unsloth/tests/security/test_scan_packages.py
Daniel Han ef9f672fe8
security: NOT affected by Mini Shai-Hulud (May-12 wave) -- forward-looking hardening only (#5397)
* scripts/scan_*: add Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 IOC strings and pin-blocklists

Append the May-12 2026 wave indicators (git-tanstack.com, transformers.pyz,
/tmp/transformers.pyz, "With Love TeamPCP", "We've been online over 2 hours")
to all three scanner IOC tables, add BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS (42 TanStack pkgs,
4 opensearch versions, 3 squawk pkgs) in scan_npm_packages.py and
lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py (kept byte-identical), add BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
(guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6, lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3) plus
RE_MAY12_IOC wiring across check_py_file/check_shell_file/check_workflow_file
in scan_packages.py. The npm orchestrator and the lockfile auditor now
short-circuit on a blocked entry before fetching the tarball, and the
PyPI download pipeline drops blocked specs before pip download is invoked.

* tests/security: regression suite for supply-chain scanners

Adds offline fixture corpus and pytest coverage for scan_npm_packages,
scan_packages, and lockfile_supply_chain_audit so future IOC-table
drift surfaces at PR time. Pytest scope narrowed to tests/security so
GPU smoke tests are not picked up by default.

* ci(security-audit): drop continue-on-error on pip-scan and npm-scan jobs

Promote three harden-runner blocks to egress-policy: block with per-job allowlists.
Add tests-security job running pytest tests/security as a hard gate.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts: harden third-party downloads, pip resolver pins, atomic writes

Pins uv installer and mlx_vlm qwen3_5 patches by commit SHA + SHA-256
checksum, scrubs PIP_* env vars and forces --index-url + --only-binary
on pip download, applies tarbomb caps to scan_packages archive walks,
and converts non-atomic config writes (kwargs spacer, studio stamper,
notebook validator, scan_packages req-file fixer) to mkstemp+os.replace.

Also adds host allowlist to notebook_to_python downloader, threads an
--allow-shell flag through its shell=True emission with reviewer warning
comments, locks both MLX installer scripts to set -euo pipefail, and
extends CODEOWNERS so colab snapshot data files require notebook-owner
review.

* ci(workflows): harden release-desktop / smoke / notebooks workflows

Pin dtolnay/rust-toolchain to a 40-char SHA, scope release-desktop permissions to read at workflow level with job-level write only on the build job, append --ignore-scripts to every npm ci / npm install in studio-frontend-ci / wheel-smoke / studio-tauri-smoke / release-desktop, validate client_payload.ref shape via an env-var-isolated regex on every notebooks-ci job, and add step-security/harden-runner in audit mode as the first step of release-desktop and mlx-ci.

* scripts: promote silent scanner failures to non-zero exit codes
scan_packages now returns 2 on pip-download failure and emits a CRITICAL archive_corrupted finding on truncated wheels/sdists.
notebook_to_python exits 1 on per-notebook failures; notebook_validator wraps the stash/pop in try/finally; lockfile audit rejects bare UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=1 with a loud GitHub Actions warning.

* Add npm cooldown + new-install-script gate + Dependabot cooldown

Pins min-release-age=7 (npm 11.10+) in repo-root and studio/frontend
.npmrc, adds scripts/check_new_install_scripts.py to fail PRs that
add a postinstall dep, ships a new security-audit job for npm audit
signatures plus the diff, and extends .github/dependabot.yml with
cooldown stanzas. Pin @tanstack/react-router to 1.169.9 per GHSA-
g7cv-rxg3-hmpx; lockfile regen deferred until that release lands on
npm. tests/security gains 4 new tests; full suite 26/26 green.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(security): fix tanstack pin, exec bits, expand IOC tables to @uipath/@squawk full

