dd0b557794* ci: add advisory lockfile supply-chain audit Adds a fast, focused workflow that scans every checked-in npm and cargo lockfile on PRs touching one. Default behaviour is advisory: only public indicator-of-compromise strings, versions on the public known-malicious list, and structurally broken lockfiles fail the build. Structural anomalies (missing integrity hashes, non-default registry, etc.) surface as :⚠️: annotations without gating merges, so reviewers see the audit result inline on every PR without changing the existing install behaviour. Also commits the two missing npm lockfiles the audit needs: studio/package-lock.json (Tauri CLI holder for desktop release) and studio/backend/core/data_recipe/oxc-validator/package-lock.json (oxc-parser runtime for the data-recipe validator). studio/setup.sh, studio/setup.ps1, build.sh, and pyproject.toml are intentionally left alone so the existing install path keeps working unchanged. Audit script behaviour: default mode -> exits 1 only on blocked-known-malicious, known-ioc-string, malformed-lockfile, missing-lockfile, unreadable-lockfile, or missing-toml-parser --strict -> promotes every finding to blocking (opt-in) Adds a try/except around lockfile reads so a permissions error prints a finding instead of crashing CI with a raw traceback. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * test(security): update cargo regression test for advisory mode `scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py` now classifies `non-registry-cargo-source` as an advisory finding by default (returns exit 0 with a `:⚠️:` annotation) rather than unconditionally blocking with exit 1. Update the existing `test_malicious_cargo_lockfile_refused` to pass --strict so it keeps verifying the "refuse to install" behavior it is named for, and add a second test that pins the default-mode behavior: advisory finding emitted, exit code 0. * audit: escape Finding for GH Actions annotations `:⚠️:` and `::error::` workflow commands truncate the annotation message at the first newline unless the message is %-encoded per the workflow-commands spec. Since `Finding.__str__` returns three lines (kind+path, package, detail), the package and detail fields were being dropped from the GitHub Actions UI. Add a `_gha_escape()` helper that applies the spec'd escapes (`%` -> `%25`, then `\r` -> `%0D`, then `\n` -> `%0A`; the `%` replacement must happen first so the subsequent escapes are not double-encoded), wrap every Finding rendered into a workflow command with it, and pin both the helper and the end-to-end single-line emission with two new regression tests. Caught by gemini-code-assist on PR #5604. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
900 lines
38 KiB
Python
900 lines
38 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
|
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
|
|
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
"""Lockfile supply-chain audit for the Studio frontend and Tauri shell.
|
|
|
|
Runs BEFORE `npm ci` / `cargo fetch` in CI. Refuses to proceed when a
|
|
lockfile contains patterns that indicate the kind of supply-chain
|
|
injection seen in the npm Shai-Hulud waves and the cargo
|
|
crates.io brand-squat attempts.
|
|
|
|
What it checks
|
|
==============
|
|
|
|
studio/frontend/package-lock.json (lockfileVersion 2 or 3):
|
|
|
|
1. `resolved` URL origin. Every entry must resolve through
|
|
`https://registry.npmjs.org/`. Direct GitHub-hosted dependencies
|
|
(`git+ssh://`, `git+https://`, `github:owner/repo#sha`,
|
|
`file:`, `http://`) are refused -- npm's TanStack incident used
|
|
exactly this vector to land an unaudited GitHub commit hash as
|
|
an optional dependency.
|
|
|
|
2. `integrity` field presence. Every non-workspace entry must carry
|
|
an `integrity` SHA. A missing integrity means the registry can
|
|
swap the tarball after lockfile generation and CI will not
|
|
notice.
|
|
|
|
3. Known IOC strings. A hardcoded set of indicator-of-compromise
|
|
substrings is grepped across the entire lockfile body (file
|
|
names, dependency keys, URLs). The list is updated as new
|
|
campaigns surface. Catching one means the local install was
|
|
about to pull a publicly-known malicious release.
|
|
|
|
studio/src-tauri/Cargo.lock:
|
|
|
|
4. `source` field origin. Every entry with a `source` must point at
|
|
`registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index`. Direct
|
|
git sources (`git+https://...`) and `path+...` for cross-crate
|
|
paths warrant manual review and are flagged.
|
|
|
|
5. Known cargo IOC strings. Same idea as (3), separate list.
|
|
|
|
Exit codes
|
|
==========
|
|
|
|
0 no findings, or an opt-out env var (UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP)
|
|
is set to a justification string (>=5 chars, not '1'/'true'/etc).
|
|
A value like '1' or 'true' is now REJECTED loudly and the audit
|
|
runs normally
|
|
1 one or more findings; stderr lists them with file path and line
|
|
number where derivable
|
|
2 internal error (missing dependency, malformed JSON, etc.)
|
|
|
|
Operational stance
|
|
==================
|
|
|
|
This scanner only PARSES the lockfiles -- it never executes anything
|
|
in them, never resolves anything against the network. Safe to run
|
|
ahead of every `npm ci`. The IOC list is short by design; this
|
|
complements (not replaces) `npm audit`, OSV-Scanner, and the
|
|
advisory-DB pipeline in `.github/workflows/security-audit.yml`. The
|
|
shape of the catch is "we refuse to proceed because the lockfile
|
|
itself is shaped wrong", which fires before any third-party install
|
|
script gets a chance to run on the runner.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import argparse
|
|
import json
|
|
import os
|
|
import re
|
|
import sys
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
|
|
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Known IOC strings (case-sensitive substring match).
