* CLI: stop `unsloth connect` from leaking Studio credentials to unverified servers
`unsloth connect` (and `unsloth chat`) discovered a Studio base URL from
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL or the default localhost port after only an unauthenticated
/api/health probe, then sent credentials to it:
- keyless connect iterated every cached API key and sent each as a bearer token
to {base}/v1/models, so a malicious or port-preempting endpoint could harvest
all of them;
- with no cached key it self-issued a Studio JWT and POSTed it to
{base}/api/auth/api-keys;
- unsloth chat sent the same self-issued JWT to the discovered base.
The key cache was a flat, global list with no binding to a server identity, so a
key minted for one Studio could be replayed to any other.
Changes:
- Scope the agent key cache per base URL so a key is only ever replayed to the
exact server it was minted for. Pre-scoping flat caches are ignored rather
than replayed (at most one extra local mint on the next launch).
- Gate every automatic credential flow to loopback bases. A non-loopback
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL now requires an explicit --api-key and nothing is sent
automatically. SSH-tunnelled Studios that land on 127.0.0.1 keep working.
- Mint the API key locally against the Studio auth DB instead of POSTing a
self-issued JWT over the network, so no bearer token leaves the process on the
local path.
- Apply the same loopback gate to connect_studio_server (used by unsloth chat).
Fully closing same-host loopback-port preemption needs a signed /api/health
handshake so the client can verify the server identity before sending anything;
that is tracked as a server-side follow-up.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI: verify Studio server identity before auto-sending credentials
Adds a challenge-response so `unsloth connect` and `unsloth chat` can confirm a
discovered loopback endpoint is really this install's Studio (not a process
that preempted the port) before sending it a cached or freshly minted
credential. This closes the same-host loopback-preemption gap left open by the
previous commit, which could only limit the blast radius.
Server:
- storage.get_or_create_identity_secret(): a dedicated server-wide secret in
app_secrets (kept separate from the per-user JWT secret), readable only by
the same OS user.
- storage.compute_identity_proof(nonce) = HMAC-SHA256(identity secret, nonce).
- GET /api/auth/identity?nonce=<base64url>: unauthenticated, returns the proof.
The nonce is opaque to the server and the proof reveals nothing about the
secret, so answering is safe.
Client:
- verify_studio_identity(base): sends a fresh 32-byte nonce, recomputes the
expected HMAC from the local same-user secret, and constant-time compares.
Fails closed on any error.
- connect._agent_api_key gates the loopback cached-key replay and the local
mint on it; connect_studio_server (used by unsloth chat) gates the
self-issued JWT on it.
A server that cannot read this install's secret (a different OS user, or a
remote/fake endpoint) cannot produce a matching proof, so the client refuses
and falls back to an explicit --api-key.
Tests: studio/backend/tests/test_identity.py (proof determinism, secret
persistence and caching, route response and nonce validation) and additions to
test_connect.py (the verify gate refuses when unverified, an explicit key skips
the check, and an end-to-end client plus server handshake against a stub HTTP
server).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI: mint through the verified server instead of the local auth DB
CodeQL (py/clear-text-storage-sensitive-data) flagged the API key written to
the per-server cache and the agent config files once it was sourced from
storage.create_api_key(); the original HTTP-minted key did not trip the query.
Now that the identity handshake cryptographically confirms the loopback
responder really is this Studio before anything is sent, minting through the
server's /api/auth/api-keys endpoint with a self-issued JWT is safe again and
restores the original, CodeQL-clean data flow. The local-DB mint path is
removed.
The security properties are unchanged: discovery is still loopback-gated and
identity-verified, the key cache is still scoped per server, and a credential
reaches the server only after the handshake has proven its identity. The only
difference from the previous commit is that the self-issued JWT is sent to the
already-verified loopback server rather than the key being minted in-process.
Tests updated to mint through the fake server again.
