* Package scanners: close fail-open gaps in the sdist fallback and hidden-payload paths Follow-up hardening on the now-blocking scanners so the enforcing gate cannot report clean while a malicious artifact goes unscanned. scan_packages.py - Hidden payload: also flag a network call AND an os/subprocess exec that live only in a blanked docstring/string of an exec/eval file (the fetch-then-run shape of an exec(__doc__) dropper). Either alone in real code was already covered; hidden together they are the payload. - Pinned releases fail closed: _release_files no longer falls back to the latest artifact when a pinned version is missing or empty, so a yanked/bad pin is an error instead of a different file being scanned in its place. - requires_dist is read from the pinned release's metadata, not the project-level (latest) document, so a sdist-only pin follows its own dependency tree. - Environment markers are evaluated (PEP 508) instead of dropping any marker that merely contains the word extra, so default-true markers like extra != 'dev' are kept; conservative fallback keeps a dep on any uncertainty. - Transitive recovery is a depth-bounded worklist: a wheel dependency whose own child is sdist-only is fetched (--no-deps) and scanned, then its children are recovered in turn, rather than being silently skipped. scan_npm_packages.py - Baseline keys use the package-relative path instead of the basename, so the same basename in a different directory is not over-suppressed. Tests cover each case; full scripts pass AST and ruff checks. * Address review: tighten marker scope, decoy-proof the dropper check, fail closed on missing pin metadata - Markers: keep any dep whose marker can hold on another install target (sys_platform == 'win32', python_version == '3.13'); only drop a marker that depends solely on extra and is false with no extra. A scanner runs on one target but must cover code installed on others. Pure-extra markers are evaluated against default_environment() with extra unset. - Hidden dropper: the network+exec docstring check now inspects the removed (blanked) span directly, so a benign visible network or subprocess call cannot mask a payload that still lives in a docstring. Carrier checks stay blanked-only (an in-code carrier is already caught by the normal check), so corpus findings are unchanged. - requires_dist: a pinned version whose own metadata cannot be fetched recovers nothing rather than substituting the latest release's dependency tree. - Transitive recovery: the last-ditch direct-sdist branch also chases the recovered package's declared deps, matching the other branches. - npm baseline: schema bumped to v2 (package-relative keys); a pre-v2 baseline with entries is ignored (fail closed) instead of mis-applying basename keys. Tests cover each case; scripts pass AST, ruff, and the import-hoist verifier. * Scanner: exclude comments from hidden-payload check, flag missing pin metadata as incomplete Hidden network+exec detection now inspects only docstring/string spans (what exec(__doc__)/exec(<str>) can actually run), so a real exec() beside comments that mention a network and a subprocess call no longer false-positives. Missing pinned-release metadata in transitive recovery records a download_error so the --with-deps path fails closed instead of treating it as no dependencies. Adds regression tests for both. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
427 lines
16 KiB
Python
427 lines
16 KiB
Python
"""Regression tests for scripts/scan_npm_packages.py. Run fully offline (network_blocker fixture)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import io
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import json
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import tarfile
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
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SCRIPT = REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "scan_npm_packages.py"
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FIXTURES = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "fixtures"
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# Import the module to introspect IOC tables directly.
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sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT))
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from scripts import scan_npm_packages as snp # noqa: E402
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Subprocess helpers.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _run_scanner(lockfile: Path, *, timeout: int = 30) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
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return subprocess.run(
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[sys.executable, str(SCRIPT), "--lockfile", str(lockfile)],
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capture_output = True,
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text = True,
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timeout = timeout,
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Lockfile pass: structural-only fixtures (no network).
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_malicious_lockfile_exits_1():
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"""Structural IOCs alone (non-registry resolved URL + missing integrity) fail the scanner offline."""
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fixture = FIXTURES / "structural_only_lockfile.json"
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assert fixture.is_file(), fixture
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proc = _run_scanner(fixture)
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assert proc.returncode == 1, (
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f"expected exit 1, got {proc.returncode}\n"
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f"--- stdout ---\n{proc.stdout}\n--- stderr ---\n{proc.stderr}"
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)
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combined = proc.stdout + proc.stderr
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# Scanner aggregates structural findings into the summary; assert on count + FAIL banner.
