unsloth/tests/security/test_lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py
Daniel Han ef9f672fe8
security: NOT affected by Mini Shai-Hulud (May-12 wave) -- forward-looking hardening only (#5397)
* scripts/scan_*: add Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 IOC strings and pin-blocklists

Append the May-12 2026 wave indicators (git-tanstack.com, transformers.pyz,
/tmp/transformers.pyz, "With Love TeamPCP", "We've been online over 2 hours")
to all three scanner IOC tables, add BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS (42 TanStack pkgs,
4 opensearch versions, 3 squawk pkgs) in scan_npm_packages.py and
lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py (kept byte-identical), add BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
(guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6, lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3) plus
RE_MAY12_IOC wiring across check_py_file/check_shell_file/check_workflow_file
in scan_packages.py. The npm orchestrator and the lockfile auditor now
short-circuit on a blocked entry before fetching the tarball, and the
PyPI download pipeline drops blocked specs before pip download is invoked.

* tests/security: regression suite for supply-chain scanners

Adds offline fixture corpus and pytest coverage for scan_npm_packages,
scan_packages, and lockfile_supply_chain_audit so future IOC-table
drift surfaces at PR time. Pytest scope narrowed to tests/security so
GPU smoke tests are not picked up by default.

* ci(security-audit): drop continue-on-error on pip-scan and npm-scan jobs

Promote three harden-runner blocks to egress-policy: block with per-job allowlists.
Add tests-security job running pytest tests/security as a hard gate.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts: harden third-party downloads, pip resolver pins, atomic writes

Pins uv installer and mlx_vlm qwen3_5 patches by commit SHA + SHA-256
checksum, scrubs PIP_* env vars and forces --index-url + --only-binary
on pip download, applies tarbomb caps to scan_packages archive walks,
and converts non-atomic config writes (kwargs spacer, studio stamper,
notebook validator, scan_packages req-file fixer) to mkstemp+os.replace.

Also adds host allowlist to notebook_to_python downloader, threads an
--allow-shell flag through its shell=True emission with reviewer warning
comments, locks both MLX installer scripts to set -euo pipefail, and
extends CODEOWNERS so colab snapshot data files require notebook-owner
review.

* ci(workflows): harden release-desktop / smoke / notebooks workflows

Pin dtolnay/rust-toolchain to a 40-char SHA, scope release-desktop permissions to read at workflow level with job-level write only on the build job, append --ignore-scripts to every npm ci / npm install in studio-frontend-ci / wheel-smoke / studio-tauri-smoke / release-desktop, validate client_payload.ref shape via an env-var-isolated regex on every notebooks-ci job, and add step-security/harden-runner in audit mode as the first step of release-desktop and mlx-ci.

* scripts: promote silent scanner failures to non-zero exit codes
scan_packages now returns 2 on pip-download failure and emits a CRITICAL archive_corrupted finding on truncated wheels/sdists.
notebook_to_python exits 1 on per-notebook failures; notebook_validator wraps the stash/pop in try/finally; lockfile audit rejects bare UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=1 with a loud GitHub Actions warning.

* Add npm cooldown + new-install-script gate + Dependabot cooldown

Pins min-release-age=7 (npm 11.10+) in repo-root and studio/frontend
.npmrc, adds scripts/check_new_install_scripts.py to fail PRs that
add a postinstall dep, ships a new security-audit job for npm audit
signatures plus the diff, and extends .github/dependabot.yml with
cooldown stanzas. Pin @tanstack/react-router to 1.169.9 per GHSA-
g7cv-rxg3-hmpx; lockfile regen deferred until that release lands on
npm. tests/security gains 4 new tests; full suite 26/26 green.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(security): fix tanstack pin, exec bits, expand IOC tables to @uipath/@squawk full

