* added remote MCP server support * trim * added tests * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * increased timeout * disabling MCP chat toggle * Fix MCP OpenAI function-name validation + cancel propagation for PR #5750 OpenAI requires function.name to match ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ before streaming starts. The existing 64-char length check is necessary but not sufficient: MCP servers can return tool names containing '.', '/', spaces, etc. that would 400 the whole chat request. Validate the composed mcp__<server_id>__<tool> name against the regex, skip + warn on miss, and drop duplicate tool names from the same server (which would also 400 the request as "duplicates"). Also propagate the agentic-loop cancel_event into MCP tool execution so a /cancel POST during a long-running MCP call (e.g. GitHub MCP search across a large repo) actually interrupts the in-flight HTTP call instead of waiting out the 300 s timeout. The watcher polls the threading.Event at 50 ms cadence inside the asyncio loop (matches routes/inference.py's existing cancel-watcher cadence) and races against the call task with asyncio.wait FIRST_COMPLETED. Tests added: - test_mcp_specs_skip_invalid_openai_function_names: drops bad chars - test_mcp_specs_skip_empty_tool_name - test_mcp_specs_drops_duplicate_names - test_call_tool_sync_respects_pre_set_cancel_event Also fix test_desktop_auth.py's router stub that listed every existing router but missed mcp_servers_router, so importing main.py fails after this PR adds it to routes/__init__.py. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * PR #5750 round 2: OAuth cleanup on delete/url-change + mcp_enabled standalone Round 2 of cross-platform validation surfaced two more P1 findings: 1. OAuth tokens never get cleared. fastmcp keys tokens by MCP URL, not by server row, and delete / URL change / use_oauth toggle only updated the SQLite row. Re-registering the same URL would silently reuse the old account's credentials. Adds clear_oauth_tokens_async() in mcp_client.py and calls it from the delete + put route handlers when the row had use_oauth=True and either the URL changes or OAuth is turned off. 2. mcp_enabled=true was ignored unless the caller also sent enable_tools=true. The frontend always sends both together so the UI path was fine, but a direct API caller sending only mcp_enabled would silently get no MCP tools, which contradicts the field's documented "append tools from every enabled MCP server" behavior. Loosens the use_tools gate in both the GGUF and safetensors paths so mcp_enabled opens the tool loop on its own; when the caller did not also opt into built-ins, the built-in list starts empty. Tests added: - test_clear_oauth_tokens_async_no_op_safe - test_delete_server_calls_oauth_cleanup_when_oauth_was_on - test_delete_server_skips_oauth_cleanup_when_oauth_off - test_update_server_clears_oauth_on_url_change - test_update_server_clears_oauth_when_oauth_disabled 26 backend MCP tests pass; full studio/backend suite 1710 passed locally. Cross-platform CI (Linux, macOS, Windows) green on staging fork. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * PR #5750 round 3: reject null bool updates + /test surfaces 400 Round 3 of cross-platform validation: 1. PUT /api/mcp/servers/<id> would 500 with TypeError when the body explicitly set is_enabled or use_oauth to null. Pydantic accepts None for an Optional[bool] and _changes_from_payload then passed None into mcp_servers_db.update_server, which int(None)d. Reject explicit null at the validation layer with 400 instead. 2. POST /api/mcp/servers/test caught HTTPException under "except Exception", so an invalid URL came back as HTTP 200 with {"ok": false, "error": "400: ..."} instead of a real 400. The create + update paths return 400 for the same input. Move validation outside the transport try/except so it surfaces 400. Tests added: - test_changes_from_payload_rejects_null_is_enabled - test_changes_from_payload_rejects_null_use_oauth - test_test_endpoint_surfaces_url_validation_as_400 * PR #5750 round 4: hyphenated MCP tool names + empty-tool-list gate Round 4 surfaces two more interaction bugs between the new MCP path and existing safetensors tool plumbing: 1. OpenAI accepts ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ for function.name, and round 1 widened the MCP regex to that set, so MCP tools can now be advertised as `mcp__srv__list-issues`. But the XML tool-call parser in tool_call_parser.py used `\w+` (no hyphen), so the model could call the tool but Studio could not parse the call. Same in routes/inference.py's `_TOOL_XML_RE` stripper, which would leave hyphenated tool-call XML in the visible content. Both regexes now use `[\w-]+`. 2. safetensors_agentic treats `tools=[]` as "allow all" (documented contract, exercised by test_empty_tools_list_does_not_enforce_allowlist). When a caller sends `enable_tools=true` + `enabled_tools=[]` + `mcp_enabled=true` and MCP discovery returns 0, the resolved tool list is genuinely empty and built-in tools (web_search / python / terminal) could execute via the model's emitted call. Fix at the route gate instead of breaking the documented contract: set `use_tools=False` when the resolved list is empty, in both GGUF and safetensors paths. Existing callers who omit `enabled_tools` still get ALL_TOOLS and are unaffected. Tests added (32 total): - test_tool_xml_parser_handles_hyphenated_function_names - test_tool_xml_strip_handles_hyphenated_function_names - test_safetensors_agentic_empty_allowlist_still_means_allow_all (documents the contract round 4 preserved) 1716 passed locally; cross-platform CI on staging fork still green. * PR #5750 round 5: GGUF allow-list + CLI policy + hyphenated params + cancel race Round 5 of parallel-reviewer aggregation surfaced six additional findings; five are real and fixed here: 1. Hyphenated MCP parameter names (`<parameter=issue-number>`) were dropped by the XML parser's `\w+` regex. Extended to `[\w-]+` in both core/inference/tool_call_parser.py and core/tool_healing.py. The latter is GGUF's own copy of the parser/strip patterns and was missed by round 4. 