* Pin isolated Node.js installer to committed sha256 digests
The isolated Node installer verified each downloaded archive only against
SHASUMS256.txt fetched from the same nodejs.org origin as the archive, so a
compromised CDN or TLS path could serve a malicious archive plus a matching
checksum and gain code execution when the extracted node is run during the
npm floor check and version probe.
Anchor trust in studio/node_prebuilt_pins.json, a committed manifest of
per-arch sha256 digests, and verify archives against it. The default channel
installs the pinned version and never fetches the remote SHASUMS. Unpinned
lts, latest, or explicit versions fail closed via UnpinnedNodeRefused unless
UNSLOTH_NODE_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED=1, and the refusal is not swallowed by the
keep-existing-on-transient-failure path. Ship the manifest in package-data.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Address review nits on the pinned Node installer
- Drop the unused npm_min_major field from node_prebuilt_pins.json; the floor is
the NPM_MIN_MAJOR module constant and the dead field could silently drift.
- Reword the unpinned-refusal message so it does not tell a user already on the
default to install it, and point the "add a pin" hint at the exact asset.
- Decode the opt-in SHASUMS body with errors="replace" so a non-UTF8 response
yields a clean PrebuiltFallback instead of an uncaught UnicodeDecodeError.
- Tests: assert the refusal message (guards the main() catch order, not just the
exit code), cover malformed-manifest parsing, and drive the opt-in remote-SHASUMS
path end to end through install_prebuilt.
* Tighten comments in the pinned Node installer
Collapse multi-line rationale comments to single lines, drop docstrings on the
obvious internal helpers (load_pins, pinned_sha256), and shorten the manifest
note. Comments/docstrings only; verified code-unchanged via AST comparison.
* Address Codex review: verify pins on existing installs; tomllib fallback
- existing_install_matches now takes an expected_sha and the short-circuit passes
the committed pin, so a version-matching but non-pinned or tampered install (e.g.
from the old remote-SHASUMS path) is re-verified instead of kept. An unpinned
target without opt-in no longer short-circuits on an existing install; it falls
through to the UnpinnedNodeRefused fail-closed path.
- The package-data test uses pytest.importorskip(tomllib/tomli) so it does not
ModuleNotFoundError on the supported 3.9/3.10 interpreters.
* Make the transient-failure keep-existing path pin-aware
The previous commit added the pinned-digest check to the existing-install
short-circuit but not to the post-download-failure fallback, which still kept any
runnable same-version install via existing_install_usable(). A same-version
install whose recorded sha256 is not the pin could therefore be kept on a
transient download failure, the exact artifact the short-circuit rejects. Refuse
to keep a same-version pin-mismatched install there too; a different usable
version is still kept for offline resilience.
* Bump pinned default Node to the current 24 LTS (24.18.0)
Node 24 LTS moved to 24.18.0; since the default channel now resolves straight to
the manifest, a frozen 24.17.0 would downgrade fresh installs and make
UNSLOTH_NODE_VERSION=lts refuse the current LTS as unpinned. Update default_version
and all six per-arch digests (verified against the official SHASUMS256.txt), and
point the test INDEX/short-circuit fixtures at the new LTS.
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Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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