [_sse({"content": text[i : i + frag]}) for i in range(0, len(text), frag)]
chunks.append(_done())
return chunks
def test_bare_json_tool_call_streamed_is_not_leaked_and_executes(monkeypatch):
"""A wrapper-less bare-JSON call must be held while incomplete, drained silently, and executed with nothing leaking."""
bare_call = '{"name": "web_search", "parameters": {"query": "weather in Sydney"}}'
first_stream = _streamed_content(bare_call)
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "It is sunny in Sydney."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "Weather: sunny, 22C."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "weather in Sydney?"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
# The tool ran with the parsed arguments.
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "weather in Sydney"})]
assert any(
event.get("type") == "tool_end" and event.get("tool_name") == "web_search"
for event in events
)
# The bare JSON never leaked to the user-visible stream.
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all('"name"' not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
assert all("web_search" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
# The post-tool synthesis is still streamed.
assert any("sunny in Sydney" in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_ordinary_json_with_name_key_is_shown_not_treated_as_tool_call(monkeypatch):
"""Markerless JSON with a non-enabled name is the answer, not a phantom call."""
answer = '{"name": "Alice", "parameters": {"age": 30}}'
first_stream = _streamed_content(answer)
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda n, a, **_k: (calls.append((n, a)) or "x"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "give me a person record"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert any("Alice" in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_incomplete_bare_json_truncation_is_not_leaked(monkeypatch):
"""If generation is cut off mid bare-JSON object (no closing brace), the held
fragment must be stripped at stream end rather than dumped to the user."""
truncated = '{"name": "web_search", "parameters": {"query": "weather in S'
stream = _streamed_content(truncated)
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda *_a, **_k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError("no complete call")),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "weather?"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all('{"name"' not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_truncated_ordinary_json_with_name_key_is_shown_not_suppressed(monkeypatch):
"""A truncated markerless object whose "name" is NOT an enabled tool (a person
record cut off mid-stream, ``{"name":"Alice","age":``) must still be shown. The
end-of-stream ``_is_bare_tc`` heuristic routed any ``{...,"name",...}`` fragment
to DRAINING (dropped); it is now gated on the enabled tool names so only a real
truncated tool call is suppressed, ordinary JSON streams through."""
truncated = '{"name": "Alice", "age": 30, "bio": "loves '
stream = _streamed_content(truncated)
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda n, a, **_k: (calls.append((n, a)) or "x"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "start a person record"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert any("Alice" in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_truncated_disabled_name_json_is_preserved_when_tools_active(monkeypatch):
"""A truncated JSON answer with a non-enabled name must still be shown (resolvers are gated on enabled names)."""
truncated = '{"name": "Alice", "parameters": {"age": 30'
stream = _streamed_content(truncated)
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda n, a, **_k: (calls.append((n, a)) or "x"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "give json"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert any("Alice" in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_truncated_enabled_name_json_is_still_suppressed(monkeypatch):
"""Counterpart guard: a truncated ENABLED-tool bare call (``web_search``) cut off
mid-JSON still must NOT leak -- the gate only spares disabled / non-tool names."""
truncated = '{"name": "web_search", "parameters": {"query": "weather in S'
stream = _streamed_content(truncated)
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda *_a, **_k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError("no complete call")),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "weather?"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all("web_search" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
assert all('{"name"' not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_oversized_disabled_name_json_is_preserved(monkeypatch):
"""An oversized still-open JSON answer with a non-enabled name streams as content, not a phantom drain."""
cap = 16384
big = "A" * (cap + 5000)
answer = '{"name":"Alice","parameters":{"bio":"' + big # never closes
first_stream = [_sse({"content": answer[i : i + 2000]}) for i in range(0, len(answer), 2000)]
first_stream.append(_done())
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda n, a, **_k: (calls.append((n, a)) or "x"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "long json"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert any("Alice" in t for t in content_texts), content_texts[:1]
def test_gemma_wrapperless_call_streamed_is_not_leaked_and_executes(monkeypatch):
"""Gemma 4 GGUF (skip_special_tokens) streams a wrapper-less ``call:NAME{..}``
with no XML signal. Like bare JSON, the BUFFERING scan must recognise it via
_GEMMA_BARE_TC_RE, drain it silently, and execute the tool -- never leaking
the ``call:`` markup to the user-visible stream."""
gemma_call = 'call:web_search{query:"weather in Sydney"}'
first_stream = _streamed_content(gemma_call)
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "It is sunny in Sydney."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "Weather: sunny, 22C."
