* Studio: require signed capability tokens for /p preview links The public /p preview routes added in #6486 run model load and chat generation as the admin user with no authentication. The only gate is the preview ref, a deterministic outputs-root path (run or run/checkpoint) that is guessable rather than secret. On a network-reachable Studio (--secure tunnel or -H 0.0.0.0), an unauthenticated caller who guesses a ref can consume GPU and probe a private fine-tuned checkpoint. Make the share link an unguessable, revocable capability: - Sign the canonical ref with a dedicated server-side secret (HMAC-SHA256, stored in app_secrets, independent of the JWT/login secret). - Require a valid token on every /p chat, models, and page request before resolving a checkpoint or loading a model; missing or invalid tokens get a generic 404 so the surface never confirms a ref exists. - Accept the token via ?k= (browser link and preview page) or Authorization: Bearer (OpenAI-compatible clients). - Rotate the secret to revoke every outstanding link (POST /api/settings/preview-links/rotate). - Clamp preview generation (max_tokens/max_completion_tokens <= 1024, n = 1) and set Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on the page so the token is not leaked via Referer. Training history hands the authenticated owner the signed token, and the copy-link button builds /p/{ref}?k={sig}. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: honor a lower caller token limit in the preview clamp Codex review: when only the legacy max_tokens was sent, the clamp left max_completion_tokens at the 1024 default, and _effective_max_tokens prefers max_completion_tokens, so a request like max_tokens=16 could still generate up to 1024 tokens. Derive one effective limit (max_completion_tokens wins, else the legacy max_tokens) and pin both fields to it so a caller's lower limit is kept. * Studio: add preview kill switch, rate limit, and revoke-links UI Follow-ups to the /p preview capability work: - Public-sharing kill switch: a persisted setting (default on) gates the public /p surface. When off, every preview request 404s even with a valid token, and the owner UI stops offering share links. GET/PUT /api/settings/preview-sharing; enforced in _verify_or_404. - Per-IP rate limit on the preview chat route: a coarse in-process sliding-window limiter (20 req/min/IP) returns 429 + Retry-After before the GPU lock is taken. Client IP honors X-Forwarded-For only when UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED is set, matching the login limiter's trust model. - Settings UI: a "Preview sharing" section with the public-sharing toggle and a "Revoke all preview links" button (confirm dialog) that rotates the secret. Tests cover the kill switch (404 when off), the 429 path, the sliding window, client-IP trust behavior, and the setting default. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: fix preview-fields sharing arg and refresh sigs after revoke Codex review: - P1: get_training_run_detail and update_training_run called _preview_fields with only output_dir after it gained a required sharing_on parameter, raising a 500 TypeError once get_run succeeded. Pass get_preview_sharing_enabled() at both sites; add a detail-endpoint regression test. - P2: after rotating the preview secret from settings, the history grid still held stale preview_sig values, so a freshly copied link would 404. Emit emitTrainingRunsChanged() after a successful revoke so the grid refetches freshly signed refs. * Studio: harden preview sharing controls (Codex review) - Fail closed: a read failure on the preview-sharing kill switch now returns False instead of defaulting to enabled, so an unavailable settings DB can't reopen the public surface. A missing key still defaults to enabled. - Per-IP rate limit behind the managed Cloudflare tunnel: client_ip now honors CF-Connecting-IP when the socket peer is loopback, so tunneled visitors are keyed by their real IP instead of collapsing onto the local cloudflared peer. - GET /p no longer mints key/share_url when sharing is disabled; it returns sharing_enabled=false so clients don't distribute links that 404. - Settings UI: toggling public sharing emits the training-runs-changed event so the history grid shows/hides Copy preview link without a manual refresh. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: harden preview rate limiter and IP keying (Opus review) From a two-agent review of the PR: - Rate limiter no longer evicts an active bucket when the table is full: a flood of distinct keys could otherwise cycle out a throttled bucket and reset its counter. Evict only aged-out buckets; if the table is full of live clients, fail closed (deny the new key) instead. - client_ip keys on the rightmost (proxy-appended) X-Forwarded-For hop when the trust env is set; the leftmost is client-spoofable. Documented the append/overwrite-proxy assumption. - _verify_or_404 checks the capability token before the kill-switch DB read, so unauthenticated /p spam can't be used as an unbounded settings-DB sink and the response is identical regardless of the sharing on/off state. Tests: nested run/checkpoint happy path + wrong-ref rejection, the eviction fail-closed behavior, and route-level coverage for the rotate / preview-sharing settings endpoints. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
496 lines
18 KiB
Python
496 lines
18 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""Security smoke for the public /p preview routes.