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
#
|
|
# Keep these short and FACTUAL. Each entry is tied to a public advisory
|
|
# and is the literal string an attacker would have to embed for the
|
|
# attack to work. Adding speculative or generic patterns here would
|
|
# generate false positives on dependency upgrades.
|
|
NPM_IOC_STRINGS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
|
# Shai-Hulud TanStack wave -- May 11, 2026 (GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx).
|
|
"router_init.js",
|
|
"tanstack_runner.js",
|
|
"router_runtime.js",
|
|
"@tanstack/setup",
|
|
"github:tanstack/router#79ac49eedf774dd4b0cfa308722bc463cfe5885c",
|
|
# Exfiltration endpoints observed across both Shai-Hulud waves.
|
|
"filev2.getsession.org",
|
|
"getsession.org/file/",
|
|
# Campaign markers; the worm tarballs print this to stdout on run.
|
|
"A Mini Shai-Hulud has Appeared",
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 2026 wave.
|
|
"git-tanstack.com",
|
|
"transformers.pyz",
|
|
"/tmp/transformers.pyz",
|
|
"With Love TeamPCP",
|
|
# Aikido (May-12 wave): payload SHA-256 hashes + Bun marker.
|
|
"ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c",
|
|
"2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96",
|
|
"bun run tanstack_runner.js",
|
|
"We've been online over 2 hours",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Hard pin-blocks for publicly confirmed malicious versions.
|
|
# keep in sync with scripts/scan_npm_packages.py
|
|
BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = {
|
|
# GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx -- TanStack May-11 2026 (84 versions).
|
|
"@tanstack/arktype-adapter": {"1.166.12", "1.166.15"},
|
|
"@tanstack/eslint-plugin-router": {"1.161.9", "1.161.12"},
|
|
"@tanstack/eslint-plugin-start": {"0.0.4", "0.0.7"},
|
|
"@tanstack/history": {"1.161.9", "1.161.12"},
|
|
"@tanstack/nitro-v2-vite-plugin": {"1.154.12", "1.154.15"},
|
|
"@tanstack/react-router": {"1.169.5", "1.169.8"},
|
|
"@tanstack/react-router-devtools": {"1.166.16", "1.166.19"},
|
|
"@tanstack/react-router-ssr-query": {"1.166.15", "1.166.18"},
|
|
"@tanstack/react-start": {"1.167.68", "1.167.71"},
|
|
"@tanstack/react-start-client": {"1.166.51", "1.166.54"},
|
|
"@tanstack/react-start-rsc": {"0.0.47", "0.0.50"},
|
|
"@tanstack/react-start-server": {"1.166.55", "1.166.58"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-cli": {"1.166.46", "1.166.49"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-core": {"1.169.5", "1.169.8"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-devtools": {"1.166.16", "1.166.19"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-devtools-core": {"1.167.6", "1.167.9"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-generator": {"1.166.45", "1.166.48"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-plugin": {"1.167.38", "1.167.41"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-ssr-query-core": {"1.168.3", "1.168.6"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-utils": {"1.161.11", "1.161.14"},
|
|
"@tanstack/router-vite-plugin": {"1.166.53", "1.166.56"},
|
|
"@tanstack/solid-router": {"1.169.5", "1.169.8"},
|
|
"@tanstack/solid-router-devtools": {"1.166.16", "1.166.19"},
|
|
"@tanstack/solid-router-ssr-query": {"1.166.15", "1.166.18"},
|
|
"@tanstack/solid-start": {"1.167.65", "1.167.68"},
|
|
"@tanstack/solid-start-client": {"1.166.50", "1.166.53"},
|
|
"@tanstack/solid-start-server": {"1.166.54", "1.166.57"},
|
|
"@tanstack/start-client-core": {"1.168.5", "1.168.8"},
|
|
"@tanstack/start-fn-stubs": {"1.161.9", "1.161.12"},
|
|
"@tanstack/start-plugin-core": {"1.169.23", "1.169.26"},
|
|
"@tanstack/start-server-core": {"1.167.33", "1.167.36"},
|
|
"@tanstack/start-static-server-functions": {"1.166.44", "1.166.47"},
|
|
"@tanstack/start-storage-context": {"1.166.38", "1.166.41"},
|
|
"@tanstack/valibot-adapter": {"1.166.12", "1.166.15"},
|
|
"@tanstack/virtual-file-routes": {"1.161.10", "1.161.13"},
|
|
"@tanstack/vue-router": {"1.169.5", "1.169.8"},
|
|
"@tanstack/vue-router-devtools": {"1.166.16", "1.166.19"},
|
|
"@tanstack/vue-router-ssr-query": {"1.166.15", "1.166.18"},
|
|
"@tanstack/vue-start": {"1.167.61", "1.167.64"},
|
|
"@tanstack/vue-start-client": {"1.166.46", "1.166.49"},
|
|
"@tanstack/vue-start-server": {"1.166.50", "1.166.53"},
|
|
"@tanstack/zod-adapter": {"1.166.12", "1.166.15"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: OpenSearch JS client.