* CLI: address review feedback on connect credential handling
- Reuse a saved per-server key before the loopback/identity gate. Keys are
scoped per base URL, so a key the user saved with --api-key for a remote or
SSH-tunnelled Studio (whose identity secret the local handshake can't match)
is replayed only to that exact server. The loopback + identity-handshake gate
now guards just auto-minting (self-issuing a JWT and creating a new key),
which is the path that needs a cryptographically verified local Studio. Fixes
keyless reuse being impossible for remote/tunnelled Studios the user had
saved a key for.
- connect_studio_server (unsloth chat / inference): when the user explicitly set
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL but the server can't be safely attached (non-loopback, or
identity unverifiable), fail with a clear message instead of silently loading
the model locally. Opportunistic discovery of the local default still falls
back to a local load.
- Harden cache parsing: tolerate a corrupt or hand-edited cache where a base
maps to a non-list (which would otherwise iterate a string into
single-character "keys"), and read the cache as UTF-8.
Tests updated and added: saved-key replay without the handshake for both local
and remote bases, keyless mint still refused when the loopback server is
unverified, and connect_studio_server erroring on an explicit remote while
falling back locally on default discovery.
* CLI: harden connect handshake against relay and gate cached minted keys
Addresses review feedback on the credential handshake:
- Refuse HTTP redirects on credential-bearing requests (the identity handshake,
/v1/models, key minting, and the chat HTTP backend). A process squatting the
discovered port could 302 /api/auth/identity to the real Studio and relay its
valid proof, or bounce a bearer-token request to another base, and urllib
follows redirects by default. A shared no-redirect opener now treats any 3xx
as an error.
- Give cached keys provenance. Keys the user supplied with --api-key are "saved"
and replay without the handshake (needed for remote or SSH-tunnelled Studios
whose secret the local handshake can't match). Keys we auto-mint are "minted"
and replay only after the identity handshake, so a port squatter can't collect
a previously minted localhost key just by answering the health check. New cache
shape: servers[base] = {"saved": [...], "minted": [...]}.
Known residual: a different-OS-user process that squats the port and can also
reach a genuine same-secret Studio elsewhere on loopback can still manually relay
the identity challenge. Fully closing that needs the proof bound to the server's
real listening port, or OS-level peer-credential checks; tracked as follow-up. A
same-user attacker is out of scope, since it can already read the 0600 key cache.
Tests: redirect rejection in the handshake, minted-cache requiring the handshake
while saved-cache bypasses it, and the existing suites updated for the new cache
shape. unsloth_cli (206) and test_identity.py (5) pass.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI: keep urllib imports function-local in the no-redirect opener
The repo's import-hoist safety linter (scripts/verify_import_hoist.py) flags
hoisting urllib to module level because it re-points the 'urllib' name in the
pre-existing HttpChatBackend._request scope. Build the no-redirect opener lazily
with function-local urllib imports instead, matching this module's convention,
and restore the local 'import urllib.request' in _request and
verify_studio_identity.
* test(identity): skip route tests when routes.auth import chain is unavailable
The identity route tests build a TestClient from routes.auth, which pulls the
whole routes package (routes/__init__ -> inference -> llama_cpp, ...). In a
minimal test matrix without the heavy backend deps, or when another test in the
same process has already broken that import chain, importing it raised and the
two route tests hard-failed. Skip in that case instead: the proof crypto is
covered by the storage-level tests, and the full backend CI still exercises the
route. No behaviour change where the deps are present (5 passed in isolation).
* test(connect): make connect tests pass on native Windows
unsloth connect supports Windows: --no-launch prints PowerShell ($env:X =
"v" / Remove-Item Env:X) instead of POSIX (export/unset), and the launch
path bridges env into a Windows agent .exe over WSLENV. The tests hardcoded
the POSIX shell forms, so on a real windows-latest runner 12 of them failed on
the assertion string even though every command exited 0.
