* Studio: stop handing CI/user secrets to downloaded llama.cpp binaries
The macOS prebuilt path installs llama.cpp from the unslothai/llama.cpp
fork's latest (unpinned, mutable) release and then executes the
downloaded llama-server / llama-quantize binaries during install-time
validation. binary_env() built that child environment from a full
os.environ.copy(), so a compromised or tampered prebuilt would inherit
every secret in the process: HF_TOKEN and the workflow GitHub tokens in
CI, and HF / cloud credentials for end users running install.sh /
setup.sh.
We publish prebuilts daily, so pinning a release tag is not workable.
Instead, neutralise the impact: these binaries have no reason to read any
token, so strip secret-bearing variables (exact names plus
TOKEN/SECRET/PASSWORD/CREDENTIAL/PRIVATE_KEY/API_KEY markers) before
handing the env to a downloaded binary. The installer's own GitHub and
Hugging Face API calls read os.environ directly, so authentication and
release-API rate limiting are unaffected; PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH,
DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH and CUDA/ROCm vars are preserved. One change covers the
install-time validation path for all six macOS workflows and end users.
Follow-up (separate, sequenced): publish build-provenance attestations
from the fork's prebuilt workflows and verify them in CI, so a forged
release is rejected rather than merely starved of secrets.
* Strip KUBECONFIG, SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and PASSPHRASE-marked vars from binary env
Extend the deny-list per PR review: KUBECONFIG and SSH_AUTH_SOCK are
credential pointers/capabilities a downloaded binary never needs, and a
PASSPHRASE marker catches SSH_PASSPHRASE / GPG_PASSPHRASE. Tests updated.
* Studio: also scrub proxy/index env vars and URL-embedded credentials before running prebuilt binaries
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Scope mlx-ci secrets to the install + download commands for PR #6696
Drop the ambient step-level env block and pass GH/GITHUB/HF tokens only
on the installer and GGUF-download commands, so the directly invoked
llama-quantize / llama-server smoke runs see no secrets. The installer
still reads tokens from os.environ for the releases API and probe fetch.
* Trim verbose comments around the secret-env scrubber for PR #6696
Comment-only: condense the block comments added across this PR. Logic
unchanged (comment_tools.py check confirms code-only signature equal).
* Redirect HOME / cache pointers to an empty dir for prebuilt binaries (PR #6696)
Address Codex P2: stripping token env vars still let a tampered binary
read on-disk token stores (~/.cache/huggingface/token, ~/.aws/credentials,
~/.config/gh) through $HOME and the cache/config pointers. Point HOME plus
the HF / XDG / Windows home pointers at a single empty throwaway dir for
the downloaded-binary env. Defense in depth: a binary resolving the real
home via getpwuid is out of scope and needs OS sandboxing.
* Close residual credential-probe gaps for PR #6696
Address the latest Codex review:
- Strip token-only URL userinfo too (scheme://ghp_token@host), not just
the user:pass form.
- Redirect HOMEDRIVE/HOMEPATH alongside USERPROFILE so a Windows binary
cannot reconstruct the real profile from %HOMEDRIVE%%HOMEPATH%.
- Drop explicit credential-file pointers (NETRC, PIP_CONFIG_FILE,
DOCKER_CONFIG, GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL) that live outside HOME.
- Probe ldd with a secret-free env: linux_runtime_dirs ran ldd on the
untrusted prebuilt with the inherited os.environ, and ldd may execute
the binary, so it could observe HF_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN during the probe.
Factored the shared scrub into secret_free_environ().
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Separate token-bearing install from binary smoke; drop CI command files (PR #6696)
Address the two P1s in the latest review:
- mlx-ci: GitHub bakes secrets into the run-script text, so inline token
assignments in a step that later runs the prebuilt let a tampered binary
read them from the script. Split into a token-bearing install + download
step that never launches a binary, and a secret-free smoke step that runs
llama-quantize / llama-server.
- secret_free_environ now drops the GitHub Actions command files
(GITHUB_ENV, GITHUB_PATH, GITHUB_OUTPUT, GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY, BASH_ENV) and
the smoke step unsets them, so a tampered prebuilt cannot inject PATH/env
into the later token-bearing MLX steps.
* Run the prebuilt smoke last, after all token-bearing steps (PR #6696)
Address the P1 workspace-poisoning vector: even with no secrets in its env,
a tampered prebuilt could edit the checkout or installed modules, and the
later HF_TOKEN MLX steps would then execute that poisoned code on push
builds. Move the prebuilt install + smoke to the end of the job so the
untrusted binary runs after every token-bearing step, leaving nothing for it
to corrupt. The MLX GGUF reload uses a source-built llama-cli, not this
prebuilt, so nothing depends on the earlier position.
* Trim comments around the secret-env scrubber and prebuilt CI steps (PR #6696)
Comment-only: condense the security-rationale block comments and merge the
duplicated prebuilt-step description in mlx-ci. Logic unchanged
(comment_tools.py check confirms the code-only signature is equal; install
suite still passes).
* Authenticate the GGUF export release-API lookup with the read-only GITHUB_TOKEN (PR #6696)
* Rename env scrubber off the secret-named identifier CodeQL flags as a clear-text sink (PR #6696)
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Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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