|
|
"@opensearch-project/opensearch": {"3.5.3", "3.6.2", "3.7.0", "3.8.0"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: @squawk/* (22 packages, 5 versions each;
|
|
# https://safedep.io/mass-npm-supply-chain-attack-tanstack-mistral/).
|
|
"@squawk/airport-data": {"0.7.4", "0.7.5", "0.7.6", "0.7.7", "0.7.8"},
|
|
"@squawk/airports": {"0.6.2", "0.6.3", "0.6.4", "0.6.5", "0.6.6"},
|
|
"@squawk/airspace": {"0.8.1", "0.8.2", "0.8.3", "0.8.4", "0.8.5"},
|
|
"@squawk/airspace-data": {"0.5.3", "0.5.4", "0.5.5", "0.5.6", "0.5.7"},
|
|
"@squawk/airway-data": {"0.5.4", "0.5.5", "0.5.6", "0.5.7", "0.5.8"},
|
|
"@squawk/airways": {"0.4.2", "0.4.3", "0.4.4", "0.4.5", "0.4.6"},
|
|
"@squawk/fix-data": {"0.6.4", "0.6.5", "0.6.6", "0.6.7", "0.6.8"},
|
|
"@squawk/fixes": {"0.3.2", "0.3.3", "0.3.4", "0.3.5", "0.3.6"},
|
|
"@squawk/flight-math": {"0.5.4", "0.5.5", "0.5.6", "0.5.7", "0.5.8"},
|
|
"@squawk/flightplan": {"0.5.2", "0.5.3", "0.5.4", "0.5.5", "0.5.6"},
|
|
"@squawk/geo": {"0.4.4", "0.4.5", "0.4.6", "0.4.7", "0.4.8"},
|
|
"@squawk/icao-registry": {"0.5.2", "0.5.3", "0.5.4", "0.5.5", "0.5.6"},
|
|
"@squawk/icao-registry-data": {"0.8.4", "0.8.5", "0.8.6", "0.8.7", "0.8.8"},
|
|
"@squawk/mcp": {"0.9.1", "0.9.2", "0.9.3", "0.9.4", "0.9.5"},
|
|
"@squawk/navaid-data": {"0.6.4", "0.6.5", "0.6.6", "0.6.7", "0.6.8"},
|
|
"@squawk/navaids": {"0.4.2", "0.4.3", "0.4.4", "0.4.5", "0.4.6"},
|
|
"@squawk/notams": {"0.3.6", "0.3.7", "0.3.8", "0.3.9", "0.3.10"},
|
|
"@squawk/procedure-data": {"0.7.3", "0.7.4", "0.7.5", "0.7.6", "0.7.7"},
|
|
"@squawk/procedures": {"0.5.2", "0.5.3", "0.5.4", "0.5.5", "0.5.6"},
|
|
"@squawk/types": {"0.8.1", "0.8.2", "0.8.3", "0.8.4", "0.8.5"},
|
|
"@squawk/units": {"0.4.3", "0.4.4", "0.4.5", "0.4.6", "0.4.7"},
|
|
"@squawk/weather": {"0.5.6", "0.5.7", "0.5.8", "0.5.9", "0.5.10"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: @uipath/* (64 packages, single version each;