Add OS-aware assertion helpers (_assert_env_set / _assert_env_unset) that check
the right shell syntax for the host OS, and skip the two WSL-from-Linux shim
tests on native Windows (os.name is 'posix' inside WSL, so that path can't run
there). No change on Linux/macOS (57 passed); the connect command's behaviour
is untouched. Validated on a windows-latest staging runner.
* style(connect): tighten comments in the credential-leak fix
Condense the verbose explanatory comments and multi-line docstrings added by
this PR to one or two lines each, drop a few that just restated the code, and
keep the security rationale where it is load-bearing. Comment/whitespace only;
verified with unslothai/scripts comment_tools.py (check --strip-docstrings:
6/6 'code unchanged'). Tests unchanged: connect 57 passed, identity 5 passed.
* CLI/Studio: harden the identity handshake (review round)
Addresses the latest Codex/Gemini review of the handshake:
- Store the identity secret privately. sqlite3.connect created the auth DB
world-readable under a 022 umask, so another OS user could read app_secrets
and forge proofs, defeating the same-user assumption the handshake rests on.
The auth dir and DB are now restricted to owner-only (0700/0600); the JWT
secret and password hashes there get the same protection.
- Bind the proof to the server's listening port. The stateless HMAC(secret,
nonce) was relayable: a process squatting the discovered port could proxy the
challenge to the real Studio on another port and pass it back. The proof now
covers the port the server actually listens on (from the socket, never the
Host header) and the client checks it against the port it connected to, so a
relayed proof from a different port no longer matches. Closes the manual-relay
residual left after the redirect fix.
- Cap the identity response read (the server is still unverified at that point)
and serve the identity route from a sync def so its first-call SQLite read
runs in the threadpool instead of the event loop.
Tests: port-bound proof + relayed-proof rejection added; identity (5) and
unsloth_cli (58) suites pass. Verified end to end against a real backend
(auth DB owner-only, handshake + mint still succeed).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI/Studio: bind the identity proof to the connection address, not just port
Follow-up to the port binding from the last review. Binding only to the port
left a cross-address relay: a squatter on a different loopback address but the
same port (for example localhost resolving to a squatter on ::1 while the real
Studio is on 127.0.0.1) could proxy the nonce to the real Studio and pass back
a proof that still matched, since both share the port.
The proof now covers the address and the port the connection landed on:
- Server: takes the address+port from request.scope, which uvicorn populates
from getsockname, so it is the real local address the client reached even
when Studio is bound to 0.0.0.0 (verified empirically), never the
client-controlled Host header.
- Client: resolves the base host to one concrete IP, talks to exactly that IP,
and binds the proof to (IP, port). A proof relayed from a Studio on a
different address or port was computed for that other endpoint and no longer
matches the one the client dialed.
Both sides normalise the address through ipaddress so equivalent forms compare
equal. Together with the private-secret and redirect fixes, this closes the
cross-user loopback relay an attacker can mount without reading the secret.
Tests: proof now bound to host+port; relayed-proof rejection retained; identity
(5) and unsloth_cli (58) suites pass. Verified end to end against a real backend
(handshake + mint still succeed).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI: pick the loopback address at discovery so localhost does not regress
find_studio_server now resolves a bare localhost base to its concrete loopback
addresses and returns the first that answers /api/health, IPv4 127.0.0.1 first
(where unsloth studio binds by default). The whole flow (health probe, identity
check, credential send) then targets that one address instead of racing
IPv4/IPv6 resolution, where localhost could resolve ::1-first and hide a Studio
bound to 127.0.0.1. A literal IP or remote name is unchanged.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
581 lines
20 KiB
Python
581 lines
20 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""Model loading and streaming shared by `inference` and `chat`."""
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import os
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import re
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Optional
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import typer
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_THINK_OPEN = "<think>"
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_THINK_BLOCK = re.compile(rf"{re.escape(_THINK_OPEN)}.*?</think>", re.DOTALL)
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# Cloudflare (in front of remote Studio proxies like RunPod) 403s the default
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# "Python-urllib/X.Y" User-Agent as a bot; send a real one on every request.
