* add unsloth studio desktop app
* Fix review findings
- studio/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json: retarget updater to staging repo
(danielhanchen/unsloth-staging-2); switch to unslothai/unsloth on upstream merge.
- studio/src-tauri/linux/postremove.sh: drop the interactive read loop and the
/home/* iteration. Package maintainer scripts must stay non-interactive and
must not touch other users' data.
- studio/frontend/src/app/auth-guards.ts: honor tauriAutoAuth() boolean. Failed
auto-auth now redirects to /login; requireGuest/requirePasswordChangeFlow
only redirect to /chat when auth succeeds. The new early-return on failed
auth is intentional so the login / change-password flows remain reachable
when desktop auth is not yet established.
- studio/frontend/src/config/env.ts: keep fetched=false on health failure so
later calls retry instead of caching the client-side platform guess.
- studio/src-tauri/src/install.rs: pick the available system package manager
(apt-get, dnf, zypper, pacman); AppImage bundles run on non-Debian distros.
- studio/frontend/src/lib/open-link.ts + markdown-text/sources callers: return
boolean from openLink so callers only preventDefault on handled URLs; relative
hrefs now navigate natively.
- studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/about-tab.tsx: fetch(apiUrl(...))
so the version request targets the backend port in desktop mode. The bare
/api/health predates the Tauri webview (blame: the earlier onboarding commit,
which ran with same-origin frontend/backend); in desktop mode the webview
origin is tauri://localhost so the bare path fails.
- install.ps1: gate the install_python_stack.py hotfix on a sentinel comment
instead of a content regex; append the sentinel after applying so reruns
are unambiguous.
- unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py _write_auth_secret: use the atomic mkstemp +
os.replace path on Windows too; chmod calls are wrapped in try/except OSError.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs probe_existing_backends: fan out the health
probes concurrently; desktop-auth status still runs sequentially per candidate.
reqwest::Client is internally Arc-wrapped so the in-loop .clone() is a
refcount bump, not a deep clone; annotated inline.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs run_cli_probe: wait() after kill() to reap
the child, matching probe_cli_capability.
- studio/src-tauri/src/process.rs + main.rs: add stop_backend_detached and use
it from the tray quit handler so the 5s graceful-wait does not block the
Tauri main loop. RunEvent::Exit keeps the synchronous safety-net call.
- studio/backend/main.py: drop the permissive localhost CORS regex in
api-only mode; the explicit allow_origins list is sufficient.
- .github/workflows/release-desktop.yml: drop max-parallel: 1 so platform
builds run in parallel, and lift releaseBody to an env var so the three
tauri-action invocations share one source of truth.
* Fix review findings (loop 2)
- studio/backend/auth/storage.py update_password: clear_desktop_secret()
alongside clear_bootstrap_password() so rotating the admin password
also revokes any previously provisioned .desktop_secret. Without this,
an old local desktop credential keeps minting fresh admin tokens via
/api/auth/desktop-login after a password rotation.
- studio/src-tauri/src/desktop_auth.rs provision_desktop_auth: wrap
cmd.output().await in tokio::time::timeout(30s). DESKTOP_AUTH_LOCK is
held across the whole desktop_auth flow, and previously a hanging
`unsloth studio provision-desktop-auth` subprocess would pin the lock
indefinitely and freeze every subsequent desktop_auth call.
* Add review tests
* Consolidate review tests
Merge review-added tests into the existing studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
(the PR's authoritative desktop-auth test file). Drops three scaffolding files under
tests/python/ in favor of five focused tests next to the tests they extend:
- test_update_password_clears_desktop_secret (runtime)
- test_update_password_on_unknown_user_leaves_desktop_secret_intact (runtime)
- test_cli_provisioning_delegates_to_storage_create_desktop_secret (source-level)
- test_cli_connect_auth_db_reads_storage_db_path (source-level)
- test_desktop_auth_provision_has_bounded_timeout (Rust source-level)
* Revert auth-guards.ts Tauri branches to unconditional form
The review loop on PR 5144 introduced a regression: the isTauri branch of
requireAuth redirected to /login when tauriAutoAuth() returned false, and
requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow silently fell through on the same
condition. The Tauri desktop app authenticates via a local auto-generated
secret; it must never surface /login or /change-password to the user. A
failed auto-auth should let the startup layer retry, not expose a password
form.
