* Studio: stop leaking seeded admin pw to cross-origin callers
The "/" SPA fallback serves index.html with an inline
``window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__`` script containing the seeded admin
password while a password change is pending. Default web mode runs
``CORSMiddleware`` with ``allow_origins=["*"]`` + ``allow_credentials=
True``, which reflects an attacker-controlled ``Origin`` back on every
request and sets Access-Control-Allow-Credentials true. The combination
let any cross-origin page ``fetch('/')`` with credentials and read the
bootstrap admin password out of the HTML body. The API smoke
``CORS: GET / leaks bootstrap pw to cross-origin caller`` audit already
tracked this (tests/studio/studio_api_smoke.py:224) but did not gate CI.
Gate ``_inject_bootstrap`` on a same-origin check: legitimate top-level
navigations omit ``Origin`` on most engines, so the absence of the
header is treated as same-origin; when the header IS present and does
not match ``request.url.scheme://request.url.netloc`` exactly, we now
skip injecting the bootstrap tag. ``Vary: Origin`` is added so an
intermediary cache cannot serve a same-origin response (with bootstrap)
to a later cross-origin caller (and vice versa).
Coverage: ``test_index_bootstrap_origin.py`` exercises the helper with
missing / matching / evil / scheme-mismatch / port-mismatch origins.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: tighten comments on bootstrap cross-origin helper
* Studio: canonicalise Origin before same-origin gate
A plain string-compare between the Origin header and request.url.netloc
misclassifies legitimate same-origin requests as cross-origin in three
scenarios:
- Browser strips the default port from Origin (https://example.com)
but Starlette's netloc keeps it (example.com:443). Per RFC 6454 the
default port is dropped on the wire, so the strings will not match
even though the requests share an origin.
- Host case differs (Origin: http://Example.com vs netloc:
example.com). Per RFC 3986 host comparison is case-insensitive.
- Scheme case differs (HTTP:// vs http://). Per RFC 3986 the scheme
is also case-insensitive.
These are usability degradations rather than security gaps (legitimate
user denied the bootstrap injection, no attacker gain), but worth
shipping so non-default Studio deployments keep the change-password
auto-fill.
Adds _canonical_origin(scheme, netloc) -> (scheme, host, port) and
compares the canonical tuples. Default-port lookup covers
http/https/ws/wss; userinfo (user:pass@) is stripped per RFC 3986
since Origin never carries credentials. Origin: "null" (sandboxed
iframes, file:// pages) and unparseable values collapse to cross-
origin so the bootstrap pw is never leaked through those paths either.
Tests: 14 cases (was 5). Covers the original same/missing/evil/
scheme/port matrix plus default-port stripping in both directions,
host + scheme case folding, Origin: null, garbage values, and
userinfo-in-netloc.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Fix IPv6 netloc parsing for PR #5739
The canonical-origin helper used ``netloc.partition(":")`` which
mis-parses bracketed IPv6 hosts (``[::1]:8902`` -> host=``[``,
port-str=``:1]:8902``). The int() then raises and the canonicaliser
returns None, so every IPv6 same-origin request is misclassified as
cross-origin and Studio refuses to inject the bootstrap pw on a
legitimate top-level nav when launched with ``unsloth studio -H ::1``.
Bracket-aware split per RFC 3986 §3.2.2, plus extra regression tests
for IPv6, opaque (data:/blob:/file:), comma-joined multi-Origin and
localhost-vs-127 cases.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Guard urlparse ValueError in same-origin gate
urlparse raises ValueError on malformed bracketed Origin values
(unclosed [, invalid IPv6 hex, text after ]) and on a few NFKC
edge cases since Py 3.8. Without a guard, a request carrying
Origin: http://[malformed surfaced as HTTP 500 from the SPA
handler rather than being treated as cross-origin per the
docstring's safer-default rule. Wrap both urlparse calls in
try/except ValueError and return False on parse failure.
Also distinguish a missing Origin header (top-level same-document
GET, treat as same-origin) from an explicit empty string (not a
valid serialised origin per RFC 6454 §6.1, treat as cross-origin).
