* Studio: persistent per-user trust_remote_code approval cache
The consent gate pins each approval to a content fingerprint (sha256 over every
repo .py), but nothing was persisted, so the dialog reappeared on every fresh
load of the same unchanged repo. This adds an on-disk, per-user approval cache
that lets the gate skip the dialog when the same user reloads the same code,
while keeping the safety guarantees intact.
Two-tier validation, both must hold or the user is re-prompted:
- Commit SHA (cheap, one HfApi.model_info().sha, no download): a match means a
byte-identical tree to the approved revision, so the scan/download is skipped.
- Content fingerprint (authoritative): used whenever the SHA is unavailable
(local path / offline) and always recomputed on a SHA miss. A new or edited
.py changes both the SHA and the fingerprint, so it is caught in every mode.
Safety:
- Keyed per subject; one user's approval never auto-runs code for another.
- CRITICAL is never stored or honored (guarded on both write and read), so a
hand-edited store cannot smuggle in an auto-approval.
- The malware (HF unsafe-file) gate stays unconditional.
- Fail-safe: a corrupt store, an unresolvable SHA, or any error degrades to
"ask again", never to "auto-approve". UNSLOTH_TRC_APPROVAL_CACHE_DISABLE=1
turns the cache off entirely.
New module utils/security/remote_code_approvals.py holds the store
(studio_root()/security/remote_code_approvals.json, atomic write, 0600, RLock)
plus the SHA resolvers. Recording happens at the single gate chokepoint when the
caller supplies the matching fingerprint, so subject is just threaded through
inference/training/export (orchestrators, routes, workers). The scan endpoint
returns already_approved so the frontend can skip the dialog on a cache hit.
Tests: new tests/test_trc_approval_cache.py covers cache miss, SHA-match skip,
SHA-moved re-scan, new-file re-consent, CRITICAL never cached (write + forged
read), disable flag, subject isolation, combined adapter+base key, corrupt
store, and no-subject bypass. Full security suite: 101 passed.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Address review: make the approval cache skip only the prompt, never the scan
Codex found that the SHA "no-scan" fast path could run untrusted code without
re-consent. Removed it; the gate now always re-scans and the cache only seeds the
authoritative fingerprint check, so it can skip the dialog but never the scan.
- CRITICAL is hard-blocked on every load (the scan always runs), so a hand-edited
store that downgrades a CRITICAL repo's severity can no longer auto-run it
(P2: do not trust editable severity for SHA approvals).
- The fingerprint covers external auto_map repos, so changed third-party code
always re-prompts even when the primary commit SHA is unchanged; there is no
longer a SHA path that bypasses the fingerprint (P1: external auto_map repos).
- resolve_commit_sha is resolved fresh on every call (no memoization), so a repo
whose default branch moves after approval re-prompts instead of reusing a stale
cached SHA (P1: revalidate mutable Hub SHAs). The SHA is now only a conservative
secondary gate: a fresh resolvable SHA must match the approved revision, else the
seed is withheld; a None (local/offline) falls back to the fingerprint.
- Approvals record the scanner ruleset version (SCAN_RULES_VERSION); the gate
ignores approvals from an older ruleset so reclassified bytes are re-scanned and
re-shown instead of silently auto-approved (P2: invalidate on scan-policy change).
Tests: test_trc_approval_cache.py rewritten around the prompt-skip semantics
(unchanged repo still scans; SHA move / changed code / scanner-version bump /
disable flag all re-prompt; forged downgraded severity still blocks CRITICAL).
105 passed with test_consent_gate.py.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Trim comments to be more succinct
* Keep run-owner subject out of persisted config; serialize approval writes
Threading subject (the run owner's username / API-key id) into the training
config meant _sanitize_db_config persisted it into config_json, which
training-history GET returns to any authenticated user, leaking who started a run
in multi-user installs. Filter subject alongside the token fields; the worker
still receives it from the live config.
The approval store's RLock only guards one process, but approvals are recorded
from separate inference/export/training subprocesses, so concurrent writers could
clobber each other on os.replace and drop an approval (re-prompt). Hold a
best-effort cross-process file lock around the read-modify-write.
* Fail safe on a malformed approval store
A store with the right version but a non-dict shape (e.g. a hand-edited
"subjects": []) passed _load()'s check, then lookup chained .get() on a list and
raised, breaking every remote-code load until the file was removed. Validate that
subjects is a dict in _load(), and tolerate a non-dict per-subject entry in
lookup/record/forget, so a corrupt store fails safe (re-prompt) instead.
* Keep subject out of the MLX W&B run config
_run_mlx_training uploads the whole training config to W&B minus a sensitive set
that only listed hf_token/wandb_token/s3_config, so the authenticated subject
(username / API-key id) was sent to W&B as run config even though DB history
already strips it. Add subject to the W&B-sensitive filter, mirroring
training._sanitize_db_config.
* Tighten the W&B subject-filter comment
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Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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