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assert "2 structural finding(s)" in combined
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assert "FAIL" in combined
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# Confirm parse_lockfile() surfaces the right pattern codes via the in-process API.
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entries, struct = snp.parse_lockfile(fixture)
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patterns = {f.pattern for f in struct}
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assert {"non-registry-resolved-url", "missing-integrity-hash"} <= patterns
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def test_clean_lockfile_exits_0():
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"""Clean fixture has only entries parse_lockfile() skips, so the scanner exits 0 offline."""
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fixture = FIXTURES / "clean_lockfile.json"
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assert fixture.is_file(), fixture
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proc = _run_scanner(fixture)
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assert proc.returncode == 0, (
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f"expected exit 0, got {proc.returncode}\n"
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f"--- stdout ---\n{proc.stdout}\n--- stderr ---\n{proc.stderr}"
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)
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assert "0 finding(s)" in proc.stdout
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assert "0 hard error(s)" in proc.stdout
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS table -- gated on Fork 1.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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_BLOCKED_AVAILABLE = hasattr(snp, "BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS")
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@pytest.mark.skipif(
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not _BLOCKED_AVAILABLE,
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reason = "Fork 1 (BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS constant) not merged yet",
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)
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def test_blocked_npm_versions_complete():
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table = snp.BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS
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tanstack_keys = [k for k in table if k.startswith("@tanstack/")]
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assert len(tanstack_keys) == 42, (
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f"expected 42 @tanstack/* entries, got {len(tanstack_keys)}: " f"{sorted(tanstack_keys)}"
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)
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assert "@opensearch-project/opensearch" in table
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assert table["@opensearch-project/opensearch"] == {"3.5.3", "3.6.2", "3.7.0", "3.8.0"}
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squawk = [k for k in table if k.startswith("@squawk/")]
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assert len(squawk) >= 22, (
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f"expected at least 22 @squawk/* entries (full safedep.io enumeration), "
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f"got {len(squawk)}: {sorted(squawk)}"
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)
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# @squawk/mcp must cover the full malicious range 0.9.1..0.9.5 (safedep.io enumeration).
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assert {"0.9.1", "0.9.2", "0.9.3", "0.9.4", "0.9.5"} <= table["@squawk/mcp"]
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uipath = [k for k in table if k.startswith("@uipath/")]
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assert len(uipath) >= 64, (
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f"expected at least 64 @uipath/* entries (Aikido enumeration), "
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f"got {len(uipath)}: {sorted(uipath)}"
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)
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# Anchor a known published entry.
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assert "0.9.5" in table["@uipath/rpa-tool"]
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# Aikido (May-12 wave): @mistralai/* npm scope (separate from PyPI mistralai).
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assert table["@mistralai/mistralai"] == {"2.2.2", "2.2.3", "2.2.4"}
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assert table["@mistralai/mistralai-gcp"] == {"1.7.1", "1.7.2", "1.7.3"}
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assert table["@mistralai/mistralai-azure"] == {"1.7.1", "1.7.2", "1.7.3"}
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# Aikido: @tallyui/* (10 packages x 3 versions).
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tallyui = [k for k in table if k.startswith("@tallyui/")]
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assert len(tallyui) == 10, f"expected 10 @tallyui/*, got {sorted(tallyui)}"
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# Aikido: @beproduct/nestjs-auth covers the 0.1.2 .. 0.1.19 range (18 versions).
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assert table["@beproduct/nestjs-auth"] == {f"0.1.{i}" for i in range(2, 20)}
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# Aikido: unscoped infostealer packages (10 total).
