* feat(studio): expose opt-in MCP control plane
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* Harden Studio MCP tools: byte-safe auth, page clamping, forward export/checkpoint fields
Follow-up hardening on the opt-in MCP control plane. All changes are additive
and backwards compatible.
- BearerTokenMiddleware now compares the Authorization header on raw bytes.
A non-ASCII bearer value previously reached str-based hmac.compare_digest,
which raises TypeError and surfaced as a 500 instead of a clean 401. The
constructor also rejects an empty or whitespace-only token so an empty token
can never match an empty "Bearer " header.
- MCP tools call the route functions directly, which skips FastAPI Query
validation. list_training_runs and get_recipe_job_dataset now clamp limit and
offset to the same bounds the HTTP routes enforce (a negative SQLite LIMIT
otherwise means "no limit").
- export_gguf forwards hf_token (the backend rejects a Hub upload without it),
accepts a list of quantization methods, and exposes imatrix / imatrix_path so
the IQ low-bit quants are reachable.
- load_checkpoint forwards hf_token and approved_remote_code_fingerprint so
gated checkpoints and the remote-code approval retry work. Its docstring is
corrected: the export backend coexists with training and inference rather than
freeing GPU work.
- start_training passes via_api_key=False explicitly instead of relying on the
unfilled Depends default.
Tests: add coverage for non-ASCII and empty-token auth, the correct-token pass
through, non-http scope pass through, pagination clamping, and the forwarded
export/checkpoint fields.
* Harden Studio MCP: cap /mcp request bodies, reject unusable tokens, fix docs
Follow-up hardening from a full review pass. All changes are additive and
backwards compatible.
- Add "/mcp" to _BODY_PROTECTED_PREFIXES so MaxBodyMiddleware enforces the same
request-body cap it already applies to every other write endpoint (/api/train,
/api/export, /api/data-recipe, ...). The MCP endpoint accepts authenticated
POST tool-call bodies; without this an authenticated client could send an
unbounded body. The middleware only buffers the request body (not the SSE
response), so streaming is unaffected, and the 500MB default cap never affects
a real JSON-RPC tool call (verified live).
- Reject a non-ASCII UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MCP_TOKEN at construction. HTTP header values
are ASCII, so a non-ASCII token cannot be sent by a standard client and would
silently lock out the endpoint; fail fast instead.
- MCP.md: document the canonical /mcp/ endpoint and note that /mcp redirects to
it, so clients that do not follow redirected POSTs still connect.
Tests: add non-ASCII token rejection coverage.
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* Tighten MCP server comments
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Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: danielhanchen <unslothshared@gmail.com>
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