Restore the three Tauri branches to the author's original unconditional
form (requireAuth: return; requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow: throw
redirect({to: '/chat'})). Keep the rest of the review fixes -- the
apiUrl() fetch wrapping, authRedirect helper, and fetchAuthStatus refactor
are all legitimate improvements and are preserved.
* Revert release-desktop.yml to author's version
The review loop's workflow-file tweaks (drop max-parallel: 1, lift releaseBody
to an env var) are cosmetic. OAuth tokens cannot push workflow-file changes,
and fine-grained PATs cannot honor maintainerCanModify on a third-party fork.
Reverting the workflow file to wasimysaid's version lets the push go through
without needing a classic PAT with both repo and workflow scopes.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Lee Jackson <130007945+Imagineer99@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <unslothai@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
683 lines
21 KiB
Python
683 lines
21 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""
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SQLite storage for authentication data (user credentials + JWT secret).
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"""
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import hashlib
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import os
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import secrets
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import sqlite3
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from typing import Optional, Tuple
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from utils.paths import auth_db_path, ensure_dir
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DB_PATH = auth_db_path()
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DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME = "unsloth"
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# Plaintext bootstrap password file — lives beside auth.db, deleted on
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# first password change so the credential never lingers on disk.
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_BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH = DB_PATH.parent / ".bootstrap_password"
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# In-process cache so we don't re-read the file on every HTML serve.
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_bootstrap_password: Optional[str] = None
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def generate_bootstrap_password() -> str:
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"""Generate a 4-word diceware passphrase and persist it to disk.
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The passphrase is written to ``_BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH`` so that it
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survives server restarts (the DB only stores the *hash*). On
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subsequent calls / restarts, the persisted value is returned.
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"""
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global _bootstrap_password
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# 1. Already cached in this process?
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if _bootstrap_password is not None:
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return _bootstrap_password
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# 2. Already persisted from a previous run?
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if _BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH.is_file():
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_bootstrap_password = _BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH.read_text().strip()
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if _bootstrap_password:
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return _bootstrap_password
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# 3. First-ever startup — generate a fresh passphrase.
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import diceware
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_bootstrap_password = diceware.get_passphrase(
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options = diceware.handle_options(args = ["-n", "4", "-d", "", "-c"])
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)
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# Persist so the *same* passphrase is used if the server restarts
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# before the user changes the password.
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ensure_dir(_BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH.parent)
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_BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH.write_text(_bootstrap_password)
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try:
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os.chmod(_BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH, 0o600)
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except OSError:
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pass
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return _bootstrap_password
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def get_bootstrap_password() -> Optional[str]:
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"""Return the cached bootstrap password, or None if not yet generated."""
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return _bootstrap_password
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def _load_bootstrap_password() -> Optional[str]:
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"""Load an existing bootstrap password without creating one."""
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global _bootstrap_password
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_bootstrap_password = None
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if _BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH.is_file():
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bootstrap_password = _BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH.read_text().strip()
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if bootstrap_password:
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_bootstrap_password = bootstrap_password
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return _bootstrap_password
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def clear_bootstrap_password() -> None:
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"""Delete the persisted bootstrap password file (called after password change)."""
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global _bootstrap_password
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_bootstrap_password = None
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if _BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH.is_file():
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_BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH.unlink(missing_ok = True)
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def _hash_token(token: str) -> str:
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"""SHA-256 hash helper used for refresh token storage.
