unsloth/studio/backend/auth/storage.py
Daniel Han f08aef1804 Studio (#4237)
* Rebuild Studio branch on top of main

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Fix security and code quality issues for Studio PR #4237

- Validate models_dir query param against allowed directory roots
  to prevent path traversal in /api/models/local endpoint
- Replace string startswith() with Path.is_relative_to() for
  frontend path traversal check in serve_frontend
- Sanitize SSE error messages to not leak exception details to
  clients (4 locations in inference.py)
- Bind port-discovery socket to 127.0.0.1 instead of all interfaces
  in llama_cpp backend
- Import datasets_root and resolve_output_dir in embedding training
  function to fix NameError and use managed output directory
- Remove stale .gitignore entries for package-lock.json and test
  directories so tests can be tracked in version control
- Add venv-reexecution logic to ui CLI command matching the studio
  command behavior

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Move models_dir path validation before try/except block

The HTTPException(403) was inside the try/except Exception handler,
so it would be caught and re-raised as a 500. Moving the validation
before the try block ensures the 403 is returned directly and also
makes the control flow clearer for static analysis (path is validated
before any filesystem operations).

* Use os.path.realpath + startswith for models_dir validation

CodeQL py/path-injection does not recognize Path.is_relative_to() as
a sanitizer. Switched to os.path.realpath + str.startswith which is
a recognized sanitizer pattern in CodeQL's taint analysis. The
startswith check uses root_str + os.sep to prevent prefix collisions
(e.g. /app/models_evil matching /app/models).

* Never pass user input to Path constructor in models_dir validation

CodeQL traces taint through Path(resolved) even after a startswith
barrier guard. Fix: the user-supplied models_dir is only used as a
string for comparison against allowed roots. The Path object passed
to _scan_models_dir comes from the trusted allowed_roots list, not
from user input. This fully breaks the taint chain.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-12 03:36:19 -07:00

263 lines
7 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
"""
SQLite storage for authentication data (user credentials + JWT secret).
"""
import hashlib
import sqlite3
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Optional, Tuple
from utils.paths import auth_db_path, ensure_dir
DB_PATH = auth_db_path()
def _hash_token(token: str) -> str:
"""SHA-256 hash a setup token for safe storage."""
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
def get_connection() -> sqlite3.Connection:
"""Get a connection to the auth database, creating tables if needed."""
ensure_dir(DB_PATH.parent)
conn = sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
conn.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_user (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
username TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,
password_salt TEXT NOT NULL,
password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
jwt_secret TEXT NOT NULL
);
"""
)
conn.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS setup_tokens (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
token_hash TEXT NOT NULL
);
"""
)
conn.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refresh_tokens (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
token_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
username TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
"""
)
conn.commit()
return conn
def is_initialized() -> bool:
"""Check if auth has been set up (user exists in DB)."""
conn = get_connection()
cur = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM auth_user")
row = cur.fetchone()
conn.close()
return bool(row["c"])
def create_initial_user(username: str, password: str, jwt_secret: str) -> None:
"""
Create the initial admin user in the database.
Raises sqlite3.IntegrityError if username already exists.
"""
from .hashing import hash_password
salt, pwd_hash = hash_password(password)
conn = get_connection()
try:
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO auth_user (username, password_salt, password_hash, jwt_secret)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(username, salt, pwd_hash, jwt_secret),
)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
def delete_user(username: str) -> None:
"""
Delete a user from the database.
Used for rollback when setup fails after user creation.
"""
conn = get_connection()
try:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM auth_user WHERE username = ?", (username,))
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
def get_user_and_secret(username: str) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str, str]]:
"""
Get user's password salt, hash, and JWT secret.
Returns (password_salt, password_hash, jwt_secret) or None if user not found.
"""
conn = get_connection()
try:
cur = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT password_salt, password_hash, jwt_secret
FROM auth_user
WHERE username = ?
""",
(username,),
)
row = cur.fetchone()
if not row:
return None
return row["password_salt"], row["password_hash"], row["jwt_secret"]
finally:
conn.close()
def load_jwt_secret() -> str:
"""
Load the JWT secret from the database.
Raises RuntimeError if auth is not initialized.
"""
conn = get_connection()
try:
cur = conn.execute("SELECT jwt_secret FROM auth_user LIMIT 1")
row = cur.fetchone()
if not row:
raise RuntimeError(
"Auth is not initialized. Please set up a password first."
)
return row["jwt_secret"]
finally:
conn.close()
def save_setup_token(token: str) -> None:
"""
Store a hashed setup token, replacing any existing one.
"""
token_hash = _hash_token(token)
conn = get_connection()
try:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM setup_tokens")
conn.execute("INSERT INTO setup_tokens (token_hash) VALUES (?)", (token_hash,))
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
def consume_setup_token(token: str) -> bool:
"""
Verify a setup token and delete it if valid.
Returns True if the token was valid (and is now consumed), False otherwise.
"""
token_hash = _hash_token(token)
conn = get_connection()
try:
cur = conn.execute(
"SELECT id FROM setup_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?", (token_hash,)
)
row = cur.fetchone()
if row is None:
return False
conn.execute("DELETE FROM setup_tokens WHERE id = ?", (row["id"],))
conn.commit()
return True
finally:
conn.close()
def has_pending_setup_token() -> bool:
"""Check if a setup token is waiting to be consumed."""
conn = get_connection()
try:
cur = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM setup_tokens")
row = cur.fetchone()
return bool(row["c"])
finally:
conn.close()
def save_refresh_token(token: str, username: str, expires_at: str) -> None:
"""
Store a hashed refresh token with its associated username and expiry.
"""
token_hash = _hash_token(token)
conn = get_connection()
try:
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (token_hash, username, expires_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?)
""",
(token_hash, username, expires_at),
)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
def verify_refresh_token(token: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Verify a refresh token and return the username.
Returns the username if valid and not expired, None otherwise.
The token is NOT consumed — it stays valid until it expires.
"""
token_hash = _hash_token(token)
conn = get_connection()
try:
# Clean up any expired tokens while we're here
conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE expires_at < ?",
(datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),),
)
conn.commit()
cur = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT id, username, expires_at FROM refresh_tokens
WHERE token_hash = ?
""",
(token_hash,),
)
row = cur.fetchone()
if row is None:
return None
# Check expiry
expires_at = datetime.fromisoformat(row["expires_at"])
if datetime.now(timezone.utc) > expires_at:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE id = ?", (row["id"],))
conn.commit()
return None
return row["username"]
finally:
conn.close()
def revoke_user_refresh_tokens(username: str) -> None:
"""Revoke all refresh tokens for a user (e.g. on logout)."""
conn = get_connection()
try:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE username = ?", (username,))
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()