unsloth/studio/backend/tests/test_index_bootstrap_origin_extra.py
Daniel Han 034ff512e7
Studio: stop seeded admin to cross-origin callers (#5739)
* Studio: stop leaking seeded admin pw to cross-origin callers

The "/" SPA fallback serves index.html with an inline
``window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__`` script containing the seeded admin
password while a password change is pending. Default web mode runs
``CORSMiddleware`` with ``allow_origins=["*"]`` + ``allow_credentials=
True``, which reflects an attacker-controlled ``Origin`` back on every
request and sets Access-Control-Allow-Credentials true. The combination
let any cross-origin page ``fetch('/')`` with credentials and read the
bootstrap admin password out of the HTML body. The API smoke
``CORS: GET / leaks bootstrap pw to cross-origin caller`` audit already
tracked this (tests/studio/studio_api_smoke.py:224) but did not gate CI.

Gate ``_inject_bootstrap`` on a same-origin check: legitimate top-level
navigations omit ``Origin`` on most engines, so the absence of the
header is treated as same-origin; when the header IS present and does
not match ``request.url.scheme://request.url.netloc`` exactly, we now
skip injecting the bootstrap tag. ``Vary: Origin`` is added so an
intermediary cache cannot serve a same-origin response (with bootstrap)
to a later cross-origin caller (and vice versa).

Coverage: ``test_index_bootstrap_origin.py`` exercises the helper with
missing / matching / evil / scheme-mismatch / port-mismatch origins.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: tighten comments on bootstrap cross-origin helper

* Studio: canonicalise Origin before same-origin gate

A plain string-compare between the Origin header and request.url.netloc
misclassifies legitimate same-origin requests as cross-origin in three
scenarios:

- Browser strips the default port from Origin (https://example.com)
  but Starlette's netloc keeps it (example.com:443). Per RFC 6454 the
  default port is dropped on the wire, so the strings will not match
  even though the requests share an origin.
- Host case differs (Origin: http://Example.com vs netloc:
  example.com). Per RFC 3986 host comparison is case-insensitive.
- Scheme case differs (HTTP:// vs http://). Per RFC 3986 the scheme
  is also case-insensitive.

These are usability degradations rather than security gaps (legitimate
user denied the bootstrap injection, no attacker gain), but worth
shipping so non-default Studio deployments keep the change-password
auto-fill.

Adds _canonical_origin(scheme, netloc) -> (scheme, host, port) and
compares the canonical tuples. Default-port lookup covers
http/https/ws/wss; userinfo (user:pass@) is stripped per RFC 3986
since Origin never carries credentials. Origin: "null" (sandboxed
iframes, file:// pages) and unparseable values collapse to cross-
origin so the bootstrap pw is never leaked through those paths either.

Tests: 14 cases (was 5). Covers the original same/missing/evil/
scheme/port matrix plus default-port stripping in both directions,
host + scheme case folding, Origin: null, garbage values, and
userinfo-in-netloc.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Fix IPv6 netloc parsing for PR #5739

The canonical-origin helper used ``netloc.partition(":")`` which
mis-parses bracketed IPv6 hosts (``[::1]:8902`` -> host=``[``,
port-str=``:1]:8902``). The int() then raises and the canonicaliser
returns None, so every IPv6 same-origin request is misclassified as
cross-origin and Studio refuses to inject the bootstrap pw on a
legitimate top-level nav when launched with ``unsloth studio -H ::1``.

Bracket-aware split per RFC 3986 §3.2.2, plus extra regression tests
for IPv6, opaque (data:/blob:/file:), comma-joined multi-Origin and
localhost-vs-127 cases.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Guard urlparse ValueError in same-origin gate

urlparse raises ValueError on malformed bracketed Origin values
(unclosed [, invalid IPv6 hex, text after ]) and on a few NFKC
edge cases since Py 3.8. Without a guard, a request carrying
Origin: http://[malformed surfaced as HTTP 500 from the SPA
handler rather than being treated as cross-origin per the
docstring's safer-default rule. Wrap both urlparse calls in
try/except ValueError and return False on parse failure.

Also distinguish a missing Origin header (top-level same-document
GET, treat as same-origin) from an explicit empty string (not a
valid serialised origin per RFC 6454 §6.1, treat as cross-origin).