|
|
# https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised).
|
|
"@uipath/apollo-react": {"4.24.5"},
|
|
"@uipath/apollo-wind": {"2.16.2"},
|
|
"@uipath/cli": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/rpa-tool": {"0.9.5"},
|
|
"@uipath/apollo-core": {"5.9.2"},
|
|
"@uipath/filesystem": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/solutionpackager-tool-core": {"0.0.34"},
|
|
"@uipath/solution-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/maestro-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/codedapp-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/agent-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/orchestrator-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/integrationservice-tool": {"1.0.2"},
|
|
"@uipath/rpa-legacy-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/vertical-solutions-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/flow-tool": {"1.0.2"},
|
|
"@uipath/codedagent-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/common": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/resource-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/auth": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/docsai-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/case-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/api-workflow-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/test-manager-tool": {"1.0.2"},
|
|
"@uipath/robot": {"1.3.4"},
|
|
"@uipath/traces-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/agent-sdk": {"1.0.2"},
|
|
"@uipath/integrationservice-sdk": {"1.0.2"},
|
|
"@uipath/maestro-sdk": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/data-fabric-tool": {"1.0.2"},
|
|
"@uipath/tasks-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/insights-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/insights-sdk": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/uipath-python-bridge": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/ap-chat": {"1.5.7"},
|
|
"@uipath/project-packager": {"1.1.16"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-case": {"0.0.9"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-workflowcompiler-browser": {"0.0.34"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-connector": {"0.0.19"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-workflowcompiler": {"0.0.16"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-webapp": {"1.0.6"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-apiworkflow": {"0.0.19"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-functions": {"0.1.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/widget.sdk": {"1.2.3"},
|
|
"@uipath/resources-tool": {"0.1.11"},
|
|
"@uipath/agent.sdk": {"0.0.18"},
|
|
"@uipath/codedagents-tool": {"0.1.12"},
|
|
"@uipath/aops-policy-tool": {"0.3.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/solution-packager": {"0.0.35"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-bpmn": {"0.0.9"},
|
|
"@uipath/packager-tool-flow": {"0.0.19"},
|
|
"@uipath/telemetry": {"0.0.7"},
|
|
"@uipath/tool-workflowcompiler": {"0.0.12"},
|
|
"@uipath/vss": {"0.1.6"},
|
|
"@uipath/solutionpackager-sdk": {"1.0.11"},
|
|
"@uipath/ui-widgets-multi-file-upload": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/access-policy-tool": {"0.3.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/context-grounding-tool": {"0.1.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/gov-tool": {"0.3.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/admin-tool": {"0.1.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/identity-tool": {"0.1.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/llmgw-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/resourcecatalog-tool": {"0.1.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/functions-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/access-policy-sdk": {"0.3.1"},
|
|
"@uipath/platform-tool": {"1.0.1"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: @mistralai/* (npm) — separate from PyPI mistralai
|
|
# (https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised).
|
|
"@mistralai/mistralai": {"2.2.2", "2.2.3", "2.2.4"},
|
|
"@mistralai/mistralai-gcp": {"1.7.1", "1.7.2", "1.7.3"},
|
|
"@mistralai/mistralai-azure": {"1.7.1", "1.7.2", "1.7.3"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: @tallyui/* (30 entries, 10 packages)
|
|
# (Aikido enumeration).
|
|
"@tallyui/components": {"1.0.1", "1.0.2", "1.0.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/connector-medusa": {"1.0.1", "1.0.2", "1.0.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/connector-shopify": {"1.0.1", "1.0.2", "1.0.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/connector-vendure": {"1.0.1", "1.0.2", "1.0.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/connector-woocommerce": {"1.0.1", "1.0.2", "1.0.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/core": {"0.2.1", "0.2.2", "0.2.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/database": {"1.0.1", "1.0.2", "1.0.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/pos": {"0.1.1", "0.1.2", "0.1.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/storage-sqlite": {"0.2.1", "0.2.2", "0.2.3"},
|
|
"@tallyui/theme": {"0.2.1", "0.2.2", "0.2.3"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: @beproduct/nestjs-auth (18 versions)
|
|
# (Aikido enumeration).
|
|
"@beproduct/nestjs-auth": {
|
|
"0.1.2",
|
|
"0.1.3",
|
|
"0.1.4",
|
|
"0.1.5",
|
|
"0.1.6",
|
|
"0.1.7",
|
|
"0.1.8",
|
|
"0.1.9",
|
|
"0.1.10",
|
|
"0.1.11",
|
|
"0.1.12",
|
|
"0.1.13",
|
|
"0.1.14",
|
|
"0.1.15",
|
|
"0.1.16",
|
|
"0.1.17",
|
|
"0.1.18",
|
|
"0.1.19",
|
|
},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: @draftlab/* + @draftauth/*
|
|
# (Aikido enumeration).
|
|
"@draftauth/client": {"0.2.1", "0.2.2"},
|
|
"@draftauth/core": {"0.13.1", "0.13.2"},
|
|
"@draftlab/auth": {"0.24.1", "0.24.2"},
|
|
"@draftlab/auth-router": {"0.5.1", "0.5.2"},
|
|
"@draftlab/db": {"0.16.1"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: @taskflow-corp/cli + @tolka/cli
|
|
# (Aikido enumeration).
|
|
"@taskflow-corp/cli": {"0.1.24", "0.1.25", "0.1.26", "0.1.27", "0.1.28", "0.1.29"},
|
|
"@tolka/cli": {"1.0.2", "1.0.3", "1.0.4", "1.0.5", "1.0.6"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: @ml-toolkit-ts/* + @mesadev/* + @dirigible-ai/sdk + @supersurkhet/*
|
|
# (Aikido enumeration).
|
|
"@dirigible-ai/sdk": {"0.6.2", "0.6.3"},
|
|
"@mesadev/rest": {"0.28.3"},
|
|
"@mesadev/saguaro": {"0.4.22"},
|
|
"@mesadev/sdk": {"0.28.3"},
|
|
"@ml-toolkit-ts/preprocessing": {"1.0.2", "1.0.3"},
|
|
"@ml-toolkit-ts/xgboost": {"1.0.3", "1.0.4"},
|
|
"@supersurkhet/cli": {"0.0.2", "0.0.3", "0.0.4", "0.0.5", "0.0.6", "0.0.7"},
|
|
"@supersurkhet/sdk": {"0.0.2", "0.0.3", "0.0.4", "0.0.5", "0.0.6", "0.0.7"},
|
|
# Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 wave: Unscoped packages (10 entries)
