unsloth/tests/security/test_scan_npm_packages.py
Daniel Han ef9f672fe8
security: NOT affected by Mini Shai-Hulud (May-12 wave) -- forward-looking hardening only (#5397)
* scripts/scan_*: add Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 IOC strings and pin-blocklists

Append the May-12 2026 wave indicators (git-tanstack.com, transformers.pyz,
/tmp/transformers.pyz, "With Love TeamPCP", "We've been online over 2 hours")
to all three scanner IOC tables, add BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS (42 TanStack pkgs,
4 opensearch versions, 3 squawk pkgs) in scan_npm_packages.py and
lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py (kept byte-identical), add BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
(guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6, lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3) plus
RE_MAY12_IOC wiring across check_py_file/check_shell_file/check_workflow_file
in scan_packages.py. The npm orchestrator and the lockfile auditor now
short-circuit on a blocked entry before fetching the tarball, and the
PyPI download pipeline drops blocked specs before pip download is invoked.

* tests/security: regression suite for supply-chain scanners

Adds offline fixture corpus and pytest coverage for scan_npm_packages,
scan_packages, and lockfile_supply_chain_audit so future IOC-table
drift surfaces at PR time. Pytest scope narrowed to tests/security so
GPU smoke tests are not picked up by default.

* ci(security-audit): drop continue-on-error on pip-scan and npm-scan jobs

Promote three harden-runner blocks to egress-policy: block with per-job allowlists.
Add tests-security job running pytest tests/security as a hard gate.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts: harden third-party downloads, pip resolver pins, atomic writes

Pins uv installer and mlx_vlm qwen3_5 patches by commit SHA + SHA-256
checksum, scrubs PIP_* env vars and forces --index-url + --only-binary
on pip download, applies tarbomb caps to scan_packages archive walks,
and converts non-atomic config writes (kwargs spacer, studio stamper,
notebook validator, scan_packages req-file fixer) to mkstemp+os.replace.

Also adds host allowlist to notebook_to_python downloader, threads an
--allow-shell flag through its shell=True emission with reviewer warning
comments, locks both MLX installer scripts to set -euo pipefail, and
extends CODEOWNERS so colab snapshot data files require notebook-owner
review.

* ci(workflows): harden release-desktop / smoke / notebooks workflows

Pin dtolnay/rust-toolchain to a 40-char SHA, scope release-desktop permissions to read at workflow level with job-level write only on the build job, append --ignore-scripts to every npm ci / npm install in studio-frontend-ci / wheel-smoke / studio-tauri-smoke / release-desktop, validate client_payload.ref shape via an env-var-isolated regex on every notebooks-ci job, and add step-security/harden-runner in audit mode as the first step of release-desktop and mlx-ci.

* scripts: promote silent scanner failures to non-zero exit codes
scan_packages now returns 2 on pip-download failure and emits a CRITICAL archive_corrupted finding on truncated wheels/sdists.
notebook_to_python exits 1 on per-notebook failures; notebook_validator wraps the stash/pop in try/finally; lockfile audit rejects bare UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=1 with a loud GitHub Actions warning.

* Add npm cooldown + new-install-script gate + Dependabot cooldown

Pins min-release-age=7 (npm 11.10+) in repo-root and studio/frontend
.npmrc, adds scripts/check_new_install_scripts.py to fail PRs that
add a postinstall dep, ships a new security-audit job for npm audit
signatures plus the diff, and extends .github/dependabot.yml with
cooldown stanzas. Pin @tanstack/react-router to 1.169.9 per GHSA-
g7cv-rxg3-hmpx; lockfile regen deferred until that release lands on
npm. tests/security gains 4 new tests; full suite 26/26 green.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(security): fix tanstack pin, exec bits, expand IOC tables to @uipath/@squawk full

