unsloth/studio/backend/tests/test_secure_tunnel_gate.py
Daniel Han 76cbddb859
Studio: allow --secure with --api-only (headless secure API server) and add --api-only to unsloth studio run (#6591)
* Studio: start the Cloudflare tunnel for --secure even in --api-only, and add --api-only to `unsloth studio run`

--secure exposes ONLY the Cloudflare link (it forces a loopback bind), but
_cloudflare_tunnel_should_start gated the tunnel on `not api_only`, so
`run.py --secure --api-only` started no tunnel and then fail-closed with
"A secure Cloudflare link is not allowed". That blocked the natural headless
use: serve just the API (no web UI) over the authenticated tunnel.

Make --secure start the tunnel regardless of api_only (the non-secure path is
unchanged: tunnel only a 0.0.0.0 bind, never api-only Tauri or Colab). Then
expose --api-only on `unsloth studio run` and forward it through both the
re-exec args and the in-venv run_server call, so
`unsloth studio run --secure --api-only --model ...` is a one-liner secure API
server.

Verified end to end: `run.py --secure --api-only` now brings up the tunnel and
serves /api/health over it (200), with / returning 404 (no UI).

Tests: update the tunnel-gate truth table (secure+api-only now tunnels;
secure+colab still does not) and add --api-only registration + re-exec/in-venv
forwarding coverage to the run CLI tests.

* Trim comments to be succinct (no behavior change)

* studio: address review on parent --api-only and secure api-only CORS

- Reject --api-only on the parent `unsloth studio` group when a subcommand
  is invoked, with the same redirect guidance used for --parallel/--secure;
  otherwise the flag was silently dropped and the UI served anyway.
- Keep CORS any-origin for secure api-only serving: that mode publishes the
  API over Cloudflare for remote browser clients, so the Tauri-only lockdown
  (still applied to plain local api-only) would break preflight. Factored the
  decision into cors_origins_for_mode() and gate it on api_only and not secure;
  run_server exports UNSLOTH_SECURE before importing main.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* studio: suppress TAURI_PORT and de-dup test for headless run --api-only

- run_server gains emit_tauri_port (default True, unchanged for the Tauri/
  desktop path). The new headless `run --api-only` path passes False so the
  Tauri-only TAURI_PORT= line no longer prepends the documented URL/API key
  banner (it ran even under --silent and could break one-liner parsers).
- Remove a duplicate test_reexec_forwards_api_only that shadowed the
  parametrized one; fold the --secure --api-only case into it so the secure
  headless path is actually collected.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-23 05:44:56 -07:00