2. core/tool_healing.py's `strip_tool_call_markup` still used `<function=\w+>` so hyphenated MCP tool-call XML leaked into the GGUF visible content even after round 4 fixed the shared parser. 3+4. `mcp_enabled` re-opened the tool loop even when the operator passed `unsloth run --disable-tools` (CLI policy False). Round 2's `(_tools_on or payload.mcp_enabled)` gate ignored the raw process policy. Now reads `state.tool_policy.get_tool_policy()` and gates mcp_enabled on `_cli_policy is not False`. Applied to both GGUF and safetensors paths. 5. GGUF's agentic loop called `execute_tool(tool_name, ...)` without checking the model-emitted name against the per-request tool list, while the safetensors loop already enforces this. Added the same allow-list check so a model that hallucinates a filtered MCP name or a built-in the caller opted out of returns "not enabled" instead of executing. Bonus P2 fixes: - `call_tool_sync` now checks `cancel_event.is_set()` BEFORE creating the call task, so a pre-set cancellation does not open the HTTP transport. - `clear_oauth_tokens_async` moved the OAuth import + construction inside the protected try block; a fastmcp.client.auth load error used to escape and 500 the delete / update route. NOT fixed (verified false or out of scope): - finding #10 "structured_content vs structuredContent": fastmcp's CallToolResult dataclass uses snake_case (verified live against structured-only tool result; fields are `dict_keys(['content', 'structured_content', 'meta', 'data', 'is_error'])`). - finding #11 "asyncio.run from running loop": call_tool_sync is invoked from `asyncio.to_thread` worker threads which have no event loop; asyncio.run() is safe there. Tests added (37 total): hyphenated param names, tool_healing strip, GGUF allow-list gate, cancel pre-set short-circuit, OAuth cleanup constructor-error swallowing. 1721 passed locally, no regressions. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: danielhanchen <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
181 lines
6.3 KiB
Python
181 lines
6.3 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import json
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from typing import Any, Optional
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from loggers import get_logger
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logger = get_logger(__name__)
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MCP_TOOL_PREFIX = "mcp__"
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_oauth_token_store = None
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def parse_server_headers(server: dict) -> Optional[dict]:
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raw = server.get("headers_json")
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if not raw:
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return None
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try:
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parsed = json.loads(raw)
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except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
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return None
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return parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else None
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def _oauth_store():
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global _oauth_token_store
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if _oauth_token_store is None:
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from key_value.aio._utils.sanitization import AlwaysHashStrategy
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from key_value.aio.stores.filetree import FileTreeStore
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from utils.paths.storage_roots import ensure_dir, studio_root
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# Hash keys/collections — fastmcp uses raw URLs like https://x.com as
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# keys and FileTreeStore would treat the "://" as nested directories.
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_oauth_token_store = FileTreeStore(
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data_directory = ensure_dir(studio_root() / "mcp-oauth-tokens"),
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key_sanitization_strategy = AlwaysHashStrategy(),
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collection_sanitization_strategy = AlwaysHashStrategy(),
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)
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return _oauth_token_store
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async def clear_oauth_tokens_async(url: str) -> None:
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"""Drop any persisted OAuth tokens for ``url``. fastmcp keys tokens by
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MCP URL, so on server delete / URL change / OAuth disable we have to
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clear the old credentials explicitly. Otherwise re-registering the
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same URL would silently reuse the old account's token. The entire
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body runs inside the protected block -- store / OAuth construction
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failing must not make the delete / update route 500."""