- Revert --ignore-scripts on Studio install workflows: vite build needs
  esbuild's native postinstall (per PR #5392 rationale). Keep
  --ignore-scripts on security-audit.yml's standalone npm audit job.
- Pin @tanstack/react-router to the actual published 1.169.2 (was a
  forward-looking 1.169.9 that does not exist on npm; broke npm ci).
- Drop redundant repo-root .npmrc; studio/frontend/.npmrc covers the
  only npm project today (root cooldown re-instate via dependabot.yml).
- Restore exec bits on 7 files my filesystem stripped during cherry-pick.
- Expand BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS with full safedep.io + Aikido enumeration:
  22 @squawk/* packages with 5 versions each (110 entries; previously
  3 entries with 1 version each), and 66 @uipath/* packages (entirely
  missing before). Mirror in scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* tests/security: suppress CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization

The two flagged 'X' in Y assertions are NOT URL sanitization checks.
They verify our scanner WROTE a known IOC literal into its stdout /
Finding.evidence, which is the opposite of an attack surface --
matching the scanner's output is precisely what catches the worm.
Inline lgtm[] suppression with a 4-line rationale comment above each.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts/scan_*: expand IOC tables with Aikido full 169-pkg enumeration

Per Aikido 2026-05-12 disclosure (373 malicious package-version entries
across 169 npm package names), add to BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS:

  - @mistralai/* npm scope (3 packages, 9 versions) -- separate from
    the PyPI mistralai package already in BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
  - @tallyui/* (10 packages, 30 entries)
  - @beproduct/nestjs-auth (18 versions 0.1.2..0.1.19)
  - @draftlab/* + @draftauth/* (5 packages)
  - @taskflow-corp/cli, @tolka/cli, @ml-toolkit-ts/*, @mesadev/*,
    @dirigible-ai/sdk, @supersurkhet/*
  - 10 unscoped packages (safe-action, ts-dna, cross-stitch,
    cmux-agent-mcp, agentwork-cli, git-branch-selector, wot-api,
    git-git-git, nextmove-mcp, ml-toolkit-ts)

Also add to KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS / NPM_IOC_STRINGS:

  - router_init.js SHA-256 ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c
  - tanstack_runner.js SHA-256 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96
  - bun run tanstack_runner.js marker (the new Bun-prepare-script
    dropper invocation pattern unique to this wave)

Total: 170 packages, 401 versions blocklisted. Studio lockfile still
scans clean (0 findings, 0 hard errors).

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* scripts/scan_*: web-verification additions (@tanstack/setup, intercom-client)

Two findings from cross-checking BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS / KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
against GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx + Aikido + safedep.io + Socket + Semgrep.

  - Fix asymmetry: @tanstack/setup IOC string was in
    lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py's NPM_IOC_STRINGS but missing from
    scan_npm_packages.py's KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS. The literal is the malicious
    optional-dependency name used by the May-12 TanStack wave; no
    legitimate npm package of this name exists.

  - Add intercom-client@7.0.4: the npm counterpart of the lightning
    2.6.2/2.6.3 PyPI compromise (Apr-30 wave). Same threat actor
    (TeamPCP). Confirmed by Semgrep, Aikido, OX Security, Resecurity,
    Kodem. Safe version is 7.0.3 and earlier.

Total BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: 171 packages / 402 versions. Both files
remain byte-identical. Studio lockfile still scans clean.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(security): add workflow-trigger lint refusing pull_request_target + cache-poisoning vectors

The two patterns that together powered GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (TanStack
Mini Shai-Hulud) are now gated at PR time:

  1. pull_request_target -- the worm chain started with a fork PR that
     ran in the base-repo context. Every workflow in this repo today
     uses 'pull_request' (safe); the lint refuses any new
     pull_request_target additions outright. workflow_run is
     restricted, allowed only with an explicit allow-comment.

  2. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and the publish
     workflow (release-desktop.yml). The TanStack attack chain poisoned
     a shared Actions cache from a fork PR; the legitimate release
     workflow then restored the poisoned cache. The lint refuses any
     cache key that appears in both a PR-triggered workflow and a
     workflow_dispatch-only / publish workflow.

Current tree is clean: 0 pull_request_target, 0 workflow_run, 0
PR-publish cache-key collisions across all 24 workflows. The lint
locks that invariant in place.