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Exercises the route layer with a real ``preview_router`` while stubbing the
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expensive model calls (``load_model`` / ``openai_chat_completions``). Covers the
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public-surface guarantees: HMAC capability gating (a valid ``?k=`` token or
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Bearer credential is required; missing/invalid/wrong-ref tokens 404 before any
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model load), path-traversal rejection, request sanitization (tools / provider
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routing / use_adapter / generation clamp), asset-path containment, the page CSP
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+ no-referrer headers and HTML escaping, and that the preview lock is held until
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a streaming response is fully drained.
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"""
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import asyncio
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import json
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from pathlib import Path
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import sys
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import types as _types
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import pytest
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_BACKEND_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
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if _BACKEND_DIR not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, _BACKEND_DIR)
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# Mirror test_preview.py: the real `loggers` package pulls in heavy handlers.
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_loggers_stub = _types.ModuleType("loggers")
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_loggers_stub.get_logger = lambda name: __import__("logging").getLogger(name)
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sys.modules.setdefault("loggers", _loggers_stub)
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.responses import StreamingResponse
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import routes.preview as preview
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import utils.preview_token as preview_token
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from models.inference import ChatCompletionRequest
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# A fixed secret keeps signing deterministic and avoids touching auth.db.
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_TEST_SECRET = b"unit-test-preview-secret-0123456789"
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def _use_test_secret(monkeypatch) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview_token, "get_or_create_preview_link_secret", lambda: _TEST_SECRET)
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def _sig(ref: str) -> str:
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"""Valid capability token for ``ref`` under the patched test secret."""
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return preview_token.sign_preview_ref(ref)
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def _make_run(outputs: Path, name: str = "demorun") -> Path:
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run = outputs / name
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run.mkdir(parents = True)
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(run / "adapter_config.json").write_text(
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json.dumps({"base_model_name_or_path": "HuggingFaceTB/SmolLM-135M"})
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)
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ckpt = run / "checkpoint-1"
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ckpt.mkdir()
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(ckpt / "adapter_config.json").write_text("{}")
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return run
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@pytest.fixture
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def captured():
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return {}
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@pytest.fixture
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def client(tmp_path, monkeypatch, captured):
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outputs = tmp_path / "outputs"
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_make_run(outputs)
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_use_test_secret(monkeypatch)
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# Public sharing on by default; reset the per-IP rate buckets each test.
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "get_preview_sharing_enabled", lambda: True)
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import utils.preview_rate_limit as _rl
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_rl.reset()
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# resolve_preview_checkpoint -> resolve_output_dir -> outputs_root().
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from utils.paths import storage_roots as _sr
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monkeypatch.setattr(_sr, "outputs_root", lambda: outputs)
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async def _fake_load_model(load_req, request, subject):
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captured["load_path"] = load_req.model_path
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return None
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async def _fake_chat(payload, request, subject):
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captured["payload"] = payload
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return {"ok": True}
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "load_model", _fake_load_model)
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "openai_chat_completions", _fake_chat)
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app = FastAPI()
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app.include_router(preview.router, prefix = "/p")
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app.dependency_overrides[preview.get_current_subject] = lambda: "admin"
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# raise_server_exceptions=False so a 5xx surfaces as a response, not a throw.