|
|
# (Aikido enumeration).
|
|
"safe-action": {"0.8.3", "0.8.4"},
|
|
"ts-dna": {"3.0.1", "3.0.2", "3.0.3", "3.0.4"},
|
|
"cross-stitch": {"1.1.3", "1.1.4", "1.1.5", "1.1.6"},
|
|
"cmux-agent-mcp": {"0.1.3", "0.1.4", "0.1.5", "0.1.6", "0.1.7", "0.1.8"},
|
|
"agentwork-cli": {"0.1.4", "0.1.5"},
|
|
"git-branch-selector": {"1.3.3", "1.3.4", "1.3.5", "1.3.6", "1.3.7"},
|
|
"wot-api": {"0.8.1", "0.8.2", "0.8.3", "0.8.4"},
|
|
"git-git-git": {"1.0.8", "1.0.9", "1.0.10", "1.0.11", "1.0.12"},
|
|
"nextmove-mcp": {"0.1.3", "0.1.4", "0.1.5", "0.1.6", "0.1.7"},
|
|
"ml-toolkit-ts": {"1.0.4", "1.0.5"},
|
|
# Cross-ecosystem Mini Shai-Hulud (Apr-30 wave): npm counterpart of
|
|
# PyPI lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3. Same threat actor (TeamPCP) per Semgrep,
|
|
# Aikido, OX Security, Resecurity. Safe version: 7.0.3 and earlier.
|
|
"intercom-client": {"7.0.4"},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CARGO_IOC_STRINGS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
|
# Reserved for future cargo-side incidents. Empty by default --
|
|
# `source` origin check below catches the structural pattern.
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Allowed lockfile origins.
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
NPM_REGISTRY_PREFIX = "https://registry.npmjs.org/"
|
|
|
|
# Tarballs are also fetched from this mirror on some GH Actions cached
|
|
# runs (npm rewrites the resolved URL on cache hit). Allow either.
|
|
NPM_REGISTRY_PREFIXES_ALLOWED: tuple[str, ...] = (NPM_REGISTRY_PREFIX,)
|
|
|
|
CARGO_REGISTRY_SOURCE = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Cargo non-registry source allowlist.
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
#
|
|
# Each entry is `(crate_name, exact_source_string)`. The crate must
|
|
# match by name AND the source must match the full pinned-SHA string
|
|
# verbatim. Bumping the commit SHA forces a re-review here: the
|
|
# scanner fires until the new SHA is appended.
|
|
#
|
|
# Studio's Tauri shell pulls `fix-path-env` directly from
|
|
# tauri-apps/fix-path-env-rs because the crate is not published to
|
|
# crates.io. The pinned commit (c4c45d5) was reviewed at the time it
|
|
# landed; future bumps need explicit approval.
|
|
CARGO_SOURCE_ALLOWLIST: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = (
|
|
(
|
|
"fix-path-env",
|
|
"git+https://github.com/tauri-apps/fix-path-env-rs#"
|
|
"c4c45d503ea115a839aae718d02f79e7c7f0f673",
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Finding container.
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Finding:
|
|
__slots__ = ("path", "package", "kind", "detail")
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, path: str, package: str, kind: str, detail: str) -> None:
|
|
self.path = path
|
|
self.package = package
|
|
self.kind = kind
|
|
self.detail = detail
|
|
|
|
def __str__(self) -> str:
|
|
return (
|
|
f" [{self.kind}] {self.path}\n"
|
|
f" package: {self.package}\n"
|
|
f" detail: {self.detail}"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _gha_escape(text: str) -> str:
|
|
"""Escape a string for use in a GitHub Actions `::warning::` /
|
|
`::error::` workflow command message. GH Actions truncates
|
|
annotation messages at the first newline unless `\\n` is
|
|
escaped as `%0A`; carriage returns and the percent sign need
|
|
matching escapes per the workflow-commands spec. Order matters:
|
|
`%` must be replaced first so the subsequent `%0A` / `%0D`
|
|
sequences are not double-encoded.
|
|
"""
|
|
return text.replace("%", "%25").replace("\r", "%0D").replace("\n", "%0A")
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# package-lock.json audit.
