29f2829582
HTTP-level integration smoke for the Studio FastAPI surface, no
Playwright. ~30 s per run on warm cache. Boots a fresh Studio, then
asserts:
1. CORS hardening -- no wildcard-origin + credentials=true; cross-
origin GET / does not leak the bootstrap password to evil.example.
2. /api/system + /api/system/hardware + /api/system/gpu-visibility
all require auth (closes the info-disclosure leak).
3. Auth state machine -- rotation invariants (old=401, new=200),
refresh-without-body returns 4xx, login burst documents the
current "no rate-limit" behaviour so future hardening updates the
test in the same PR.
4. JWT-expiry forgery -- mint a JWT with exp=now-1 using the install's
own secret + assert it returns 401.
5. API key lifecycle E2E -- create -> list -> use against
/v1/chat/completions -> delete -> verify 401.
6. Auth file-mode hardening (Linux only): auth/ is 0700, auth.db +
-wal + -shm + .bootstrap_password are 0600.
7. Inference lifecycle gaps -- /v1/models lists the loaded model,
/v1/embeddings + /v1/responses return 200 OR structured 4xx,
bogus gguf_variant rejected, force-reload swaps the llama-server
PID.
8. Endpoint-by-endpoint auth audit -- pins the EXPECTED auth posture
for known routes; an unauthenticated /api/shutdown is rejected
BEFORE the shutdown trigger fires.
Reuses the same GGUF cache key as studio-ui-smoke.yml so the model
download is one cache-hit across CI.
Random per-run rotated passwords + ::add-mask:: pattern matches
studio-ui-smoke.yml + studio-inference-smoke.yml.
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| ISSUE_TEMPLATE | ||
| workflows | ||
| CODEOWNERS | ||
| dependabot.yml | ||
| FUNDING.yml | ||