Four new regression tests pinned down by the PR audit: malformed
IPv6 bracket, invalid IPv6 hex, bracket with trailing garbage,
and the empty Origin header.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Shorten origin-gate comments for PR #5739
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
196 lines
7 KiB
Python
196 lines
7 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
|
|
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
|
|
|
|
"""Extra edge-case coverage for the bootstrap-pw cross-origin gate.
|
|
Companion to ``test_index_bootstrap_origin.py``: IPv6 netlocs, opaque
|
|
origins (``data:``, ``blob:``), comma-joined multi-Origin headers, and
|
|
the ``localhost`` vs ``127.0.0.1`` distinct-origin rule.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _build_request(host: str, origin, scheme: str = "http") -> MagicMock:
|
|
request = MagicMock()
|
|
request.url.scheme = scheme
|
|
request.url.netloc = host
|
|
request.headers = {"origin": origin} if origin is not None else {}
|
|
return request
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── IPv6 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_loopback_same_origin():
|
|
"""Studio supports ``-H ::1`` binds; netloc is ``[::1]:8902``. Bare
|
|
``partition(":")`` mis-parses the bracketed form and would refuse the
|
|
bootstrap on legitimate same-origin nav.
|
|
"""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("[::1]:8902", origin = "http://[::1]:8902")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_full_address_same_origin():
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request(
|
|
"[2001:db8::1]:8443",
|
|
origin = "https://[2001:db8::1]:8443",
|
|
scheme = "https",
|
|
)
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_default_port_stripped():
|
|
"""Browser drops :80 on ``http://[::1]``."""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("[::1]:80", origin = "http://[::1]")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_case_insensitive():
|
|
"""Hex digits in IPv6 are case-insensitive per RFC 5952."""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request(
|
|
"[2001:DB8::1]:8443",
|
|
origin = "https://[2001:db8::1]:8443",
|
|
scheme = "https",
|
|
)
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_different_host_cross_origin():
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("[::1]:8902", origin = "http://[2001:db8::1]:8902")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_port_mismatch_cross_origin():
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("[::1]:8902", origin = "http://[::1]:9999")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_userinfo_stripped():
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("user:pass@[::1]:8902", origin = "http://[::1]:8902")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Opaque origins (data:, blob:) ───────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_data_url_origin_is_cross_origin():
|
|
"""``data:`` URLs are opaque origins (HTML living standard); no host,
|
|
never same-origin.
|
|
"""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request(
|
|
"127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>"
|
|
)
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_blob_url_origin_is_cross_origin():
|
|
"""``blob:`` URLs carry the inner origin only in non-canonical form; the
|
|
canonical comparison rejects them.
|
|
"""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "blob:http://127.0.0.1:8902/uuid")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_file_url_origin_is_cross_origin():
|
|
"""``file://`` pages usually send ``Origin: null``; historical engines
|
|
sent ``Origin: file://``. Neither is same-origin vs an http listener.
|
|
"""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "file://")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Multi-Origin header (comma-joined by Starlette) ────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_comma_joined_origins_cross_origin():
|
|
"""Starlette concatenates repeated headers with ``, ``; the canonical
|
|
parser can't safely split this, so it falls to cross-origin.
|
|
"""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request(
|
|
"127.0.0.1:8902",
|
|
origin = "http://127.0.0.1:8902, http://evil.example",
|
|
)
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── localhost vs 127.0.0.1 (distinct origins per web platform) ──────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_localhost_vs_127_is_cross_origin():
|
|
"""Browsers treat ``localhost`` and ``127.0.0.1`` as distinct origins;
|
|
the canonical comparison must not DNS-collapse them.
|
|
"""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "http://localhost:8902")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_127_vs_localhost_is_cross_origin():
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("localhost:8902", origin = "http://127.0.0.1:8902")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── urlparse ValueError robustness ─────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_malformed_ipv6_bracket_is_cross_origin():
|
|
"""``urlparse`` raises ``ValueError('Invalid IPv6 URL')`` on unclosed
|
|
brackets (CVE-2024-11168 hardening). The gate must swallow and fall to
|
|
cross-origin rather than 500 the SPA handler.
|
|
"""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "http://[malformed")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_invalid_ipv6_address_is_cross_origin():
|
|
"""Bracketed but invalid IPv6 (e.g. ``[::g]``) also raises
|
|
``ValueError`` inside ``urlparse``."""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "http://[::g]:8902")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_bracket_with_trailing_garbage_is_cross_origin():
|
|
"""Text after the closing bracket also raises inside ``urlparse``."""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "http://[2001:db8::1]extra:8902")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_same_origin_request_empty_origin_header_is_cross_origin():
|
|
"""Explicit empty ``Origin:`` is not a valid serialised origin and must
|
|
not be conflated with a missing header; cross-origin, bootstrap withheld.
|
|
"""
|
|
from main import _is_same_origin_request
|
|
|
|
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "")
|
|
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
|