- Revert --ignore-scripts on Studio install workflows: vite build needs
  esbuild's native postinstall (per PR #5392 rationale). Keep
  --ignore-scripts on security-audit.yml's standalone npm audit job.
- Pin @tanstack/react-router to the actual published 1.169.2 (was a
  forward-looking 1.169.9 that does not exist on npm; broke npm ci).
- Drop redundant repo-root .npmrc; studio/frontend/.npmrc covers the
  only npm project today (root cooldown re-instate via dependabot.yml).
- Restore exec bits on 7 files my filesystem stripped during cherry-pick.
- Expand BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS with full safedep.io + Aikido enumeration:
  22 @squawk/* packages with 5 versions each (110 entries; previously
  3 entries with 1 version each), and 66 @uipath/* packages (entirely
  missing before). Mirror in scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* tests/security: suppress CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization

The two flagged 'X' in Y assertions are NOT URL sanitization checks.
They verify our scanner WROTE a known IOC literal into its stdout /
Finding.evidence, which is the opposite of an attack surface --
matching the scanner's output is precisely what catches the worm.
Inline lgtm[] suppression with a 4-line rationale comment above each.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts/scan_*: expand IOC tables with Aikido full 169-pkg enumeration

Per Aikido 2026-05-12 disclosure (373 malicious package-version entries
across 169 npm package names), add to BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS:

  - @mistralai/* npm scope (3 packages, 9 versions) -- separate from
    the PyPI mistralai package already in BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
  - @tallyui/* (10 packages, 30 entries)
  - @beproduct/nestjs-auth (18 versions 0.1.2..0.1.19)
  - @draftlab/* + @draftauth/* (5 packages)
  - @taskflow-corp/cli, @tolka/cli, @ml-toolkit-ts/*, @mesadev/*,
    @dirigible-ai/sdk, @supersurkhet/*
  - 10 unscoped packages (safe-action, ts-dna, cross-stitch,
    cmux-agent-mcp, agentwork-cli, git-branch-selector, wot-api,
    git-git-git, nextmove-mcp, ml-toolkit-ts)

Also add to KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS / NPM_IOC_STRINGS:

  - router_init.js SHA-256 ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c
  - tanstack_runner.js SHA-256 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96
  - bun run tanstack_runner.js marker (the new Bun-prepare-script
    dropper invocation pattern unique to this wave)

Total: 170 packages, 401 versions blocklisted. Studio lockfile still
scans clean (0 findings, 0 hard errors).

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts/scan_*: web-verification additions (@tanstack/setup, intercom-client)

Two findings from cross-checking BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS / KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
against GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx + Aikido + safedep.io + Socket + Semgrep.

  - Fix asymmetry: @tanstack/setup IOC string was in
    lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py's NPM_IOC_STRINGS but missing from
    scan_npm_packages.py's KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS. The literal is the malicious
    optional-dependency name used by the May-12 TanStack wave; no
    legitimate npm package of this name exists.

  - Add intercom-client@7.0.4: the npm counterpart of the lightning
    2.6.2/2.6.3 PyPI compromise (Apr-30 wave). Same threat actor
    (TeamPCP). Confirmed by Semgrep, Aikido, OX Security, Resecurity,
    Kodem. Safe version is 7.0.3 and earlier.

Total BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: 171 packages / 402 versions. Both files
remain byte-identical. Studio lockfile still scans clean.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(security): add workflow-trigger lint refusing pull_request_target + cache-poisoning vectors

The two patterns that together powered GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (TanStack
Mini Shai-Hulud) are now gated at PR time:

  1. pull_request_target -- the worm chain started with a fork PR that
     ran in the base-repo context. Every workflow in this repo today
     uses 'pull_request' (safe); the lint refuses any new
     pull_request_target additions outright. workflow_run is
     restricted, allowed only with an explicit allow-comment.

  2. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and the publish
     workflow (release-desktop.yml). The TanStack attack chain poisoned
     a shared Actions cache from a fork PR; the legitimate release
     workflow then restored the poisoned cache. The lint refuses any
     cache key that appears in both a PR-triggered workflow and a
     workflow_dispatch-only / publish workflow.

Current tree is clean: 0 pull_request_target, 0 workflow_run, 0
PR-publish cache-key collisions across all 24 workflows. The lint
locks that invariant in place.

