* studio: announce Cloudflare tunnel state and warn about public exposure on startup The startup banner only printed a line when a tunnel URL was up, so a plain `unsloth studio -H 0.0.0.0` launch silently created a public trycloudflare.com URL with no indication that Studio had become reachable from the internet. The only hint at the tunnel was the CLI help, shown when an invalid command was typed. Make the banner always state the tunnel state for wildcard binds: - ON: the public URL plus a warning that anyone with it can reach Studio from outside the network, and that --no-cloudflare keeps it local-only. - FAILED: requested but did not start (local network only). - OFF: --no-cloudflare was passed (local network only). Secure mode keeps its existing wording (the authenticated tunnel is intended and --no-cloudflare is not valid there). Clarify the --cloudflare help text in both the argparse and typer definitions. Default behavior is unchanged. Also surface the state on the `unsloth studio run` banner, which runs the server with silent=True and prints its own banner: it now calls _print_cloudflare_line too, so the ON/OFF/FAILED notice and public-exposure warning are no longer skipped on that path (previously it only echoed the URL when a tunnel was up). For the OFF and FAILED notices, do not claim "local network only" when the reachability probe just confirmed the raw port is reachable from the public internet: --no-cloudflare and a failed tunnel disable only the Cloudflare link, not the wildcard bind, so the message is reworded to flag the public raw port. * Fix/adjust Cloudflare banner warnings for PR #6515 * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Fix/adjust Cloudflare banner comments for PR #6515 * Fix/adjust IPv6 Cloudflare tunnel gate for PR #6515 * Fix/adjust Cloudflare review comments for PR #6515 * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Fix silent run Cloudflare notice * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci --------- Co-authored-by: wasimysaid <wasimysdev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
214 lines
7.9 KiB
Python
214 lines
7.9 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
|
|
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
|
|
|
|
"""Cloudflare tunnel start gate, incl. --secure on loopback. Imports run.py
|
|
directly, so run under the Studio venv."""
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import sys
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
|
|
import pytest
|
|
|
|
_BACKEND = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
|
|
if str(_BACKEND) not in sys.path:
|
|
sys.path.insert(0, str(_BACKEND))
|
|
|
|
from run import _cloudflare_tunnel_should_start as should_start # noqa: E402
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"cloudflare,host,secure,api_only,is_colab,expected",
|
|
[
|
|
# Non-secure wildcard binds tunnel by default.
|
|
(True, "0.0.0.0", False, False, False, True),
|
|
(True, "::", False, False, False, True),
|
|
(True, "127.0.0.1", False, False, False, False),
|
|
(True, "localhost", False, False, False, False),
|
|
# --secure tunnels a loopback bind too.
|
|
(True, "127.0.0.1", True, False, False, True),
|
|
(True, "0.0.0.0", True, False, False, True),
|
|
# --no-cloudflare always wins.
|
|
(False, "0.0.0.0", False, False, False, False),
|
|
(False, "::", False, False, False, False),
|
|
(False, "127.0.0.1", True, False, False, False),
|
|
# Non-secure api-only never tunnels (Tauri).
|
|
(True, "0.0.0.0", False, True, False, False),
|
|
(True, "::", False, True, False, False),
|
|
# --secure tunnels even api-only (headless secure API server).
|
|
(True, "127.0.0.1", True, True, False, True),
|
|
# Colab never tunnels, even --secure.
|
|
(True, "0.0.0.0", False, False, True, False),
|
|
(True, "::", False, False, True, False),
|
|
(True, "127.0.0.1", True, False, True, False),
|
|
(True, "127.0.0.1", True, True, True, False),
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_cloudflare_gate(cloudflare, host, secure, api_only, is_colab, expected):
|
|
assert (
|
|
should_start(
|
|
cloudflare = cloudflare,
|
|
host = host,
|
|
secure = secure,
|
|
api_only = api_only,
|
|
is_colab = is_colab,
|
|
)
|
|
is expected
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_run_server_accepts_secure_kwarg():
|
|
import inspect
|
|
|
|
import run
|
|
|
|
assert "secure" in inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters
|
|
assert inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters["secure"].default is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_arg_parser_secure_polarity_and_not_secure_alias():
|
|
# --secure/--no-secure is the documented flag; --not-secure is a hidden,
|
|
# back-compat alias for --no-secure. Last flag wins (BooleanOptionalAction).
|
|
import run
|
|
|
|
parser = run._build_arg_parser()
|
|
assert parser.parse_args([]).secure is False
|
|
assert parser.parse_args(["--secure"]).secure is True
|
|
assert parser.parse_args(["--no-secure"]).secure is False
|
|
assert parser.parse_args(["--not-secure"]).secure is False
|
|
assert parser.parse_args(["--secure", "--not-secure"]).secure is False
|
|
assert parser.parse_args(["--not-secure", "--secure"]).secure is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_run_server_accepts_enable_tools_kwarg():
|
|
import inspect
|
|
|
|
import run
|
|
|
|
params = inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters
|
|
assert "enable_tools" in params
|
|
assert params["enable_tools"].default is None # default: leave policy unset
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_tool_policy_not_auto_disabled_by_bind():
