dee1b68b6d
Two more P1 follow-ups from the round 7 reviewer pass:
1. Device-login log filter no longer leaks sensitive lines.
The old `_safe_to_forward` used unanchored substring matches like
`"logged in"`, so a line such as
Not logged in: refresh_token=rt_LEAK auth.json=/home/u/.codex/auth.json
slipped through the safe-vocabulary filter and was streamed to the
browser. A malicious codex shim earlier on PATH can print that
line trivially, defeating the "opaque output stays in backend
logs" safety guarantee the route claimed.
Round 7b fix: anchored regex set (must start with one of the
known upstream phrases) plus an explicit blocklist for
refresh_token / access_token / api_key / secret / auth.json / the
codex config dir / "not logged in" / "not authenticated". A line
that matches the blocklist is dropped regardless of which safe
pattern would otherwise have accepted it. New tests reconstruct
the regex set inline and assert both the leak cases drop and the
clean upstream phrases pass.
2. `_run_cli` timeout cleanup no longer 500s on a kill race.
`_run_cli` would call `proc.kill()` after `os.killpg(pid, SIGTERM)`
reaped the process group. If the SIGTERM landed first, the
subsequent `proc.kill()` raised `ProcessLookupError` and bubbled
out of `_run_cli`, turning `/api/codex/status` into a 500 during
a timeout race. The device-login cleanup at codex_provider.py
already wraps the same destructive call in a try / except. Mirror
that exception guard here so the two timeout paths behave the
same.
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| .. | ||
| assets | ||
| auth | ||
| core | ||
| loggers | ||
| models | ||
| plugins | ||
| requirements | ||
| routes | ||
| state | ||
| storage | ||
| tests | ||
| utils | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| _platform_compat.py | ||
| colab.py | ||
| main.py | ||
| run.py | ||
| startup_banner.py | ||