* Keep server-side tools enabled under --secure and on every bind --secure binds loopback and exposes Studio only through an authenticated Cloudflare HTTPS tunnel, but it was grouped with a raw 0.0.0.0 bind and force-disabled all server-side tools (web search, Python, terminal). The process tool policy overrode the client's enable_tools request, so the model was never told the tools existed and answered in plain text. The plain 'unsloth studio' command had no way to re-enable and printed nothing. Tools now default on for every bind. The bind host and --secure no longer change the tool policy; only an explicit --enable-tools/--disable-tools forces it on or off. Both 'unsloth studio' and 'unsloth studio run' accept the flags and the startup banner states the resolved policy. - run.py: replace _apply_default_tool_policy(host, secure) with _apply_cli_tool_policy(enable_tools); add an enable_tools kwarg to run_server and --enable-tools/--disable-tools to the argparse. - _tool_policy.py: resolve_tool_policy defaults to on for every host and no longer prompts on a network bind. - studio.py: drop the secure-as-public tool gating, add the flags to the plain command, and reword the startup banner. - Update and extend the secure-flag and tool-policy tests. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Add tool-policy notice to plain server banner and refresh run --help Follow-up to PR review: - run.py: the plain 'unsloth studio' / --secure / direct run.py path went through _emit_startup_output without any tool-policy line, so a network-reachable launch was silent about code execution now that tools default on. Thread enable_tools through _emit_startup_output / _emit_secure_startup_output and print a one-line policy notice, followed by a single stop hint. - studio.py: the 'unsloth studio run' --enable-tools/--disable-tools and --yes help still described the removed loopback-on/network-off default and the confirmation prompt; reword to match the new policy. - Add tests for the banner notice and the refreshed help text. * Update CI tool-policy resolver tests for default-on behavior tests/python/test_unsloth_run_tool_policy_resolver.py still asserted the removed network-bind policy (0.0.0.0 and LAN IP default off, explicit enable prompts and aborts on a declined prompt), so it failed the Python CI jobs. Rewrite the truth table: every bind defaults on, explicit on/off always wins, and the resolver never prompts (yes/silent/prompt kept for compatibility). * Trim comments for the tool-policy change Shorten the verbose docstrings and block comments added for --secure tool handling; keep the security-relevant intent. Verified comment-only via an AST diff (code unchanged). * Add deterministic test that server-side tools execute under --secure Drive the GGUF agentic tool loop with a fake llama-server stream and let the real execute_tool run: python counts 1..100, terminal returns a UTC datetime, and web_search runs through real _web_search with only the ddgs network boundary mocked. A policy assertion pins that the post-fix --secure path (policy None + per-request enable_tools) is what keeps these executions reachable. No model, GPU, or live network; runs in the existing backend CI. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Align _emit_startup_output banner test with the moved stop hint The tool-policy notice now prints between the access banner and the stop hint, so the stop hint is emitted once at the end instead of inline in the banner (include_stop_hint is False and print_studio_stop_hint runs once). Update the plain-localhost case to match; the mismatch and wildcard cases already asserted this wiring. --------- Co-authored-by: Michael Han <michaelhan2050@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
150 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
150 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""Cloudflare tunnel start gate, incl. --secure on loopback. Imports run.py
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directly, so run under the Studio venv."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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_BACKEND = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
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if str(_BACKEND) not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, str(_BACKEND))
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from run import _cloudflare_tunnel_should_start as should_start # noqa: E402
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"cloudflare,host,secure,api_only,is_colab,expected",
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[
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# Non-secure: historical 0.0.0.0-only behaviour preserved.
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(True, "0.0.0.0", False, False, False, True),
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(True, "127.0.0.1", False, False, False, False),
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(True, "localhost", False, False, False, False),
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# --secure tunnels a loopback bind too.
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(True, "127.0.0.1", True, False, False, True),
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(True, "0.0.0.0", True, False, False, True),
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# --no-cloudflare always wins.