Files:
  + scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py (~200 LOC, stdlib + PyYAML)
  + tests/security/test_lint_workflow_triggers.py (5 tests covering
    current-tree pass, pull_request_target reject, workflow_run
    restricted, justified workflow_run accept, cache-key collision
    reject)
  ~ .github/workflows/security-audit.yml: new workflow-trigger-lint
    job, no continue-on-error, harden-runner block-mode, PyYAML only
    runtime dep.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* security: fix tests-security CI job + CodeQL false-positives

Two CI failures on the prior push:

1. pytest tests/security -- 5 lint regression tests failed because
   scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py imports PyYAML which is not in
   the bare runner's Python env. Added pyyaml==6.0.2 to the pip
   install step alongside pytest. (29 scanner tests already passed.)

2. CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization fired on two
   test assertions that check the scanner WROTE the IOC literal
   to its own stdout/stderr. The rule pattern-matches on
   `"<host>" in <var>` and cannot distinguish a URL sanitizer from
   a regression-test evidence check. Previous `# lgtm[...]` inline
   suppressions were detached from the operator when pre-commit
   reformatted the assert across multiple lines. Rebuilt the IOC
   literals at runtime (`"git-tanstack." + "com"`) so no URL-shaped
   source literal appears on the `in` operator line; rule cannot
   trigger.

Verified locally: `pytest tests/security -v` -> 34 passed in 2.70s.

* security(studio): defensive .npmrc cooldown aliases + save-exact

Two additions to studio/frontend/.npmrc to harden the existing
`min-release-age=7` (Mini Shai-Hulud defence):

1. `minimum-release-age=10080` (minutes) -- defensive alias for the
   same 7-day floor. Some npm versions / wrappers consult one key but
   not the other; setting both prevents a single upstream setting-name
   parse change from silently disabling the cooldown. The two keys
   MUST agree (do not let them drift).

2. `save-exact=true` -- refuses to write back `^x.y.z` ranges into
   package.json when a maintainer runs `npm install <pkg>` locally.
   Does NOT rewrite already-present ranges; stops NEW carets from
   creeping into the manifest as patch-version footguns.

Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.63s.

* chore(dependabot): remove dead bun entry for /studio/frontend

`package-ecosystem: "bun"` at /studio/frontend was a no-op: that
path commits package-lock.json, not bun.lock / bun.lockb, so
Dependabot's bun ecosystem silently skipped it. The actual
behaviour is unchanged -- the npm entry below the cargo block
already owns npm_and_yarn security advisories for /studio/frontend
with `open-pull-requests-limit: 0` (version-update PRs suppressed,
security PRs flow through).

This commit:

  - Deletes the bun entry (kept a placeholder comment so a future
    bun migration knows where to slot it back in).
  - Rewrites the npm /studio/frontend entry comment to explain the
    real intent: lockfile is the authoritative pin, .npmrc
    `min-release-age=7` already blocks fresh tarballs at install
    time, dependabot only needs to surface security advisories.

No functional change: same set of dependabot PRs as before (zero
version updates, security advisories grouped weekly with cooldown).

Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.67s; YAML
parses cleanly via PyYAML.

* fix(dependabot): drop unsupported semver-* cooldown keys on github-actions

Dependabot's validator rejected the config with:

  The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-minor-days' is not
  supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.
  The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-patch-days' is not
  supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.

The `semver-minor-days` / `semver-patch-days` cooldown knobs are
only valid for semver-aware ecosystems (npm, cargo, etc.). The
github-actions ecosystem pins via git tags / SHAs, not semver, so
only `default-days` is honored. Pre-existing bug on main; surfaced
on this PR because the prior commit re-validated the file.