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def audit_npm_lockfile(path: Path) -> list[Finding]:
|
|
findings: list[Finding] = []
|
|
if not path.exists():
|
|
# A missing requested lockfile is a config error, not a clean
|
|
# audit; surface it so a deleted default cannot pass silently.
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = "<root>",
|
|
kind = "missing-lockfile",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
"expected lockfile not found; refusing to silently "
|
|
"report a clean audit for a path that was not scanned"
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
return findings
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
raw = path.read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
# Permission denied, is-a-directory, broken-pipe etc. -- surface
|
|
# as a finding instead of crashing CI with a raw traceback.
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = "<root>",
|
|
kind = "unreadable-lockfile",
|
|
detail = f"could not read file: {exc}",
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
return findings
|
|
try:
|
|
lock = json.loads(raw)
|
|
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = "<root>",
|
|
kind = "malformed-lockfile",
|
|
detail = f"could not parse as JSON: {exc}",
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
return findings
|
|
|
|
lockfile_version = lock.get("lockfileVersion")
|
|
if lockfile_version not in (2, 3):
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = "<root>",
|
|
kind = "unsupported-lockfile-version",
|
|
detail = (f"only lockfileVersion 2 or 3 audited; got {lockfile_version}"),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
packages = lock.get("packages") or {}
|
|
for key, entry in packages.items():
|
|
# The empty key "" is the project root; workspace entries use
|
|
# keys like "node_modules/foo" or "studio/frontend/sub-pkg".
|
|
# Skip the project root (it has no `resolved`).
|
|
if key == "":
|
|
continue
|
|
if entry.get("link"):
|
|
# Workspace symlink; no tarball to resolve.
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
resolved = entry.get("resolved")
|
|
# Entries living inside another package's `node_modules/`
|
|
# tree are bundled fold-ins -- the parent's tarball ships
|
|
# their source verbatim and the parent's `integrity` covers
|
|
# the whole subtree. npm represents them in lockfileVersion 3
|
|
# as nested entries with no `resolved` and no `integrity` of
|
|
# their own. Treat them as transparent to this audit.
|
|
nested = key.count("/node_modules/") >= 1
|
|
|
|
# 1. resolved-URL origin.
|
|
if resolved is None:
|
|
if nested or entry.get("bundled"):
|
|
# Bundled / fold-in entry; covered by parent integrity.
|
|
pass
|
|
elif entry.get("version"):
|
|
# Top-level entry without a resolved URL is suspicious.
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = key,
|
|
kind = "missing-resolved-url",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
f"version={entry['version']!r} but no `resolved` "
|
|
"field; lockfile is incomplete"
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
else:
|
|
if not any(resolved.startswith(p) for p in NPM_REGISTRY_PREFIXES_ALLOWED):
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = key,
|
|
kind = "non-registry-resolved-url",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
f"resolved={resolved!r}; only "
|
|
f"{NPM_REGISTRY_PREFIX} is permitted. Direct "
|
|
"GitHub / git / file references are the "
|
|
"Shai-Hulud injection vector."
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# 2. integrity-hash presence.
|
|
if resolved is not None and not entry.get("integrity"):
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = key,
|
|
kind = "missing-integrity-hash",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
"no `integrity` field; npm cannot verify the "
|
|
"tarball SHA against the registry-published hash"
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# 3. Blocked malicious version list.
|
|
nm_prefix = "node_modules/"
|
|
pkg_name = key[len(nm_prefix) :] if key.startswith(nm_prefix) else key
|
|
version = entry.get("version")
|
|
blocked = BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS.get(pkg_name, set())
|
|
if version and version in blocked:
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = key,
|
|
kind = "blocked-known-malicious",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
f"{pkg_name}@{version} is on the " "BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS list"
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# 4. Known IOC strings: scan the raw file body so we hit fields the
|
|
# structural pass above doesn't enumerate (scripts, optional
|
|
# dependencies, etc.). Cheap and complete.
|
|
for ioc in NPM_IOC_STRINGS:
|
|
if ioc in raw:
|
|
# Best-effort line number lookup.
|
|
line_no = _first_line_containing(raw, ioc)
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = f"{path}:{line_no}" if line_no else str(path),
|
|
package = "<ioc-match>",
|
|
kind = "known-ioc-string",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
f"matched known IOC substring {ioc!r}; this is "
|
|
"a public indicator of a recent supply-chain "
|
|
"compromise. Refuse to install."
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return findings
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _first_line_containing(text: str, needle: str) -> int | None:
|
|
for i, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start = 1):
|
|
if needle in line:
|
|
return i
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Cargo.lock audit.
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Cargo.lock is TOML; parse with stdlib tomllib (Python 3.11+). The
|
|
# studio's Tauri shell already requires a modern toolchain so this is
|
|
# always available where CI runs.
|
|
_PACKAGE_HEADER = re.compile(r"^\[\[package\]\]\s*$")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def audit_cargo_lockfile(path: Path) -> list[Finding]:
|
|
findings: list[Finding] = []
|
|
if not path.exists():
