unsloth/.github/workflows/wheel-smoke.yml
Daniel Han ac765d2efb
studio/ci: pre-install lockfile supply-chain audit (npm + cargo) (#5392)
* studio/ci: pre-install lockfile supply-chain audit (npm + cargo)

The Mini Shai-Hulud wave that hit @tanstack/* on 2026-05-11 19:20-19:26
UTC (GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx) pushed 84 malicious versions across 42
packages. Each compromised tarball carried an `optionalDependencies`
entry pointing at a GitHub-hosted prepare script that exfiltrated
GitHub / npm / AWS / Vault / SSH credentials on `npm install` / `npm
ci`. Our current lockfile pins ALL @tanstack/* at pre-malicious
versions so we were not exposed, but the only defense layer between
"dependabot opens a security-update PR during a malicious window" and
"a compromised package's postinstall runs on the CI runner" is the
advisory-DB latency. `npm audit` and OSV-Scanner are reactive: there
is a window between malicious publication and GHSA landing.

Add a pre-install lockfile audit that fires on the injection pattern
itself, BEFORE `npm ci` gets a chance to execute lifecycle scripts:

  scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py

    npm side (studio/frontend/package-lock.json, lockfileVersion 2/3):
      1. every `resolved` URL must point to registry.npmjs.org;
         direct GitHub / git+ / file: refs are the Shai-Hulud vector
      2. every non-bundled entry must carry an `integrity` SHA
      3. raw-text scan for known IOC strings (router_init.js,
         tanstack_runner.js, router_runtime.js, @tanstack/setup,
         the specific TanStack worm commit hash, getsession.org
         exfiltration host, "A Mini Shai-Hulud has Appeared" marker)
      4. nested `node_modules/.../node_modules/` fold-ins are
         transparent -- they ride on the parent tarball's integrity

    cargo side (studio/src-tauri/Cargo.lock):
      5. every `source` must be the crates.io registry
      6. registry crates must have a `checksum`
      7. one allowlist entry: fix-path-env from
         tauri-apps/fix-path-env-rs at pinned SHA c4c45d5. Any other
         non-registry source -- or a bump of that pinned SHA --
         re-fires the audit until reviewed + appended

Wire into four workflows:

  .github/workflows/security-audit.yml -- new step inside the
    advisory-audit job, immediately before `npm audit` so the
    structural pass and the advisory-DB pass appear together in
    the GitHub step summary.

  .github/workflows/studio-frontend-ci.yml,
  .github/workflows/wheel-smoke.yml,
  .github/workflows/studio-tauri-smoke.yml -- new step immediately
    BEFORE `npm ci`. If a future malicious bump lands in our lockfile,
    the audit refuses and `npm ci` never runs, so no `prepare` /
    `postinstall` from a compromised tarball can execute on the
    runner.

Note on --ignore-scripts: every npm ci in our CI is followed directly
by `npm run build` or `tauri build`, both of which depend on package
install scripts (esbuild's native-binary postinstall, etc.). Blanket
--ignore-scripts breaks the build, so the pre-install structural
audit is the practical mitigation. The audit reads lockfiles only;
it never executes anything from them.

Verified:
  - Clean state: 0 findings on the current tree (npm + cargo).
  - Fault injection: synthetic `@tanstack/setup` IOC + non-registry
    `resolved` URL both fire with exit code 1.
  - YAML parses cleanly for all four modified workflows.

Refs:
  - https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem
  - https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383
  - https://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx
  - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised
  - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 20:36:52 -07:00

130 lines
4.9 KiB
YAML

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved.
# Builds the PyPI wheel from the PR branch, then verifies the built wheel
# actually contains what we expect to ship and does NOT contain the broken
# Studio bundle that 2026.5.1 published. This is the single workflow that
# would have blocked the 2026.5.1 release before twine upload.
#
# Verified locally end-to-end against this branch:
# - python -m build produces unsloth-<version>-py3-none-any.whl in 13s
# - wheel content sanity passes:
# lockfile shipped, frontend dist shipped,
# no node_modules in wheel, no bun.lock in wheel,
# main bundle has unstable_Provider hits=1 (assistant-ui internals only).
# - Studio backend imports cleanly from the installed wheel with the
# lightweight dep set below.
name: Wheel CI
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- 'pyproject.toml'
- 'studio/**'
- 'unsloth/**'
- 'unsloth_cli/**'
- '.github/workflows/wheel-smoke.yml'
push:
branches: [main, pip]
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
wheel:
name: Wheel build + content sanity + import smoke
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: 'npm'
cache-dependency-path: studio/frontend/package-lock.json
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6.2.0
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- name: Lockfile supply-chain audit (pre-install scan)
run: python3 scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py
- name: Build frontend
run: |
cd studio/frontend
npm ci --no-fund --no-audit
npm run build
- name: Build wheel + sdist
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip build
rm -rf dist build ./*.egg-info
python -m build
- name: Wheel content sanity
run: |
python - <<'PY'
import zipfile, glob, sys
w = glob.glob("dist/unsloth-*.whl")
if not w:
print("FAIL: no wheel produced"); sys.exit(2)
w = w[0]
print(f"wheel: {w}")
with zipfile.ZipFile(w) as z:
n = z.namelist()
checks = {
"lockfile shipped": any(s.endswith("studio/frontend/package-lock.json") for s in n),
"frontend dist shipped": any(s.endswith("studio/frontend/dist/index.html") for s in n),
"no node_modules": not any("studio/frontend/node_modules/" in s for s in n),
"no bun.lock": not any(s.endswith("studio/frontend/bun.lock") for s in n),
}
js = [s for s in n
if "studio/frontend/dist/assets/" in s
and s.endswith(".js")
and "/index-" in s]
if not js:
print("FAIL: no main bundle index-*.js in wheel"); sys.exit(2)
data = z.read(js[0]).decode("utf-8", "replace")
hits = data.count("unstable_Provider:")
print(f"main bundle: {js[0]}")
print(f"unstable_Provider hits: {hits} (>=4 indicates 2026.5.1 regression)")
checks["bundle has no Studio unstable_Provider call site"] = (hits < 4)
print()
for k, v in checks.items():
print(f" [{'PASS' if v else 'FAIL'}] {k}")
sys.exit(0 if all(checks.values()) else 1)
PY
- name: Studio backend import smoke
# Imports `studio.backend.main:app` from the freshly-installed wheel in
# a clean venv. This catches the class of bug that 2026.5.1 shipped with:
# frontend dist missing, package-lock.json missing, or the wheel's Python
# source tree broken in a way that surfaces only at app construction time.
run: |
python -m venv /tmp/v
/tmp/v/bin/pip install --upgrade pip
/tmp/v/bin/pip install -r studio/backend/requirements/studio.txt
/tmp/v/bin/pip install \
python-multipart aiofiles sqlalchemy cryptography \
pyyaml jinja2 mammoth unpdf requests \
'numpy<3'
/tmp/v/bin/pip install --no-deps dist/unsloth-*.whl
# Run from /tmp so Python imports the installed package, not the source tree.
cd /tmp
/tmp/v/bin/python -c "from studio.backend.main import app; print('Studio backend OK:', app.title)"
- name: Upload wheel on failure
if: failure()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: unsloth-wheel
path: dist/
retention-days: 7