|
|
# Tools default on for every bind; the backend only changes the policy from
|
|
# an explicit --enable-tools/--disable-tools, never from host/secure.
|
|
import run
|
|
from state.tool_policy import get_tool_policy, reset_tool_policy
|
|
|
|
for host in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "0.0.0.0"):
|
|
reset_tool_policy()
|
|
run._apply_cli_tool_policy(None) # no flag, on any bind
|
|
assert get_tool_policy() is None, host # untouched: per-request honored
|
|
|
|
reset_tool_policy()
|
|
run._apply_cli_tool_policy(True) # --enable-tools: forced on
|
|
assert get_tool_policy() is True
|
|
|
|
reset_tool_policy()
|
|
run._apply_cli_tool_policy(False) # --disable-tools: forced off
|
|
assert get_tool_policy() is False
|
|
reset_tool_policy()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_tool_policy_notice_wording():
|
|
# The plain-server startup banner states the resolved policy for every bind.
|
|
import run
|
|
|
|
loopback = run._tool_policy_notice("127.0.0.1", False, None)
|
|
assert "ENABLED by default" in loopback and "loopback" in loopback
|
|
|
|
network = run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, None)
|
|
assert "ENABLED by default" in network and "network-reachable" in network
|
|
|
|
secure = run._tool_policy_notice("127.0.0.1", True, None)
|
|
assert "Cloudflare HTTPS tunnel" in secure
|
|
|
|
assert run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, False) == (
|
|
"Server-side tools are DISABLED (--disable-tools)."
|
|
)
|
|
assert "ENABLED (--enable-tools)" in run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_startup_output_emits_tool_notice_on_network_bind(capsys, monkeypatch):
|
|
# Plain `unsloth studio -H 0.0.0.0` must not be silent about tools now.
|
|
import run
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_verify_global_reachability", lambda *a, **k: None)
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_print_cloudflare_line", lambda *a, **k: None)
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_localhost_ipv6_mismatch_url", lambda *a, **k: None)
|
|
|
|
run._emit_startup_output("0.0.0.0", 8000, "0.0.0.0", secure = False, enable_tools = None)
|
|
out = capsys.readouterr().out
|
|
assert "Server-side tools" in out
|
|
assert "network-reachable" in out
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_startup_output_emits_disabled_notice(capsys, monkeypatch):
|
|
import run
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_localhost_ipv6_mismatch_url", lambda *a, **k: None)
|
|
run._emit_startup_output("127.0.0.1", 8000, "127.0.0.1", secure = False, enable_tools = False)
|
|
out = capsys.readouterr().out
|
|
assert "Server-side tools are DISABLED" in out
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_run_server_rejects_secure_without_cloudflare():
|
|
# Direct backend callers (not just the CLI) must reject the contradictory combo.
|
|
import run
|
|
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
|
|
run.run_server(secure = True, cloudflare = False)
|
|
assert "A secure Cloudflare link is not allowed" in str(exc.value)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_failclosed_message_present_in_source():
|
|
# The exact, user-facing fail-closed message must not drift.
|
|
src = (_BACKEND / "run.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
|
|
assert (
|
|
"A secure Cloudflare link is not allowed, use --no-secure which provides a 0.0.0.0 link"
|
|
in src
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"api_only,secure,expected",
|
|
[
|
|
(False, False, ["*"]), # plain server: any origin
|
|
(False, True, ["*"]), # secure UI server: any origin
|
|
(True, True, ["*"]), # secure api-only: remote browsers need any origin
|
|
(True, False, "tauri"), # local api-only: locked to the Tauri app
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_cors_origins_for_mode(api_only, secure, expected):
|
|
from utils.host_policy import cors_origins_for_mode
|
|
origins = cors_origins_for_mode(api_only = api_only, secure = secure)
|
|
if expected == "tauri":
|
|
assert origins != ["*"] and any(o.startswith("tauri://") for o in origins)
|
|
else:
|
|
assert origins == expected
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_run_server_exports_secure_env_for_cors():
|
|
# run_server must export UNSLOTH_SECURE before importing main so the CORS
|
|
# profile can tell remote secure serving from local Tauri use.
|
|
src = (_BACKEND / "run.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
|
|
assert 'os.environ["UNSLOTH_SECURE"] = "1"' in src
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_run_server_emit_tauri_port_defaults_on():
|
|
# Default on keeps the desktop app's stdout contract; the headless
|
|
# `run --api-only` path opts out explicitly.
|
|
import inspect
|
|
|
|
import run
|
|
|
|
params = inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters
|
|
assert "emit_tauri_port" in params
|
|
assert params["emit_tauri_port"].default is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_tauri_port_print_is_gated_in_source():
|
|
# The TAURI_PORT line must depend on emit_tauri_port, not api_only alone.
|
|
src = (_BACKEND / "run.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
|
|
assert "if api_only and emit_tauri_port:" in src
|