unsloth/studio/backend/run.py
Leo Borcherding 91a0df9514
Studio: make the Cloudflare tunnel opt-in (off by default) (#7046)
* Studio: make the Cloudflare tunnel opt-in (off by default)

A wildcard bind (`-H 0.0.0.0`) auto-started a public trycloudflare.com
tunnel, so exposing Studio on the LAN also published it to the public
internet. Flip the default so the tunnel is opt-in.

- `--cloudflare` is now tri-state (Optional[bool], default None = off),
  mirroring the existing --enable-tools/--disable-tools handling. Pass
  --cloudflare to expose a public HTTPS link for a wildcard bind; --secure
  still implies the tunnel.
- --secure + --no-cloudflare is still rejected as a contradiction.
- Update the parent-command guard, re-exec forwarding, startup-banner
  wording, the colab comment, README, and tests.

* Studio: update installer/setup launch hints for opt-in Cloudflare

The post-install launch hints only mentioned --secure for a public link.
Now that the tunnel is opt-in, clarify that -H 0.0.0.0 exposes the raw
port on the LAN (not a public URL), and surface --cloudflare as the
explicit opt-in for a public HTTPS link (--secure keeps the raw port
private). Applied to install.ps1, install.sh, and studio/setup.sh.

* Studio: address review - keep cloudflare tri-state + harden run re-exec

Two review points from the bots:

- Gemini: keep `cloudflare` as Optional[bool] in run_server instead of
  casting None -> False, so the startup banner can distinguish "OFF (default)"
  (unset) from "OFF (--no-cloudflare)" (explicit). `_cloudflare_flag` and the
  banner branch now carry the tri-state.
- Codex (P1): `unsloth studio run` re-execs the studio venv's console script,
  which can be an older build whose --cloudflare defaulted on; omitting the
  flag let it re-enable the tunnel. That path now forwards the default polarity
  explicitly (--no-cloudflare, or nothing under --secure since --secure implies
  the tunnel). The plain `unsloth studio` path runs the same-version in-tree
  run.py (resolved via _find_run_py), so it keeps forwarding only an explicit
  polarity and still shows the accurate "(default)" banner.

Tests updated for the tri-state banner labels, the None gate cases, and the
new re-exec forwarding.

* Studio: forward --no-cloudflare on plain re-exec too (mixed install)

Codex follow-up: _find_run_py falls back to STUDIO_HOME/.../studio/backend/
run.py when the package copy is absent, so the plain `unsloth studio` re-exec
can land on an older run.py whose --cloudflare defaults on. Forward the default
polarity explicitly there too (--no-cloudflare, or nothing under --secure),
matching the run subcommand. The common in-venv launch skips the re-exec and
still shows the tri-state "(default)" banner.

* Studio: fix launch hint - --cloudflare needs the wildcard bind

Codex P3: the launch hint listed --cloudflare next to the loopback
`unsloth studio -p 8888` command, but the tunnel only starts for wildcard
binds, so `--cloudflare` alone on 127.0.0.1 does nothing. Show
`-H 0.0.0.0 --cloudflare` in the hints (install.ps1, install.sh,
studio/setup.sh) and clarify the same in the README.

* Studio: cross-platform masked terminal password prompt helper

Per-keystroke '*' echo (POSIX termios cbreak / Windows msvcrt.getwch),
backspace editing, Ctrl-C abort, EOF handling, confirmation loop with
re-prompt on mismatch or policy failure. Pure should_prompt gate for the
--secure/--cloudflare exposure paths.

* Studio CLI: force a terminal password change before public tunnel exposure

When a launch will start the Cloudflare tunnel (--secure, or --cloudflare on
a non-api-only wildcard bind) and the admin account still has its seeded
bootstrap password, prompt for a new password in the terminal (masked with
'*', confirmed, re-prompting until valid) before any re-exec or server
exists. The change is committed in the parent so it never crosses argv or
the environment and older studio-venv children see it immediately. Without
a terminal, warn and fall back to the backend bootstrap shutdown timer.
Mirrors backend update_password semantics in one transaction: rehash,
rotate the JWT secret, clear must_change_password, revoke refresh tokens,
drop the desktop secret, then remove the stale credential files.

* Studio: terminal password gate before the public tunnel (backend backstop)

Never publish a trycloudflare URL while the seeded admin password is
active: run_server now runs a terminal password-change gate after the
tunnel decision and strictly before start_studio_tunnel. Interactive
refusal fails closed (shutdown + exit 1, mirroring the secure gate);
without a tty it warns and keeps the bootstrap deadline. Success applies
the same effects as the change-password route (update_password +
revoke_user_refresh_tokens) and drops the stale
app.state.bootstrap_password. MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH centralised in
auth/storage.py and referenced by the HTTP schema. terminal_prompt.py
carries the pure gate helper (interactive loop stubbed; supplied by the
masked-input module). Also migrates the studio/setup.ps1 launch footer
that still showed the bare wildcard hint.

* README: reconcile remote-access section with opt-in Cloudflare tunnel

* Studio: harden the terminal password gate after review

- run.py: run the gate BEFORE the uvicorn socket binds. On a wildcard
  --cloudflare launch the served HTML injects the bootstrap credential
  for first login, so a pre-gate listener would hand the default
  password to anyone who reaches the raw port while the operator is
  still typing. The gate now also seeds the admin row itself (it can
  run before lifespan startup).
- Headless launches that nothing would protect now fail closed: the
  bootstrap deadline never arms for api-only serving and
  UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT=0 disables it, so warn-and-proceed
  would have promised a shutdown that never comes. Both the CLI and the
  backend refuse to publish in that case; the ordinary headless path
  still warns and relies on the 1h deadline, and no longer auto-fills
  the default credential into HTML served on a public URL.
- storage.update_password gains revoke_refresh_tokens to delete the
  user's refresh tokens in the SAME transaction as the password commit;
  the change-password route and the backend gate use it (a separable
  follow-up delete could fail after the commit and leave a stale
  refresh token able to mint access tokens under the rotated secret).
- clear_bootstrap_password is best-effort: a locked/undeletable file
  must not surface as a failed password change.
- CLI masked reader: disable ISIG like the backend so Ctrl-Z cannot
  suspend the process with the shared terminal stuck in no-echo mode;
  handle Ctrl-C/Ctrl-Z as characters; treat stream EOF mid-line as an
  abort instead of submitting a partial password. Both readers restore
  terminal attrs from a SIGTERM/SIGHUP handler since a finally block
  cannot run when a default-disposition signal terminates the process.
- Backend reader: decode byte-at-a-time through an incremental UTF-8
  decoder so multi-byte characters split across read boundaries are no
  longer dropped; isatty checks tolerate closed/None streams.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: persist bootstrap suppression through lifespan startup

The pre-bind password gate nulled app.state.bootstrap_password, but the
FastAPI lifespan runs after it and re-reads the bootstrap password into
app.state on both admin paths, so a headless public launch could still
serve the injected credential in HTML. Carry a persistent
suppress_bootstrap_injection flag that the lifespan honors instead.

Also drop the quoted Tuple annotation on _terminal_password_gate that
tripped the import-hoist lint (the typing import looked unused).

* Studio CLI: keep the pre-exec auth DB private (0700 dir, 0600 db)

On a fresh install the pre-exposure password gate creates auth/ and
auth.db through the CLI before the backend ever runs, and
sqlite3.connect leaves the DB 0644 under a 022 umask. Mirror backend
storage.get_connection's chmod so the committed password hash and JWT
secret are never world-readable, even if the launch aborts before the
backend applies its own modes.

* Tighten pre-exposure password gate comments

* Studio: delete seeded bootstrap password before headless public re-exec

The headless warn-and-proceed path returns with the default admin
password still active, then re-execs a child Studio process. An old
studio-venv child (mixed-version install) predates the pre-bind gate and
its injection-suppress flag, so its lifespan reads .bootstrap_password
and injects the seeded credential into the public HTML for up to the
bootstrap deadline. A CLI-flag handshake cannot fix this uniformly: the
studio run path uses ignore_unknown_options and an old in-venv child
runs in-process, so it would never reject the flag.

Delete the seeded .bootstrap_password file in the parent before re-exec
so a fresh child of any version reads None and never serves it. This
covers both re-exec paths and both child versions. must_change_password
stays set, so the login page still forces a change and the bootstrap
shutdown timer still arms; only the plaintext-on-disk copy is removed.
Recovery is via a terminal-attached run or reset-password. Backend gate
and CLI warnings updated to match.

* Studio: commit the seeded admin before headless public re-exec

The headless-warn path deletes the seeded .bootstrap_password so a
re-exec'd child cannot inject it, but _ensure_cli_default_admin's INSERT
was never committed and rolled back on conn.close(). On a fresh
STUDIO_HOME an old studio-venv child then found no admin, regenerated a
fresh bootstrap password + file, and injected THAT into the public page,
defeating the deletion.

Commit the seeded admin right after _ensure_cli_default_admin so any
re-exec'd child sees the existing account and does not regenerate.
Regression tests cover both re-exec paths on a fresh (unseeded) DB.

* Studio: fail closed when the bootstrap password file cannot be removed

On the headless public path, deleting .bootstrap_password is the
protection against an old re-exec'd child injecting the seeded
credential. If unlink fails (locked file, read-only auth dir) the file
is still on disk, so warning and proceeding would still leak it for the
bootstrap-timeout window. Abort with a clear error instead. Regression
test covers the unlink-failure fail-closed path.

* Studio: hold no-echo for the whole password line, not per keystroke

The POSIX masked reader set cbreak/no-echo inside _getch_posix and restored
the terminal to echo-on in a finally after every single keystroke, because
_read_password calls _getch once per character. Between one char returning and
the next call re-entering cbreak, ECHO was on, so a keystroke arriving in that
window echoed the password in cleartext.

Move the terminal mode into a _prompt_raw_mode context that _read_password
holds around the entire line (mirroring unsloth_cli/commands/_password_prompt.py,
which already did this), restoring once when the line completes or aborts.
_getch_posix now only reads, since the mode is held by the caller. The context
is a no-op when stdin is not a real terminal, keeping the _getch test seam.

Add a regression test asserting the raw-mode context wraps the read exactly
once and every keystroke is read while it is active.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: strip the seeded bootstrap password when the auth DB check fails

The pre-exposure gate returned early on two auth-DB inspection failures and
proceeded to re-exec without removing the seeded .bootstrap_password:

- _connect_auth_db() failure: a seeded credential from a prior run may still
  be on disk.
- the must_change_password read-back failure: worse, _ensure_cli_default_admin
  had already seeded the admin and the code committed it (writing
  .bootstrap_password) right before the failing SELECT.