210 lines
7.7 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
"""Cloudflare tunnel start gate, incl. --secure on loopback. Imports run.py
directly, so run under the Studio venv."""
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
_BACKEND = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
if str(_BACKEND) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(_BACKEND))
from run import _cloudflare_tunnel_should_start as should_start # noqa: E402
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"cloudflare,host,secure,api_only,is_colab,expected",
[
# Non-secure: historical 0.0.0.0-only behaviour preserved.
(True, "0.0.0.0", False, False, False, True),
(True, "127.0.0.1", False, False, False, False),
(True, "localhost", False, False, False, False),
# --secure tunnels a loopback bind too.
(True, "127.0.0.1", True, False, False, True),
(True, "0.0.0.0", True, False, False, True),
# --no-cloudflare always wins.
(False, "0.0.0.0", False, False, False, False),
(False, "127.0.0.1", True, False, False, False),
# Non-secure api-only never tunnels (Tauri).
(True, "0.0.0.0", False, True, False, False),
# --secure tunnels even api-only (headless secure API server).
(True, "127.0.0.1", True, True, False, True),
# Colab never tunnels, even --secure.
(True, "0.0.0.0", False, False, True, False),
(True, "127.0.0.1", True, False, True, False),
(True, "127.0.0.1", True, True, True, False),
],
)
def test_cloudflare_gate(cloudflare, host, secure, api_only, is_colab, expected):
assert (
should_start(
cloudflare = cloudflare,
host = host,
secure = secure,
api_only = api_only,
is_colab = is_colab,
)
is expected
)
def test_run_server_accepts_secure_kwarg():
import inspect
import run
assert "secure" in inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters
assert inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters["secure"].default is False
def test_arg_parser_secure_polarity_and_not_secure_alias():
# --secure/--no-secure is the documented flag; --not-secure is a hidden,
# back-compat alias for --no-secure. Last flag wins (BooleanOptionalAction).
import run
parser = run._build_arg_parser()
assert parser.parse_args([]).secure is False
assert parser.parse_args(["--secure"]).secure is True
assert parser.parse_args(["--no-secure"]).secure is False
assert parser.parse_args(["--not-secure"]).secure is False
assert parser.parse_args(["--secure", "--not-secure"]).secure is False
assert parser.parse_args(["--not-secure", "--secure"]).secure is True
def test_run_server_accepts_enable_tools_kwarg():
import inspect
import run
params = inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters
assert "enable_tools" in params
assert params["enable_tools"].default is None # default: leave policy unset
def test_tool_policy_not_auto_disabled_by_bind():
# Tools default on for every bind; the backend only changes the policy from
# an explicit --enable-tools/--disable-tools, never from host/secure.
import run
from state.tool_policy import get_tool_policy, reset_tool_policy
for host in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "0.0.0.0"):
reset_tool_policy()
run._apply_cli_tool_policy(None) # no flag, on any bind
assert get_tool_policy() is None, host # untouched: per-request honored
reset_tool_policy()
run._apply_cli_tool_policy(True) # --enable-tools: forced on
assert get_tool_policy() is True
reset_tool_policy()
run._apply_cli_tool_policy(False) # --disable-tools: forced off
assert get_tool_policy() is False
reset_tool_policy()
def test_tool_policy_notice_wording():
# The plain-server startup banner states the resolved policy for every bind.
import run
loopback = run._tool_policy_notice("127.0.0.1", False, None)
assert "ENABLED by default" in loopback and "loopback" in loopback
network = run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, None)
assert "ENABLED by default" in network and "network-reachable" in network
secure = run._tool_policy_notice("127.0.0.1", True, None)
assert "Cloudflare HTTPS tunnel" in secure
assert run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, False) == (
"Server-side tools are DISABLED (--disable-tools)."
)
assert "ENABLED (--enable-tools)" in run._tool_policy_notice("0.0.0.0", False, True)
def test_startup_output_emits_tool_notice_on_network_bind(capsys, monkeypatch):
# Plain `unsloth studio -H 0.0.0.0` must not be silent about tools now.
import run
monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_verify_global_reachability", lambda *a, **k: None)
monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_print_cloudflare_line", lambda: None)
monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_localhost_ipv6_mismatch_url", lambda *a, **k: None)
run._emit_startup_output("0.0.0.0", 8000, "0.0.0.0", secure = False, enable_tools = None)
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert "Server-side tools" in out
assert "network-reachable" in out
def test_startup_output_emits_disabled_notice(capsys, monkeypatch):
import run
monkeypatch.setattr(run, "_localhost_ipv6_mismatch_url", lambda *a, **k: None)
run._emit_startup_output("127.0.0.1", 8000, "127.0.0.1", secure = False, enable_tools = False)
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert "Server-side tools are DISABLED" in out
def test_run_server_rejects_secure_without_cloudflare():
# Direct backend callers (not just the CLI) must reject the contradictory combo.
import run
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
run.run_server(secure = True, cloudflare = False)
assert "A secure Cloudflare link is not allowed" in str(exc.value)
def test_failclosed_message_present_in_source():
# The exact, user-facing fail-closed message must not drift.
src = (_BACKEND / "run.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
assert (
"A secure Cloudflare link is not allowed, use --no-secure which provides a 0.0.0.0 link"
in src
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"api_only,secure,expected",
[
(False, False, ["*"]), # plain server: any origin
(False, True, ["*"]), # secure UI server: any origin
(True, True, ["*"]), # secure api-only: remote browsers need any origin
(True, False, "tauri"), # local api-only: locked to the Tauri app
],
)
def test_cors_origins_for_mode(api_only, secure, expected):
from utils.host_policy import cors_origins_for_mode
origins = cors_origins_for_mode(api_only = api_only, secure = secure)
if expected == "tauri":
assert origins != ["*"] and any(o.startswith("tauri://") for o in origins)
else:
assert origins == expected
def test_run_server_exports_secure_env_for_cors():
# run_server must export UNSLOTH_SECURE before importing main so the CORS
# profile can tell remote secure serving from local Tauri use.
src = (_BACKEND / "run.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
assert 'os.environ["UNSLOTH_SECURE"] = "1"' in src
def test_run_server_emit_tauri_port_defaults_on():
# Default on keeps the desktop app's stdout contract; the headless
# `run --api-only` path opts out explicitly.
import inspect
import run
params = inspect.signature(run.run_server).parameters
assert "emit_tauri_port" in params
assert params["emit_tauri_port"].default is True
def test_tauri_port_print_is_gated_in_source():
# The TAURI_PORT line must depend on emit_tauri_port, not api_only alone.
src = (_BACKEND / "run.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8")
assert "if api_only and emit_tauri_port:" in src