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "weather in Sydney?"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "weather in Sydney"})]
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all("call:" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
assert any("sunny in Sydney" in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def _usage_done(usage: dict, finish_reason: str = "stop") -> str:
"""A terminal SSE chunk carrying llama-server's ``usage`` block, the way the
real server reports it on the final chunk of a completion."""
return (
"data: "
+ json.dumps(
{
"choices": [{"index": 0, "delta": {}, "finish_reason": finish_reason}],
"usage": usage,
}
)
+ "\n"
)
def test_metadata_event_preserves_prompt_tokens_details(monkeypatch):
"""The tool loop's metadata event must carry llama-server's
``prompt_tokens_details`` (KV-cache hits) through ``_build_metadata_event``,
so the route reports real ``cached_tokens`` instead of always 0 (#6570).
This drives the *real* generator; the route-level test feeds a pre-built
metadata event and so never exercises this code.
"""
stream = [
_sse({"content": "The answer is 42."}),
_usage_done(
{
"prompt_tokens": 20,
"completion_tokens": 4,
"prompt_tokens_details": {"cached_tokens": 16},
}
),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
tools = [],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
metadata = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "metadata"]
assert metadata, "expected a metadata event"
usage = metadata[-1]["usage"]
assert usage["prompt_tokens_details"] == {"cached_tokens": 16}
assert usage["prompt_tokens"] == 20
assert usage["completion_tokens"] == 4
def test_metadata_event_omits_prompt_tokens_details_when_absent(monkeypatch):
"""No KV-cache block from the server -> the key isn't fabricated, so the
route falls back to its 0-default instead of reading a bogus value."""
stream = [
_sse({"content": "hi"}),
_usage_done({"prompt_tokens": 5, "completion_tokens": 2}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], payloads)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
tools = [],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
metadata = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "metadata"]
assert metadata, "expected a metadata event"
assert "prompt_tokens_details" not in metadata[-1]["usage"]
def test_gguf_rehearsal_name_split_before_args_is_not_leaked(monkeypatch):
"""Finding 6: a rehearsal call whose name (``web_search``) and ``[ARGS]{...}``
arrive in separate content deltas must hold the bare name in the buffer until
``[ARGS]`` flips it to a drain. Without _is_rehearsal_prefix the GGUF path
streams the tool name as visible content before the call executes."""
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": "web_search"}),
_sse({"content": '[ARGS]{"query":"cats"}'}),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Found cats."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
def fake_execute_tool(name, arguments, **_kwargs):
calls.append((name, arguments))
return "result"
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", fake_execute_tool)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search cats"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "cats"})], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all("web_search" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
assert all("[ARGS]" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_initial_buffer_flush_holds_split_rehearsal_name(monkeypatch):
"""The first flush out of BUFFERING (prose plus a trailing active-tool-name in
the first delta, ``[ARGS]{...}`` in the next) must apply the same trailing-name
hold the STREAMING branch uses. The first delta has spaces so it is not a
rehearsal prefix and falls to the initial flush, which previously emitted the
bare name before the call drained."""
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": "I will use web_search"}),
_sse({"content": '[ARGS]{"query":"cats"}'}),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Found cats."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "result"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search cats"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "cats"})], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all("web_search" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
assert all("[ARGS]" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_rehearsal_name_after_prose_in_streaming_is_not_leaked(monkeypatch):
"""Finding 9: the BUFFERING guard only covers a rehearsal at the turn start.
When prose has already streamed (STREAMING state) and the model then emits the
tool name and ``[ARGS]{...}`` in later deltas, the bare name must still be held,
not flushed as visible content before the call drains."""
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": "Let me think. "}),
_sse({"content": "I will search "}),
_sse({"content": "web_search"}),
_sse({"content": '[ARGS]{"query":"cats"}'}),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Found cats."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "result"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search cats"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "cats"})], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert all("web_search" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_plain_answer_ending_with_tool_name_word_is_preserved(monkeypatch):
"""End-of-stream flush: a plain answer that ENDS on a tool-name word with no
``[ARGS]`` following is real prose and must not be dropped by the streaming
rehearsal hold."""
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": "I think "}),
_sse({"content": "you should "}),
_sse({"content": "web_search"}),
_done(),
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "result"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "advise"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert any(t.rstrip().endswith("web_search") for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_long_tool_name_split_rehearsal_is_not_capped_and_executes(monkeypatch):
"""Finding 11: a realistic MCP name longer than the 32-char buffer cap split as
NAME then [ARGS]{...} must still be held (a rehearsal prefix is self-bounding),
so the name does not leak and the call executes."""
name = "mcp__github__create_pull_request"
assert len(name) >= 32, len(name)
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": name}),
_sse({"content": '[ARGS]{"x":1}'}),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "done"}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda n, a, **_k: (calls.append((n, a)) or "result"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "go"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": name}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [(name, {"x": 1})], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert not any(name in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_streaming_keeps_bare_args_before_think_block(monkeypatch):
"""F4: the GGUF streaming strip must run its open-ended ``[ARGS]`` tail cleanup
only on the LAST segment. A bare ``foo[ARGS]`` (no JSON body, ``foo`` not a tool)
before a <think> block is prose, not a truncated call, so the final visible text
must keep it verbatim instead of dropping ``foo[ARGS]`` and corrupting the
sentence."""
