f08aef1804
* Rebuild Studio branch on top of main * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Fix security and code quality issues for Studio PR #4237 - Validate models_dir query param against allowed directory roots to prevent path traversal in /api/models/local endpoint - Replace string startswith() with Path.is_relative_to() for frontend path traversal check in serve_frontend - Sanitize SSE error messages to not leak exception details to clients (4 locations in inference.py) - Bind port-discovery socket to 127.0.0.1 instead of all interfaces in llama_cpp backend - Import datasets_root and resolve_output_dir in embedding training function to fix NameError and use managed output directory - Remove stale .gitignore entries for package-lock.json and test directories so tests can be tracked in version control - Add venv-reexecution logic to ui CLI command matching the studio command behavior * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Move models_dir path validation before try/except block The HTTPException(403) was inside the try/except Exception handler, so it would be caught and re-raised as a 500. Moving the validation before the try block ensures the 403 is returned directly and also makes the control flow clearer for static analysis (path is validated before any filesystem operations). * Use os.path.realpath + startswith for models_dir validation CodeQL py/path-injection does not recognize Path.is_relative_to() as a sanitizer. Switched to os.path.realpath + str.startswith which is a recognized sanitizer pattern in CodeQL's taint analysis. The startswith check uses root_str + os.sep to prevent prefix collisions (e.g. /app/models_evil matching /app/models). * Never pass user input to Path constructor in models_dir validation CodeQL traces taint through Path(resolved) even after a startswith barrier guard. Fix: the user-supplied models_dir is only used as a string for comparison against allowed roots. The Path object passed to _scan_models_dir comes from the trusted allowed_roots list, not from user input. This fully breaks the taint chain. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
47 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
47 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""
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Authentication module for JWT-based auth with SQLite storage.
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"""
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from .authentication import (
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create_access_token,
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create_refresh_token,
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refresh_access_token,
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get_current_subject,
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reload_secret,
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)
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from .storage import (
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is_initialized,
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create_initial_user,
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get_user_and_secret,
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load_jwt_secret,
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save_setup_token,
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consume_setup_token,
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has_pending_setup_token,
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save_refresh_token,
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verify_refresh_token,
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revoke_user_refresh_tokens,
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)
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from .hashing import hash_password, verify_password
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__all__ = [
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"create_access_token",
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"create_refresh_token",
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"refresh_access_token",
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"get_current_subject",
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"reload_secret",
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"is_initialized",
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"create_initial_user",
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"get_user_and_secret",
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"load_jwt_secret",
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"save_setup_token",
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"consume_setup_token",
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"has_pending_setup_token",
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"save_refresh_token",
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"verify_refresh_token",
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"revoke_user_refresh_tokens",
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"hash_password",
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"verify_password",
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]
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