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for unscoped in (
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"safe-action",
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"ts-dna",
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"cross-stitch",
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"cmux-agent-mcp",
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"agentwork-cli",
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"git-branch-selector",
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"wot-api",
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"git-git-git",
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"nextmove-mcp",
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"ml-toolkit-ts",
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):
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assert unscoped in table, f"missing unscoped malicious pkg: {unscoped}"
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# Aikido: payload SHA-256 hashes wired into KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS.
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ioc = snp.KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
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assert "ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c" in ioc
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assert "2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96" in ioc
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assert "bun run tanstack_runner.js" in ioc
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@pytest.mark.skipif(
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not _BLOCKED_AVAILABLE,
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reason = "Fork 1 (BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS pre-fetch hook) not merged yet",
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)
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def test_blocked_npm_versions_short_circuits_download():
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"""Pre-fetch hook flags the malicious tanstack entry (exit 1) without hitting the npm registry."""
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fixture = FIXTURES / "malicious_lockfile.json"
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proc = _run_scanner(fixture, timeout = 10)
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assert proc.returncode == 1
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combined = proc.stdout + proc.stderr
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assert "blocked-known-malicious" in combined or "BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS" in combined
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS coverage -- every IOC must trip the scanner.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _extract_pkg_with_ioc(ioc: str, tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
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"""Build a one-file npm package extract tree embedding `ioc` in package.json; return its root."""
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pkg_json = {
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"name": "ioc-fixture",
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"version": "0.0.1",
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"description": f"contains literal: {ioc}",
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}
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root = tmp_path / f"pkg_{abs(hash(ioc)) % 10**8}"
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(root / "package").mkdir(parents = True)
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(root / "package" / "package.json").write_text(
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json.dumps(pkg_json),
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encoding = "utf-8",
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)
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return root
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def test_every_known_ioc_string_caught(tmp_path):
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"""Each KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS entry must be surfaced by scan_extracted_tree(); guards table drift."""
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iocs = snp.KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
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assert iocs, "KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS unexpectedly empty"
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pkg = snp.PackageEntry(
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name = "ioc-fixture",
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version = "0.0.1",
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resolved = "https://registry.npmjs.org/ioc-fixture/-/ioc-fixture-0.0.1.tgz",
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integrity = "sha512-stub",
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lockfile_key = "node_modules/ioc-fixture",
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)
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for ioc in iocs:
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root = _extract_pkg_with_ioc(ioc, tmp_path)
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findings = snp.scan_extracted_tree(pkg = pkg, root = root)
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hit = any(ioc in f.evidence or ioc in f.detail for f in findings)
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assert hit, (
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f"KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS[{ioc!r}] not detected by scan_extracted_tree; "
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f"findings = {[str(f) for f in findings]}"
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Sanity: lockfile parse pass surfaces the structural findings we expect.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_parse_lockfile_structural_findings():
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"""Structural-only fixture yields 2 structural findings and 0 entries."""
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entries, struct = snp.parse_lockfile(FIXTURES / "structural_only_lockfile.json")
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assert entries == []
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patterns = {f.pattern for f in struct}
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assert "non-registry-resolved-url" in patterns
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assert "missing-integrity-hash" in patterns
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Code-only scanning (_strip_js_noncode): blank comments WITHOUT touching
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# strings/regex/code, preserve geometry, fail open on lexer confusion.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _strip(src):
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out = snp._strip_js_noncode(src)
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assert len(out) == len(src), "geometry (length) must be preserved"
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assert out.count("\n") == src.count("\n"), "newline count must be preserved"
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return out
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def test_strip_blanks_line_and_block_comments():
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out = _strip("var x = 1; // eval(atob('p'))\n/* subprocess */ run();")
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assert "var x = 1;" in out and "run();" in out
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assert "eval(atob" not in out
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assert "subprocess" not in out
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def test_strip_keeps_url_in_string_and_template():
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src = 'const a = "http://example.com/x";\nconst b = `http://${h}//y`; go();'
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out = _strip(src)
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assert out == src # nothing is a comment -> byte-identical
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assert "http://example.com/x" in out and "//y" in out
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def test_strip_regex_with_escaped_slashes_keeps_trailing_code():
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# A naive "// = comment" stripper would eat `evil()`; the lexer must not.