In the mixed-version case (a new outer CLI re-execing an old studio-venv child
that predates the pre-bind gate), that child would read the file back and
inject the default admin credential into the public Cloudflare page. The
sibling headless branch already deletes the file for exactly this reason, so
these returns were an inconsistent gap.

Factor the delete-or-fail-closed logic into
_strip_seeded_bootstrap_password_or_exit and call it on both inspection
failures (and reuse it in the headless branch): strip the seeded file first
(version-independent protection), failing closed if the removal itself fails.
must_change_password stays set, so the login page still forces a change and the
bootstrap shutdown timer still arms.

Add tests for both new paths (connect failure and post-commit read-back
failure strip the file and proceed; a failed strip fails closed).

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: fail closed when the seeded admin cannot be committed before exposure

The pre-exposure gate wrapped _ensure_cli_default_admin (the INSERT), its
conn.commit(), and the must_change_password read-back in one try, and the
except recovered by stripping .bootstrap_password and proceeding to re-exec on
the assumption the admin was already committed. That assumption only holds when
the failing statement is the SELECT. When the INSERT or the commit itself fails
(e.g. a write lock held past the busy timeout on a fresh install), no admin row
is committed: it rolls back on conn.close(), and a re-exec'd old studio-venv
child (no pre-bind gate) then finds no admin, regenerates a fresh bootstrap
password + file, and serves that default credential on the public Cloudflare
page. Stripping the file cannot stop a regeneration.

Split the seed+commit into its own try that fails closed (refuse the public
launch, best-effort removing any half-written seed file) since we cannot prove a
committed admin; keep the separate read-back failure on the strip-and-proceed
path, where the admin is committed so an old child finds it and will not
regenerate. Add a test for the seed-commit-failure path.

* Studio: decode the CLI masked password reader with errors="replace"

The CLI reader read keystrokes with text-mode sys.stdin.read(1), which raises
UnicodeDecodeError on a pasted non-UTF-8 password (e.g. Latin-1 bytes), or under
PYTHONUTF8 yields a lone surrogate that later crashes the pbkdf2 encode -- either
aborts the launch with a traceback. The backend mirror (terminal_prompt.py)
already reads raw bytes through an incremental decoder with errors="replace".
Mirror that here: read with os.read and an incremental decoder so invalid bytes
map to U+FFFD, iterating over each emitted char (one byte can complete a
replacement plus the next char).

* Studio: resolve the child launcher before the pre-exposure gate

The gate strips the seeded .bootstrap_password on a headless public launch, and
it ran before the re-exec launchability check (studio venv / run.py / console
script present). So a headless launch with an incomplete studio setup would seed
the admin, delete the bootstrap password, then abort because the child could not
be found, leaving the admin at must_change_password=1 with no password ever
shown or injectable: locked out until `unsloth studio reset-password`.

Resolve and validate the child launcher first, in both `studio` (studio_default)
and `studio run`, and only then run the gate, so an unlaunchable setup exits
before anything is stripped. Add a regression test that a missing venv exits
without removing the seeded file.

* Studio: fail closed when the auth DB cannot be opened before exposure

The connect-failure branch of the pre-exposure gate stripped .bootstrap_password
and proceeded, on the assumption a committed admin from a prior run made an old
child find it and not regenerate. But on a fresh public launch whose
_connect_auth_db() itself fails (transient lock during the schema/seed step, or
an unwritable home), no admin is committed, so a mixed-version re-exec child that
predates the backend gate can find no user, generate a fresh bootstrap password,
and serve it on the public Cloudflare page. Stripping a file we cannot vouch for
cannot stop a regeneration.

Make this branch fail closed like the seed/commit failure path: we only continue
past the DB inspection once a committed admin is confirmed. The existing file is
left untouched so a retry (after a transient lock clears) can still prompt.

Update the connect-failure test to assert fail-closed, and give the in-venv
--secure flag test a real STUDIO_HOME with an already-changed admin so the gate
is a no-op rather than relying on a DB-open failure.

* Studio: invalidate seeded bootstrap files before deleting auth.db on reset

reset-password deleted auth.db first, then best-effort unlinked the seeded
.bootstrap_password and desktop secret. unlink() only ignores
FileNotFoundError, so a locked or read-only file (Windows AV, read-only auth
dir) survived while auth.db was gone. The next server start then re-seeded
from that stale plaintext and re-validated the exact credential the reset was
meant to revoke.

Invalidate the credential files first, truncating any that cannot be
unlinked, then delete the DB, so a surviving file can never carry a reusable
secret. clear_bootstrap_password now truncates on unlink failure for the same
reason, and its warning says the contents were cleared rather than claiming
the stale password is already invalid.

* Studio: require a servable frontend before the pre-exposure gate can strip the seeded password

A headless public launch strips the seeded .bootstrap_password before the
re-exec'd child starts. If the child then cannot serve the login page (the only
in-band way to change the seeded password) the admin is locked out
(must_change_password=1, no file, no UI) until reset-password.

Add _require_servable_frontend_or_exit and call it before the gate on both
`unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run` public launches: fail closed if a
non-api-only public launch has no built frontend dist, before anything is
stripped. A user-supplied --frontend is validated to contain index.html so a
bad path cannot silently bypass the check; an auto-resolved dist is trusted
(_find_frontend_dist already requires index.html) and forwarded to the child.

Model-load aborts on `studio run` remain a residual: the parent must strip for
mixed-version safety (an old studio-venv child has no pre-bind gate) and model
loadability cannot be proven before exec, so that path stays recoverable via
reset-password.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: harden reset-password ordering and validate the in-venv backend before the strip

Three follow-ups to the pre-exposure hardening:

reset-password now deletes auth.db FIRST and proves it is gone before touching
the seeded credential files. If the DB cannot be removed (a running Studio or
Windows holds it open, or a read-only auth dir) it aborts with the credential
files untouched, so a forgotten-password reset is not left half-done with the
recovery credentials deleted while an un-resettable must_change_password=1 DB
survives. After the DB is gone it invalidates the stale credential files
(unlink, else truncate) and fails closed if a file can be neither removed nor
truncated, since a surviving plaintext would be re-seeded by
generate_bootstrap_password() and re-validate the revoked password.

The in-venv (in-process) launch path had no analogue of the re-exec launcher
check: a headless public launch would seed the admin and strip the seeded
.bootstrap_password in the gate before _load_run_module() later failed on a
broken/partial venv, leaving must_change_password=1 with no password to log in.
Add _validate_inproc_backend_before_strip, called on the in-venv path (both
`unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run`) before the gate on the headless
public path, so a broken backend fails cleanly before anything is stripped. It
is scoped to the headless path so an interactive prompt is not delayed behind a
full backend import.

* Studio: validate the frontend and tunnel before the strip on every public path

Five follow-ups closing the remaining pre-exposure-strip lockouts:

The in-venv (in-process) paths of both `unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio
run` validated the backend but not the frontend before the gate, so a headless
public launch with a missing/bad dist would strip the seeded .bootstrap_password
and then abort in run_server() during frontend setup, leaving
must_change_password=1 with no login page. Both now validate a servable frontend
before the strip (cheap check first, backend import after) and serve the
resolved dist in-process.

The `studio run` re-exec discarded the dist that satisfied the pre-strip check
and only forwarded a user-supplied --frontend. In a shadowed install where the
parent finds a built dist the child cannot, it stripped and exec'd without the
path, and the child aborted during frontend setup. It now forwards the resolved
dist, matching `unsloth studio`.

On a headless --secure launch the bind is loopback, so the Cloudflare tunnel is
the only public exposure. If cloudflared is provably unavailable (found nowhere
and undownloadable) the tunnel cannot start, so stripping the recovery
credential would just lock the user out with no public URL ever served. Add
_tunnel_binary_confirmed_unavailable and, on --secure only, refuse the launch
with the credential preserved rather than strip. Wildcard --cloudflare binds
0.0.0.0 publicly regardless of the tunnel, so it still strips; any uncertainty
(helper not loadable) also still strips, since a possible credential leak
outweighs a recoverable lockout.

clear_bootstrap_password no longer claims it cleared the file's contents when
both unlink and truncate failed; it now reports the stale password is still on
disk and asks the user to remove it manually.

* Studio: fix cloudflared probe path and skip the bootstrap strip for a self-suppressing child

Two follow-ups to the --secure pre-exposure hardening:

The cloudflared availability probe loaded cloudflare_tunnel by file path but not
its backend deps: ensure_cloudflared() -> _cache_path() lazily imports
utils.paths.storage_roots, which only resolves when studio/backend is on
sys.path. From the outer CLI it is not, so the probe saw ensure_cloudflared()
return None (cache unresolvable) and wrongly treated the tunnel as unavailable,
refusing --secure even when cloudflared was cached or downloadable. Add the
backend dir to sys.path for the probe (and remove it after) so the cache path
resolves as it will in the child.

A headless --secure launch stripped the seeded .bootstrap_password before the
child proved the tunnel could actually connect, so a cloudflared that is present
but cannot establish the tunnel (blocked connectivity, Cloudflare outage) left
must_change_password=1 with no recovery credential. But the strip is only needed
when the re-exec'd child is an OLD studio-venv backend with no pre-bind
suppression: this install's own run.py sets app.state.suppress_bootstrap_injection
before binding and never serves the seeded credential publicly. Add
_child_self_suppresses (true in-process, or when the re-exec target is this
install's own run.py by path identity) and skip the strip in that case, keeping
.bootstrap_password as a local recovery credential; the strip stays fully in
force for the studio-venv console-script path and any venv-fallback run.py, where
an old child is actually possible.

* Studio: reword the pre-exposure terminal password prompt

* Studio: warn when -H is overridden by --secure; align pre-exposure prompt wording

- --secure/--secure run: emit a Note (not an error) when -H is a non-loopback
  host, since --secure forces the loopback bind and would otherwise discard -H
  silently.
- Reword the pre-exposure terminal prompt to 'exposed on the public internet'
  in both the backend gate and the CLI mirror.
- Align the CLI success line with the backend ("Password updated for '<user>'.").
- Tests for the new -H warning (present when overridden, absent on loopback).