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Plain SHA-256 is intentional here: refresh tokens are high-entropy
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random strings from ``secrets.token_urlsafe(48)`` (384 bits of
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entropy), so a slow KDF (Argon2 / bcrypt / PBKDF2) provides zero
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additional security — no attacker can brute-force 2^384 regardless
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of hash speed — while adding tens of ms of CPU to every refresh.
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See the OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet on fast-vs-slow hashing
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of high-entropy inputs.
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API keys use the separate ``_pbkdf2_api_key`` helper below, which
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runs PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with a persistent server-side salt — not
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for cryptographic reasons (128-bit random tokens don't need slow
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hashing), but because CodeQL's ``py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing``
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query mislabels API keys as passwords and demands a KDF.
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"""
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return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
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def get_connection() -> sqlite3.Connection:
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"""Get a connection to the auth database, creating tables if needed."""
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ensure_dir(DB_PATH.parent)
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conn = sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH)
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conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
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conn.execute(
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"""
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_user (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
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username TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,
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password_salt TEXT NOT NULL,
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password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
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jwt_secret TEXT NOT NULL,
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must_change_password INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
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);
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"""
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)
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conn.execute(
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"""
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refresh_tokens (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
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token_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
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username TEXT NOT NULL,
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expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
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is_desktop INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
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);
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"""
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)
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conn.execute(
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"""
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS api_keys (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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username TEXT NOT NULL,
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key_prefix TEXT NOT NULL,
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key_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
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last_used_at TEXT,
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expires_at TEXT,
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is_active INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1
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);
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"""
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)
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conn.execute(
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"""
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_secrets (
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key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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value TEXT NOT NULL
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);
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"""
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)
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columns = {row["name"] for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(auth_user)")}
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if "must_change_password" not in columns:
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conn.execute(
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"ALTER TABLE auth_user ADD COLUMN must_change_password INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"
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)
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refresh_columns = {
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row["name"] for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(refresh_tokens)")
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}
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if "is_desktop" not in refresh_columns:
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conn.execute(
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"ALTER TABLE refresh_tokens ADD COLUMN is_desktop INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"
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)
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conn.commit()
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return conn
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# ── API-key PBKDF2 salt ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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#
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# Module-level cache for the persistent API-key PBKDF2 salt. Populated
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# lazily on first use via ``_get_or_create_api_key_pbkdf2_salt``. Not
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# protected by a lock because (a) the ``INSERT OR IGNORE`` provides
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# atomicity at the SQLite layer and (b) concurrent populations converge
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# on the same value, so the worst case is a harmless duplicate read on
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# startup.
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_api_key_pbkdf2_salt_cache: Optional[bytes] = None
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def _get_or_create_api_key_pbkdf2_salt() -> bytes:
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"""Return the persistent API-key PBKDF2 salt, generating it once if missing.
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Stored as a hex-encoded 32-byte random value in the ``app_secrets``
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table under key ``"api_key_pbkdf2_salt"``. Regenerated only if the row
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is missing (i.e. fresh install, or operator manually deleted the row
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and accepts invalidating existing API keys).
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"""
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global _api_key_pbkdf2_salt_cache
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if _api_key_pbkdf2_salt_cache is not None:
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return _api_key_pbkdf2_salt_cache
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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cur = conn.execute(
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"SELECT value FROM app_secrets WHERE key = ?",
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("api_key_pbkdf2_salt",),
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)
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row = cur.fetchone()
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if row is None:
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new_value = secrets.token_hex(32) # 32 bytes -> 64 hex chars
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conn.execute(
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"INSERT OR IGNORE INTO app_secrets (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)",
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("api_key_pbkdf2_salt", new_value),
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)
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conn.commit()
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cur = conn.execute(
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"SELECT value FROM app_secrets WHERE key = ?",
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("api_key_pbkdf2_salt",),
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)
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row = cur.fetchone()
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salt = bytes.fromhex(row["value"])
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finally:
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conn.close()
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_api_key_pbkdf2_salt_cache = salt
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return salt
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_API_KEY_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 100_000
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DESKTOP_SECRET_PREFIX = "desktop-"
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_DESKTOP_SECRET_HASH_KEY = "desktop_secret_hash"
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_DESKTOP_SECRET_CREATED_AT_KEY = "desktop_secret_created_at"
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def _pbkdf2_api_key(raw_key: str) -> str:
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"""PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 an API key with a persistent server-side salt.