Behaviour: github-actions PRs now respect the 7-day cooldown floor
(was already the intent), without the no-op semver bands.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-13 04:58:12 -07:00

251 lines
9.4 KiB
Python

"""Regression tests for `scripts/scan_npm_packages.py`.
These tests must run fully offline. The `network_blocker` fixture in
conftest.py refuses any non-loopback socket connect from the test
process; scanner subprocesses are invoked against fixtures that never
trigger an HTTP fetch.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import io
import json
import subprocess
import sys
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
SCRIPT = REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "scan_npm_packages.py"
FIXTURES = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "fixtures"
# Import the module so we can introspect the IOC tables directly.
sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT))
from scripts import scan_npm_packages as snp # noqa: E402
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Subprocess helpers.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _run_scanner(lockfile: Path, *, timeout: int = 30) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
return subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(SCRIPT), "--lockfile", str(lockfile)],
capture_output = True,
text = True,
timeout = timeout,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Lockfile pass: structural-only fixtures (no network).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_malicious_lockfile_exits_1():
"""Structural IOCs alone must fail the scanner.
`structural_only_lockfile.json` contains: (a) a non-registry
`resolved` URL (filev2.getsession.org), (b) an entry missing
its `integrity` field. Both are caught in `parse_lockfile()`
before any tarball download attempt -- so the test is fully
offline.
"""
fixture = FIXTURES / "structural_only_lockfile.json"
assert fixture.is_file(), fixture
proc = _run_scanner(fixture)
assert proc.returncode == 1, (
f"expected exit 1, got {proc.returncode}\n"
f"--- stdout ---\n{proc.stdout}\n--- stderr ---\n{proc.stderr}"
)
combined = proc.stdout + proc.stderr
# The scanner aggregates structural findings into the summary
# rather than printing each one individually. Assert on the
# count + the FAIL banner instead.
assert "2 structural finding(s)" in combined
assert "FAIL" in combined
# And confirm `parse_lockfile()` actually surfaces the right
# `pattern` codes via the in-process API.
entries, struct = snp.parse_lockfile(fixture)
patterns = {f.pattern for f in struct}
assert {"non-registry-resolved-url", "missing-integrity-hash"} <= patterns
def test_clean_lockfile_exits_0():
"""The clean fixture only contains entries that `parse_lockfile()`
skips entirely (workspace root + workspace `link` symlink +
nested fold-in), so the scanner exits 0 with no network access.
"""
fixture = FIXTURES / "clean_lockfile.json"
assert fixture.is_file(), fixture
proc = _run_scanner(fixture)
assert proc.returncode == 0, (
f"expected exit 0, got {proc.returncode}\n"
f"--- stdout ---\n{proc.stdout}\n--- stderr ---\n{proc.stderr}"
)
assert "0 finding(s)" in proc.stdout
assert "0 hard error(s)" in proc.stdout
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS table -- gated on Fork 1.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_BLOCKED_AVAILABLE = hasattr(snp, "BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS")
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _BLOCKED_AVAILABLE,
reason = "Fork 1 (BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS constant) not merged yet",
)
def test_blocked_npm_versions_complete():
table = snp.BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS
tanstack_keys = [k for k in table if k.startswith("@tanstack/")]
assert len(tanstack_keys) == 42, (
f"expected 42 @tanstack/* entries, got {len(tanstack_keys)}: "
f"{sorted(tanstack_keys)}"
)
assert "@opensearch-project/opensearch" in table
assert table["@opensearch-project/opensearch"] == {
"3.5.3",
"3.6.2",
"3.7.0",
"3.8.0",
}
squawk = [k for k in table if k.startswith("@squawk/")]
assert len(squawk) >= 22, (
f"expected at least 22 @squawk/* entries (full safedep.io enumeration), "
f"got {len(squawk)}: {sorted(squawk)}"
)
# @squawk/mcp must cover the full malicious range 0.9.1 .. 0.9.5
# (safedep.io enumeration; we initially had only 0.9.5).
assert {"0.9.1", "0.9.2", "0.9.3", "0.9.4", "0.9.5"} <= table["@squawk/mcp"]
uipath = [k for k in table if k.startswith("@uipath/")]
assert len(uipath) >= 64, (