* Studio: add non-interactive --password to set the initial admin password

Headless hosts (CI, containers, systemd units) have no TTY, so the forced
first-exposure password change could not be completed unattended. Add a
non-interactive way to set the INITIAL admin password before the server binds:

- --password <value>, the UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD env var, or --password -
  (read one line from stdin). Off by default; unset falls back to the normal
  interactive terminal prompt / browser setup.
- Applies on any launch (public --secure/--cloudflare or a headless -H 0.0.0.0
  bind), only when the account still has its seeded bootstrap password. An
  already-set password is a hard error, never an override; an invalid value
  (too short, or equal to the bootstrap) fails closed before bind.
- The CLI applies the change in the parent, never forwards --password to the
  re-exec child, and strips UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD from the child env so the
  secret never crosses to the child. run.py does the same on the direct path and
  strips the env var so spawned subprocesses (cloudflared, llama-server, tools)
  cannot inherit it.

Mirrors resolve_supplied_password across the CLI and backend, documents the
option in the README (including the argv-visibility caveat), and covers all
flows (env/stdin/literal, fail-closed cases, no-forward, env-strip,
reset-password roundtrip) in the CLI, backend, and unit suites.

* Studio: truncate the stale bootstrap file when unlink fails on a CLI password change

The post-change cleanup in _cli_update_password only warned when
.bootstrap_password could not be unlinked but was still writable (locked file,
read-only auth dir), leaving the old plaintext on disk. If auth.db is later
reset or removed, generate_bootstrap_password() reads that file back and
re-validates the revoked bootstrap password. Truncate the file on unlink
failure so its stale plaintext cannot be re-seeded, mirroring the backend
clear_bootstrap_password(); the password change is already committed, so this
never rolls it back. The warning now states truthfully whether the contents
were cleared or the file must be removed manually.