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(False, "0.0.0.0", False, False, False, False),
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(False, "127.0.0.1", True, False, False, False),
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# api-only and Colab never tunnel.
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(True, "0.0.0.0", False, True, False, False),
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(True, "127.0.0.1", True, True, False, False),
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(True, "0.0.0.0", False, False, True, False),
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(True, "127.0.0.1", True, False, True, False),
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],
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)
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def test_cloudflare_gate(cloudflare, host, secure, api_only, is_colab, expected):
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assert (
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should_start(
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cloudflare = cloudflare,
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host = host,
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secure = secure,
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api_only = api_only,
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is_colab = is_colab,
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)
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is expected
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)
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def test_run_server_accepts_secure_kwarg():
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import inspect
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import run
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assert "secure" in inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters
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assert inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters["secure"].default is False
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def test_run_server_accepts_enable_tools_kwarg():
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import inspect
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import run
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params = inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters
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assert "enable_tools" in params
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assert params["enable_tools"].default is None # default: leave policy unset
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def test_tool_policy_not_auto_disabled_by_bind():
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# Tools default on for every bind; the backend only changes the policy from
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# an explicit --enable-tools/--disable-tools, never from host/secure.
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import run
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from state.tool_policy import get_tool_policy, reset_tool_policy
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for host in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "0.0.0.0"):
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reset_tool_policy()
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run._apply_cli_tool_policy(None) # no flag, on any bind
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assert get_tool_policy() is None, host # untouched: per-request honored
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reset_tool_policy()
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run._apply_cli_tool_policy(True) # --enable-tools: forced on
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assert get_tool_policy() is True
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reset_tool_policy()
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run._apply_cli_tool_policy(False) # --disable-tools: forced off
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assert get_tool_policy() is False
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reset_tool_policy()
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def test_tool_policy_notice_wording():
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# The plain-server startup banner states the resolved policy for every bind.
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import run
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loopback = run._tool_policy_notice("127.0.0.1", False, None)
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assert "ENABLED by default" in loopback and "loopback" in loopback
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network = run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, None)
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assert "ENABLED by default" in network and "network-reachable" in network
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secure = run._tool_policy_notice("127.0.0.1", True, None)
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assert "Cloudflare HTTPS tunnel" in secure
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assert run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, False) == (
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"Server-side tools are DISABLED (--disable-tools)."
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)
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assert "ENABLED (--enable-tools)" in run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, True)
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def test_startup_output_emits_tool_notice_on_network_bind(capsys, monkeypatch):
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# Plain `unsloth studio -H 0.0.0.0` must not be silent about tools now.
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import run
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monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_verify_global_reachability", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_print_cloudflare_line", lambda: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_localhost_ipv6_mismatch_url", lambda *a, **k: None)
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run._emit_startup_output("0.0.0.0", 8000, "0.0.0.0", secure = False, enable_tools = None)
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out = capsys.readouterr().out
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assert "Server-side tools" in out
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assert "network-reachable" in out
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def test_startup_output_emits_disabled_notice(capsys, monkeypatch):
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import run
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monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_localhost_ipv6_mismatch_url", lambda *a, **k: None)
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run._emit_startup_output("127.0.0.1", 8000, "127.0.0.1", secure = False, enable_tools = False)
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out = capsys.readouterr().out
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assert "Server-side tools are DISABLED" in out
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def test_run_server_rejects_secure_without_cloudflare():
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# Direct backend callers (not just the CLI) must reject the contradictory combo.
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import run
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with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
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run.run_server(secure = True, cloudflare = False)
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assert "A secure Cloudflare link is not allowed" in str(exc.value)
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def test_failclosed_message_present_in_source():
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# The exact, user-facing fail-closed message must not drift.
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src = (_BACKEND / "run.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
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assert (
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"A secure Cloudflare link is not allowed, use --not-secure which provides a 0.0.0.0 link"
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in src
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)
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