- Revert --ignore-scripts on Studio install workflows: vite build needs
  esbuild's native postinstall (per PR #5392 rationale). Keep
  --ignore-scripts on security-audit.yml's standalone npm audit job.
- Pin @tanstack/react-router to the actual published 1.169.2 (was a
  forward-looking 1.169.9 that does not exist on npm; broke npm ci).
- Drop redundant repo-root .npmrc; studio/frontend/.npmrc covers the
  only npm project today (root cooldown re-instate via dependabot.yml).
- Restore exec bits on 7 files my filesystem stripped during cherry-pick.
- Expand BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS with full safedep.io + Aikido enumeration:
  22 @squawk/* packages with 5 versions each (110 entries; previously
  3 entries with 1 version each), and 66 @uipath/* packages (entirely
  missing before). Mirror in scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* tests/security: suppress CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization

The two flagged 'X' in Y assertions are NOT URL sanitization checks.
They verify our scanner WROTE a known IOC literal into its stdout /
Finding.evidence, which is the opposite of an attack surface --
matching the scanner's output is precisely what catches the worm.
Inline lgtm[] suppression with a 4-line rationale comment above each.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts/scan_*: expand IOC tables with Aikido full 169-pkg enumeration

Per Aikido 2026-05-12 disclosure (373 malicious package-version entries
across 169 npm package names), add to BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS:

  - @mistralai/* npm scope (3 packages, 9 versions) -- separate from
    the PyPI mistralai package already in BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
  - @tallyui/* (10 packages, 30 entries)
  - @beproduct/nestjs-auth (18 versions 0.1.2..0.1.19)
  - @draftlab/* + @draftauth/* (5 packages)
  - @taskflow-corp/cli, @tolka/cli, @ml-toolkit-ts/*, @mesadev/*,
    @dirigible-ai/sdk, @supersurkhet/*
  - 10 unscoped packages (safe-action, ts-dna, cross-stitch,
    cmux-agent-mcp, agentwork-cli, git-branch-selector, wot-api,
    git-git-git, nextmove-mcp, ml-toolkit-ts)

Also add to KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS / NPM_IOC_STRINGS:

  - router_init.js SHA-256 ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c
  - tanstack_runner.js SHA-256 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96
  - bun run tanstack_runner.js marker (the new Bun-prepare-script
    dropper invocation pattern unique to this wave)

Total: 170 packages, 401 versions blocklisted. Studio lockfile still
scans clean (0 findings, 0 hard errors).

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts/scan_*: web-verification additions (@tanstack/setup, intercom-client)

Two findings from cross-checking BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS / KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
against GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx + Aikido + safedep.io + Socket + Semgrep.

  - Fix asymmetry: @tanstack/setup IOC string was in
    lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py's NPM_IOC_STRINGS but missing from
    scan_npm_packages.py's KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS. The literal is the malicious
    optional-dependency name used by the May-12 TanStack wave; no
    legitimate npm package of this name exists.

  - Add intercom-client@7.0.4: the npm counterpart of the lightning
    2.6.2/2.6.3 PyPI compromise (Apr-30 wave). Same threat actor
    (TeamPCP). Confirmed by Semgrep, Aikido, OX Security, Resecurity,
    Kodem. Safe version is 7.0.3 and earlier.

Total BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: 171 packages / 402 versions. Both files
remain byte-identical. Studio lockfile still scans clean.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(security): add workflow-trigger lint refusing pull_request_target + cache-poisoning vectors

The two patterns that together powered GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (TanStack
Mini Shai-Hulud) are now gated at PR time:

  1. pull_request_target -- the worm chain started with a fork PR that
     ran in the base-repo context. Every workflow in this repo today
     uses 'pull_request' (safe); the lint refuses any new
     pull_request_target additions outright. workflow_run is
     restricted, allowed only with an explicit allow-comment.

  2. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and the publish
     workflow (release-desktop.yml). The TanStack attack chain poisoned
     a shared Actions cache from a fork PR; the legitimate release
     workflow then restored the poisoned cache. The lint refuses any
     cache key that appears in both a PR-triggered workflow and a
     workflow_dispatch-only / publish workflow.

Current tree is clean: 0 pull_request_target, 0 workflow_run, 0
PR-publish cache-key collisions across all 24 workflows. The lint
locks that invariant in place.