* Studio: tighten comments

---------

Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-15 06:13:25 -07:00

1875 lines
71 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
"""Run script for Unsloth UI Backend.
Self-contained; can be moved to any directory.
"""
import os
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional, Tuple
def _fix_torch_cuda_ld_path():
"""Prepend torch's bundled CUDA libs to LD_LIBRARY_PATH.
PyTorch wheels ship their own CUDA runtime (libcudart, libcublas, ...) in
``site-packages/nvidia/*/lib``. On Linux the dynamic linker reads
LD_LIBRARY_PATH before the RUNPATH baked into torch's .so files, so a
pre-existing LD_LIBRARY_PATH pointing at a different system CUDA (e.g.
/usr/local/cuda-13/lib64 from conda or a Docker base image) shadows torch's
libs and triggers "undefined symbol" errors when torch is imported. Detect
torch's lib dirs (without importing torch) and prepend them. Returns True if
LD_LIBRARY_PATH was changed.
"""
if sys.platform != "linux":
return False
ld_path = os.environ.get("LD_LIBRARY_PATH", "")
if not ld_path:
return False
try:
import importlib.util
spec = importlib.util.find_spec("torch")
if not spec or not spec.origin:
return False
torch_dir = os.path.dirname(spec.origin)
site_pkgs = os.path.dirname(torch_dir)
nvidia_dir = os.path.join(site_pkgs, "nvidia")
lib_dirs = []
torch_lib = os.path.join(torch_dir, "lib")
if os.path.isdir(torch_lib):
lib_dirs.append(torch_lib)
if os.path.isdir(nvidia_dir):
for sub in sorted(os.listdir(nvidia_dir)):
lib = os.path.join(nvidia_dir, sub, "lib")
if os.path.isdir(lib):
lib_dirs.append(lib)
if not lib_dirs:
return False
existing = ld_path.split(":")
if existing[: len(lib_dirs)] == lib_dirs:
return False # already at the front, nothing to do
torch_set = set(lib_dirs)
cleaned = [p for p in existing if p not in torch_set]
os.environ["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"] = ":".join(lib_dirs + cleaned)
return True
except Exception:
return False
_LD_FIXED_SENTINEL = "_UNSLOTH_STUDIO_LD_FIXED"
def _maybe_reexec_for_cuda_ld_path():
"""Re-exec once so the dynamic linker sees the corrected LD_LIBRARY_PATH.
LD_LIBRARY_PATH is read at process start, so editing os.environ in-process
cannot fix the running interpreter; a single re-exec is required. Call only
from a true entry point (the ``if __name__ == "__main__"`` block), never at
import time, because os.execv replaces the whole process (an embedder such
as Colab that does ``from run import run_server`` must not be re-exec'd).
"""
if _LD_FIXED_SENTINEL in os.environ:
return
if not _fix_torch_cuda_ld_path():
return
os.environ[_LD_FIXED_SENTINEL] = "1"
argv = getattr(sys, "orig_argv", None) or [sys.executable, *sys.argv]
os.execv(sys.executable, argv)
# Suppress C-level dependency warnings globally (e.g. SwigPyPacked).
os.environ["PYTHONWARNINGS"] = "ignore"
# Add the backend dir to sys.path early so local modules import.
backend_dir = Path(__file__).parent
if str(backend_dir) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(backend_dir))
from utils.cpu_threads import configure_cpu_threads
try:
configure_cpu_threads()
except ValueError as exc:
configured = os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_CPU_THREADS")
raise SystemExit(f"Error: Invalid UNSLOTH_CPU_THREADS value {configured!r}: {exc}") from None
# Anaconda/conda-forge Python: seed platform._sys_version_cache before imports
# that trigger attrs -> rich -> structlog -> platform crash.
# See: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/102396
import _platform_compat # noqa: F401
from loggers import get_logger
from startup_banner import print_studio_access_banner, print_studio_stop_hint
logger = get_logger(__name__)
def _resolve_external_ip() -> str:
"""Resolve the machine's external IP address.
Tries, in order:
1. GCE metadata server (instant on Google Cloud VMs)
2. ifconfig.me (anywhere with internet)
3. LAN IP via UDP socket trick (fallback)
"""
import urllib.request
import socket
# 1. GCE metadata server (<10ms on GCE, times out fast elsewhere).
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(
"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/0/access-configs/0/external-ip",
headers = {"Metadata-Flavor": "Google"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout = 1) as resp:
ip = resp.read().decode().strip()
if ip:
return ip
except Exception:
pass
# 2. Public IP service.
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen("https://ifconfig.me", timeout = 3) as resp:
ip = resp.read().decode().strip()
if ip:
return ip
except Exception:
pass
# 3. Fallback: LAN IP via UDP socket trick
try:
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
s.connect(("8.8.8.8", 80))
ip = s.getsockname()[0]
s.close()
return ip
except Exception:
return "0.0.0.0"
def _install_uvicorn_startup_log_rewrite(bind_host: str, display_host: str) -> None:
"""Rewrite Uvicorn's startup log line: swap wildcard bind for the
externally-reachable address, use our Mac-aware stop hint, and rename the
prefix to "Unsloth Studio running on"."""
import logging
import re
rewrite_host = (
bind_host in ("0.0.0.0", "::") and bool(display_host) and display_host != bind_host
)
new_suffix = "(To stop: press Ctrl+C -- on macOS, Control+C not Command+C)"
old_suffix_re = re.compile(r"\(Press CTRL\+C to quit\)")
old_prefix = "Uvicorn running on "
new_prefix = "Unsloth Studio running on "
def _rewrite(text: str) -> str:
if text.startswith(old_prefix):
text = new_prefix + text[len(old_prefix) :]
return old_suffix_re.sub(new_suffix, text)
class _UvicornStartupRewrite(logging.Filter):
def filter(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> bool:
try:
msg = record.msg if isinstance(record.msg, str) else ""
if (
msg.startswith(old_prefix)
and isinstance(record.args, tuple)
and len(record.args) >= 3
):
if rewrite_host and record.args[1] == bind_host:
record.args = (
record.args[0],
display_host,
record.args[2],
*record.args[3:],
)
record.msg = _rewrite(msg)
cmsg = getattr(record, "color_message", None)
if isinstance(cmsg, str):
record.color_message = _rewrite(cmsg)
except Exception:
pass
return True
f = _UvicornStartupRewrite()
for name in ("uvicorn", "uvicorn.error"):
logging.getLogger(name).addFilter(f)
def _local_port_open(
host: str,
port: int,
timeout: float = 1.0,
) -> bool:
"""True iff a TCP connection to (host, port) succeeds within timeout."""
import socket
try:
with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout = timeout):
return True
except OSError:
return False
def _working_local_url(port: int) -> "str | None":
"""A working loopback URL on this machine, or None if neither 127.0.0.1 nor
::1 responds. Fallback when external reachability fails."""
if _local_port_open("127.0.0.1", port):
return f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
if _local_port_open("::1", port):
return f"http://[::1]:{port}"
return None
def _localhost_ipv6_mismatch_url(bind_host: str, port: int) -> "str | None":
"""Return the IPv4 loopback URL when localhost won't reach 127.0.0.1.
Local Studio binds to 127.0.0.1. Where localhost resolves to IPv6 only (::1),
http://localhost:<port> fails (or hits a different process on ::1) even though
http://127.0.0.1:<port> works. Return the IPv4 URL for the caller to surface.
"""
import socket
if bind_host != "127.0.0.1" or not port or port <= 0:
return None
ipv4_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
# Only warn once Studio is confirmed answering on IPv4 loopback.
if _working_local_url(port) != ipv4_url:
return None
try:
addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo("localhost", port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
except Exception:
return None
if not addr_info:
return None
has_ipv4_loopback = False
has_ipv6_loopback = False
for family, _, _, _, sockaddr in addr_info:
if family == socket.AF_INET and sockaddr and sockaddr[0] == "127.0.0.1":
has_ipv4_loopback = True
elif family == socket.AF_INET6 and sockaddr:
host = sockaddr[0].split("%", 1)[0]
if host == "::1":
has_ipv6_loopback = True
# A connection to ::1 is NOT evidence Studio is reachable there: Studio binds
# 127.0.0.1 only, so anything on ::1 is a different process. Dual-stack
# localhost is fine (browsers fall back to 127.0.0.1), so only the IPv6-only
# case strands the user.
if has_ipv6_loopback and not has_ipv4_loopback:
return ipv4_url
return None
def _stdout_color_ok() -> bool:
"""Whether to emit ANSI color codes on stdout. Mirrors startup_banner."""
if os.environ.get("NO_COLOR", "").strip():
return False
if os.environ.get("FORCE_COLOR", "").strip():
return True
try:
return sys.stdout.isatty()
except (AttributeError, OSError, ValueError):
return False
def _print_localhost_ipv6_mismatch_warning(local_url: str, port: int) -> None:
"""Warn that localhost points at ::1 while Studio is bound to 127.0.0.1."""
use_color = _stdout_color_ok()
warn_c = "\033[38;5;215;1m" if use_color else ""
reset = "\033[0m" if use_color else ""
print(
f"{warn_c} Warning: localhost resolves to IPv6 (::1), but Unsloth "
f"Studio is listening on 127.0.0.1 only. Open {local_url} instead of "
f"http://localhost:{port}.{reset}",
flush = True,
)
def _verify_global_reachability(display_host: str, port: int) -> None:
"""Probe check-host.net to confirm display_host:port is reachable from the
public internet. Synchronous so output lands between the banner URLs and the
stop hint. Bounded at ~15s; failures swallowed (verifier failing != Studio
failing). Only meaningful for a wildcard bind."""
global _public_reachable
# Reset to "unknown" each run; set True/False only when the probe decides.
_public_reachable = None
import ipaddress
import json
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
if not display_host or display_host in ("0.0.0.0", "::"):
return
use_color = _stdout_color_ok()
dim = "\033[38;5;245m" if use_color else ""
ok_c = "\033[38;5;120;1m" if use_color else ""
err_c = "\033[38;5;203;1m" if use_color else ""
warn_c = "\033[38;5;215;1m" if use_color else ""
local_url_c = "\033[38;5;108;1m" if use_color else "" # matches banner's URL color
reset = "\033[0m" if use_color else ""
url = f"http://{_url_host(display_host)}:{port}"
# Private/loopback/link-local addresses aren't globally routable.
try:
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(display_host)
if addr.is_loopback or addr.is_private or addr.is_link_local:
_public_reachable = False
print(
f"{dim} Note: {display_host} is a private/LAN address -- "
f"reachable on this network only, not from the public internet."
f"{reset}",
flush = True,
)
return
except ValueError:
# Not an IP literal; probe by hostname.
pass
try:
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode({"host": f"{display_host}:{port}", "max_nodes": 3})
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"https://check-host.net/check-tcp?{qs}",
headers = {
"Accept": "application/json",
"User-Agent": "unsloth-studio-reachability/1",
},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout = 5) as resp:
init = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors = "replace"))
req_id = init.get("request_id")
if not req_id:
return
results = {}
deadline = time.monotonic() + 15.0
poll_req = urllib.request.Request(
f"https://check-host.net/check-result/{req_id}",
headers = {
"Accept": "application/json",
"User-Agent": "unsloth-studio-reachability/1",
},
)
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
time.sleep(1.5)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(poll_req, timeout = 5) as resp:
results = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors = "replace"))
except Exception:
continue
if results and all(v is not None for v in results.values()):
break
# Two decisive nodes is enough; stop early.
decisive = [
v
for v in results.values()
if isinstance(v, list)
and v
and isinstance(v[0], dict)
and ("time" in v[0] or "error" in v[0])
]
if len(decisive) >= 2:
break
ok_nodes = err_nodes = 0
for v in results.values():
if not isinstance(v, list) or not v or not isinstance(v[0], dict):
continue
if "time" in v[0]:
ok_nodes += 1
elif "error" in v[0]:
err_nodes += 1
total = ok_nodes + err_nodes
print("", flush = True)
if ok_nodes:
_public_reachable = True
print(
f"{ok_c} Reachability check: {url}/ is reachable from the "
f"public internet ({ok_nodes}/{total} probe nodes connected).{reset}",
flush = True,
)
elif err_nodes:
_public_reachable = False
print(
f"{err_c} Reachability check: {url}/ is NOT reachable from "
f"the public internet ({err_nodes}/{total} probe nodes failed).{reset}",
flush = True,
)
print(
f"{dim} Usually a cloud firewall (AWS security group, "
f"GCP firewall / Azure NSG rule) or home router isn't "
f"allowing inbound TCP {port}.{reset}",
flush = True,
)
print(
f"{dim} No firewall change needed -- SSH local-forward "
f"from your own computer:{reset}",
flush = True,
)
print(
f"{dim} ssh -L {port}:localhost:{port} <user>@{display_host}{reset}",
flush = True,
)
print(
f"{dim} then open http://localhost:{port}/ in your browser.{reset}",
flush = True,
)
# Only offer the local URL if loopback answers.
local_url = _working_local_url(port)
if local_url:
print(
f"{local_url_c} You can access Unsloth Studio locally "
f"in the meantime: {local_url}{reset}",
flush = True,
)
else:
print(
f"{warn_c} Reachability check: probe nodes did not respond "
f"in time -- could not verify {url}/.{reset}",
flush = True,
)
except urllib.error.URLError:
# Outbound HTTPS blocked; skip.
pass
except Exception:
pass
def _display_host_for_bind(host: str) -> str:
return _resolve_external_ip() if host in ("0.0.0.0", "::") else host
def _loopback_bind_host_for(host: str) -> str:
return "::1" if host == "::" else "127.0.0.1"
def _url_host(host: str) -> str:
return (
f"[{host}]" if ":" in host and not (host.startswith("[") and host.endswith("]")) else host
)
def _tool_policy_notice(host: str, secure: bool, enable_tools: "Optional[bool]") -> str:
"""One-line tool-policy summary for the plain-server startup banner, so a
network-reachable launch is never silent about code execution."""
if enable_tools is False:
return "Server-side tools are DISABLED (--disable-tools)."
state = (
"ENABLED (--enable-tools)"
if enable_tools
else "ENABLED by default (per-request setting honored)"
)
if secure:
return (
f"Server-side tools are {state}, reachable via the authenticated "
"Cloudflare HTTPS tunnel. Anyone with the API key can run code on "
"this machine. Do not share the API key. Pass --disable-tools to turn off."
)
from utils.host_policy import is_external_host
if host in ("0.0.0.0", "::") or is_external_host(host):
return (
f"Server-side tools are {state} and this port is network-reachable. "
"Anyone who can reach it with the API key can run code on this "
"machine. Do not share the API key. Pass --disable-tools to turn off."
)
return f"Server-side tools are {state} for loopback. Pass --disable-tools to turn off."
def _emit_tool_policy_notice(host: str, secure: bool, enable_tools: "Optional[bool]") -> None:
print(_tool_policy_notice(host, secure, enable_tools), flush = True)
def _emit_secure_startup_output(port: int, enable_tools: "Optional[bool]" = None) -> None:
"""Secure-mode banner: only the Cloudflare link (loopback has no public raw URL)."""
print("")
print("🦥 Unsloth Studio is running (secure)")
print("" * 52)
_print_cloudflare_line(secure = True)
print(f" On this machine only: http://127.0.0.1:{port}/")
print("" * 52)
_emit_tool_policy_notice("127.0.0.1", True, enable_tools)
print_studio_stop_hint()
def _emit_startup_output(
host: str,
port: int,
display_host: str,
secure: bool = False,
enable_tools: "Optional[bool]" = None,
) -> None:
"""Print the access banner, post-startup warnings, the tool-policy notice,
then a single stop hint. Extracted from ``_run`` so the wiring is testable."""
if secure:
_emit_secure_startup_output(port, enable_tools)
return
wildcard_bind = host in ("0.0.0.0", "::")
localhost_mismatch_url = _localhost_ipv6_mismatch_url(host, port)
print_studio_access_banner(
port = port,
bind_host = host,
display_host = display_host,
include_stop_hint = False,
)
if localhost_mismatch_url:
_print_localhost_ipv6_mismatch_warning(localhost_mismatch_url, port)
elif wildcard_bind:
_verify_global_reachability(display_host, port)
_print_cloudflare_line(loopback_host = _loopback_bind_host_for(host))
_emit_tool_policy_notice(host, False, enable_tools)
print_studio_stop_hint()
def _print_cloudflare_line(secure: bool = False, loopback_host: str = "127.0.0.1") -> None:
"""Print Cloudflare tunnel state for startup banners."""
from startup_banner import stdout_supports_color
accent = "\033[38;5;150;1m"
warn = "\033[38;5;215;1m"
reset = "\033[0m"
color = stdout_supports_color()
def _emit(text: str, style: str = "") -> None:
print(f"{style}{text}{reset}" if (color and style) else text)
if _cloudflare_url:
if _public_reachable is False:
_emit(f" Use the secure link access via Cloudflare instead: {_cloudflare_url}", accent)
else:
_emit(f" Secure link access via Cloudflare: {_cloudflare_url}", accent)
if not secure:
if _public_reachable is True:
_emit(
" Cloudflare tunnel: ON. This Cloudflare URL is PUBLIC, and the "
"raw port is also publicly reachable. --no-cloudflare disables "
f"only the Cloudflare URL; bind {loopback_host} or close firewall "
"access to keep Studio private.",
warn,
)
else:
_emit(
" Cloudflare tunnel: ON. This is a PUBLIC internet URL: anyone "
"who has it can reach this Studio. Relaunch with --no-cloudflare "
f"to disable the Cloudflare URL; bind {loopback_host} or close "
"firewall access to keep Studio private.",
warn,
)
return
if _cloudflare_requested:
if _public_reachable is True:
_emit(
" Cloudflare tunnel: requested but failed to start. The raw port is "
"still reachable from the public internet (see the reachability check "
"above): anyone who can reach it can access this Studio.",
warn,
)
elif _public_reachable is False:
_emit(
" Cloudflare tunnel: requested but failed to start. Studio is reachable "
"on your local network only (no public link).",
warn,
)
else:
_emit(
" Cloudflare tunnel: requested but failed to start. There is no "
"Cloudflare public link. Raw port reachability was not verified; "
f"bind {loopback_host} or close firewall access to keep Studio private.",
warn,
)
elif _cloudflare_flag:
if _public_reachable is True:
_emit(
" Cloudflare tunnel: OFF for this mode. The raw port is still "
"reachable from the public internet (see the reachability check above): "
"anyone who can reach it can access this Studio.",
warn,
)
elif _public_reachable is False:
_emit(
" Cloudflare tunnel: OFF for this mode. Studio is reachable on your "
"local network only (no public link)."
)
else:
_emit(
" Cloudflare tunnel: OFF for this mode. There is no Cloudflare public "
"link. Raw port reachability was not verified; "
f"bind {loopback_host} or close firewall access to keep Studio private.",
warn,
)
elif _cloudflare_flag is False or _cloudflare_flag is None:
# None = off by default (no flag); False = explicit --no-cloudflare.
_reason = "default" if _cloudflare_flag is None else "--no-cloudflare"
if _public_reachable is True:
_emit(
f" Cloudflare tunnel: OFF ({_reason}). The raw port is still "
"reachable from the public internet (see the reachability check above): "
"pass --cloudflare to also expose a public Cloudflare HTTPS link, or "
f"bind {loopback_host} to keep Studio private.",
warn,
)
elif _public_reachable is False:
_emit(
f" Cloudflare tunnel: OFF ({_reason}). Studio is reachable on your "
"local network only. Pass --cloudflare to expose a public "
"Cloudflare HTTPS link."
)
else:
_emit(
f" Cloudflare tunnel: OFF ({_reason}). There is no Cloudflare "
"public link. Raw port reachability was not verified; pass --cloudflare "
"to expose a public Cloudflare HTTPS link, or "
f"bind {loopback_host} or close firewall access to keep Studio private.",
warn,
)
def _get_pid_on_port(port: int) -> "tuple[int, str] | None":
"""Return (pid, process_name) listening on *port*, or None.
Uses psutil when available, else None so callers can still report the conflict
without process details.
"""
try:
import psutil
except ImportError:
return None
try:
for conn in psutil.net_connections(kind = "tcp"):
if conn.status == "LISTEN" and conn.laddr.port == port:
if conn.pid is None:
return None
try:
proc = psutil.Process(conn.pid)
return (conn.pid, proc.name())
except (psutil.NoSuchProcess, psutil.AccessDenied):
return (conn.pid, "<unknown>")
except (psutil.AccessDenied, OSError) as e:
# net_connections() needs elevated privileges on some platforms.
logger.debug("Failed to scan network connections for port %s: %s", port, e)
return None
def _is_port_free(host: str, port: int) -> bool:
"""Check if a port is available for binding.
For a ``0.0.0.0`` wildcard host, also check whether anything is listening on
``127.0.0.1`` (and ``::1`` when IPv6 exists): an SSH tunnel may hold loopback
while the wildcard bind succeeds, making Studio unreachable via ``localhost``.
"""
import socket
# 1. Can we bind to the requested address? getaddrinfo resolves both
# IPv4 and IPv6 to the right address family.
try:
addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
family, socktype, proto, _, sockaddr = addr_info[0]
with socket.socket(family, socktype, proto) as s:
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.bind(sockaddr)
except OSError:
return False
# 2. On a wildcard bind, verify localhost isn't already claimed by another
# process (e.g. an SSH -L tunnel); a successful connect means it is.
if host in ("0.0.0.0", "::"):
for loopback, family in [
("127.0.0.1", socket.AF_INET),
("::1", socket.AF_INET6),
]:
try:
with socket.socket(family, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
s.settimeout(1)
if s.connect_ex((loopback, port)) == 0:
# Port is taken on loopback.
return False
except OSError:
# IPv6 disabled or other OS-level restriction -- skip.
continue
return True
def _find_free_port(
host: str,
start: int,
max_attempts: int = 20,
) -> int:
"""Find a free port from `start`, trying up to max_attempts ports."""
for offset in range(max_attempts):
candidate = start + offset
if _is_port_free(host, candidate):
return candidate
raise RuntimeError(f"Could not find a free port in range {start}-{start + max_attempts - 1}")
from utils.paths.storage_roots import studio_root as _studio_root
_PID_FILE = _studio_root() / "studio.pid"
# Direct backend launches bypass the CLI's env re-export; do it here for
# real custom roots so unsloth-zoo's import-time LLAMA_CPP_DEFAULT_DIR
# picks up the custom build. Skip legacy-default to avoid flipping
# default-mode installs into env-override.
try:
_LEGACY_STUDIO_ROOT = (Path.home() / ".unsloth" / "studio").resolve()
except (OSError, ValueError):
_LEGACY_STUDIO_ROOT = Path.home() / ".unsloth" / "studio"
try:
_STUDIO_ROOT_RESOLVED = _studio_root().resolve()
except (OSError, ValueError):
_STUDIO_ROOT_RESOLVED = _studio_root()
if _STUDIO_ROOT_RESOLVED != _LEGACY_STUDIO_ROOT:
if not os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_HOME"):
os.environ["UNSLOTH_STUDIO_HOME"] = str(_STUDIO_ROOT_RESOLVED)
if not os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_LLAMA_CPP_PATH"):
os.environ["UNSLOTH_LLAMA_CPP_PATH"] = str(_STUDIO_ROOT_RESOLVED / "llama.cpp")
# The studio bundles unsloth_zoo; declare unsloth present (as `import unsloth`
# does) so its lazy submodule imports (export, hardware, mlx) and the
# DiffusionGemma runner never trip the install guard on a clean install.
os.environ.setdefault("UNSLOTH_IS_PRESENT", "1")
def _write_pid_file():
"""Write the current process PID to the studio PID file."""
try:
_PID_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents = True, exist_ok = True)
_PID_FILE.write_text(str(os.getpid()))
except OSError:
pass
def _remove_pid_file():
"""Remove the PID file if it belongs to this process."""
try:
if _PID_FILE.is_file():
stored = _PID_FILE.read_text().strip()
if stored == str(os.getpid()):
_PID_FILE.unlink(missing_ok = True)
except OSError:
pass
def _graceful_shutdown(server = None):
"""Shut down all subprocess backends and the uvicorn server.
Called from signal handlers to clean up children before exit. Critical on
Windows where atexit handlers are unreliable after Ctrl+C.
"""
_remove_pid_file()
logger.info("Graceful shutdown initiated -- cleaning up subprocesses...")
# 1. Shut down uvicorn (releases the listening socket).
if server is not None:
server.should_exit = True
# 2. Clean up inference subprocess (if instantiated).
try:
from core.inference.orchestrator import _inference_backend
if _inference_backend is not None:
_inference_backend._shutdown_subprocess(timeout = 5.0)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Error shutting down inference subprocess: %s", e)