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": "Please pass foo[ARGS] "}),
_sse({"content": "<think>pause</think> "}),
_sse({"content": "to the template."}),
_done(),
]
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream], [])
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "result"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "x"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert calls == [], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert content_texts, events
assert content_texts[-1] == "Please pass foo[ARGS] <think>pause</think> to the template."
def test_gguf_inactive_name_args_in_prose_is_not_drained(monkeypatch):
"""BUG A: an inactive-name ``foo[ARGS]{...}`` in a prose answer must not be treated
as a tool call. The BUFFERING and end-of-stream safety-net ``[ARGS]`` checks gate on
active tool names (like the safetensors loop and the mid-stream path), so ``foo``
(``web_search`` is the only enabled tool) is neither drained/parsed into a disabled
no-op nor forced into another generation turn."""
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": 'foo[ARGS]{"x":1} is just syntax.'}),
_done(),
]
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream], [])
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "result"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "x"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 2,
)
)
# No tool executed for the inactive name; a spurious no-op re-prompt would exhaust the
# single supplied stream and error.
assert calls == [], calls
assert not any(e.get("type") in ("tool_start", "tool_end") for e in events), events
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
# The inactive ``foo[ARGS]{...}`` is prose: the name-gated strip keeps the whole sentence.
assert any('foo[ARGS]{"x":1} is just syntax.' in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_inactive_rehearsal_before_active_call_executes_and_keeps_prose(monkeypatch):
"""BUG X (#5704): an inactive ``foo[ARGS]{...}`` before a real ``web_search[ARGS]{...}``
in one delta must NOT swallow the real call; web_search executes while the inactive
rehearsal stays visible as prose."""
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": 'foo[ARGS]{"a":1} web_search[ARGS]{"query":"cats"}'}),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Found cats."}), _done()]
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], [])
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "result"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search cats"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
# The real call runs; ``foo`` is not executed as a phantom disabled call.
assert calls == [("web_search", {"query": "cats"})], calls
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
# The inactive rehearsal is preserved as prose; the active one is stripped.
assert any('foo[ARGS]{"a":1}' in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
assert all("web_search[ARGS]" not in t for t in content_texts), content_texts
def test_gguf_rehearsal_detection_recognises_spent_one_shot_with_original_tools():
# Rehearsal detection is fed the ORIGINAL tool list, so a spent one-shot's re-emitted
# repeat is still detected (matching the strip gate) instead of blanking the turn.
from core.inference.llama_cpp import _gguf_has_genuine_tool_signal
from core.inference.tool_call_parser import TOOL_XML_SIGNALS
repeat = 'render_html[ARGS]{"code":"<html>x</html>"}'
active_only = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}]
original = active_only + [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "render_html"}}]
assert not _gguf_has_genuine_tool_signal(repeat, TOOL_XML_SIGNALS, active_only)
assert _gguf_has_genuine_tool_signal(repeat, TOOL_XML_SIGNALS, original)
def test_gguf_rehearsal_prefix_and_tail_hold_recognise_spent_one_shot():
# The BUFFERING prefix check and STREAMING/flush tail-holds use the ORIGINAL tool list,
# so a spent one-shot's split repeat is held rather than leaked as visible text.
from core.inference.llama_cpp import _held_rehearsal_tail_len, _is_rehearsal_prefix
active_only = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}]
original = active_only + [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "render_html"}}]
assert not _is_rehearsal_prefix("render_html", active_only)
assert _is_rehearsal_prefix("render_html", original)
assert _held_rehearsal_tail_len("answer render_html", active_only) == 0
assert _held_rehearsal_tail_len("answer render_html", original) == len("render_html")
def test_gguf_oversized_bare_json_not_leaked_and_executes(monkeypatch):
"""An oversized bare-JSON call drains rather than streams, and still executes via the safety net."""
cap = 16384
big = "A" * (cap + 5000)
full = '{"name":"python","parameters":{"code":"' + big + '"}}'
first_stream = [_sse({"content": full[i : i + 2000]}) for i in range(0, len(full), 2000)]
first_stream.append(_done())
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "done"}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "OK"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "run"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
content_texts = [e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content"]
assert not any(t.lstrip().startswith('{"name') for t in content_texts), content_texts[:1]
assert calls and calls[0][0] == "python"
assert len(calls[0][1].get("code", "")) > cap
def test_gguf_bare_json_call_not_replayed_in_next_turn_content(monkeypatch):
"""After a bare-JSON call executes, the kept assistant message must not carry the raw call as content."""
