e3c7948874
Codex P1 on the previous commit: granting both ``allow-popups`` and ``allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox`` while forcing every link through ``<base target="_blank">`` lets a malicious assistant-emitted link open a regular browser tab that retains ``window.opener``. The destination page can then call ``window.opener.top.location.href = '...'`` and tabnab the original Studio tab. Drop ``allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox``. ``allow-popups`` stays so the click still produces a tab instead of being silently dropped, but the popup now INHERITS the iframe sandbox (no allow-same-origin, no allow-top-navigation), so it cannot reach back into the host. Trade-off: the opened tab loads with an opaque origin and some real sites render degraded inside the popup. This is the deliberate exchange for tabnabbing safety; the chat-message preview iframe is the primary surface, the popup is a follow-up link click. Existing rendering-iframe sandbox test now asserts allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox is NOT present. |
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| .. | ||
| backend | ||
| frontend | ||
| src-tauri | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| install_llama_prebuilt.py | ||
| install_python_stack.py | ||
| LICENSE.AGPL-3.0 | ||
| package-lock.json | ||
| package.json | ||
| setup.bat | ||
| setup.ps1 | ||
| setup.sh | ||
| Unsloth_Studio_Colab.ipynb | ||