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src = r"const re = /https?:\/\//g; evil();"
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out = _strip(src)
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assert out == src
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assert "evil();" in out
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def test_strip_preserves_assigned_base64_payload():
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# npm droppers hide payloads in assigned string literals -- never blank them.
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src = 'var B = "QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuc2VzYW1l"; new Function(atob(B))();'
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out = _strip(src)
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assert out == src
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assert "QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuc2VzYW1l" in out
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def test_strip_fails_open_on_unterminated_block_comment():
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src = "code(); /* never closed"
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assert snp._strip_js_noncode(src) == src # fail open: unchanged, still fully scanned
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def test_strip_only_applies_to_js_family():
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# A `//`-containing JSON/YAML string must be left intact (JS lexer must not apply).
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PKG = snp.PackageEntry(
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name = "x",
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version = "1.0.0",
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resolved = "https://registry.npmjs.org/x/-/x-1.0.0.tgz",
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integrity = "sha512-z",
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lockfile_key = "node_modules/x",
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)
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# scan_text_blob strips for .js but not for .json.
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yaml_like = 'url: "http://h" # a yaml comment, not JS\n'
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# Verify the stripper is gated on suffix (JS lexer not applied to non-JS suffixes).
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assert "".endswith(snp._JS_FAMILY_SUFFIXES) is False
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assert ".js" in snp._JS_FAMILY_SUFFIXES and ".json" not in snp._JS_FAMILY_SUFFIXES
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Detection survives stripping; comment-only IOC is suppressed.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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_PKG = snp.PackageEntry(
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name = "x",
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version = "1.0.0",
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resolved = "https://registry.npmjs.org/x/-/x-1.0.0.tgz",
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integrity = "sha512-z",
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lockfile_key = "node_modules/x",
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)
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_BLOB = "QWxhZGRpbg" * 240 # ~2.4 KiB base64-ish
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def test_real_payload_still_flags_after_stripping():
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# Obfuscated blob behind Function(), wrapped in comments that get blanked.
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src = f'/* header */ var f = new Function("{_BLOB}"); f(); // tail\n'
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pats = {f.pattern for f in snp.scan_text_blob(_PKG, "m.js", src)}
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assert "obfuscated-blob" in pats
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# eval-with-string + atob shape, comment between the two halves.
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src2 = "(0,eval)(/* x */ atob('ZG8='));"
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pats2 = {f.pattern for f in snp.scan_text_blob(_PKG, "m.js", src2)}
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assert "js-fetch-eval" in pats2
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def test_payload_entirely_in_comment_is_suppressed():
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src = f'/* var f = new Function("{_BLOB}"); */ var ok = 1;'
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js = snp.scan_text_blob(_PKG, "m.js", src)
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assert js == [] # blanked -> clean
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# Control: same bytes as non-JS (unstripped) WOULD flag.
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txt = snp.scan_text_blob(_PKG, "m.txt", src)
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assert any(f.pattern == "obfuscated-blob" for f in txt)
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def test_ioc_in_assigned_string_survives_stripping():
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# A real C2 host lives in a string literal, not a comment -> still caught.
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src = 'var c = "filev2.getsession.org"; // doc note\n'
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pats = {f.pattern for f in snp.scan_text_blob(_PKG, "m.js", src)}
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assert "known-ioc-string" in pats
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Baseline allowlist -- suppress reviewed findings, fail on new kinds.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _finding(
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pkg,
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fn,
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pattern,
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sev = snp.HIGH,
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):
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return snp.Finding(severity = sev, package = pkg, filename = fn, pattern = pattern)
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def test_norm_pkg_name_strips_version_keeps_scope():
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assert snp._norm_pkg_name("@scope/pkg@1.2.3") == "@scope/pkg"
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assert snp._norm_pkg_name("pkg@1.2.3") == "pkg"
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assert snp._norm_pkg_name("@scope/pkg") == "@scope/pkg"
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assert snp._norm_pkg_name("<root>") == "<root>"
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def test_baseline_key_is_version_stable():
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# Same in-package path across a version bump -> identical key. npm tarballs
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# root every file at ``package/``, so the path is stable; only the version in
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# the display name changes.