import copy
first_stream = [
_sse({"content": '{"name":"web_search","parameters":{"query":"cats"}}'}),
_done(),
]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "Found."}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
monkeypatch.setattr("core.inference.tools.execute_tool", lambda *_a, **_k: "RESULT")
list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "cats"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 2,
)
)
assert len(payloads) >= 2
asst = [m for m in payloads[1]["messages"] if m.get("role") == "assistant"]
assert asst and not any('"name"' in (m.get("content") or "") for m in asst), asst
def test_gguf_textual_fallback_caps_distinct_tool_calls_per_turn(monkeypatch):
"""A single textual-fallback turn that parses many DISTINCT tool calls must be
capped at _MAX_TOOL_CALLS_PER_TURN (structured delta.tool_calls are grammar
bounded by llama-server; text parsed from content is not). Mirrors the
safetensors loop so one runaway turn cannot fan out into dozens of executions."""
from core.inference.llama_cpp import _MAX_TOOL_CALLS_PER_TURN
n = _MAX_TOOL_CALLS_PER_TURN + 4
blocks = "".join(
'<tool_call>{"name":"t%d","arguments":{"i":%d}}</tool_call>' % (i, i) for i in range(n)
)
first_stream = [_sse({"content": blocks}), _done()]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "done"}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "OK"),
)
list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "go"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": f"t{i}"}} for i in range(n)],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert len(calls) == _MAX_TOOL_CALLS_PER_TURN, [c[0] for c in calls]
# The cap keeps the first calls in order (no reordering / drop of leading ones).
assert [c[0] for c in calls] == [f"t{i}" for i in range(_MAX_TOOL_CALLS_PER_TURN)]
def test_gguf_textual_fallback_collapses_duplicate_tool_calls(monkeypatch):
"""Exact-duplicate textual calls in one turn collapse to a single execution."""
blocks = '<tool_call>{"name":"web_search","arguments":{"query":"cats"}}</tool_call>' * 5
first_stream = [_sse({"content": blocks}), _done()]
final_stream = [_sse({"content": "done"}), _done()]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [first_stream, final_stream], payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "OK"),
)
list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "cats"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
)
)
assert len(calls) == 1, [c[0] for c in calls]
def test_gguf_drain_truncated_enabled_name_json_preserved_when_auto_heal_disabled(monkeypatch):
"""Auto-Heal OFF keeps a truncated enabled-name fragment visible; ON suppresses it (strip gated on auto_heal_tool_calls)."""
trunc = '{"name":"web_search","parameters":{"query":"weather'
def _run(auto_heal):
stream = [_sse({"content": trunc}), _done()]
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, [stream], [])
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "result"),
)
events = list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "x"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 1,
auto_heal_tool_calls = auto_heal,
)
)
contents = "".join(e.get("text", "") for e in events if e.get("type") == "content")
return calls, contents
calls_off, contents_off = _run(False)
assert calls_off == [], calls_off
assert "web_search" in contents_off, contents_off
calls_on, contents_on = _run(True)
assert calls_on == [], calls_on
assert "web_search" not in contents_on, contents_on
def test_gguf_valid_tool_calls_respect_max_tool_iterations(monkeypatch):
"""Re-prompt slots must not extend the tool budget: stop after ``max_tool_iterations`` executed rounds."""
# More tool-call streams than the budget: if re-prompt slots leaked into the budget (the bug) the
# loop would run 2+3=5 rounds; honouring it stops after 2, then a tool-less final-answer pass.
streams = [
_structured_tool_call("web_search", {"query": f"q{i}"}, f"call_{i}") for i in range(6)
]
payloads: list[dict] = []
backend = _make_backend(monkeypatch, streams, payloads)
calls: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
"core.inference.tools.execute_tool",
lambda name, arguments, **_k: (calls.append((name, arguments)) or "result"),
)
list(
backend.generate_chat_completion_with_tools(
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "search repeatedly"}],
tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}}],
max_tool_iterations = 2,
)
)
# Exactly two executed tool rounds, then one final-answer pass.
assert len(calls) == 2, calls
assert len(payloads) == 3, len(payloads)
# The final pass is the budget-exhausted nudge and carries no tools.
assert _tool_names(payloads[2]) == [], _tool_names(payloads[2])
assert any(
m.get("role") == "user" and "used all available tool calls" in m.get("content", "")
for m in payloads[2]["messages"]
), payloads[2]["messages"]