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_USER_AGENT = "unsloth-cli"
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# Built lazily; urllib stays function-local to match this module.
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_no_redirect_opener = None
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def urlopen_no_redirect(request, timeout):
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"""urlopen that errors on any redirect: following a 3xx would send a bearer
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token (or accept an identity proof) to a base we never vetted, letting a port
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squatter relay a real Studio's response."""
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global _no_redirect_opener
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if _no_redirect_opener is None:
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import urllib.error
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import urllib.request
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class _NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
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def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
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raise urllib.error.HTTPError(
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req.full_url, code, f"refusing redirect to {newurl}", headers, fp
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)
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_no_redirect_opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_NoRedirect)
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return _no_redirect_opener.open(request, timeout = timeout)
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def ensure_studio_backend_path() -> None:
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backend_dir = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "studio" / "backend")
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if backend_dir not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, backend_dir)
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def configure_quiet_logging() -> None:
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import logging
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import structlog
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# The CLI never configures structlog, so without this every backend INFO
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# line prints. LOG_LEVEL is exported so the worker subprocess inherits it.
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level_name = os.environ.setdefault("LOG_LEVEL", "WARNING").upper()
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level = getattr(logging, level_name, logging.WARNING)
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structlog.configure(wrapper_class = structlog.make_filtering_bound_logger(level))
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os.environ.setdefault("HF_HUB_DISABLE_PROGRESS_BARS", "1")
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def visible_text(text: str, show_thinking: bool) -> str:
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if show_thinking:
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return text
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text = _THINK_BLOCK.sub("", text)
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# Hold back an unclosed trailing <think> so reasoning never leaks mid-stream.
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open_idx = text.find(_THINK_OPEN)
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if open_idx != -1:
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text = text[:open_idx]
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max_prefix = min(len(text), len(_THINK_OPEN) - 1)
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for size in range(max_prefix, 0, -1):
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if _THINK_OPEN.startswith(text[-size:]):
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return text[:-size]
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return text
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def stream_to_stdout(stream, show_thinking: bool) -> str:
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# Backends yield the full text-so-far on each step (llama.cpp ends with a
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# metadata dict, skipped); print the growing tail, return the raw text.
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raw = ""
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shown = ""
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for chunk in stream:
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if not isinstance(chunk, str):
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continue
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raw = chunk
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rendered = visible_text(chunk, show_thinking)
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delta = rendered[len(shown) :]
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if delta:
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sys.stdout.write(delta)
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sys.stdout.flush()
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shown = rendered
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sys.stdout.write("\n")
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sys.stdout.flush()
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return raw
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def stream_markdown(stream, show_thinking: bool, *, console) -> str:
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from rich.live import Live
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from rich.markdown import Markdown
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from rich.text import Text
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raw = ""
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with Live(console = console, refresh_per_second = 12, vertical_overflow = "visible") as live:
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for chunk in stream:
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if not isinstance(chunk, str):
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continue
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raw = chunk
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visible = visible_text(chunk, show_thinking)
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live.update(Markdown(visible) if visible.strip() else Text(""))
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return raw
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def collect_stream(stream, show_thinking: bool) -> str:
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raw = ""
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for chunk in stream:
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if isinstance(chunk, str):
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raw = chunk
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return visible_text(raw, show_thinking)
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def render_columns(
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left_label: str,
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left_text: str,
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right_label: str,
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right_text: str,
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*,
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console = None,
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) -> None:
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from rich import box
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from rich.console import Console
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from rich.table import Table
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table = Table(box = box.MINIMAL, expand = True, padding = (0, 1), pad_edge = False)
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table.add_column(left_label, header_style = "bold yellow", ratio = 1, overflow = "fold")
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table.add_column(right_label, header_style = "bold magenta", ratio = 1, overflow = "fold")
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table.add_row(left_text or "", right_text or "")
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(console or Console()).print(table)
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class ChatBackend:
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"""Uniform stream()/close() over the llama-server and Unsloth backends."""