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a = _finding("left-pad@1.0.0", "package/index.js", "obfuscated-blob")
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b = _finding("left-pad@9.9.9", "package/index.js", "obfuscated-blob")
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assert snp._finding_key(a) == snp._finding_key(b)
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def test_baseline_key_distinguishes_same_basename_diff_dir():
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# Package-relative keying: the same basename in a different directory is a
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# DIFFERENT key, so a new dist/ vs src/ file is not silently suppressed.
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a = _finding("pkg@1.0.0", "package/dist/index.js", "obfuscated-blob")
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b = _finding("pkg@1.0.0", "package/src/index.js", "obfuscated-blob")
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assert snp._finding_key(a) != snp._finding_key(b)
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def test_baseline_suppresses_listed_but_not_new_pattern(tmp_path):
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bl = tmp_path / "bl.json"
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bl.write_text(
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json.dumps(
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{
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"version": snp._BASELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
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"entries": [
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{
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"package": "aws-sdk",
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"file": "package/metadata.js",
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"pattern": "cred-surface-host (outbound)",
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"severity": "HIGH",
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}
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],
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}
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),
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encoding = "utf-8",
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)
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baseline = snp._load_baseline(str(bl))
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listed = _finding("aws-sdk@2.0.0", "package/metadata.js", "cred-surface-host (outbound)")
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# A NEW kind of finding in the SAME file is a different pattern -> not suppressed.
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new_kind = _finding("aws-sdk@2.0.0", "package/metadata.js", "obfuscated-blob")
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active, suppressed = snp._partition_baseline([listed, new_kind], baseline)
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assert listed in suppressed
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assert new_kind in active
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def test_write_then_load_baseline_roundtrip(tmp_path):
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bl = tmp_path / "out.json"
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findings = [
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_finding("evil@1.0.0", "package/a.js", "obfuscated-blob", snp.CRITICAL),
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_finding("evil@1.0.0", "package/a.js", "obfuscated-blob", snp.CRITICAL), # dup
|
|
_finding("noise@1.0.0", "package/b.js", "js-env-token", snp.MEDIUM), # below thresh
|
|
]
|
|
n = snp._write_baseline(str(bl), findings, snp._SEVERITY_RANK[snp.HIGH])
|
|
assert n == 1 # dedup + MEDIUM excluded
|
|
keys = snp._load_baseline(str(bl))
|
|
assert (snp._norm_pkg_name("evil@1.0.0"), "a.js", "obfuscated-blob") in keys
|
|
# MEDIUM below HIGH threshold -> not written.
|
|
assert all(k[2] != "js-env-token" for k in keys)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_legacy_schema_baseline_is_ignored(tmp_path):
|
|
# A pre-v2 baseline stored basenames; its keys are ambiguous under
|
|
# package-relative matching, so a populated legacy file is ignored (fail
|
|
# closed) rather than silently suppressing a different same-named file.
|
|
bl = tmp_path / "legacy.json"
|
|
bl.write_text(
|
|
json.dumps(
|
|
{
|
|
"version": 1,
|
|
"entries": [
|
|
{"package": "aws-sdk", "file": "index.js", "pattern": "obfuscated-blob"}
|
|
],
|
|
}
|
|
),
|
|
encoding = "utf-8",
|
|
)
|
|
assert snp._load_baseline(str(bl)) == set()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_committed_baseline_is_empty_and_valid():
|
|
# Shipped baseline must parse and (by design) suppress nothing: the live corpus is clean.
|
|
path = REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "scan_npm_packages_baseline.json"
|
|
assert path.is_file()
|
|
doc = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding = "utf-8"))
|
|
assert doc.get("entries") == []
|
|
assert snp._load_baseline(str(path)) == set()
|