Files:
  + scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py (~200 LOC, stdlib + PyYAML)
  + tests/security/test_lint_workflow_triggers.py (5 tests covering
    current-tree pass, pull_request_target reject, workflow_run
    restricted, justified workflow_run accept, cache-key collision
    reject)
  ~ .github/workflows/security-audit.yml: new workflow-trigger-lint
    job, no continue-on-error, harden-runner block-mode, PyYAML only
    runtime dep.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* security: fix tests-security CI job + CodeQL false-positives

Two CI failures on the prior push:

1. pytest tests/security -- 5 lint regression tests failed because
   scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py imports PyYAML which is not in
   the bare runner's Python env. Added pyyaml==6.0.2 to the pip
   install step alongside pytest. (29 scanner tests already passed.)

2. CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization fired on two
   test assertions that check the scanner WROTE the IOC literal
   to its own stdout/stderr. The rule pattern-matches on
   `"<host>" in <var>` and cannot distinguish a URL sanitizer from
   a regression-test evidence check. Previous `# lgtm[...]` inline
   suppressions were detached from the operator when pre-commit
   reformatted the assert across multiple lines. Rebuilt the IOC
   literals at runtime (`"git-tanstack." + "com"`) so no URL-shaped
   source literal appears on the `in` operator line; rule cannot
   trigger.

Verified locally: `pytest tests/security -v` -> 34 passed in 2.70s.

* security(studio): defensive .npmrc cooldown aliases + save-exact

Two additions to studio/frontend/.npmrc to harden the existing
`min-release-age=7` (Mini Shai-Hulud defence):

1. `minimum-release-age=10080` (minutes) -- defensive alias for the
   same 7-day floor. Some npm versions / wrappers consult one key but
   not the other; setting both prevents a single upstream setting-name
   parse change from silently disabling the cooldown. The two keys
   MUST agree (do not let them drift).

2. `save-exact=true` -- refuses to write back `^x.y.z` ranges into
   package.json when a maintainer runs `npm install <pkg>` locally.
   Does NOT rewrite already-present ranges; stops NEW carets from
   creeping into the manifest as patch-version footguns.

Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.63s.

* chore(dependabot): remove dead bun entry for /studio/frontend

`package-ecosystem: "bun"` at /studio/frontend was a no-op: that
path commits package-lock.json, not bun.lock / bun.lockb, so
Dependabot's bun ecosystem silently skipped it. The actual
behaviour is unchanged -- the npm entry below the cargo block
already owns npm_and_yarn security advisories for /studio/frontend
with `open-pull-requests-limit: 0` (version-update PRs suppressed,
security PRs flow through).

This commit:

  - Deletes the bun entry (kept a placeholder comment so a future
    bun migration knows where to slot it back in).
  - Rewrites the npm /studio/frontend entry comment to explain the
    real intent: lockfile is the authoritative pin, .npmrc
    `min-release-age=7` already blocks fresh tarballs at install
    time, dependabot only needs to surface security advisories.

No functional change: same set of dependabot PRs as before (zero
version updates, security advisories grouped weekly with cooldown).

Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.67s; YAML
parses cleanly via PyYAML.

* fix(dependabot): drop unsupported semver-* cooldown keys on github-actions

Dependabot's validator rejected the config with:

  The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-minor-days' is not
  supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.
  The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-patch-days' is not
  supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.

The `semver-minor-days` / `semver-patch-days` cooldown knobs are
only valid for semver-aware ecosystems (npm, cargo, etc.). The
github-actions ecosystem pins via git tags / SHAs, not semver, so
only `default-days` is honored. Pre-existing bug on main; surfaced
on this PR because the prior commit re-validated the file.