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Used for API-key storage ONLY, not refresh tokens. Matches the
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PBKDF2 algorithm + iteration count used by the password hasher in
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``auth/hashing.py`` so the codebase is consistent on which KDF it
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uses for credential storage.
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Notes on why a slow KDF here is *only* a CodeQL appeasement and
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*not* a cryptographic requirement: API keys are cryptographically
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random 128-bit tokens (via ``secrets.token_hex``), so brute force
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against 2^128 is infeasible regardless of hash speed. CodeQL's
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``py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing`` query mislabels these tokens as
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"password" sensitive data and then demands a KDF from its
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allowlist (Argon2 / scrypt / bcrypt / PBKDF2). Per the query's
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own recommendation page we use PBKDF2. The persistent salt is
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still loaded from ``app_secrets`` so an attacker dumping the
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``api_keys`` table alone cannot derive hashes for candidate
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tokens without also obtaining the salt row.
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"""
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salt = _get_or_create_api_key_pbkdf2_salt()
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dk = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(
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"sha256",
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raw_key.encode("utf-8"),
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salt,
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_API_KEY_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS,
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)
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return dk.hex()
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def _pbkdf2_desktop_secret(raw_secret: str) -> str:
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return _pbkdf2_api_key(raw_secret)
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def is_initialized() -> bool:
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"""Check if auth is ready for login (at least one user exists in DB)."""
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conn = get_connection()
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cur = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM auth_user")
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row = cur.fetchone()
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conn.close()
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return bool(row["c"])
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def create_initial_user(
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username: str,
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password: str,
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jwt_secret: str,
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*,
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must_change_password: bool = False,
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) -> None:
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"""
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Create the initial admin user in the database.
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Raises sqlite3.IntegrityError if username already exists.
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"""
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from .hashing import hash_password
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salt, pwd_hash = hash_password(password)
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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conn.execute(
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"""
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INSERT INTO auth_user (
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username,
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password_salt,
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password_hash,
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jwt_secret,
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must_change_password
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)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
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""",
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(username, salt, pwd_hash, jwt_secret, int(must_change_password)),
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)
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conn.commit()
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def delete_user(username: str) -> None:
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"""
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Delete a user from the database.
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Used for rollback when user creation fails partway through bootstrap.
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"""
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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conn.execute("DELETE FROM auth_user WHERE username = ?", (username,))
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conn.commit()
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def get_user_and_secret(username: str) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str, str, bool]]:
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"""
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Get user's password salt, hash, and JWT secret.
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Returns (password_salt, password_hash, jwt_secret, must_change_password)
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or None if user not found.
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"""
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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cur = conn.execute(
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"""
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SELECT password_salt, password_hash, jwt_secret, must_change_password
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FROM auth_user
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WHERE username = ?
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""",
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(username,),
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)
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row = cur.fetchone()
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if not row:
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return None
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return (
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row["password_salt"],
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row["password_hash"],
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row["jwt_secret"],
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bool(row["must_change_password"]),
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)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def get_jwt_secret(username: str) -> Optional[str]:
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"""Return the current JWT signing secret for a user."""
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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cur = conn.execute(
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"SELECT jwt_secret FROM auth_user WHERE username = ?",
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(username,),
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)
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row = cur.fetchone()
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return row["jwt_secret"] if row else None
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def requires_password_change(username: str) -> bool:
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"""Return whether the user must change the seeded default password."""
