006bf4479e
The python tool's static safety analysis (_check_signal_escape_patterns) was purely name-based with no attribute visitor, so obfuscated routes to the shell / network / file policies it already enforces slipped past: eval / exec / compile, __import__ / importlib with a computed or dangerous module name, getattr / setattr aimed at os / subprocess / sys / builtins, and dunder gadget chains (().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()). Add a dynamic_exec category covering those, surfaced through _check_code_safety alongside the existing categories. Dynamic import stays allowed for a benign literal module name (huggingface_hub, json, numpy) so real workflows and the HF upload gate keep working; ordinary getattr(obj, "field") and __class__ access stay benign. Bypass Permissions (disable_sandbox) still skips the check. Tests: TestDynamicExecObfuscation in test_sandbox_tools.py with matching benign cases, giving _check_signal_escape_patterns its first direct coverage. |
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| .. | ||
| backend | ||
| frontend | ||
| src-tauri | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| install_llama_prebuilt.py | ||
| install_node_prebuilt.py | ||
| install_python_stack.py | ||
| LICENSE.AGPL-3.0 | ||
| node_prebuilt_pins.json | ||
| package-lock.json | ||
| package.json | ||
| setup.bat | ||
| setup.ps1 | ||
| setup.sh | ||
| Unsloth_Studio_Colab.ipynb | ||