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return TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions = False)
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# ── Page rendering ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_page_renders_with_csp(client):
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r = client.get(f"/p/demorun?k={_sig('demorun')}")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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assert "text/html" in r.headers["content-type"]
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csp = r.headers.get("content-security-policy", "")
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assert "default-src 'self'" in csp
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assert "base-uri 'none'" in csp
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# Token rides in the query string; keep it out of the Referer header.
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assert r.headers.get("referrer-policy") == "no-referrer"
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def test_page_escapes_title(tmp_path, monkeypatch, captured):
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outputs = tmp_path / "outputs"
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# Run dir name carries an HTML-special char; the page must escape it.
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_make_run(outputs, name = "a<b")
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_use_test_secret(monkeypatch)
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from utils.paths import storage_roots as _sr
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monkeypatch.setattr(_sr, "outputs_root", lambda: outputs)
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app = FastAPI()
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app.include_router(preview.router, prefix = "/p")
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c = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions = False)
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# Sign the decoded canonical ref ("a<b"), not the %-encoded path segment.
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r = c.get(f"/p/a%3Cb?k={_sig('a<b')}")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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assert "a<b" not in r.text
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assert "a<b" in r.text
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def test_models_endpoint_shape(client):
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r = client.get(f"/p/demorun/v1/models?k={_sig('demorun')}")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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body = r.json()
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assert body["object"] == "list"
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assert body["data"][0]["id"] == "demorun"
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assert body["data"][0]["owned_by"] == "unsloth-studio"
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def test_list_previews_builds_urls(client, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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preview,
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"list_preview_targets",
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lambda: [{"ref": "demorun", "is_latest": True}],
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)
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r = client.get("/p")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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data = r.json()["data"]
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assert data[0]["url"].endswith("/p/demorun/v1")
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# The listing hands the authenticated owner a usable capability.
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assert data[0]["key"] == _sig("demorun")
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assert data[0]["share_url"].endswith(f"/p/demorun?k={_sig('demorun')}")
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def test_list_previews_omits_capability_when_sharing_disabled(client, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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preview,
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"list_preview_targets",
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lambda: [{"ref": "demorun", "is_latest": True}],
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "get_preview_sharing_enabled", lambda: False)
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r = client.get("/p")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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body = r.json()
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# Don't hand out credentials that 404; signal the disabled state instead.
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assert body["sharing_enabled"] is False
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assert body["data"][0]["key"] is None
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assert body["data"][0]["share_url"] is None
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# ── Path traversal / containment ────────────────────────────────────────────
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"path",
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[
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"/p/..", # parent segment as run
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"/p/%2e%2e/etc", # encoded traversal
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"/p/..%2f..%2fetc/v1/models", # encoded slash traversal
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"/p/does-not-exist", # unknown run
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],
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)
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def test_traversal_and_missing_rejected(client, path):
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r = client.get(path)
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assert r.status_code in (400, 404), (path, r.status_code)
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def test_chat_traversal_rejected(client):
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r = client.post(
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"/p/..%2f..%2fetc/v1/chat/completions",
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json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]},
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)
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assert r.status_code in (400, 404)
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# ── Asset containment ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"asset",
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[
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"../../../../etc/passwd", # escapes dist
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"secrets.txt", # non-allowlisted suffix
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"nope.png", # allowlisted suffix but missing
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],
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)
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def test_asset_path_contained(client, asset):
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r = client.get(f"/p/_assets/{asset}")
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assert r.status_code == 404
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# ── Request sanitization ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_chat_payload_sanitized(client, captured):
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r = client.post(
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f"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('demorun')}",
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json = {
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"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
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"tools": [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "rm", "parameters": {}}}],
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"enable_tools": True,
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"enabled_tools": ["python"],
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"mcp_enabled": True,
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"bypass_permissions": True,
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"provider_id": "p1",
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"provider_type": "custom",
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"provider_base_url": "http://evil.example/v1",
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"external_model": "gpt-4o",
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"use_adapter": False,
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"confirm_tool_calls": True,
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"session_id": "abc",
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"rag_scope": {"project_id": "x"},
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},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 200
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p = captured["payload"]
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assert isinstance(p, ChatCompletionRequest)
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# Tools / code-exec off.