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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cur = conn.execute(
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"SELECT must_change_password FROM auth_user WHERE username = ?",
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(username,),
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)
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row = cur.fetchone()
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return bool(row and row["must_change_password"])
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def load_jwt_secret() -> str:
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"""
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Load the JWT secret from the database.
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Raises RuntimeError if no auth user has been created yet.
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"""
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conn = get_connection()
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try:
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cur = conn.execute("SELECT jwt_secret FROM auth_user LIMIT 1")
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row = cur.fetchone()
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if not row:
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raise RuntimeError(
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"Auth is not initialized. Wait for the seeded admin bootstrap to complete."
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)
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return row["jwt_secret"]
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def ensure_default_admin() -> bool:
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"""Seed the default admin account on first startup.
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Uses a randomly generated diceware passphrase as the bootstrap password.
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Returns True when the default admin was created in this call.
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"""
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if get_user_and_secret(DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME) is not None:
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_load_bootstrap_password()
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return False
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bootstrap_pw = generate_bootstrap_password()
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try:
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create_initial_user(
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username = DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME,
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password = bootstrap_pw,
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jwt_secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(64),
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must_change_password = True,
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)
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return True
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|
except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def update_password(username: str, new_password: str) -> bool:
|
|
"""Update password, clear first-login requirement, rotate JWT secret."""
|
|
from .hashing import hash_password
|
|
|
|
salt, pwd_hash = hash_password(new_password)
|
|
jwt_secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(64)
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
cursor = conn.execute(
|
|
"""
|
|
UPDATE auth_user
|
|
SET password_salt = ?, password_hash = ?, jwt_secret = ?, must_change_password = 0
|
|
WHERE username = ?
|
|
""",
|
|
(salt, pwd_hash, jwt_secret, username),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
if cursor.rowcount > 0:
|
|
clear_bootstrap_password()
|
|
clear_desktop_secret()
|
|
return cursor.rowcount > 0
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def save_refresh_token(
|
|
token: str,
|
|
username: str,
|
|
expires_at: str,
|
|
*,
|
|
is_desktop: bool = False,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""
|
|
Store a hashed refresh token with its associated username and expiry.
|
|
"""
|
|
token_hash = _hash_token(token)
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"""
|
|
INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (token_hash, username, expires_at, is_desktop)
|
|
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
|
|
""",
|
|
(token_hash, username, expires_at, int(is_desktop)),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def verify_refresh_token(token: str) -> Optional[Tuple[str, bool]]:
|
|
"""
|
|
Verify a refresh token and return the username plus desktop marker.
|
|
|
|
Returns the username and desktop marker if valid and not expired, None otherwise.
|
|
The token is NOT consumed — it stays valid until it expires.
|
|
"""
|
|
token_hash = _hash_token(token)
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
# Clean up any expired tokens while we're here
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE expires_at < ?",
|
|
(datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
|
|
cur = conn.execute(
|
|
"""
|
|
SELECT id, username, expires_at, is_desktop FROM refresh_tokens
|
|
WHERE token_hash = ?
|
|
""",
|
|
(token_hash,),
|
|
)
|
|
row = cur.fetchone()
|
|
if row is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
# Check expiry
|
|
expires_at = datetime.fromisoformat(row["expires_at"])
|
|
if datetime.now(timezone.utc) > expires_at:
|
|
conn.execute("DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE id = ?", (row["id"],))
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
return row["username"], bool(row["is_desktop"])
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def revoke_user_refresh_tokens(username: str) -> None:
|
|
"""Revoke all refresh tokens for a user (e.g. on logout)."""