Four new regression tests pinned down by the PR audit: malformed
IPv6 bracket, invalid IPv6 hex, bracket with trailing garbage,
and the empty Origin header.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Shorten origin-gate comments for PR #5739

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-25 23:36:51 -07:00

196 lines
7 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
"""Extra edge-case coverage for the bootstrap-pw cross-origin gate.
Companion to ``test_index_bootstrap_origin.py``: IPv6 netlocs, opaque
origins (``data:``, ``blob:``), comma-joined multi-Origin headers, and
the ``localhost`` vs ``127.0.0.1`` distinct-origin rule.
"""
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
def _build_request(host: str, origin, scheme: str = "http") -> MagicMock:
request = MagicMock()
request.url.scheme = scheme
request.url.netloc = host
request.headers = {"origin": origin} if origin is not None else {}
return request
# ── IPv6 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_loopback_same_origin():
"""Studio supports ``-H ::1`` binds; netloc is ``[::1]:8902``. Bare
``partition(":")`` mis-parses the bracketed form and would refuse the
bootstrap on legitimate same-origin nav.
"""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("[::1]:8902", origin = "http://[::1]:8902")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_full_address_same_origin():
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request(
"[2001:db8::1]:8443",
origin = "https://[2001:db8::1]:8443",
scheme = "https",
)
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_default_port_stripped():
"""Browser drops :80 on ``http://[::1]``."""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("[::1]:80", origin = "http://[::1]")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_case_insensitive():
"""Hex digits in IPv6 are case-insensitive per RFC 5952."""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request(
"[2001:DB8::1]:8443",
origin = "https://[2001:db8::1]:8443",
scheme = "https",
)
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_different_host_cross_origin():
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("[::1]:8902", origin = "http://[2001:db8::1]:8902")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_port_mismatch_cross_origin():
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("[::1]:8902", origin = "http://[::1]:9999")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
def test_is_same_origin_request_ipv6_userinfo_stripped():
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("user:pass@[::1]:8902", origin = "http://[::1]:8902")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is True
# ── Opaque origins (data:, blob:) ───────────────────────────────────
def test_is_same_origin_request_data_url_origin_is_cross_origin():
"""``data:`` URLs are opaque origins (HTML living standard); no host,
never same-origin.
"""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request(
"127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>"
)
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
def test_is_same_origin_request_blob_url_origin_is_cross_origin():
"""``blob:`` URLs carry the inner origin only in non-canonical form; the
canonical comparison rejects them.
"""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "blob:http://127.0.0.1:8902/uuid")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
def test_is_same_origin_request_file_url_origin_is_cross_origin():
"""``file://`` pages usually send ``Origin: null``; historical engines
sent ``Origin: file://``. Neither is same-origin vs an http listener.
"""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "file://")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
# ── Multi-Origin header (comma-joined by Starlette) ────────────────
def test_is_same_origin_request_comma_joined_origins_cross_origin():
"""Starlette concatenates repeated headers with ``, ``; the canonical
parser can't safely split this, so it falls to cross-origin.
"""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request(
"127.0.0.1:8902",
origin = "http://127.0.0.1:8902, http://evil.example",
)
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
# ── localhost vs 127.0.0.1 (distinct origins per web platform) ──────
def test_is_same_origin_request_localhost_vs_127_is_cross_origin():
"""Browsers treat ``localhost`` and ``127.0.0.1`` as distinct origins;
the canonical comparison must not DNS-collapse them.
"""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "http://localhost:8902")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
def test_is_same_origin_request_127_vs_localhost_is_cross_origin():
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("localhost:8902", origin = "http://127.0.0.1:8902")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
# ── urlparse ValueError robustness ─────────────────────────────────
def test_is_same_origin_request_malformed_ipv6_bracket_is_cross_origin():
"""``urlparse`` raises ``ValueError('Invalid IPv6 URL')`` on unclosed
brackets (CVE-2024-11168 hardening). The gate must swallow and fall to
cross-origin rather than 500 the SPA handler.
"""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "http://[malformed")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
def test_is_same_origin_request_invalid_ipv6_address_is_cross_origin():
"""Bracketed but invalid IPv6 (e.g. ``[::g]``) also raises
``ValueError`` inside ``urlparse``."""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "http://[::g]:8902")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
def test_is_same_origin_request_bracket_with_trailing_garbage_is_cross_origin():
"""Text after the closing bracket also raises inside ``urlparse``."""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "http://[2001:db8::1]extra:8902")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False
def test_is_same_origin_request_empty_origin_header_is_cross_origin():
"""Explicit empty ``Origin:`` is not a valid serialised origin and must
not be conflated with a missing header; cross-origin, bootstrap withheld.
"""
from main import _is_same_origin_request
req = _build_request("127.0.0.1:8902", origin = "")
assert _is_same_origin_request(req) is False