unsloth/.github/workflows/wheel-smoke.yml
Daniel Han 05d6a2f3ae
security: persist-credentials:false on every actions/checkout (org-wide sweep) (#5413)
## Threat model

When `actions/checkout` runs without `persist-credentials: false`,
the short-lived `GITHUB_TOKEN` injected at job start gets written
into the workspace's `.git/config` so subsequent Git operations
in the same job (push, fetch, etc.) can use it transparently.

Failure mode if a downstream step packages the workspace:

  1. Step T fetches the repo via `actions/checkout` (token in
     `.git/config`).
  2. Step T+N packages the workspace -- or `logs/`, or a `dist/`
     dir that lives inside the workspace -- via
     `actions/upload-artifact`. The hidden `.git/` folder rides
     along.
  3. While the workflow is still running, the uploaded zip is
     immediately downloadable via the GitHub UI / API. On a
     PUBLIC repo, any logged-in GitHub user can download it.
  4. The attacker extracts the live `GITHUB_TOKEN` from
     `.git/config` and uses it to push code, modify branches,
     comment on / close PRs, etc., before the token expires at
     end-of-workflow (typically 1-6 hours).

This is a moderate-risk class because our long-running workflows
(Studio inference smoke, full Tauri build, MLX install on macOS)
keep the token alive for 30+ minutes -- plenty of window.

## What changes

Adds `with: persist-credentials: false` to all 51
`actions/checkout` call sites across 23 workflows. None of our
workflows actually use the persisted credentials -- the only
push-back operations are `gh release create / upload` in
release-desktop.yml, and those go through `${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`
explicitly (NOT via the persisted .git/config token).

So the sweep is universal -- no exceptions, no broken push-paths,
no required follow-up.

## Verification

- 51 checkout calls / 51 persist-credentials lines (one-to-one).
- All 24 workflow YAMLs still parse cleanly under PyYAML.
- No push-back-via-persisted-creds call site exists -- grepped
  the workflow tree for `git push`, `git remote update`, etc.
  Zero matches outside intentional `gh release ...` calls that
  explicitly forward `${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`.

## Companion PR

unslothai/unsloth-zoo PR #637 (the greenfield CI mirror) gets the
same sweep on its 9 checkout sites in commit 1e6c0b0. Filed there
rather than as a separate PR to keep the related changes
together.
2026-05-13 22:02:35 -07:00

138 lines
5.4 KiB
YAML

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved.
# Builds the PyPI wheel from the PR branch, then verifies the built wheel
# actually contains what we expect to ship and does NOT contain the broken
# Studio bundle that 2026.5.1 published. This is the single workflow that
# would have blocked the 2026.5.1 release before twine upload.
#
# Verified locally end-to-end against this branch:
# - python -m build produces unsloth-<version>-py3-none-any.whl in 13s
# - wheel content sanity passes:
# lockfile shipped, frontend dist shipped,
# no node_modules in wheel, no bun.lock in wheel,
# main bundle has unstable_Provider hits=1 (assistant-ui internals only).
# - Studio backend imports cleanly from the installed wheel with the
# lightweight dep set below.
name: Wheel CI
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- 'pyproject.toml'
- 'studio/**'
- 'unsloth/**'
- 'unsloth_cli/**'
- '.github/workflows/wheel-smoke.yml'
push:
branches: [main, pip]
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
wheel:
name: Wheel build + content sanity + import smoke
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: 'npm'
cache-dependency-path: studio/frontend/package-lock.json
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6.2.0
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- name: Lockfile supply-chain audit (pre-install scan)
run: python3 scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py
- name: Build frontend
# Lifecycle scripts (esbuild native-binary postinstall, etc.) are
# required for `vite build`. The pre-install lockfile structural
# audit (lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py) is the practical defence
# against the npm postinstall-dropper class -- it fires BEFORE any
# tarball runs, on the injection pattern itself rather than an
# advisory-DB lookup.
run: |
cd studio/frontend
npm ci --no-fund --no-audit
npm run build
- name: Build wheel + sdist
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip build
rm -rf dist build ./*.egg-info
python -m build
- name: Wheel content sanity
run: |
python - <<'PY'
import zipfile, glob, sys
w = glob.glob("dist/unsloth-*.whl")
if not w:
print("FAIL: no wheel produced"); sys.exit(2)
w = w[0]
print(f"wheel: {w}")
with zipfile.ZipFile(w) as z:
n = z.namelist()
checks = {
"lockfile shipped": any(s.endswith("studio/frontend/package-lock.json") for s in n),
"frontend dist shipped": any(s.endswith("studio/frontend/dist/index.html") for s in n),
"no node_modules": not any("studio/frontend/node_modules/" in s for s in n),
"no bun.lock": not any(s.endswith("studio/frontend/bun.lock") for s in n),
}
js = [s for s in n
if "studio/frontend/dist/assets/" in s
and s.endswith(".js")
and "/index-" in s]
if not js:
print("FAIL: no main bundle index-*.js in wheel"); sys.exit(2)
data = z.read(js[0]).decode("utf-8", "replace")
hits = data.count("unstable_Provider:")
print(f"main bundle: {js[0]}")
print(f"unstable_Provider hits: {hits} (>=4 indicates 2026.5.1 regression)")
checks["bundle has no Studio unstable_Provider call site"] = (hits < 4)
print()
for k, v in checks.items():
print(f" [{'PASS' if v else 'FAIL'}] {k}")
sys.exit(0 if all(checks.values()) else 1)
PY
- name: Studio backend import smoke
# Imports `studio.backend.main:app` from the freshly-installed wheel in
# a clean venv. This catches the class of bug that 2026.5.1 shipped with:
# frontend dist missing, package-lock.json missing, or the wheel's Python
# source tree broken in a way that surfaces only at app construction time.
run: |
python -m venv /tmp/v
/tmp/v/bin/pip install --upgrade pip
/tmp/v/bin/pip install -r studio/backend/requirements/studio.txt
/tmp/v/bin/pip install \
python-multipart aiofiles sqlalchemy cryptography \
pyyaml jinja2 mammoth unpdf requests \
'numpy<3'
/tmp/v/bin/pip install --no-deps dist/unsloth-*.whl
# Run from /tmp so Python imports the installed package, not the source tree.
cd /tmp
/tmp/v/bin/python -c "from studio.backend.main import app; print('Studio backend OK:', app.title)"
- name: Upload wheel on failure
if: failure()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: unsloth-wheel
path: dist/
retention-days: 7