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
conn.execute("DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE username = ?", (username,))
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def create_desktop_secret() -> str:
|
|
"""Create/rotate the local desktop credential and return it once."""
|
|
ensure_default_admin()
|
|
raw_secret = DESKTOP_SECRET_PREFIX + secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
|
|
secret_hash = _pbkdf2_desktop_secret(raw_secret)
|
|
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO app_secrets (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)",
|
|
(_DESKTOP_SECRET_HASH_KEY, secret_hash),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO app_secrets (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)",
|
|
(_DESKTOP_SECRET_CREATED_AT_KEY, now),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
return raw_secret
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def validate_desktop_secret(raw_secret: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""Return the real admin username when the desktop secret matches."""
|
|
if not raw_secret.startswith(DESKTOP_SECRET_PREFIX):
|
|
return None
|
|
if get_user_and_secret(DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME) is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
secret_hash = _pbkdf2_desktop_secret(raw_secret)
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
cur = conn.execute(
|
|
"SELECT value FROM app_secrets WHERE key = ?",
|
|
(_DESKTOP_SECRET_HASH_KEY,),
|
|
)
|
|
row = cur.fetchone()
|
|
if row is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
if not secrets.compare_digest(row["value"], secret_hash):
|
|
return None
|
|
return DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def clear_desktop_secret() -> None:
|
|
"""Remove backend-side desktop auth state."""
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"DELETE FROM app_secrets WHERE key IN (?, ?)",
|
|
(_DESKTOP_SECRET_HASH_KEY, _DESKTOP_SECRET_CREATED_AT_KEY),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# API key management
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
API_KEY_PREFIX = "sk-unsloth-"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def create_api_key(
|
|
username: str,
|
|
name: str,
|
|
expires_at: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
) -> Tuple[str, dict]:
|
|
"""Create a new API key for *username*.
|
|
|
|
Returns ``(raw_key, row_dict)`` where *raw_key* is shown to the user
|
|
exactly once. The database only stores the SHA-256 hash.
|
|
"""
|
|
raw_key = API_KEY_PREFIX + secrets.token_hex(16)
|
|
key_hash = _pbkdf2_api_key(raw_key)
|
|
key_prefix = raw_key[len(API_KEY_PREFIX) : len(API_KEY_PREFIX) + 8]
|
|
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
|
|
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"""
|
|
INSERT INTO api_keys (username, key_prefix, key_hash, name, created_at, expires_at)
|
|
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
|
|
""",
|
|
(username, key_prefix, key_hash, name, now, expires_at),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
cur = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM api_keys WHERE key_hash = ?", (key_hash,))
|
|
row = cur.fetchone()
|
|
return raw_key, dict(row)
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def list_api_keys(username: str) -> list:
|
|
"""Return all API keys for *username* (never exposes ``key_hash``)."""
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
cur = conn.execute(
|
|
"""
|
|
SELECT id, username, key_prefix, name, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, is_active
|
|
FROM api_keys
|
|
WHERE username = ?
|
|
ORDER BY created_at DESC
|
|
""",
|
|
(username,),
|
|
)
|
|
return [dict(row) for row in cur.fetchall()]
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def revoke_api_key(username: str, key_id: int) -> bool:
|
|
"""Soft-delete an API key. Returns True if a matching row was found."""
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
cursor = conn.execute(
|
|
"UPDATE api_keys SET is_active = 0 WHERE id = ? AND username = ?",
|
|
(key_id, username),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
return cursor.rowcount > 0
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def validate_api_key(raw_key: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""Validate *raw_key* and return the owning username, or ``None``.
|
|
|
|
Also updates ``last_used_at`` on success.
|
|
"""
|
|
key_hash = _pbkdf2_api_key(raw_key)
|
|
conn = get_connection()
|
|
try:
|
|
cur = conn.execute(
|
|
"SELECT id, username, is_active, expires_at FROM api_keys WHERE key_hash = ?",
|
|
(key_hash,),
|
|
)
|
|
row = cur.fetchone()
|
|
if row is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
if not row["is_active"]:
|
|
return None
|
|
if row["expires_at"] is not None:
|
|
expires = datetime.fromisoformat(row["expires_at"])
|
|
if datetime.now(timezone.utc) > expires:
|
|
return None
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"UPDATE api_keys SET last_used_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
|
|
(datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(), row["id"]),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
return row["username"]
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|