* Rebuild Studio branch on top of main * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Fix security and code quality issues for Studio PR #4237 - Validate models_dir query param against allowed directory roots to prevent path traversal in /api/models/local endpoint - Replace string startswith() with Path.is_relative_to() for frontend path traversal check in serve_frontend - Sanitize SSE error messages to not leak exception details to clients (4 locations in inference.py) - Bind port-discovery socket to 127.0.0.1 instead of all interfaces in llama_cpp backend - Import datasets_root and resolve_output_dir in embedding training function to fix NameError and use managed output directory - Remove stale .gitignore entries for package-lock.json and test directories so tests can be tracked in version control - Add venv-reexecution logic to ui CLI command matching the studio command behavior * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Move models_dir path validation before try/except block The HTTPException(403) was inside the try/except Exception handler, so it would be caught and re-raised as a 500. Moving the validation before the try block ensures the 403 is returned directly and also makes the control flow clearer for static analysis (path is validated before any filesystem operations). * Use os.path.realpath + startswith for models_dir validation CodeQL py/path-injection does not recognize Path.is_relative_to() as a sanitizer. Switched to os.path.realpath + str.startswith which is a recognized sanitizer pattern in CodeQL's taint analysis. The startswith check uses root_str + os.sep to prevent prefix collisions (e.g. /app/models_evil matching /app/models). * Never pass user input to Path constructor in models_dir validation CodeQL traces taint through Path(resolved) even after a startswith barrier guard. Fix: the user-supplied models_dir is only used as a string for comparison against allowed roots. The Path object passed to _scan_models_dir comes from the trusted allowed_roots list, not from user input. This fully breaks the taint chain. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
140 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
140 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""
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Authentication API routes
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"""
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from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status
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import secrets
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from models.auth import (
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AuthSetupRequest,
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AuthLoginRequest,
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RefreshTokenRequest,
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AuthStatusResponse,
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)
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from models.users import Token
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from auth import storage, hashing
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from auth.authentication import (
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create_access_token,
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create_refresh_token,
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refresh_access_token,
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reload_secret,
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)
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router = APIRouter()
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@router.get("/status", response_model = AuthStatusResponse)
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async def auth_status() -> AuthStatusResponse:
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"""
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Check whether auth has already been initialized.
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- initialized = False -> frontend should show "Set admin password" screen.
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- initialized = True -> frontend should show normal login.
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"""
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return AuthStatusResponse(initialized = storage.is_initialized())
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@router.post("/setup", response_model = Token, status_code = status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
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async def setup_auth(payload: AuthSetupRequest) -> Token:
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"""
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First-time setup: create the admin user and a JWT secret.
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Requires a valid setup token (printed to the server console on startup).
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Can only be called once. Subsequent calls will return 400.
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"""
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if storage.is_initialized():
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail = "Auth is already initialized.",
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)
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# Validate the one-time setup token
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if not storage.consume_setup_token(payload.setup_token):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail = "Invalid or expired setup token.",
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)
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# Generate a strong random JWT secret for this installation
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jwt_secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(64)
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# Create user + generate tokens atomically — rollback if anything fails
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try:
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storage.create_initial_user(
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username = payload.username,
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password = payload.password,
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jwt_secret = jwt_secret,
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)
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# Reload JWT secret from DB (so authentication.py picks it up)
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reload_secret()
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# Issue access + refresh tokens for the new user
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access_token = create_access_token(subject = payload.username)
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refresh_token = create_refresh_token(subject = payload.username)
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except Exception as e:
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# Rollback: remove the user row so setup can be retried
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storage.delete_user(payload.username)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
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detail = f"Setup failed (rolled back): {str(e)}",
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)
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return Token(
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access_token = access_token,
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refresh_token = refresh_token,
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token_type = "bearer",
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)
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@router.post("/login", response_model = Token)
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async def login(payload: AuthLoginRequest) -> Token:
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"""
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Login with username/password and receive access + refresh tokens.
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"""
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record = storage.get_user_and_secret(payload.username)
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if record is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Incorrect username or password",
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)
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salt, pwd_hash, _jwt_secret = record
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if not hashing.verify_password(payload.password, salt, pwd_hash):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Incorrect username or password",
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)
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access_token = create_access_token(subject = payload.username)
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refresh_token = create_refresh_token(subject = payload.username)
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return Token(
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access_token = access_token,
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refresh_token = refresh_token,
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token_type = "bearer",
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)
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@router.post("/refresh", response_model = Token)
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async def refresh(payload: RefreshTokenRequest) -> Token:
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"""
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Exchange a valid refresh token for a new access token.
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The refresh token itself is reusable until it expires (7 days).
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"""
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new_access_token = refresh_access_token(payload.refresh_token)
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if new_access_token is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Invalid or expired refresh token",
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)
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return Token(
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access_token = new_access_token,
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refresh_token = payload.refresh_token,
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token_type = "bearer",
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)
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