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assert p.tools is None
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assert p.enable_tools is False
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assert p.enabled_tools is None
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assert p.mcp_enabled is False
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assert p.bypass_permissions is False
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# Tool-loop levers neutralized regardless of the tool gate.
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assert p.confirm_tool_calls is False
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assert p.session_id is None
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assert p.rag_scope is None
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# Provider routing stripped so /p can't proxy an arbitrary endpoint.
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assert p.provider_id is None
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assert p.provider_type is None
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assert p.provider_base_url is None
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assert p.external_model is None
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# Adapter pinned on for LoRA: a caller can't flip the shared backend to base.
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assert p.use_adapter is True
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# Generation cost capped on this public surface (no override sent -> ceiling).
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assert p.max_tokens == preview._PREVIEW_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS
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assert p.max_completion_tokens == preview._PREVIEW_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS
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assert p.n == 1
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# Loads the resolved checkpoint dir, not an attacker-supplied path.
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assert captured["load_path"].endswith("demorun")
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def test_merged_checkpoint_strips_use_adapter(tmp_path, monkeypatch, captured):
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# Merged (non-LoRA) checkpoint: no adapter to toggle, so use_adapter -> None.
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outputs = tmp_path / "outputs"
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merged = outputs / "mergedrun"
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merged.mkdir(parents = True)
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(merged / "config.json").write_text(json.dumps({"_name_or_path": "some/base"}))
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_use_test_secret(monkeypatch)
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from utils.paths import storage_roots as _sr
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monkeypatch.setattr(_sr, "outputs_root", lambda: outputs)
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async def _fake_load(load_req, request, subject):
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return None
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async def _fake_chat(payload, request, subject):
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captured["payload"] = payload
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return {"ok": True}
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "load_model", _fake_load)
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "openai_chat_completions", _fake_chat)
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app = FastAPI()
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app.include_router(preview.router, prefix = "/p")
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c = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions = False)
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r = c.post(
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f"/p/mergedrun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('mergedrun')}",
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json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], "use_adapter": False},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 200
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assert captured["payload"].use_adapter is None
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# ── Streaming lock lifetime ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_streaming_holds_lock_until_drained(tmp_path, monkeypatch, captured):
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outputs = tmp_path / "outputs"
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_make_run(outputs)
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from utils.paths import storage_roots as _sr
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monkeypatch.setattr(_sr, "outputs_root", lambda: outputs)
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async def _fake_load_model(load_req, request, subject):
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return None
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async def _gen():
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yield b"data: {}\n\n"
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yield b"data: [DONE]\n\n"
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async def _fake_chat(payload, request, subject):
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return StreamingResponse(_gen())
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "load_model", _fake_load_model)
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monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "openai_chat_completions", _fake_chat)
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async def _run():
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assert not preview._preview_lock.locked()
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payload = ChatCompletionRequest(messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}])
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resp = await preview._serve_chat("demorun", None, payload, request = None)
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# Lock must still be held: a second checkpoint must not swap the backend
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# mid-stream.
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assert preview._preview_lock.locked()
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chunks = [c async for c in resp.body_iterator]
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# Released only after the stream fully drains.
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assert not preview._preview_lock.locked()
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return chunks
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chunks = asyncio.run(_run())
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assert any(b"[DONE]" in c for c in chunks)
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assert not preview._preview_lock.locked()
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# ── Capability gating ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_chat_without_token_404_and_no_load(client, captured):
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r = client.post(
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"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions",
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json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 404
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# Verified before any model work: nothing loaded, nothing generated.
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assert "load_path" not in captured
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assert "payload" not in captured
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def test_chat_with_invalid_token_404(client, captured):
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r = client.post(
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"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k=not-a-valid-token",
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json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 404
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assert "load_path" not in captured
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def test_token_for_other_ref_rejected(client, captured):
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# A capability minted for a different ref must not unlock demorun.