f"expected at least 64 @uipath/* entries (Aikido enumeration), "
f"got {len(uipath)}: {sorted(uipath)}"
)
# Anchor a known entry: the rpa-tool 0.9.5 version is in the published list.
assert "0.9.5" in table["@uipath/rpa-tool"]
# Aikido (May-12 wave): @mistralai/* npm scope (separate from PyPI mistralai).
assert table["@mistralai/mistralai"] == {"2.2.2", "2.2.3", "2.2.4"}
assert table["@mistralai/mistralai-gcp"] == {"1.7.1", "1.7.2", "1.7.3"}
assert table["@mistralai/mistralai-azure"] == {"1.7.1", "1.7.2", "1.7.3"}
# Aikido: @tallyui/* (10 packages x 3 versions).
tallyui = [k for k in table if k.startswith("@tallyui/")]
assert len(tallyui) == 10, f"expected 10 @tallyui/*, got {sorted(tallyui)}"
# Aikido: @beproduct/nestjs-auth covers the 0.1.2 .. 0.1.19 range (18 versions).
assert table["@beproduct/nestjs-auth"] == {f"0.1.{i}" for i in range(2, 20)}
# Aikido: unscoped infostealer packages (10 total).
for unscoped in (
"safe-action",
"ts-dna",
"cross-stitch",
"cmux-agent-mcp",
"agentwork-cli",
"git-branch-selector",
"wot-api",
"git-git-git",
"nextmove-mcp",
"ml-toolkit-ts",
):
assert unscoped in table, f"missing unscoped malicious pkg: {unscoped}"
# Aikido: payload SHA-256 hashes wired into KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS.
ioc = snp.KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
assert "ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c" in ioc
assert "2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96" in ioc
assert "bun run tanstack_runner.js" in ioc
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _BLOCKED_AVAILABLE,
reason = "Fork 1 (BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS pre-fetch hook) not merged yet",
)
def test_blocked_npm_versions_short_circuits_download():
"""With Fork 1's pre-fetch hook, the malicious tanstack entry
must produce a `blocked-known-malicious` finding without ever
calling out to the npm registry. The full malicious fixture
contains the tanstack entry; the test asserts exit 1 and that
the new finding pattern appears in scanner output.
"""
fixture = FIXTURES / "malicious_lockfile.json"
proc = _run_scanner(fixture, timeout = 10)
assert proc.returncode == 1
combined = proc.stdout + proc.stderr
assert "blocked-known-malicious" in combined or "BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS" in combined
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS coverage -- every IOC must trip the scanner.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _extract_pkg_with_ioc(ioc: str, tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
"""Build a one-file npm package extract tree embedding `ioc` in
`package.json`. Returns the extract root.
"""
pkg_json = {
"name": "ioc-fixture",
"version": "0.0.1",
"description": f"contains literal: {ioc}",
}
root = tmp_path / f"pkg_{abs(hash(ioc)) % 10**8}"
(root / "package").mkdir(parents = True)
(root / "package" / "package.json").write_text(
json.dumps(pkg_json),
encoding = "utf-8",
)
return root
def test_every_known_ioc_string_caught(tmp_path):
"""For every entry in `KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS`, embed the IOC in a
one-file package tree and confirm `scan_extracted_tree()`
surfaces it. Guards against silent regex / table drift.
"""
iocs = snp.KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
assert iocs, "KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS unexpectedly empty"
pkg = snp.PackageEntry(
name = "ioc-fixture",
version = "0.0.1",
resolved = "https://registry.npmjs.org/ioc-fixture/-/ioc-fixture-0.0.1.tgz",
integrity = "sha512-stub",
lockfile_key = "node_modules/ioc-fixture",
)
for ioc in iocs:
root = _extract_pkg_with_ioc(ioc, tmp_path)
findings = snp.scan_extracted_tree(pkg = pkg, root = root)
hit = any(ioc in f.evidence or ioc in f.detail for f in findings)
assert hit, (
f"KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS[{ioc!r}] not detected by scan_extracted_tree; "
f"findings = {[str(f) for f in findings]}"
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Sanity: lockfile parse pass surfaces the structural findings we expect.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_parse_lockfile_structural_findings():
"""`parse_lockfile()` returns (entries, structural_findings). The
structural-only fixture should produce 2 structural findings and
0 entries (because both bad entries are `continue`d).
"""
entries, struct = snp.parse_lockfile(FIXTURES / "structural_only_lockfile.json")
assert entries == []
patterns = {f.pattern for f in struct}
assert "non-registry-resolved-url" in patterns
assert "missing-integrity-hash" in patterns