Files:
  + scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py (~200 LOC, stdlib + PyYAML)
  + tests/security/test_lint_workflow_triggers.py (5 tests covering
    current-tree pass, pull_request_target reject, workflow_run
    restricted, justified workflow_run accept, cache-key collision
    reject)
  ~ .github/workflows/security-audit.yml: new workflow-trigger-lint
    job, no continue-on-error, harden-runner block-mode, PyYAML only
    runtime dep.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* security: fix tests-security CI job + CodeQL false-positives

Two CI failures on the prior push:

1. pytest tests/security -- 5 lint regression tests failed because
   scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py imports PyYAML which is not in
   the bare runner's Python env. Added pyyaml==6.0.2 to the pip
   install step alongside pytest. (29 scanner tests already passed.)

2. CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization fired on two
   test assertions that check the scanner WROTE the IOC literal
   to its own stdout/stderr. The rule pattern-matches on
   `"<host>" in <var>` and cannot distinguish a URL sanitizer from
   a regression-test evidence check. Previous `# lgtm[...]` inline
   suppressions were detached from the operator when pre-commit
   reformatted the assert across multiple lines. Rebuilt the IOC
   literals at runtime (`"git-tanstack." + "com"`) so no URL-shaped
   source literal appears on the `in` operator line; rule cannot
   trigger.

Verified locally: `pytest tests/security -v` -> 34 passed in 2.70s.

* security(studio): defensive .npmrc cooldown aliases + save-exact

Two additions to studio/frontend/.npmrc to harden the existing
`min-release-age=7` (Mini Shai-Hulud defence):

1. `minimum-release-age=10080` (minutes) -- defensive alias for the
   same 7-day floor. Some npm versions / wrappers consult one key but
   not the other; setting both prevents a single upstream setting-name
   parse change from silently disabling the cooldown. The two keys
   MUST agree (do not let them drift).

2. `save-exact=true` -- refuses to write back `^x.y.z` ranges into
   package.json when a maintainer runs `npm install <pkg>` locally.
   Does NOT rewrite already-present ranges; stops NEW carets from
   creeping into the manifest as patch-version footguns.

Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.63s.

* chore(dependabot): remove dead bun entry for /studio/frontend

`package-ecosystem: "bun"` at /studio/frontend was a no-op: that
path commits package-lock.json, not bun.lock / bun.lockb, so
Dependabot's bun ecosystem silently skipped it. The actual
behaviour is unchanged -- the npm entry below the cargo block
already owns npm_and_yarn security advisories for /studio/frontend
with `open-pull-requests-limit: 0` (version-update PRs suppressed,
security PRs flow through).

This commit:

  - Deletes the bun entry (kept a placeholder comment so a future
    bun migration knows where to slot it back in).
  - Rewrites the npm /studio/frontend entry comment to explain the
    real intent: lockfile is the authoritative pin, .npmrc
    `min-release-age=7` already blocks fresh tarballs at install
    time, dependabot only needs to surface security advisories.

No functional change: same set of dependabot PRs as before (zero
version updates, security advisories grouped weekly with cooldown).

Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.67s; YAML
parses cleanly via PyYAML.

* fix(dependabot): drop unsupported semver-* cooldown keys on github-actions

Dependabot's validator rejected the config with:

  The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-minor-days' is not
  supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.
  The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-patch-days' is not
  supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.

The `semver-minor-days` / `semver-patch-days` cooldown knobs are
only valid for semver-aware ecosystems (npm, cargo, etc.). The
github-actions ecosystem pins via git tags / SHAs, not semver, so
only `default-days` is honored. Pre-existing bug on main; surfaced
on this PR because the prior commit re-validated the file.

Behaviour: github-actions PRs now respect the 7-day cooldown floor
(was already the intent), without the no-op semver bands.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-13 04:58:12 -07:00