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def __init__(self, kind: str, backend) -> None:
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self._kind = kind # "gguf" | "unsloth"
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self._backend = backend
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def stream(
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self,
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messages: list,
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*,
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system_prompt: str,
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temperature: float,
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top_p: float,
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top_k: int,
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max_new_tokens: int,
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repetition_penalty: float,
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enable_thinking: bool,
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use_adapter: Optional[bool] = None,
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):
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if self._kind == "gguf":
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# llama-server takes the system prompt as the first message.
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msgs = list(messages)
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if system_prompt:
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msgs = [{"role": "system", "content": system_prompt}, *msgs]
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return self._backend.generate_chat_completion(
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messages = msgs,
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temperature = temperature,
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top_p = top_p,
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top_k = top_k,
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max_tokens = max_new_tokens,
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repetition_penalty = repetition_penalty,
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enable_thinking = enable_thinking,
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)
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gen_kwargs = dict(
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messages = messages,
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system_prompt = system_prompt,
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temperature = temperature,
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top_p = top_p,
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top_k = top_k,
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max_new_tokens = max_new_tokens,
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repetition_penalty = repetition_penalty,
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enable_thinking = enable_thinking,
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)
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if use_adapter is not None:
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return self._backend.generate_with_adapter_control(
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use_adapter = use_adapter, **gen_kwargs
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)
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return self._backend.generate_chat_response(**gen_kwargs)
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def close(self) -> None:
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# Shut the worker down directly: the graceful unload_model waits for
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# an ack that compare mode can swallow, hanging exit for minutes.
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try:
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if self._kind == "gguf":
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self._backend.unload_model()
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else:
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self._backend._shutdown_subprocess(timeout = 2.0)
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except Exception:
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pass
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def resolve_model_config(model: str, *, hf_token: Optional[str]):
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ensure_studio_backend_path()
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from utils.models import ModelConfig
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model_config = ModelConfig.from_identifier(model_id = model, hf_token = hf_token)
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if not model_config:
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typer.echo("Could not resolve model config", err = True)
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raise typer.Exit(code = 1)
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return model_config
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def _load_gguf_backend(model_config, *, hf_token, max_seq_length):
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ensure_studio_backend_path()
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from core.inference.llama_cpp import LlamaCppBackend
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llama_backend = LlamaCppBackend()
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common = dict(
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hf_variant = model_config.gguf_variant,
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model_identifier = model_config.identifier,
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is_vision = model_config.is_vision,
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n_ctx = max_seq_length,
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)
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if model_config.gguf_hf_repo:
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loaded = llama_backend.load_model(
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hf_repo = model_config.gguf_hf_repo, hf_token = hf_token, **common
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)
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else:
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loaded = llama_backend.load_model(
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gguf_path = model_config.gguf_file,
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mmproj_path = model_config.gguf_mmproj_file,
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mtp_draft_path = model_config.gguf_mtp_file,
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**common,
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)
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if not loaded:
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typer.echo("Model load failed", err = True)
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raise typer.Exit(code = 1)
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return ChatBackend("gguf", llama_backend)
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def load_chat_backend(
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model: str,
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*,
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hf_token: Optional[str],
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max_seq_length: int,
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load_in_4bit: bool,
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model_config = None,
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fresh_backend: bool = False,
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):
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"""Load `model` in-process: GGUF via llama-server, else the orchestrator.
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fresh_backend uses a private orchestrator so a second model (compare's
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base column) can run alongside the main one.