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try:
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from fastmcp.client.auth import OAuth
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auth = OAuth(mcp_url = url, token_storage = _oauth_store())
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await auth.token_storage_adapter.clear()
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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# Cleanup is best-effort; the row delete still wins.
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logger.warning("Failed to clear OAuth tokens for %s: %s", url, exc)
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def _client(url: str, headers: Optional[dict], use_oauth: bool = False):
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from fastmcp import Client
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from fastmcp.client.transports import SSETransport, StreamableHttpTransport
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from fastmcp.mcp_config import infer_transport_type_from_url
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auth = None
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if use_oauth:
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from fastmcp.client.auth import OAuth
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auth = OAuth(mcp_url = url, token_storage = _oauth_store())
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transport_cls = (
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SSETransport
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if infer_transport_type_from_url(url) == "sse"
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else StreamableHttpTransport
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)
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return Client(transport_cls(url = url, headers = headers or None, auth = auth))
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async def list_tools_async(
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url: str,
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headers: Optional[dict] = None,
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timeout: float = 5.0,
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use_oauth: bool = False,
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) -> list[dict]:
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async def _fetch() -> list[dict]:
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async with _client(url, headers, use_oauth) as client:
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tools = await client.list_tools()
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return [t.model_dump(exclude_none = True) for t in tools]
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return await asyncio.wait_for(_fetch(), timeout = timeout)
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def _flatten_result(result: Any) -> str:
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parts = []
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for block in getattr(result, "content", None) or []:
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text = getattr(block, "text", None)
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if text:
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parts.append(str(text))
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body = "\n".join(parts)
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if not body:
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structured = getattr(result, "structured_content", None)
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body = str(structured) if structured is not None else ""
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if getattr(result, "is_error", False):
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# "Error: " prefix triggers tool_call_parser's TOOL_ERROR_PREFIXES nudge.
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return f"Error: {body}" if body else "Error: tool returned no content"
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return body
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def call_tool_sync(
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url: str,
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headers: Optional[dict],
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name: str,
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args: dict,
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timeout: Optional[float] = 300.0,
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use_oauth: bool = False,
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cancel_event = None,
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) -> str:
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"""Synchronously call an MCP tool.
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``cancel_event``: optional ``threading.Event``. When set, the in-flight
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HTTP call is cancelled and the function returns a cancellation Error.
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Polled in parallel with the tool call via ``asyncio.wait`` so a /cancel
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POST from the UI interrupts even mid-network-read.
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"""
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async def _call() -> Any:
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async with _client(url, headers, use_oauth) as client:
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return await client.call_tool(name, args)
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async def _watch_cancel() -> None:
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# 50 ms cadence keeps cancellation responsive without busy-looping;
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# matches the cadence routes/inference.py uses for cancel watchers.
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while cancel_event is not None and not cancel_event.is_set():
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await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
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async def _race() -> Any:
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# Check cancellation before spawning the call task so a pre-set
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# event short-circuits before opening the transport / HTTP
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# connection (reviewer-reproduced race).
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if cancel_event is not None and cancel_event.is_set():
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raise _MCPCancelled
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call_task = asyncio.create_task(_call())
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if cancel_event is None:
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return await asyncio.wait_for(call_task, timeout = timeout)
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watch_task = asyncio.create_task(_watch_cancel())
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try:
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done, pending = await asyncio.wait(
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{call_task, watch_task},
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timeout = timeout,
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return_when = asyncio.FIRST_COMPLETED,
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)
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finally:
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for t in (call_task, watch_task):
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if not t.done():
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t.cancel()
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if not done:
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raise asyncio.TimeoutError
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if call_task in done:
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return call_task.result()
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raise _MCPCancelled
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try:
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result = asyncio.run(_race())
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except _MCPCancelled:
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return f"Error: MCP tool '{name}' cancelled"
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except asyncio.TimeoutError:
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return f"Error: MCP tool '{name}' timed out after {timeout:g}s"
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except Exception as exc:
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logger.exception("MCP call_tool failed for %s: %s", name, exc)
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return f"Error: MCP tool '{name}' failed: {exc}"
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return _flatten_result(result)
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class _MCPCancelled(Exception):
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"""Internal sentinel raised when cancel_event fires before the tool returns."""
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