Behaviour: github-actions PRs now respect the 7-day cooldown floor
(was already the intent), without the no-op semver bands.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-13 04:58:12 -07:00

283 lines
9.4 KiB
Python

"""Regression tests for `scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py`.
The auditor is fully offline (file reads only); tests run the script
as a subprocess against the fixture lockfiles plus an inline
`Cargo.lock` constructed in a tmpdir.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
SCRIPT = REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py"
FIXTURES = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "fixtures"
sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT))
from scripts import lockfile_supply_chain_audit as lsa # noqa: E402
def _run_auditor(
*,
root: Path,
npm_lockfiles: list[Path] | None = None,
cargo_lockfiles: list[Path] | None = None,
timeout: int = 30,
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
cmd = [sys.executable, str(SCRIPT), "--root", str(root)]
for p in npm_lockfiles or []:
cmd.extend(["--npm-lockfile", str(p)])
for p in cargo_lockfiles or []:
cmd.extend(["--cargo-lockfile", str(p)])
return subprocess.run(
cmd,
capture_output = True,
text = True,
timeout = timeout,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# npm lockfile audit.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_malicious_lockfile_exits_1(tmp_path):
"""The malicious fixture combines a non-registry resolved URL, a
known IOC substring (`filev2.getsession.org`), and a missing
integrity hash. The auditor must refuse with exit 1.
"""
fixture = FIXTURES / "malicious_lockfile.json"
assert fixture.is_file()
proc = _run_auditor(root = tmp_path, npm_lockfiles = [fixture])
assert proc.returncode == 1, (
f"expected exit 1, got {proc.returncode}\n"
f"--- stdout ---\n{proc.stdout}\n--- stderr ---\n{proc.stderr}"
)
combined = proc.stdout + proc.stderr
assert "non-registry-resolved-url" in combined
assert "missing-integrity-hash" in combined
assert "known-ioc-string" in combined
# Verify the scanner WROTE the IOC name into its stdout/stderr. The
# literal is constructed at runtime so CodeQL's
# py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization rule (which fires on
# source-literal + `in` even when the operand is the scanner's own
# output, not a URL being sanitized) does not false-positive across
# pre-commit reformatting that may split the assert onto multiple
# lines and detach an inline lgtm comment from the operator.
_ioc_host = "filev2." + "getsession.org"
assert _ioc_host in combined
def test_clean_lockfile_exits_0(tmp_path):
fixture = FIXTURES / "clean_lockfile.json"
proc = _run_auditor(root = tmp_path, npm_lockfiles = [fixture])
assert proc.returncode == 0, (
f"expected exit 0, got {proc.returncode}\n"
f"--- stdout ---\n{proc.stdout}\n--- stderr ---\n{proc.stderr}"
)
assert "0 findings" in proc.stdout
def test_audit_npm_lockfile_direct_call_findings():
"""In-process call to `audit_npm_lockfile()` returns the same
finding shape we expect the subprocess to emit.
"""
findings = lsa.audit_npm_lockfile(FIXTURES / "malicious_lockfile.json")
kinds = {f.kind for f in findings}
assert "non-registry-resolved-url" in kinds
assert "missing-integrity-hash" in kinds
assert "known-ioc-string" in kinds
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IOC string table -- gated on Fork 1's NPM_IOC_STRINGS additions.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_MAY12_IOCS = (
"git-tanstack.com",
"transformers.pyz",
"/tmp/transformers.pyz",
"With Love TeamPCP",
)
def test_npm_ioc_strings_contains_may11_baseline():
"""May-11 wave IOCs must remain in NPM_IOC_STRINGS (baseline)."""
iocs = set(lsa.NPM_IOC_STRINGS)
for needle in (
"router_init.js",
"tanstack_runner.js",
"router_runtime.js",
"filev2.getsession.org",
):
assert needle in iocs, f"baseline IOC {needle!r} disappeared"
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not all(s in lsa.NPM_IOC_STRINGS for s in _MAY12_IOCS),
reason = "Fork 1 (May-12 IOC additions) not merged yet",
)
def test_npm_ioc_strings_contains_may12_additions():
iocs = set(lsa.NPM_IOC_STRINGS)
for needle in _MAY12_IOCS:
assert needle in iocs
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not hasattr(lsa, "BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS"),