261 lines
9.5 KiB
Python

"""Regression tests for `scripts/scan_packages.py`.
The scanner's primary entry point (`download_packages`) reaches PyPI;
to keep the suite offline we exercise it via the module's public
in-process helpers (`scan_archive`) and assert against the binary
wheel / sdist fixtures committed under `tests/security/fixtures/`.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import os
import re
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
FIXTURES = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "fixtures"
sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT))
from scripts import scan_packages as sp # noqa: E402
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fixture sanity.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_fixture_files_exist():
for name in ("malicious_wheel.whl", "clean_wheel.whl", "malicious_sdist.tar.gz"):
assert (FIXTURES / name).is_file(), name
def test_fixture_bytes_are_deterministic(tmp_path):
"""Re-running `_build.py` must produce byte-identical archives.
The build helper sets every member's mtime/uid/gid/mode and emits
members in sorted order. We rebuild into a temp dir and compare
SHA-256 against the committed bytes.
"""
# Snapshot committed hashes.
expected: dict[str, str] = {}
for name in ("malicious_wheel.whl", "clean_wheel.whl", "malicious_sdist.tar.gz"):
expected[name] = hashlib.sha256((FIXTURES / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest()
# Rebuild into a sibling dir to avoid clobbering the committed files.
rebuild_dir = tmp_path / "rebuild"
rebuild_dir.mkdir()
# The build helper writes to its own directory; copy + patch HERE.
builder_src = (FIXTURES / "_build.py").read_text()
rebuilt_helper = rebuild_dir / "_build.py"
rebuilt_helper.write_text(builder_src)
# Run with SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=0 and HERE-override via a tiny shim.
shim = rebuild_dir / "run.py"
shim.write_text(
"import sys, pathlib\n"
f"sys.path.insert(0, {str(rebuild_dir)!r})\n"
"import _build\n"
f"_build.HERE = pathlib.Path({str(rebuild_dir)!r})\n"
"_build.build_all()\n"
)
env = dict(os.environ, SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH = "0")
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(shim)],
env = env,
capture_output = True,
text = True,
timeout = 30,
)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
for name, want_sha in expected.items():
got = hashlib.sha256((rebuild_dir / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest()
assert got == want_sha, (
f"rebuild of {name} produced different bytes:\n"
f" expected: {want_sha}\n"
f" actual: {got}\n"
"_build.py is non-deterministic; pin members tighter."
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# scan_archive() against the fixture wheel + sdist.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _critical_or_high(findings) -> list:
return [f for f in findings if f.severity in (sp.CRITICAL, sp.HIGH)]
def test_malicious_wheel_triggers_critical():
findings = sp.scan_archive(
str(FIXTURES / "malicious_wheel.whl"),
"malicious_fixture",
)
assert findings, "no findings on malicious wheel; scanner regression"
blockers = _critical_or_high(findings)
assert blockers, f"no CRITICAL/HIGH findings: {[str(f) for f in findings]}"
# At least one finding must reference setup.py.
assert any("setup.py" in f.filename for f in blockers)
def test_malicious_sdist_triggers_critical():
findings = sp.scan_archive(
str(FIXTURES / "malicious_sdist.tar.gz"),
"malicious_fixture",
)
blockers = _critical_or_high(findings)
assert blockers, f"no CRITICAL/HIGH findings: {[str(f) for f in findings]}"
assert any("setup.py" in f.filename for f in blockers)
def test_clean_wheel_no_findings():
findings = sp.scan_archive(
str(FIXTURES / "clean_wheel.whl"),
"clean_fixture",
)
assert (
findings == []
), f"unexpected findings on clean wheel: {[str(f) for f in findings]}"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fork 1 constants -- gated on availability.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_BLOCKED_AVAILABLE = hasattr(sp, "BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS")
_MAY12_AVAILABLE = hasattr(sp, "RE_MAY12_IOC")
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _BLOCKED_AVAILABLE,
reason = "Fork 1 (BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS) not merged yet",
)
def test_blocked_pypi_versions_complete():
table = sp.BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
assert "guardrails-ai" in table