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r = client.post(
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f"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('otherrun')}",
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json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 404
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assert "load_path" not in captured
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def test_models_without_token_404(client):
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assert client.get("/p/demorun/v1/models").status_code == 404
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def test_page_without_token_404(client):
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assert client.get("/p/demorun").status_code == 404
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def test_checkpoint_route_with_valid_sig(client, captured):
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# Nested ref: the signed/verified/resolved canonical ref is "run/checkpoint".
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sig = _sig("demorun/checkpoint-1")
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r = client.post(
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f"/p/demorun/checkpoint-1/v1/chat/completions?k={sig}",
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json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 200
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assert captured["load_path"].endswith("checkpoint-1")
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|
|
def test_checkpoint_token_does_not_unlock_bare_run(client, captured):
|
|
# A token minted for the nested checkpoint must not unlock the run ref.
|
|
r = client.post(
|
|
f"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('demorun/checkpoint-1')}",
|
|
json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]},
|
|
)
|
|
assert r.status_code == 404
|
|
assert "load_path" not in captured
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_bearer_token_accepted(client, captured):
|
|
# OpenAI-compatible clients pass the capability as the api_key (Bearer header).
|
|
r = client.post(
|
|
"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions",
|
|
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_sig('demorun')}"},
|
|
json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]},
|
|
)
|
|
assert r.status_code == 200
|
|
assert captured["load_path"].endswith("demorun")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_generation_clamp_caps_overrides(client, captured):
|
|
r = client.post(
|
|
f"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('demorun')}",
|
|
json = {
|
|
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
|
|
"max_tokens": 999999,
|
|
"max_completion_tokens": 888888,
|
|
"n": 64,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
assert r.status_code == 200
|
|
p = captured["payload"]
|
|
assert p.max_tokens == preview._PREVIEW_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS
|
|
assert p.max_completion_tokens == preview._PREVIEW_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS
|
|
assert p.n == 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_generation_clamp_honors_lower_legacy_max_tokens(client, captured):
|
|
# A caller asking for fewer tokens via the legacy field must not be bumped up
|
|
# to the ceiling: _effective_max_tokens prefers max_completion_tokens, so both
|
|
# fields have to carry the lower value.
|
|
r = client.post(
|
|
f"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('demorun')}",
|
|
json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], "max_tokens": 16},
|
|
)
|
|
assert r.status_code == 200
|
|
p = captured["payload"]
|
|
assert p.max_tokens == 16
|
|
assert p.max_completion_tokens == 16
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_generation_clamp_honors_lower_completion_tokens(client, captured):
|
|
r = client.post(
|
|
f"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('demorun')}",
|
|
json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], "max_completion_tokens": 32},
|
|
)
|
|
assert r.status_code == 200
|
|
p = captured["payload"]
|
|
assert p.max_tokens == 32
|
|
assert p.max_completion_tokens == 32
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Public-sharing kill switch ───────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_chat_blocked_when_sharing_disabled(client, monkeypatch, captured):
|
|
# Admin turned public sharing off: even a valid token 404s, with no model load.
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "get_preview_sharing_enabled", lambda: False)
|
|
r = client.post(
|
|
f"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('demorun')}",
|
|
json = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]},
|
|
)
|
|
assert r.status_code == 404
|
|
assert "load_path" not in captured
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_page_blocked_when_sharing_disabled(client, monkeypatch):
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(preview, "get_preview_sharing_enabled", lambda: False)
|
|
assert client.get(f"/p/demorun?k={_sig('demorun')}").status_code == 404
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Rate limiting ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_chat_rate_limited_returns_429(client, monkeypatch):
|
|
import utils.preview_rate_limit as rl
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(rl, "_MAX_REQUESTS", 2)
|
|
rl.reset()
|
|
url = f"/p/demorun/v1/chat/completions?k={_sig('demorun')}"
|
|
body = {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]}
|
|
assert client.post(url, json = body).status_code == 200
|
|
assert client.post(url, json = body).status_code == 200
|
|
r = client.post(url, json = body)
|
|
assert r.status_code == 429
|
|
assert r.headers.get("retry-after")
|