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"""
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if model_config is None:
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model_config = resolve_model_config(model, hf_token = hf_token)
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typer.echo(f"Loading {model}", err = True)
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if model_config.is_gguf:
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return _load_gguf_backend(model_config, hf_token = hf_token, max_seq_length = max_seq_length)
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if fresh_backend:
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ensure_studio_backend_path()
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from core.inference import InferenceOrchestrator
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backend = InferenceOrchestrator()
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else:
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ensure_studio_backend_path()
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from core.inference import get_inference_backend
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backend = get_inference_backend()
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if not backend.load_model(
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config = model_config,
|
|
max_seq_length = max_seq_length,
|
|
load_in_4bit = load_in_4bit,
|
|
hf_token = hf_token,
|
|
):
|
|
typer.echo("Model load failed", err = True)
|
|
raise typer.Exit(code = 1)
|
|
return ChatBackend("unsloth", backend)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _loopback_candidate_bases(base: str) -> list:
|
|
"""For a bare ``localhost`` base, the concrete IP bases to try, IPv4
|
|
127.0.0.1 first (where ``unsloth studio`` binds by default). Pinning to one
|
|
address up front means discovery, the identity check, and the credential we
|
|
then send all target the same endpoint instead of racing IPv4/IPv6
|
|
resolution -- which would otherwise let the health probe land on one address
|
|
and the identity check on another. A literal IP or remote name is unchanged.
|
|
"""
|
|
from urllib.parse import urlparse
|
|
|
|
parsed = urlparse(base)
|
|
if (parsed.hostname or "").lower() != "localhost":
|
|
return [base]
|
|
import socket
|
|
|
|
port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
|
|
try:
|
|
ips = {
|
|
ai[4][0] for ai in socket.getaddrinfo(parsed.hostname, port, type = socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
}
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return [base]
|
|
ordered = sorted(ips, key = lambda ip: (ip != "127.0.0.1", ip))
|
|
bases = [
|
|
f"{parsed.scheme}://" + (f"[{ip}]:{port}" if ":" in ip else f"{ip}:{port}")
|
|
for ip in ordered
|
|
]
|
|
return bases or [base]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def find_studio_server(timeout: float = 3.0) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
import urllib.request
|
|
|
|
base = os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8888").rstrip("/")
|
|
# Try the concrete loopback addresses in order and return the first that
|
|
# answers, so the rest of the flow talks to that exact address.
|
|
for candidate in _loopback_candidate_bases(base):
|
|
request = urllib.request.Request(
|
|
f"{candidate}/api/health", headers = {"User-Agent": _USER_AGENT}
|
|
)
|
|
try:
|
|
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout = timeout):
|
|
return candidate
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
continue
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def is_loopback_url(base: str) -> bool:
|
|
"""True only when *base* resolves to loopback. find_studio_server() trusts a
|
|
base after only a health probe, so credentials are auto-sent only to loopback
|
|
(a local Studio or an SSH tunnel on 127.0.0.1), the targets the auto flows mean."""
|
|
from urllib.parse import urlparse
|
|
|
|
host = (urlparse(base).hostname or "").lower()
|
|
if host in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"):
|
|
return True
|
|
try:
|
|
import ipaddress
|
|
return ipaddress.ip_address(host).is_loopback
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def verify_studio_identity(base: str, timeout: float = 3.0) -> bool:
|
|
"""Confirm `base` is really this machine's Studio before sending a secret.
|
|
|
|
Send a random nonce to /api/auth/identity and check the returned HMAC against
|
|
the one computed from the local same-user secret; an endpoint without that
|
|
secret (port squatter, remote/fake) can't match. Fails closed on any error."""