# 3. Clean up export subprocess (if instantiated).
try:
from core.export.orchestrator import _export_backend
if _export_backend is not None:
_export_backend._shutdown_subprocess(timeout = 5.0)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Error shutting down export subprocess: %s", e)
# 4. Clean up training subprocess (if active).
try:
from core.training.training import _training_backend
if _training_backend is not None:
_training_backend.force_terminate()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Error shutting down training subprocess: %s", e)
# 5. Kill llama-server subprocess (if loaded).
try:
from routes.inference import _llama_cpp_backend
if _llama_cpp_backend is not None:
_llama_cpp_backend._kill_process()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Error shutting down llama-server: %s", e)
# 6. Stop the Cloudflare tunnel (if started).
try:
from cloudflare_tunnel import stop_studio_tunnel
stop_studio_tunnel()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Error stopping Cloudflare tunnel: %s", e)
# 7. Backstop sweep for any adopted child the steps above missed.
try:
from utils.process_lifetime import terminate_all
terminate_all()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Error in process-lifetime sweep: %s", e)
logger.info("All subprocesses cleaned up")
# Bound the join so a stuck uvicorn shutdown cannot hang the terminal.
_SERVER_SHUTDOWN_JOIN_TIMEOUT = 5.0
def _flush_standard_streams() -> None:
for stream in (sys.stdout, sys.stderr):
try:
stream.flush()
except Exception:
pass
def _wait_for_server_shutdown(timeout: Optional[float] = _SERVER_SHUTDOWN_JOIN_TIMEOUT) -> None:
"""Join the uvicorn thread so the prompt returns only after its shutdown logs
flush. Skip the self-join when called from the server thread."""
import threading
thread = _server_thread
if thread is None or thread is threading.current_thread():
_flush_standard_streams()
return
thread.join(timeout = timeout)
if thread.is_alive():
logger.warning("Timed out waiting for uvicorn server thread to stop")
_flush_standard_streams()
# The uvicorn server instance -- set by run_server(), used by callers
# that tell the server to exit (e.g. signal handlers).
_server = None
_server_thread = None
# Shutdown event -- wakes the main loop on signal.
_shutdown_event = None
# trycloudflare.com URL for wildcard binds (set by run_server, read by the banner);
# None when there is no tunnel (loopback, disabled, or a silently-ignored failure).
_cloudflare_url = None
# Public reachability from the last _verify_global_reachability run, read by the
# Cloudflare banner line. True when the public ip:port probe confirmed reachable,
# False when it confirmed NOT reachable, None when the probe did not run or could
# not decide (timeout, blocked, private address).
_public_reachable = None
_cloudflare_requested = False
# Opt-in tri-state (mirrors the CLI): None = off by default, True = on,
# False = explicit --no-cloudflare. run_server overwrites it before the banner.
_cloudflare_flag = None
_DEFAULT_FRONTEND_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "frontend" / "dist"
def _iter_frontend_fallback_candidates() -> "list[Path]":
"""Yield `studio/frontend/dist` paths to try when the default is missing.
Covers PATH-shadowed binaries whose __file__ resolves into a site-packages
tree with no vite build (e.g. plain `pip install unsloth`).
"""
import ast
import re
out: list[Path] = []
home_str = (
os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_HOME")
or os.environ.get("STUDIO_HOME")
or str(Path.home() / ".unsloth" / "studio")
)
venv_dir = Path(home_str).expanduser() / "unsloth_studio"
# Installer venv site-packages.
for pattern in (
"lib/python*/site-packages/studio/frontend/dist",
"Lib/site-packages/studio/frontend/dist",
):
out.extend(venv_dir.glob(pattern))
# Editable source roots referenced from the installer venv.
for sp_pattern in ("lib/python*/site-packages", "Lib/site-packages"):
for sp in venv_dir.glob(sp_pattern):
for finder in sp.glob("__editable___*_finder.py"):
try:
src = finder.read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
except OSError:
continue
# Tolerate single/multi-line dict literals; [^}]* rejects nested
# dicts, which the setuptools editable template never emits.
m = re.search(r"^MAPPING\s*(?::[^=]*)?=\s*(\{[^}]*\})", src, re.M | re.S)
if not m:
continue
try:
mapping = ast.literal_eval(m.group(1))
except (SyntaxError, ValueError):
continue
# literal_eval can return a set/list/None if `{...}` isn't a dict.
if not isinstance(mapping, dict):
continue
studio_pkg = mapping.get("studio")
if studio_pkg:
out.append(Path(studio_pkg) / "frontend" / "dist")
return out
def _resolve_frontend_path(frontend_path: Path) -> tuple[Optional[Path], list[Path]]:
"""Pick a frontend dir that contains `index.html`.
Returns (chosen, attempted). `chosen` is None if nothing servable was found;
`attempted` is the ordered list for diagnostics.
"""
attempted: list[Path] = []
seen: set[Path] = set()
def _try(p: Path) -> bool:
try:
key = p.resolve()
except OSError:
key = p
if key in seen:
return False
seen.add(key)
attempted.append(p)
return (p / "index.html").is_file()
if _try(Path(frontend_path)):
return attempted[-1], attempted
for alt in _iter_frontend_fallback_candidates():
if _try(alt):
return attempted[-1], attempted
return None, attempted
class _TeeStream:
"""Mirror writes to the original stream and a session log file.
Console behavior is unchanged (writes/returns delegate to the original
stream; Tauri's structured-stdout protocol and isatty probes see exactly
what they saw before). The file copy is best-effort: a full disk or a
closed handle must never break the console."""
def __init__(self, stream, log_fh):
self._stream = stream
self._log_fh = log_fh
def write(self, data):
try:
self._log_fh.write(data)
except Exception:
pass
return self._stream.write(data)
def flush(self):
try:
self._log_fh.flush()
except Exception:
pass
try:
self._stream.flush()
except Exception:
pass
def __getattr__(self, name):
return getattr(self._stream, name)
def _setup_server_disk_logging():
"""Tee stdout/stderr to ~/.unsloth/studio/logs/server/ and aim
faulthandler at the same file so hard crashes (access violations /
SIGSEGV in the GPU runtime) leave a stack trace on disk.
Also exports PYTHONFAULTHANDLER=1 so child Python processes (training
workers) dump native-crash stacks to their captured stderr. Keeps the
newest 20 session logs. Opt out with UNSLOTH_STUDIO_NO_FILE_LOG=1.
Returns the log path, or None when disabled/unavailable.
"""
if os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_NO_FILE_LOG") == "1":
return None
try:
from utils.paths import studio_root
log_dir = Path(studio_root()) / "logs" / "server"
except Exception:
home = (
os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_HOME")
or os.environ.get("STUDIO_HOME")
or os.path.join(os.path.expanduser("~"), ".unsloth", "studio")
)
log_dir = Path(home) / "logs" / "server"
try:
log_dir.mkdir(parents = True, exist_ok = True)
stamp = time.strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")
log_path = log_dir / f"server-{stamp}-pid{os.getpid()}.log"
# Line-buffered so the tail survives a hard kill; errors="replace"
# so a console encoding quirk can never take the server down.
log_fh = open(log_path, "w", encoding = "utf-8", errors = "replace", buffering = 1)
except Exception:
return None
import faulthandler
try:
faulthandler.enable(file = log_fh, all_threads = True)
except Exception:
pass
# Children (training workers) inherit: their native-crash stacks land on
# the stderr the server already captures.
os.environ.setdefault("PYTHONFAULTHANDLER", "1")
sys.stdout = _TeeStream(sys.stdout, log_fh)
sys.stderr = _TeeStream(sys.stderr, log_fh)
# Best-effort retention: keep the newest 20 session logs.
try:
logs = sorted(log_dir.glob("server-*.log"), key = lambda p: p.stat().st_mtime)
for old in logs[:-20]:
old.unlink(missing_ok = True)
except Exception:
pass
return log_path
def _cloudflare_tunnel_should_start(
*, cloudflare: bool, host: str, secure: bool, api_only: bool, is_colab: bool
) -> bool:
"""Whether to start the Cloudflare tunnel. --secure exposes only the tunnel
(loopback bind), so it tunnels even api-only (headless secure API serving);
otherwise tunnel wildcard binds, never api-only (Tauri) or Colab."""
if is_colab or not cloudflare:
return False
if secure:
return True
return host in ("0.0.0.0", "::") and not api_only
def _stream_isatty(stream) -> bool:
"""isatty() that treats broken streams as non-interactive.
isatty() can raise under service wrappers (closed stdin -> ValueError;
sys.stdin None in Windows GUI -> AttributeError); such a stream can't host a
prompt, which is a fallback, not an error.
"""
try:
return stream.isatty()
except (AttributeError, ValueError):
return False
def _terminal_password_gate(
*,
tunnel_will_start: bool,
host: str,
secure: bool,
api_only: bool,
frontend_served: bool,
is_colab: bool = False,
) -> Tuple[bool, bool]:
"""Force a terminal password change before the public tunnel goes up.
When the tunnel is about to publish Studio and the seeded admin password was
never changed, ask for a new one (masked, confirmed) before any public URL
exists. The CLI normally does this before re-exec'ing the backend; this is
the backstop for direct `python run.py` launches and older-CLI installs.
Must run BEFORE the uvicorn socket binds: on a wildcard bind the served HTML
injects the bootstrap credential, so a pre-gate listener would hand the
default password to anyone reaching the raw port while the operator types.
Returns (proceed, drop_bootstrap_injection):
proceed False -> abort the launch (interactive refusal, or a headless
public launch nothing would protect); fail closed.
drop_bootstrap_injection True -> caller must null
app.state.bootstrap_password: the password just changed (stale), or a
public URL is about to serve the default credential and must not leak it.
Without a usable terminal the prompt is skipped: proceed if the bootstrap
deadline (armed later) will protect the launch; if even that is disabled
(api-only, timeout 0) nothing protects it, so refuse. NOT wrapped in a broad
try/except: an auth storage failure must abort rather than expose the default.
"""
if not tunnel_will_start:
return True, False
from auth import hashing as _auth_hashing
from auth import storage as _auth_storage
from auth.bootstrap_timeout import (
bootstrap_timeout_seconds,
should_arm_bootstrap_timeout,
)
from auth.terminal_prompt import (
prompt_for_password_change,
should_prompt_password_change,
)
_admin = _auth_storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME
# Gate can run before lifespan: seed the admin row here (idempotent).
_auth_storage.ensure_default_admin()
requires_change = _auth_storage.requires_password_change(_admin)
if not requires_change:
return True, False
if not should_prompt_password_change(
tunnel_will_start = tunnel_will_start,
requires_change = requires_change,
stdin_isatty = _stream_isatty(sys.stdin),
stderr_isatty = _stream_isatty(sys.stderr),
):
# No terminal: only proceed if the bootstrap deadline will arm; api-only
# and TIMEOUT=0 never arm it, leaving the default credential public.
deadline_arms = should_arm_bootstrap_timeout(
host = host,
secure = secure,
api_only = api_only,
frontend_served = frontend_served,
is_colab = is_colab,
requires_change = True,
timeout_seconds = bootstrap_timeout_seconds(),
)
if not deadline_arms:
print(
"Refusing to publish Studio on a public Cloudflare URL: the "
"default admin password was never changed, no terminal is "
"attached to change it here, and the bootstrap shutdown "
"deadline does not apply to this launch (api-only, or "
"UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT=0). Change the password "
"first (run `unsloth studio` locally and log in, or re-run "
"with a terminal attached), then retry.",
file = sys.stderr,
flush = True,
)
return False, False
# The public page won't auto-fill the bootstrap credential (suppressed
# below) and the seeded file may already be gone, so point recovery at a
# terminal-attached run / reset-password instead of reading it from disk.
print(
" WARNING: the default admin password is still active while "
"Studio is about to be published on a public Cloudflare URL, and "
"no terminal is attached to change it here. The public page will "