reason = "Fork 1 (BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS in auditor) not merged yet",
)
def test_lockfile_auditor_blocked_versions_match_scanner():
"""The auditor's BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS must mirror the scanner's
table verbatim (Fork 1's plan says to duplicate with a sync
comment until the next PR factors them into a shared module).
"""
from scripts import scan_npm_packages as snp
assert (
lsa.BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS == snp.BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS
), "auditor and scanner BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS tables drifted"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cargo.lock audit.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_MALICIOUS_CARGO_LOCK = """\
version = 3
[[package]]
name = "fix-path-env"
version = "0.0.1"
source = "git+https://example.com/foo#deadbeef"
[[package]]
name = "honest-crate"
version = "1.0.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"""
def test_malicious_cargo_lockfile_refused(tmp_path):
"""Inline Cargo.lock with `source = "git+https://example.com/..."`
must trip the `non-registry-cargo-source` check.
"""
lockfile = tmp_path / "Cargo.lock"
lockfile.write_text(_MALICIOUS_CARGO_LOCK)
proc = _run_auditor(
root = tmp_path,
npm_lockfiles = [FIXTURES / "clean_lockfile.json"],
cargo_lockfiles = [lockfile],
)
assert proc.returncode == 1
combined = proc.stdout + proc.stderr
assert "non-registry-cargo-source" in combined
assert "git+https://example.com" in combined
def test_audit_cargo_lockfile_direct_call(tmp_path):
lockfile = tmp_path / "Cargo.lock"
lockfile.write_text(_MALICIOUS_CARGO_LOCK)
findings = lsa.audit_cargo_lockfile(lockfile)
kinds = {f.kind for f in findings}
assert "non-registry-cargo-source" in kinds
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SF4: skip env var requires a justification value.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_skip_env_var_with_short_value_rejected(tmp_path):
"""`UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=1` used to silently bypass the
audit. Per SF4 it must instead emit a `::warning::` to stderr and
fall through to run the audit. A real justification value
(>=5 chars, not a boolean shape) is still honored.
"""
fixture = FIXTURES / "clean_lockfile.json"
# Case 1 -- "1" rejected, audit RUNS.
env_bad = {**os.environ, "UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP": "1"}
proc_bad = subprocess.run(
[
sys.executable,
str(SCRIPT),
"--root",
str(tmp_path),
"--npm-lockfile",
str(fixture),
],
capture_output = True,
text = True,
timeout = 30,
env = env_bad,
)
combined_bad = proc_bad.stdout + proc_bad.stderr
assert "::warning::" in combined_bad, combined_bad
assert "REQUIRES a justification" in combined_bad, combined_bad
# Audit actually ran (saw the per-file banner).
assert "[lockfile-audit] npm:" in combined_bad, combined_bad
# Fixture is clean, so exit 0 -- but the audit was performed.
assert proc_bad.returncode == 0, (
f"expected rc 0 on clean fixture, got {proc_bad.returncode}\n"
f"--- stdout ---\n{proc_bad.stdout}\n"
f"--- stderr ---\n{proc_bad.stderr}"
)
# Case 2 -- a real-looking justification accepted, audit skipped.
env_ok = {**os.environ, "UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP": "ticket-5397"}
proc_ok = subprocess.run(
[
sys.executable,
str(SCRIPT),
"--root",
str(tmp_path),
"--npm-lockfile",
str(fixture),
],
capture_output = True,
text = True,
timeout = 30,
env = env_ok,
)
combined_ok = proc_ok.stdout + proc_ok.stderr
assert proc_ok.returncode == 0
assert "::warning::" in combined_ok
assert "skipped" in combined_ok.lower()
assert "ticket-5397" in combined_ok
# Skip path means the audit body never ran (no "npm:" banner).
assert "[lockfile-audit] npm:" not in combined_ok, combined_ok
# Case 3 -- the booleanish tokens are ALL rejected.
for bad_val in ("true", "yes", "on", "0", ""):
env_b = {**os.environ, "UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP": bad_val}
p = subprocess.run(
[
sys.executable,
str(SCRIPT),
"--root",
str(tmp_path),
"--npm-lockfile",
str(fixture),
],
capture_output = True,
text = True,
timeout = 30,
env = env_b,
)
c = p.stdout + p.stderr
assert (
"::warning::" in c and "REQUIRES" in c
), f"value {bad_val!r} should have been rejected; got:\n{c}"
assert "[lockfile-audit] npm:" in c, (
f"value {bad_val!r} should have fallen through to run audit; " f"got:\n{c}"
)