|
|
import base64
|
|
import hmac as _hmac
|
|
import json
|
|
import secrets as _secrets
|
|
import socket
|
|
import urllib.request
|
|
from urllib.parse import urlparse
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
import studio.backend.core # noqa: F401 puts studio/backend on sys.path
|
|
from studio.backend.auth import storage
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
parsed = urlparse(base)
|
|
host = parsed.hostname or ""
|
|
port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
|
|
# Resolve to one concrete address and talk to *that* address, then bind the
|
|
# proof to (address, port). A name like localhost can resolve to a squatter on
|
|
# ::1 while the real Studio is on 127.0.0.1; connecting to the resolved IP and
|
|
# binding to it means a proof relayed from a different address/port won't match.
|
|
try:
|
|
ip = socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, type = socket.SOCK_STREAM)[0][4][0]
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return False
|
|
netloc = f"[{ip}]:{port}" if ":" in ip else f"{ip}:{port}"
|
|
nonce = _secrets.token_bytes(32)
|
|
query = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(nonce).decode()
|
|
request = urllib.request.Request(
|
|
f"{parsed.scheme}://{netloc}/api/auth/identity?nonce={query}",
|
|
headers = {"User-Agent": _USER_AGENT, "Host": parsed.netloc},
|
|
)
|
|
try:
|
|
# No redirects: a 302 could relay a real Studio's proof (see urlopen_no_redirect).
|
|
# Cap the read: the server is still unverified, so don't trust its length.
|
|
with urlopen_no_redirect(request, timeout = timeout) as response:
|
|
proof = json.loads(response.read(65536).decode() or "{}").get("proof")
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return False
|
|
if not isinstance(proof, str):
|
|
return False
|
|
try:
|
|
expected = storage.compute_identity_proof(nonce, ip, port)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return False
|
|
return _hmac.compare_digest(proof, expected)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _studio_token() -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""Self-issue a JWT: the CLI runs as the same OS user as the server, so it
|
|
signs with the same stored secret the server validates against."""
|
|
try:
|
|
import studio.backend.core # noqa: F401 puts studio/backend on sys.path
|
|
|
|
from studio.backend.auth import storage
|
|
from studio.backend.auth.authentication import create_access_token
|
|
|
|
row = storage.get_connection().execute("SELECT username FROM auth_user LIMIT 1").fetchone()
|
|
return create_access_token(row[0], desktop = True) if row else None
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
class HttpChatBackend:
|
|
"""Chat against a running Studio server over its OpenAI-compatible API.
|
|
|
|
close() leaves the model loaded on purpose — the next session (or the
|
|
UI) starts instantly.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, base_url: str, token: str) -> None:
|
|
self._base = base_url
|
|
self._token = token
|
|
|
|
def _request(
|
|
self,
|
|
method: str,
|
|
path: str,
|
|
payload = None,
|
|
timeout = None,
|
|
):
|
|
import json
|
|
import urllib.request
|
|
|
|
request = urllib.request.Request(
|
|
self._base + path,
|
|
data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload).encode(),
|
|
headers = {
|
|
"Authorization": f"Bearer {self._token}",
|
|
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
|
"User-Agent": _USER_AGENT,
|
|
},
|
|
method = method,
|
|
)
|
|
# No redirects: this carries a bearer token (see urlopen_no_redirect).
|
|
return urlopen_no_redirect(request, timeout = timeout)
|
|
|
|
def ensure_loaded(self, model: str, *, hf_token, max_seq_length, load_in_4bit) -> None:
|
|
typer.echo(f"Loading {model} on the Studio server", err = True)
|
|
try:
|
|
self._request(
|
|
"POST",
|
|
"/api/inference/load",
|
|
{
|
|
"model_path": model,
|
|
"hf_token": hf_token,
|
|
"max_seq_length": max_seq_length,
|
|
"load_in_4bit": load_in_4bit,
|
|
},
|
|
).close()
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
typer.echo(f"Model load failed: {exc}", err = True)
|
|
raise typer.Exit(code = 1)
|
|
|
|
def stream(
|
|
self,
|
|
messages: list,
|
|
*,
|
|
system_prompt: str,
|
|
temperature: float,
|
|
top_p: float,
|
|
top_k: int,
|
|
max_new_tokens: int,
|
|
repetition_penalty: float,
|
|
enable_thinking: bool,
|
|
use_adapter: Optional[bool] = None,
|
|
):
|
|
import json
|
|
|
|
msgs = list(messages)
|
|
if system_prompt:
|
|
msgs = [{"role": "system", "content": system_prompt}, *msgs]
|
|
resp = self._request(
|
|
"POST",
|
|
"/v1/chat/completions",
|
|
{
|
|
"model": "default",
|
|
"messages": msgs,
|
|
"stream": True,
|
|
"temperature": temperature,
|
|
"top_p": top_p,
|
|
"top_k": top_k,
|
|
"max_tokens": max_new_tokens,
|
|
"repetition_penalty": repetition_penalty,
|
|
"enable_thinking": enable_thinking,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def cumulative():