"NOT auto-fill the bootstrap credential. Set a new password by "
"running `unsloth studio` locally with a terminal attached, or "
"`unsloth studio reset-password`. Studio shuts down after the "
"bootstrap deadline (UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT, default 1h) "
"unless the password is changed.",
file = sys.stderr,
flush = True,
)
# Never serve the default credential in HTML over a public URL.
return True, True
def _is_current_password(candidate: str) -> bool:
record = _auth_storage.get_user_and_secret(_admin)
if record is None:
return False
salt, pwd_hash, _jwt_secret, _must_change = record
return _auth_hashing.verify_password(candidate, salt, pwd_hash)
def _apply_change(new_password: str) -> None:
# Same effects as routes/auth.py change_password: rehash, rotate the JWT
# secret, revoke refresh tokens in the SAME transaction.
_auth_storage.update_password(_admin, new_password, revoke_refresh_tokens = True)
changed = prompt_for_password_change(
min_length = _auth_storage.MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
is_current_password = _is_current_password,
apply_change = _apply_change,
out = sys.stderr,
)
return (True, True) if changed else (False, False)
def _apply_supplied_password(password_value: "Optional[str]") -> None:
"""Non-interactively set the INITIAL admin password before the socket binds,
for a direct ``python run.py`` launch (the CLI does this in its own parent).
Value comes from --password / UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD / stdin.
Only ever sets the FIRST password: an already-set one is a hard error, an
invalid value fails closed. NOT wrapped in a broad try/except: an auth
storage failure must abort rather than expose the default credential.
"""
from auth import hashing as _auth_hashing
from auth import storage as _auth_storage
from auth.terminal_prompt import SUPPLIED_PASSWORD_ENV, resolve_supplied_password
supplied = resolve_supplied_password(password_value)
# Strip the env var once read so child subprocesses (cloudflared, llama-server,
# code-exec tools) can't inherit the plaintext via /proc/PID/environ. Mirrors
# the CLI. Unconditional: strips a leftover value even when a literal --password won.
os.environ.pop(SUPPLIED_PASSWORD_ENV, None)
if not supplied:
return
_admin = _auth_storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME
_auth_storage.ensure_default_admin()
if not _auth_storage.requires_password_change(_admin):
print(
"Error: a Studio admin password is already set; --password only sets "
"the initial password. Run `unsloth studio reset-password` first.",
file = sys.stderr,
flush = True,
)
sys.exit(1)
def _is_current_password(candidate: str) -> bool:
record = _auth_storage.get_user_and_secret(_admin)
if record is None:
return False
salt, pwd_hash, _jwt_secret, _must_change = record
return _auth_hashing.verify_password(candidate, salt, pwd_hash)
if len(supplied) < _auth_storage.MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
print(
f"Error: password must be at least {_auth_storage.MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} "
"characters; not starting.",
file = sys.stderr,
flush = True,
)
sys.exit(1)
if _is_current_password(supplied):
print(
"Error: the new password must differ from the current bootstrap "
"password; not starting.",
file = sys.stderr,
flush = True,
)
sys.exit(1)
_auth_storage.update_password(_admin, supplied, revoke_refresh_tokens = True)
print(f"Password updated for '{_admin}'.", file = sys.stderr, flush = True)
def _apply_cli_tool_policy(enable_tools: "Optional[bool]") -> None:
"""Honor an explicit --enable-tools/--disable-tools; None leaves the policy
unset (tools default on, per-request enable_tools honored). Host is never
inspected here."""
if enable_tools is None:
return
from state.tool_policy import set_tool_policy
set_tool_policy(enable_tools)
def run_server(
host: str = "127.0.0.1",
port: int = 8888,
frontend_path: Path = _DEFAULT_FRONTEND_PATH,
silent: bool = False,
api_only: bool = False,
llama_parallel_slots: int = 1,
cloudflare: "Optional[bool]" = None,
secure: bool = False,
enable_tools: "Optional[bool]" = None,
password: "Optional[str]" = None,
emit_tauri_port: bool = True,
):
"""
Start the FastAPI server.
Args:
host: Host to bind to
port: Port to bind to (auto-increments if in use)
frontend_path: Path to frontend build directory (optional)
silent: Suppress startup messages
api_only: API server only, no frontend (for Tauri desktop app)
llama_parallel_slots: parallel slots for llama-server
cloudflare: opt in to the public Cloudflare HTTPS tunnel for a wildcard
bind. Tri-state: None (unset) and False both mean off; True enables it.
--secure implies it (True) and rejects an explicit False.
enable_tools: explicit --enable-tools/--disable-tools policy; None leaves
the default (tools on, per-request enable_tools honored)
emit_tauri_port: print the machine-readable TAURI_PORT line the desktop
app parses from stdout; the headless `run --api-only` path turns it
off so it does not pollute the documented URL/API-key banner
Note:
Signal handlers are NOT registered here so embedders (e.g. Colab) keep
their own interrupt semantics; standalone callers register them after.
"""
global _server, _server_thread, _shutdown_event
boot_started = time.perf_counter()
logger.info("run_server startup begin api_only=%s host=%s port=%s", api_only, host, port)
# Reap every child if the parent dies abnormally (terminal close, Task
# Manager kill, SIGKILL); must run before any child can spawn.
from utils.process_lifetime import initialize_parent_lifetime
initialize_parent_lifetime()
# --secure exposes ONLY the Cloudflare link: reject --secure --no-cloudflare,
# then force a loopback bind so the raw port is never public (even -H 0.0.0.0).
# Otherwise keep the tri-state so the banner distinguishes "off by default"
# from an explicit --no-cloudflare.
if secure:
if cloudflare is False:
raise SystemExit(
"--secure requires the Cloudflare tunnel; do not combine it with --no-cloudflare."
)
cloudflare = True
host = "127.0.0.1"
# `unsloth studio run` installs its own resolved policy and passes None here.
_apply_cli_tool_policy(enable_tools)
# Windows cp1252 can't encode emoji; reconfigure stdout to UTF-8.
if sys.platform == "win32" and hasattr(sys.stdout, "reconfigure"):
try:
sys.stdout.reconfigure(encoding = "utf-8", errors = "replace")
except Exception:
pass
# Persist a session log + native-crash stacks BEFORE importing main, so
# even import-time failures leave evidence on disk. Field report: Studio
# "terminates without a warning" -- a native crash in the GPU runtime
# kills the process with no Python traceback, and a desktop-shortcut
# console closes before anything can be read. Console-only logging made
# that undiagnosable.
_session_log = _setup_server_disk_logging()
if _session_log is not None and not silent:
print(f"Session log: {_session_log}")
# Set env vars BEFORE importing main so CORS middleware picks them up.
# secure api-only is a remote server behind Cloudflare, so it keeps the
# any-origin CORS profile; plain api-only stays locked to the Tauri app.
if api_only:
os.environ["UNSLOTH_API_ONLY"] = "1"
if secure:
os.environ["UNSLOTH_SECURE"] = "1"
import nest_asyncio
nest_asyncio.apply()
import asyncio
from threading import Thread, Event
import uvicorn
# `from main import app` below loads torch/unsloth/transformers (~2 min cold,
# silent), so print a flushed heads-up (piped stdout is block-buffered).
if not silent:
print(
"Loading Unsloth Studio, please wait... (this can take a few minutes)",
flush = True,
)
print(" - loading PyTorch, Unsloth and Transformers...", flush = True)
import_started = time.perf_counter()
from main import app, setup_frontend, _IS_COLAB
logger.info(
"Imported FastAPI app in %.1fms",
(time.perf_counter() - import_started) * 1000,
)
if not silent:
print(" - Starting server...", flush = True)
from utils.paths import ensure_studio_directories
# Allow local stdio MCP servers on a loopback bind (the user's own machine),
# but never on Colab, which is a hosted VM reachable through its proxy. The
# gate reads the env var at request time, so this need not precede the import.
from utils.host_policy import apply_stdio_mcp_loopback_default
apply_stdio_mcp_loopback_default(host, is_colab = _IS_COLAB)
# Create all standard directories on startup.
ensure_studio_directories()
logger.info(
"Ensured Studio directories in %.1fms",
(time.perf_counter() - boot_started) * 1000,
)
# Auto-find a free port if the requested one is in use.
if not _is_port_free(host, port):
original_port = port
blocker = _get_pid_on_port(port)
port = _find_free_port(host, port + 1)
if not silent:
print("")
print("=" * 50)
if blocker:
pid, name = blocker
print(f"Port {original_port} is already in use by {name} (PID {pid}).")
else:
print(f"Port {original_port} is already in use.")
print(f"Unsloth Studio will use port {port} instead.")
print(f"Open http://localhost:{port} in your browser.")
print("=" * 50)
print("")
# Setup frontend (skip in api-only). Falls back through alternate locations if
# the default lacks a built dist; errors loudly rather than 404 on `/`.
if frontend_path and not api_only:
chosen, attempted = _resolve_frontend_path(Path(frontend_path))
if chosen is not None and setup_frontend(app, chosen):
if not silent:
# Resolve so logs show an absolute path for support.
try:
display = chosen.resolve()
except OSError:
display = chosen
print(f"[OK] Frontend loaded from {display}")
else:
home_str = (
os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_HOME")
or os.environ.get("STUDIO_HOME")
or str(Path.home() / ".unsloth" / "studio")
)
# Windows shim: $STUDIO_HOME/bin/unsloth.exe; Linux/macOS venv binary:
# $STUDIO_HOME/unsloth_studio/bin/unsloth.
home = Path(home_str).expanduser()
if sys.platform == "win32":
installer_bin = home / "bin" / "unsloth.exe"
else:
installer_bin = home / "unsloth_studio" / "bin" / "unsloth"
tried_lines = "\n".join(f" - {p}" for p in attempted) or " (none)"
raise SystemExit(
"[ERROR] Studio frontend build not found.\n"
f"Tried:\n{tried_lines}\n"
"\n"
"Likely cause: another 'unsloth' on PATH is shadowing the "
"installer's binary and points at a site-packages tree with "
"no built dist.\n"
"\n"
"Fix one of:\n"
f" - run the installer's binary directly: {installer_bin} studio\n"
" - pass --frontend <path/to/studio/frontend/dist>\n"
" - pass --api-only to skip serving the web UI\n"
" - reinstall: curl -fsSL https://unsloth.ai/install.sh | sh"
)
# Resolve once; shared by the log rewrite and banner.
display_host = _display_host_for_bind(host)
_install_uvicorn_startup_log_rewrite(host, display_host)
logger.info(
"run_server pre-uvicorn setup completed in %.1fms",
(time.perf_counter() - boot_started) * 1000,
)
ready_event = Event()
startup_failed = Event()
startup_errors = []
class _ReadyServer(uvicorn.Server):
async def startup(self, *args, **kwargs):
await super().startup(*args, **kwargs)
if getattr(self, "started", False) and not self.should_exit:
logger.info(
"Uvicorn startup hook completed in %.1fms",
(time.perf_counter() - boot_started) * 1000,
)
ready_event.set()
# server_header=False suppresses uvicorn's "Server: uvicorn"; SecurityHeadersMiddleware sets its own.
config_kwargs = dict(
host = host,
port = port,
log_level = "info",
access_log = False,
server_header = False,
)
# Colab only: trust X-Forwarded-* from Colab's reverse proxy so the app sees
# the real https origin. forwarded_allow_ips="*" is safe in Colab's
# single-user sandbox but too lax for local/standalone, so leave uvicorn's
# loopback-only default elsewhere.
if _IS_COLAB:
config_kwargs["proxy_headers"] = True
config_kwargs["forwarded_allow_ips"] = "*"
config = uvicorn.Config(app, **config_kwargs)
_server = _ReadyServer(config)
_shutdown_event = Event()
# Expose the actual bound port so handlers build loopback URLs at the real
# backend, not whatever a proxy/tunnel exposed. For ephemeral binds (port==0)
# leave it unset so handlers fall back to the request scope / base_url.
app.state.server_port = port if port and port > 0 else None
# Direct (non-tunnel) base for the API panel; resolve wildcard binds to the LAN IP.
if port and port > 0:
_direct_host = _display_host_for_bind(host)
app.state.server_url = f"http://{_url_host(_direct_host)}:{port}"
else:
app.state.server_url = None
