* Fix external drive custom folder selection * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Update studio/backend/tests/test_linux_external_media_paths.py Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Keep legacy media scan validation strict * Apply sensitive-dir denylist to legacy folder browser for PR #6799 The legacy /api/models browse endpoint gained the new /run/media mount roots in its allowlist but not the credential/config guard that scan-folder registration and the Hub browser already enforce. Filter sensitive names during enumeration and reject them in _resolve_browse_target so .ssh, .aws, .config, etc. under allowlisted roots stay unbrowseable, matching the Hub browser. Add a public contains_sensitive_path_component helper and cover the legacy resolver with a regression test. * Trim redundant comments in PR #6799 changes * Skip sensitive Linux media roots * Reject sensitive dirs at exact browse roots for PR #6799 Both _resolve_browse_target functions only checked contains_sensitive_path_component while walking descendant parts, so requesting an allowlisted root itself (empty relative path) returned it unchecked. A pre-existing scan-folder row under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config, etc. (registerable before the denylist was added) is re-added to the allowlist on upgrade and could then be browsed. Check the resolved target once before returning in both the legacy and Hub browsers, and cover the root case in both test suites. * fix: avoid unused path helper reexports * fix: import sensitive path helpers directly * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: imagineer99 <samleejackson0@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Lee Jackson <130007945+Imagineer99@users.noreply.github.com>
172 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
172 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""Persistence for user-registered custom model scan folders.
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Self-bootstrapping table inside the existing studio SQLite so the Hub module
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doesn't have to modify upstream studio_db.py's schema init."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import platform
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import sqlite3
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import threading
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from storage.studio_db import get_connection
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from hub.utils.paths import normalize_path
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from utils.paths.external_media import is_linux_run_media_path
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from utils.paths.sensitive import (
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contains_sensitive_path_component as _shared_contains_sensitive_path_component,
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)
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_schema_lock = threading.Lock()
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_schema_ready = False
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def _denied_path_prefixes() -> list[str]:
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system = platform.system()
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if system == "Linux":
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return ["/proc", "/sys", "/dev", "/etc", "/boot", "/run"]
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if system == "Darwin":
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# realpath() resolves /etc -> /private/etc, /tmp -> /private/tmp on macOS,
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# so include the /private variants to avoid bypasses.
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return [
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"/System",
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"/Library",
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"/dev",
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"/etc",
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"/private/etc",
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"/tmp",
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"/private/tmp",
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"/var",
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"/private/var",
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]
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if system == "Windows":
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win = os.environ.get("SystemRoot", r"C:\Windows")
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pf = os.environ.get("ProgramFiles", r"C:\Program Files")
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pf86 = os.environ.get("ProgramFiles(x86)", r"C:\Program Files (x86)")
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return [os.path.normcase(p) for p in [win, pf, pf86]]
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return []
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def _contains_sensitive_path_component(path: str) -> bool:
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return _shared_contains_sensitive_path_component(path)
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def contains_sensitive_path_component(path: str) -> bool:
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"""Public predicate for the credential/config denylist (.ssh, .aws, ...).
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Shared with the folder browser so browse and register enforce one policy."""
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return _contains_sensitive_path_component(path)
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def _ensure_schema(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
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global _schema_ready
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if _schema_ready:
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return
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with _schema_lock:
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if _schema_ready:
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return
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collation = "COLLATE NOCASE" if platform.system() == "Windows" else ""
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conn.execute(
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f"""
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS scan_folders (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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path TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE {collation},
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created_at TEXT NOT NULL
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)
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"""
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)
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conn.commit()
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_schema_ready = True
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def list_scan_folders() -> list[dict]:
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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_ensure_schema(conn)
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rows = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id, path, created_at FROM scan_folders ORDER BY created_at"
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).fetchall()
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return [dict(row) for row in rows]
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def add_scan_folder(path: str) -> dict:
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"""Add a readable directory for the local OS user; not a multi-user sandbox."""
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if not path or not path.strip():
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raise ValueError("Path cannot be empty")
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normalized = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(normalize_path(path.strip())))
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if not os.path.exists(normalized):
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raise ValueError("Path does not exist")
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if not os.path.isdir(normalized):
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raise ValueError("Path must be a directory, not a file")
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if not os.access(normalized, os.R_OK | os.X_OK):
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raise ValueError("Path is not readable")
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if os.path.dirname(normalized) == normalized:
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# Registering a filesystem root would expose denied system dirs via browse.
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raise ValueError("The filesystem root cannot be registered")
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if _contains_sensitive_path_component(normalized):
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raise ValueError("Credential or configuration directories are not allowed")
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is_win = platform.system() == "Windows"
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check = os.path.normcase(normalized) if is_win else normalized
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for prefix in _denied_path_prefixes():
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if check == prefix or check.startswith(prefix + os.sep):
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if prefix == "/run" and is_linux_run_media_path(check):
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continue
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raise ValueError(f"Path under {prefix} is not allowed")
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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_ensure_schema(conn)
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
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if is_win:
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existing = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id, path, created_at FROM scan_folders WHERE path = ? COLLATE NOCASE",
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(normalized,),
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).fetchone()
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else:
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existing = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id, path, created_at FROM scan_folders WHERE path = ?",
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(normalized,),
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).fetchone()
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if existing is not None:
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return dict(existing)
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try:
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conn.execute(
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"INSERT INTO scan_folders (path, created_at) VALUES (?, ?)",
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(normalized, now),
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)
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conn.commit()
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except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
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pass
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fallback_sql = (
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"SELECT id, path, created_at FROM scan_folders WHERE path = ? COLLATE NOCASE"
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if is_win
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else "SELECT id, path, created_at FROM scan_folders WHERE path = ?"
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)
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row = conn.execute(fallback_sql, (normalized,)).fetchone()
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if row is None:
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raise ValueError("Folder was concurrently removed")
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return dict(row)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def remove_scan_folder(id: int) -> None:
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# sqlite INTEGER is signed 64-bit; ids outside that range cannot exist.
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if not -(2**63) <= id < 2**63:
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return
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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_ensure_schema(conn)
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conn.execute("DELETE FROM scan_folders WHERE id = ?", (id,))
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conn.commit()
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finally:
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conn.close()
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