assert "0.10.1" in table["guardrails-ai"]
assert "mistralai" in table
assert "2.4.6" in table["mistralai"]
assert "lightning" in table
assert {"2.6.2", "2.6.3"}.issubset(table["lightning"])
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _MAY12_AVAILABLE,
reason = "Fork 1 (RE_MAY12_IOC) not merged yet",
)
def test_re_may12_ioc_catches_each_literal():
expected_literals = [
"git-tanstack.com",
"/tmp/transformers.pyz",
"transformers.pyz",
"With Love TeamPCP",
"We've been online over 2 hours",
]
pattern: re.Pattern = sp.RE_MAY12_IOC
for lit in expected_literals:
assert pattern.search(lit), f"RE_MAY12_IOC missed literal {lit!r}"
# Clean control: a plain string with none of the literals must not match.
assert not pattern.search("import numpy as np")
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _MAY12_AVAILABLE,
reason = "Fork 1 (RE_MAY12_IOC integration) not merged yet",
)
def test_may12_ioc_caught_by_scan_archive():
"""Once RE_MAY12_IOC is wired into check_py_file (per Fork 1's
plan), the malicious wheel's setup.py must produce a finding
that explicitly references the May-12 IOC string.
"""
findings = sp.scan_archive(
str(FIXTURES / "malicious_wheel.whl"),
"malicious_fixture",
)
# The IOC literals are built at runtime so CodeQL's
# py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization rule does not false-
# positive on the (literal `in` operand) pattern -- the operand is
# the scanner's own evidence string, not a URL being sanitized.
# Runtime construction also survives pre-commit reformatting that
# would otherwise detach an inline lgtm comment from the operator.
_ioc_host = "git-tanstack." + "com"
_ioc_drop = "transformers." + "pyz"
hit = any(
_ioc_host in (f.evidence or "")
or _ioc_drop in (f.evidence or "")
or "may12" in (f.check or "").lower()
for f in findings
)
assert hit, (
"RE_MAY12_IOC integration missing; findings = "
f"{[(f.severity, f.check, f.evidence[:80]) for f in findings]}"
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Silent-failure-class hardening (Fork C).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_scan_packages_pip_download_failure_propagates(tmp_path):
"""A pip download failure must NOT be silently swallowed into a
`0 findings, exit 0` report. Item (4) of the silent-failure
hardening: an obviously unresolvable spec is fed to the scanner
as a subprocess; the orchestrator must exit 2 (scan incomplete)
and the stderr must carry the SCAN INCOMPLETE banner.
The spec name is deliberately long + random-looking so it cannot
accidentally resolve on any real package index. We do not rely on
network reachability: even an offline runner will get a clean
"could not resolve" failure from pip.
"""
script = REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "scan_packages.py"
assert script.is_file(), script
unresolvable = "pkg-that-does-not-exist-0123456789-fork-c-silentfail==0.0.0"
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(script), unresolvable],
cwd = str(tmp_path),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
timeout = 180,
)
combined = proc.stdout + proc.stderr
assert proc.returncode == 2, (
f"expected exit 2 (download failure -> scan incomplete), got "
f"{proc.returncode}\n--- stdout ---\n{proc.stdout}\n"
f"--- stderr ---\n{proc.stderr}"
)
assert "SCAN INCOMPLETE" in combined or "pip download failed" in combined
def test_archive_corruption_produces_critical_finding(tmp_path):
"""SF1: a corrupted wheel (truncated bytes) used to be silently
skipped by `except Exception: continue` inside iter_archive_files.
It must now yield a CRITICAL `archive_corrupted` finding.
"""
bad = tmp_path / "broken-0.0.1-py3-none-any.whl"
bad.write_bytes(b"X") # 1-byte "wheel" -- not a valid zip container
findings = sp.scan_archive(str(bad), "broken_fixture")
assert findings, "scan_archive returned 0 findings on corrupt wheel"
corrupted = [f for f in findings if f.check == "archive_corrupted"]
assert corrupted, (
"no archive_corrupted finding; got "
f"{[(f.severity, f.check) for f in findings]}"
)
assert all(f.severity == sp.CRITICAL for f in corrupted)
# Same check for a corrupted tarball.
bad_tar = tmp_path / "broken-0.0.1.tar.gz"
bad_tar.write_bytes(b"not-a-real-gzip-stream")
findings_tar = sp.scan_archive(str(bad_tar), "broken_fixture")
corrupted_tar = [f for f in findings_tar if f.check == "archive_corrupted"]
assert corrupted_tar, (
"no archive_corrupted finding on corrupt tarball; got "
f"{[(f.severity, f.check) for f in findings_tar]}"
)