|
|
# See audit_npm_lockfile: missing lockfile is a finding.
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = "<root>",
|
|
kind = "missing-lockfile",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
"expected lockfile not found; refusing to silently "
|
|
"report a clean audit for a path that was not scanned"
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
return findings
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
raw = path.read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = "<root>",
|
|
kind = "unreadable-lockfile",
|
|
detail = f"could not read file: {exc}",
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
return findings
|
|
try:
|
|
import tomllib # type: ignore[import-not-found]
|
|
except ImportError:
|
|
# Python <3.11; fall back to a tomli shim if importable.
|
|
try:
|
|
import tomli as tomllib # type: ignore[no-redef]
|
|
except ImportError:
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = "<root>",
|
|
kind = "missing-toml-parser",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
"Python 3.11+ tomllib or tomli is required to "
|
|
"parse Cargo.lock; install tomli or upgrade "
|
|
"Python before re-running this audit"
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
return findings
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
lock = tomllib.loads(raw)
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = "<root>",
|
|
kind = "malformed-lockfile",
|
|
detail = f"could not parse as TOML: {exc}",
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
return findings
|
|
|
|
for entry in lock.get("package", []):
|
|
name = entry.get("name") or "<unnamed>"
|
|
version = entry.get("version") or "<unversioned>"
|
|
source = entry.get("source")
|
|
# Workspace-local crates have no `source` field; skip them.
|
|
if source is None:
|
|
continue
|
|
if source != CARGO_REGISTRY_SOURCE:
|
|
if (name, source) in CARGO_SOURCE_ALLOWLIST:
|
|
# Pre-approved non-registry source pinned by SHA.
|
|
pass
|
|
else:
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = f"{name}@{version}",
|
|
kind = "non-registry-cargo-source",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
f"source={source!r}; only "
|
|
f"{CARGO_REGISTRY_SOURCE!r} is permitted "
|
|
"by default, and no allowlist entry covers "
|
|
"this crate. If the source is legitimate, "
|
|
"add `(name, source)` to "
|
|
"CARGO_SOURCE_ALLOWLIST after reviewing the "
|
|
"pinned commit."
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
if not entry.get("checksum") and source == CARGO_REGISTRY_SOURCE:
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = str(path),
|
|
package = f"{name}@{version}",
|
|
kind = "missing-cargo-checksum",
|
|
detail = (
|
|
"registry crate without checksum; cargo cannot "
|
|
"verify the downloaded source against the "
|
|
"registry-published SHA"
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
for ioc in CARGO_IOC_STRINGS:
|
|
if ioc in raw:
|
|
line_no = _first_line_containing(raw, ioc)
|
|
findings.append(
|
|
Finding(
|
|
path = f"{path}:{line_no}" if line_no else str(path),
|
|
package = "<ioc-match>",
|
|
kind = "known-ioc-string",
|
|
detail = f"matched known IOC substring {ioc!r}",
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return findings
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# CLI.
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Finding kinds split into BLOCKING vs ADVISORY for the default run mode.
|
|
# Blocking findings come from public supply-chain attack indicators (a
|
|
# version we know is malicious, a string an attacker would have to embed
|
|
# for an attack to work). Advisory findings are structural lockfile
|
|
# anomalies (missing integrity, non-default registry, etc.) -- they
|
|
# WARN the maintainer but do not block merges. Pass --strict to make
|
|
# every finding blocking (PR-5479-style behavior for opt-in adopters).
|
|
BLOCKING_KINDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
|
|
{
|
|
"blocked-known-malicious",
|
|
"known-ioc-string",
|
|
# Internal-failure kinds: a structurally broken lockfile MIGHT
|
|
# be hiding a real attack, so we keep these blocking too.
|
|
"malformed-lockfile",
|
|
"missing-lockfile",
|
|
"unreadable-lockfile",
|
|
"missing-toml-parser",
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
DEFAULT_NPM_LOCKFILES = (
|
|
"studio/frontend/package-lock.json",
|
|
"studio/backend/core/data_recipe/oxc-validator/package-lock.json",
|
|
"studio/package-lock.json",
|
|
)
|
|
DEFAULT_CARGO_LOCKFILES = ("studio/src-tauri/Cargo.lock",)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
|
|
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
|
|
description = "Pre-install lockfile supply-chain audit.",
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"--root",
|
|
default = str(REPO_ROOT),
|
|
help = "Repo root (default: parent of this script).",
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"--npm-lockfile",
|
|
action = "append",
|
|
default = None,
|
|
help = (
|
|
"Path to a package-lock.json (repeatable). "
|
|
"Default: studio/frontend/package-lock.json, "
|
|
"studio/backend/core/data_recipe/oxc-validator/package-lock.json, "
|
|
"and studio/package-lock.json (Tauri CLI for desktop release)."
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"--cargo-lockfile",
|
|
action = "append",
|
|
default = None,
|
|
help = (
|
|
"Path to a Cargo.lock (repeatable). "
|
|
"Default: studio/src-tauri/Cargo.lock."
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"--strict",
|
|
action = "store_true",
|
|
help = (
|
|
"Treat every finding as blocking (exit 1). "
|
|
"Default mode only blocks on known-malicious versions, "
|
|
"indicator-of-compromise strings, or structurally broken "
|
|
"lockfiles; everything else is printed as an advisory "
|
|
"warning with exit 0. CI should use the default; local "
|
|
"audits aiming for zero noise can opt in via --strict."