|
|
# Accumulate SSE deltas into the full-text-so-far convention the
|
|
# stream helpers expect.
|
|
text = ""
|
|
with resp:
|
|
for raw_line in resp:
|
|
line = raw_line.decode("utf-8", "replace").strip()
|
|
if not line.startswith("data:"):
|
|
continue
|
|
data = line[len("data:") :].strip()
|
|
if data == "[DONE]":
|
|
break
|
|
try:
|
|
parsed = json.loads(data)
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
continue
|
|
if "error" in parsed:
|
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
f"Server error: {parsed['error'].get('message', 'Unknown server error')}"
|
|
)
|
|
try:
|
|
delta = parsed["choices"][0]["delta"].get("content")
|
|
except (KeyError, IndexError):
|
|
continue
|
|
if not delta:
|
|
continue
|
|
text += delta
|
|
# An emoji can arrive split across two deltas as lone
|
|
# surrogate halves: hold back a trailing half, merge pairs.
|
|
visible = text
|
|
if "\ud800" <= visible[-1] <= "\udbff":
|
|
visible = visible[:-1]
|
|
yield visible.encode("utf-16", "surrogatepass").decode("utf-16", "replace")
|
|
|
|
return cumulative()
|
|
|
|
def close(self) -> None:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
def connect_studio_server(model: str, *, hf_token, max_seq_length, load_in_4bit):
|
|
"""Backend on a running Studio server, or None (caller loads locally)."""
|
|
base_url = find_studio_server()
|
|
if not base_url:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
# Explicit server (UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL) we can't safely attach to -> fail loudly;
|
|
# opportunistic local discovery just falls back to a local load.
|
|
explicit = bool(os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL"))
|
|
|
|
def _refuse(reason: str):
|
|
if not explicit:
|
|
return None
|
|
typer.echo(
|
|
f"Can't attach to the Studio server at {base_url}: {reason} Run Studio "
|
|
"on this machine, or unset UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL to load the model locally.",
|
|
err = True,
|
|
)
|
|
raise typer.Exit(code = 1)
|
|
|
|
# Only hand the self-issued JWT (signed with the local secret) to loopback: a
|
|
# remote URL is unverified and a real remote Studio would reject it anyway.
|
|
if not is_loopback_url(base_url):
|
|
return _refuse(
|
|
"it isn't a local Studio, so a self-issued token can't "
|
|
"authenticate to it and must not be sent to it."
|
|
)
|
|
# Confirm the loopback responder is really our Studio (not a port squatter).
|
|
if not verify_studio_identity(base_url):
|
|
return _refuse(
|
|
"its identity couldn't be verified (it may be running as a "
|
|
"different OS user, or another process took the port)."
|
|
)
|
|
token = _studio_token()
|
|
if not token:
|
|
return _refuse("couldn't self-issue a Studio token (is Studio set up here?).")
|
|
backend = HttpChatBackend(base_url, token)
|
|
backend.ensure_loaded(
|
|
model, hf_token = hf_token, max_seq_length = max_seq_length, load_in_4bit = load_in_4bit
|
|
)
|
|
return backend
|