6d8c18cd1a* Replace standalone Studio wording with Unsloth Replace the single word Studio with Unsloth wherever it is used as shorthand for Unsloth Studio in docs, CLI output, UI strings, i18n locales, workflow display names, comments and docstrings. Kept unchanged: the full name Unsloth Studio, third party product names (LM Studio, Visual Studio, Mac Studio), feature names (Recipe Studio, Fine-tuning Studio and its translations), and all identifiers such as env vars, commands, paths and filenames. * Address review feedback on the Studio wording rename Use "an" before Unsloth where the rename left the article as "a". Restore the split brand where Unsloth and Studio render as two halves of the full product name: the onboarding sidebar subtitle and the IPv6 localhost warning. Scope two messages to the full name Unsloth Studio where plain Unsloth was misleading: the AMD README bullet and the CLI studio setup error.
71 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
71 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""Resolve the caller's IP for rate limiting.
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Trust model, in order:
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1. If the operator opts in via ``UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED`` (Unsloth behind
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their own reverse proxy), honor the *rightmost* ``X-Forwarded-For`` hop -- the
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one the trusted proxy appended. The leftmost entry is client-controlled and
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spoofable, so this assumes a proxy that appends (or overwrites) the header;
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only enable the env var behind such a proxy.
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2. If the socket peer is loopback, honor ``CF-Connecting-IP``. Unsloth's managed
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Cloudflare tunnel terminates at 127.0.0.1, so every tunneled visitor would
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otherwise collapse onto the same socket peer (the local cloudflared process)
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and share one rate-limit bucket. ``CF-Connecting-IP`` is set by Cloudflare's
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edge and can't be forged by a tunneled client.
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3. Otherwise the socket peer, so a direct LAN caller can't spoof a header to
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dodge a per-IP limit.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import ipaddress
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import os
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_TRUST_FORWARDED_ENV = "UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED"
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def _trust_forwarded_for() -> bool:
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return os.environ.get(_TRUST_FORWARDED_ENV, "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
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def _is_loopback(host: str | None) -> bool:
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try:
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return bool(host) and ipaddress.ip_address(host).is_loopback
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except ValueError:
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return False
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def _normalize_addr(value: str | None) -> str | None:
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"""Parse an ``X-Forwarded-For`` entry into a bare, validated IP (strip port/brackets)."""
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raw = (value or "").strip().strip('"')
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if not raw:
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return None
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if raw.startswith("["): # [ipv6]:port
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raw = raw[1:].split("]", 1)[0]
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elif raw.count(":") == 1: # ipv4:port
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raw = raw.split(":", 1)[0]
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try:
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return ipaddress.ip_address(raw).compressed
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except ValueError:
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return None
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def client_ip(request) -> str:
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"""Best-effort client IP, or ``"_unknown"`` when it can't be determined."""
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if request is None:
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return "_unknown"
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peer = request.client.host if request.client else None
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if _trust_forwarded_for():
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# Rightmost hop = what the trusted proxy saw; the leftmost is spoofable.
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xff = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
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if xff:
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normalized = _normalize_addr(xff.rsplit(",", 1)[-1])
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if normalized:
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return normalized
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if _is_loopback(peer):
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cf = _normalize_addr(request.headers.get("cf-connecting-ip"))
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if cf:
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return cf
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return peer or "_unknown"
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