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
|
|
|
|
# SF4: require a real justification (e.g. JIRA ticket id) for the
|
|
# skip env var. Treat the trivially-set values ("1", "true", "yes",
|
|
# "on", empty) as INVALID -- they look like accidental flips and
|
|
# silently bypassed the supply-chain audit. A valid value is a
|
|
# non-empty string >=5 chars after stripping that does not match
|
|
# any of the boolean-shaped tokens above. An invalid value emits a
|
|
# loud GitHub Actions warning to stderr and FALLS THROUGH to run
|
|
# the audit normally (fail-safe). A valid value emits a warning
|
|
# naming the reason and skips with rc=0 (compat).
|
|
_skip_raw = os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP")
|
|
if _skip_raw is not None:
|
|
_skip = _skip_raw.strip()
|
|
_invalid_tokens = {"", "1", "0", "true", "false", "yes", "no", "on", "off"}
|
|
if _skip.lower() in _invalid_tokens or len(_skip) < 5:
|
|
print(
|
|
"::warning::Lockfile audit skip REQUIRES a justification "
|
|
f"value (>=5 chars, not '{_skip_raw}'). Proceeding with "
|
|
"audit. Use e.g. UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=ticket-1234.",
|
|
file = sys.stderr,
|
|
flush = True,
|
|
)
|
|
else:
|
|
print(
|
|
f"::warning::Lockfile audit skipped: reason='{_skip}'",
|
|
file = sys.stderr,
|
|
flush = True,
|
|
)
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
root = Path(args.root).resolve()
|
|
# Explicit --npm-lockfile/--cargo-lockfile scopes the scan to those
|
|
# paths; defaults apply only to the no-args CI invocation.
|
|
_user_explicit = args.npm_lockfile is not None or args.cargo_lockfile is not None
|
|
if _user_explicit:
|
|
npm_paths = [root / p for p in (args.npm_lockfile or ())]
|
|
cargo_paths = [root / p for p in (args.cargo_lockfile or ())]
|
|
else:
|
|
npm_paths = [root / p for p in DEFAULT_NPM_LOCKFILES]
|
|
cargo_paths = [root / p for p in DEFAULT_CARGO_LOCKFILES]
|
|
|
|
all_findings: list[Finding] = []
|
|
for p in npm_paths:
|
|
print(f"[lockfile-audit] npm: {p}", flush = True)
|
|
all_findings.extend(audit_npm_lockfile(p))
|
|
for p in cargo_paths:
|
|
print(f"[lockfile-audit] cargo: {p}", flush = True)
|
|
all_findings.extend(audit_cargo_lockfile(p))
|
|
|
|
if not all_findings:
|
|
print(
|
|
f"[lockfile-audit] OK: 0 findings across "
|
|
f"{len(npm_paths)} npm + {len(cargo_paths)} cargo lockfile(s)",
|
|
flush = True,
|
|
)
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
# Split findings into blocking (known-malicious / IOC / structurally
|
|
# broken) and advisory (everything else, e.g. missing integrity on a
|
|
# registry-published tarball). In default mode advisory findings are
|
|
# printed but do not change the exit code; --strict treats every
|
|
# finding as blocking.
|
|
blocking = [f for f in all_findings if f.kind in BLOCKING_KINDS]
|
|
advisory = [f for f in all_findings if f.kind not in BLOCKING_KINDS]
|
|
|
|
if args.strict:
|
|
blocking = list(all_findings)
|
|
advisory = []
|
|
|
|
if advisory:
|
|
print(
|
|
f"\n[lockfile-audit] {len(advisory)} advisory finding(s) "
|
|
"(non-blocking; pass --strict to fail the build on these):\n",
|
|
file = sys.stderr,
|
|
)
|
|
for f in advisory:
|
|
# Surface in GitHub Actions UI as a warning annotation when run
|
|
# under Actions; harmless prefix elsewhere. GH Actions
|
|
# truncates annotation messages at the first newline unless
|
|
# newlines are escaped as `%0A`, so the full multi-line
|
|
# Finding (kind + path + package + detail) only renders in
|
|
# the UI after _gha_escape collapses it onto one line.
|
|
print(f"::warning::{_gha_escape(str(f))}", file = sys.stderr)
|
|
print(file = sys.stderr)
|
|
|
|
if not blocking:
|
|
print(
|
|
f"[lockfile-audit] OK: {len(advisory)} advisory finding(s), "
|
|
"0 blocking. Run with --strict to escalate advisory findings.",
|
|
flush = True,
|
|
)
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
print(
|
|
f"\n[lockfile-audit] FAIL: {len(blocking)} blocking finding(s):\n",
|
|
file = sys.stderr,
|
|
)
|
|
for f in blocking:
|
|
# Same %-encoding rationale as the advisory branch above: the
|
|
# GH Actions annotation is truncated at the first newline
|
|
# unless the message is escaped.
|
|
print(f"::error::{_gha_escape(str(f))}", file = sys.stderr)
|
|
print(file = sys.stderr)
|
|
print(
|
|
"[lockfile-audit] Refusing to proceed. Each blocking finding "
|
|
"above is either a public indicator-of-compromise, a known-"
|
|
"malicious pinned version, or a structurally broken lockfile. "
|
|
"Investigate before running `npm ci` or `cargo fetch`.",
|
|
file = sys.stderr,
|
|
)
|
|
return 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
sys.exit(main())
|