app.state.secure = secure
app.state.llama_parallel_slots = llama_parallel_slots
# Expose a shutdown callable before the server accepts requests so
# /api/shutdown is ready as soon as readiness publishes.
def _trigger_shutdown():
_graceful_shutdown(_server)
if _shutdown_event is not None:
_shutdown_event.set()
app.state.trigger_shutdown = _trigger_shutdown
# A supplied --password / UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD / stdin sets the initial
# admin password before the gate and socket bind (direct `python run.py`;
# the CLI applies it in its own parent).
_apply_supplied_password(password)
# Never publish with the seeded default password active: prompt first (or
# warn / fail closed headless; see _terminal_password_gate). Runs BEFORE the
# socket binds so a pre-gate listener can't hand out the injected credential.
_pw_proceed, _pw_drop_bootstrap = _terminal_password_gate(
tunnel_will_start = _cloudflare_tunnel_should_start(
cloudflare = cloudflare,
host = host,
secure = secure,
api_only = api_only,
is_colab = _IS_COLAB,
),
host = host,
secure = secure,
api_only = api_only,
frontend_served = bool(frontend_path) and not api_only,
is_colab = _IS_COLAB,
)
if not _pw_proceed:
print(
"Not starting Studio; set a new admin password first, or launch "
"without --secure/--cloudflare.",
file = sys.stderr,
flush = True,
)
sys.exit(1)
if _pw_drop_bootstrap:
# Password just changed (stale) or a public URL is about to serve the
# default credential: don't leak it in the HTML. Lifespan runs AFTER this
# and re-reads the bootstrap password, so the flag (not a plain None)
# makes it skip that re-read.
app.state.suppress_bootstrap_injection = True
app.state.bootstrap_password = None
# Run server in a daemon thread with explicit new_event_loop() +
# run_until_complete() (not asyncio.run) so nest_asyncio's patches don't
# interfere when Colab/IPython already runs a loop on the main thread.
def _run():
loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
try:
loop.run_until_complete(_server.serve())
except BaseException as exc:
startup_errors.append(exc)
startup_failed.set()
finally:
loop.close()
if not ready_event.is_set():
startup_failed.set()
thread = Thread(target = _run, daemon = True)
_server_thread = thread
thread.start()
# Wait until uvicorn finishes lifespan startup and binds sockets, or until it
# exits/fails first. No deadline: a slow but live startup stays in progress.
try:
while not ready_event.is_set():
if startup_failed.is_set() or not thread.is_alive():
if startup_errors:
raise RuntimeError(
"Uvicorn server failed before startup completed"
) from startup_errors[0]
raise RuntimeError("Uvicorn server exited before startup completed")
ready_event.wait(timeout = 0.1)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
_graceful_shutdown(_server)
_shutdown_event.set()
raise
logger.info(
"run_server uvicorn ready after %.1fms",
(time.perf_counter() - boot_started) * 1000,
)
_write_pid_file()
import atexit
atexit.register(_remove_pid_file)
from utils.process_lifetime import terminate_all
atexit.register(terminate_all)
# Output port for Tauri (api-only), only after sockets bind and startup done.
# The headless `run --api-only` path opts out so it does not leak this line.
if api_only and emit_tauri_port:
print(f"TAURI_PORT={port}", flush = True)
# Free trycloudflare.com tunnel for wildcard binds (the raw ip:port is often
# unreachable). Started pre-banner and even when silent so the CLI banner can
# read app.state.cloudflare_url; torn down by _graceful_shutdown.
global _cloudflare_url, _cloudflare_requested, _cloudflare_flag
_cloudflare_url = None
_cloudflare_flag = cloudflare
app.state.cloudflare_url = None
_cloudflare_enabled = _cloudflare_tunnel_should_start(
cloudflare = cloudflare,
host = host,
secure = secure,
api_only = api_only,
is_colab = _IS_COLAB,
)
_cloudflare_requested = _cloudflare_enabled
if _cloudflare_enabled:
try: # best-effort: any failure must not block startup
from cloudflare_tunnel import start_studio_tunnel, stop_studio_tunnel
_cloudflare_url = start_studio_tunnel(port)
app.state.cloudflare_url = _cloudflare_url
# Backstop: tear the tunnel down even on an abnormal exit that bypasses
# _graceful_shutdown (e.g. an exception after startup -> sys.exit). Idempotent.
atexit.register(stop_studio_tunnel)
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Cloudflare tunnel skipped: %s", e)
# --secure fails closed: no tunnel means no public link, so exit rather than
# silently fall back to a raw port.
if secure and not _cloudflare_url:
print(
"A secure Cloudflare link is not allowed, use --no-secure which provides a 0.0.0.0 link",
file = sys.stderr,
flush = True,
)
_graceful_shutdown(_server)
sys.exit(1)
# Time-box a freshly-exposed web UI: if nobody changes the seeded admin
# password within the deadline (default 1h), shut down rather than leave an
# unsecured public instance running. No-op for loopback, --api-only, Colab,
# an already-changed password, or UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT=0.
try:
from auth import storage as _auth_storage
from auth.bootstrap_timeout import (
arm_bootstrap_timeout,
bootstrap_timeout_seconds,
should_arm_bootstrap_timeout,
)
_bootstrap_timeout = bootstrap_timeout_seconds()
if should_arm_bootstrap_timeout(
host = host,
secure = secure,
api_only = api_only,
frontend_served = bool(frontend_path) and not api_only,
is_colab = _IS_COLAB,
requires_change = _auth_storage.requires_password_change(
_auth_storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME
),
timeout_seconds = _bootstrap_timeout,
):
arm_bootstrap_timeout(
_auth_storage,
_trigger_shutdown,
timeout_seconds = _bootstrap_timeout,
logger = logger,
)
logger.info(
"Studio will shut down in %ds unless the default admin password is changed.",
_bootstrap_timeout,
)
except Exception as e: # best-effort: never block startup on the timeout
logger.warning("Bootstrap timeout not armed: %s", e)
if not silent:
_emit_startup_output(host, port, display_host, secure = secure, enable_tools = enable_tools)
return app
# Mirror unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py's _PARALLEL_*. Default 1 is for direct
# backend launches; `unsloth studio run` always passes its own value (4).
_PARALLEL_MIN = 1
_PARALLEL_MAX = 64
_PARALLEL_DEFAULT_PLAIN = 1
def _build_arg_parser():
"""Build the backend CLI argument parser.
Extracted from the __main__ block so the flag wiring (notably the
--secure/--no-secure polarity and its --not-secure alias) stays unit-testable.
"""
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description = "Run Unsloth UI Backend server")
parser.add_argument(
"--host",
default = "127.0.0.1",
help = "Host to bind to (default: 127.0.0.1; use 0.0.0.0 for network/cloud access)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--password",
default = None,
help = "Set the INITIAL admin password non-interactively (headless), only when "
"none is set yet. Also reads UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD, or --password - for stdin. "
"A literal value is visible in the process list. Rotate later via "
"`unsloth studio reset-password`.",
)
parser.add_argument("--port", type = int, default = 8888, help = "Port to bind to")
parser.add_argument(
"--frontend",
type = str,
default = _DEFAULT_FRONTEND_PATH,
help = "Path to frontend build",
)
parser.add_argument("--silent", action = "store_true", help = "Suppress output")
parser.add_argument(
"--api-only",
action = "store_true",
help = "API server only, no frontend (for Tauri)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--cloudflare",
action = argparse.BooleanOptionalAction,
default = None,
help = "Expose Studio on a PUBLIC internet URL via a free Cloudflare HTTPS "
"tunnel, for non-api-only wildcard binds (0.0.0.0 or ::). Off by default; "
"pass --cloudflare to enable it (--secure implies it), --no-cloudflare to "
"force it off. It does not change a raw wildcard bind. If the admin "
"password was never changed, Studio asks for a new one in the terminal "
"before publishing the URL.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--secure",
action = argparse.BooleanOptionalAction,
default = False,
help = "Expose ONLY a Cloudflare HTTPS link: bind localhost and fail closed "
"if the tunnel can't start. Without it, --no-secure also serves the raw "
"0.0.0.0 port, which is reachable from anywhere on the network. If the "
"admin password was never changed, Studio asks for a new one in the "
"terminal before publishing the URL.",
)
# Back-compat: accept --not-secure as a hidden alias for --no-secure.
parser.add_argument(
"--not-secure",
dest = "secure",
action = "store_false",
default = argparse.SUPPRESS,
help = argparse.SUPPRESS,
)
# Tri-state tool policy: no flag -> None (tools on, per-request honored);
# --enable-tools/--disable-tools force on/off.
parser.add_argument(
"--enable-tools",
dest = "enable_tools",
action = "store_true",
default = None,
help = "Force server-side tools (web search, code execution) on for "
"every request. Default: on for every bind, per-request setting honored.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--disable-tools",
dest = "enable_tools",
action = "store_false",
default = None,
help = "Force server-side tools off for every request.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--parallel",
"--n-parallel",
type = int,
default = _PARALLEL_DEFAULT_PLAIN,
help = (
f"llama-server parallel decode slots ({_PARALLEL_MIN}..{_PARALLEL_MAX}). "
f"Default {_PARALLEL_DEFAULT_PLAIN}; `unsloth studio run` uses 4."
),
)
return parser
# For direct execution (also invoked by CLI via os.execvp / subprocess).
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Correct a conflicting system CUDA on LD_LIBRARY_PATH before torch is
# imported (below, via run_server). Re-execs once on Linux so the dynamic
# linker uses torch's bundled CUDA libs; no-op on other platforms, when
# LD_LIBRARY_PATH is unset or already correct, or after the single re-exec.
_maybe_reexec_for_cuda_ld_path()
import signal
import traceback
# Ensure stderr handles Unicode on Windows (non-ASCII path tracebacks).
if sys.platform == "win32" and hasattr(sys.stderr, "reconfigure"):
try:
sys.stderr.reconfigure(encoding = "utf-8", errors = "replace")
except Exception:
pass
parser = _build_arg_parser()
args = parser.parse_args()
if not _PARALLEL_MIN <= args.parallel <= _PARALLEL_MAX:
parser.error(f"--parallel must be between {_PARALLEL_MIN} and {_PARALLEL_MAX}")
if args.secure and args.cloudflare is False:
parser.error(
"--secure requires the Cloudflare tunnel; do not combine it with --no-cloudflare"
)
kwargs = dict(
host = args.host,
port = args.port,
silent = args.silent,
api_only = args.api_only,
llama_parallel_slots = args.parallel,
cloudflare = args.cloudflare,
secure = args.secure,
enable_tools = args.enable_tools,
password = args.password,
)
if args.frontend is not None:
kwargs["frontend_path"] = Path(args.frontend)
try:
run_server(**kwargs)
except Exception:
sys.stderr.write("\n")
sys.stderr.write("=" * 60 + "\n")
sys.stderr.write("ERROR: Unsloth Studio failed to start.\n")
sys.stderr.write("=" * 60 + "\n")
traceback.print_exc(file = sys.stderr)
sys.stderr.write("\n")
sys.stderr.write("If a package is missing, try re-running: unsloth studio setup\n")
sys.stderr.flush()
sys.exit(1)
# Signal handler -- ensures subprocess cleanup on Ctrl+C.
def _signal_handler(signum, frame):
# Restore defaults so a second signal force-quits if shutdown stalls.
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal.SIG_DFL)
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIG_DFL)
if hasattr(signal, "SIGBREAK"):
signal.signal(signal.SIGBREAK, signal.SIG_DFL)
_graceful_shutdown(_server)
_shutdown_event.set()
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, _signal_handler)
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, _signal_handler)
# On Windows, some terminals send SIGBREAK for Ctrl+C / Ctrl+Break.
if hasattr(signal, "SIGBREAK"):
signal.signal(signal.SIGBREAK, _signal_handler)
# Keep running until shutdown signal. Event.wait() without a timeout blocks at
# the C level on Linux, preventing SIGINT delivery; a short timeout in a loop
# lets the interpreter process pending signals.
while not _shutdown_event.is_set():
_shutdown_event.wait(timeout = 1)
_wait_for_server_shutdown()