80d3434d61* Studio: require signed capability tokens for /p preview links The public /p preview routes added in #6486 run model load and chat generation as the admin user with no authentication. The only gate is the preview ref, a deterministic outputs-root path (run or run/checkpoint) that is guessable rather than secret. On a network-reachable Studio (--secure tunnel or -H 0.0.0.0), an unauthenticated caller who guesses a ref can consume GPU and probe a private fine-tuned checkpoint. Make the share link an unguessable, revocable capability: - Sign the canonical ref with a dedicated server-side secret (HMAC-SHA256, stored in app_secrets, independent of the JWT/login secret). - Require a valid token on every /p chat, models, and page request before resolving a checkpoint or loading a model; missing or invalid tokens get a generic 404 so the surface never confirms a ref exists. - Accept the token via ?k= (browser link and preview page) or Authorization: Bearer (OpenAI-compatible clients). - Rotate the secret to revoke every outstanding link (POST /api/settings/preview-links/rotate). - Clamp preview generation (max_tokens/max_completion_tokens <= 1024, n = 1) and set Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on the page so the token is not leaked via Referer. Training history hands the authenticated owner the signed token, and the copy-link button builds /p/{ref}?k={sig}. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: honor a lower caller token limit in the preview clamp Codex review: when only the legacy max_tokens was sent, the clamp left max_completion_tokens at the 1024 default, and _effective_max_tokens prefers max_completion_tokens, so a request like max_tokens=16 could still generate up to 1024 tokens. Derive one effective limit (max_completion_tokens wins, else the legacy max_tokens) and pin both fields to it so a caller's lower limit is kept. * Studio: add preview kill switch, rate limit, and revoke-links UI Follow-ups to the /p preview capability work: - Public-sharing kill switch: a persisted setting (default on) gates the public /p surface. When off, every preview request 404s even with a valid token, and the owner UI stops offering share links. GET/PUT /api/settings/preview-sharing; enforced in _verify_or_404. - Per-IP rate limit on the preview chat route: a coarse in-process sliding-window limiter (20 req/min/IP) returns 429 + Retry-After before the GPU lock is taken. Client IP honors X-Forwarded-For only when UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED is set, matching the login limiter's trust model. - Settings UI: a "Preview sharing" section with the public-sharing toggle and a "Revoke all preview links" button (confirm dialog) that rotates the secret. Tests cover the kill switch (404 when off), the 429 path, the sliding window, client-IP trust behavior, and the setting default. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: fix preview-fields sharing arg and refresh sigs after revoke Codex review: - P1: get_training_run_detail and update_training_run called _preview_fields with only output_dir after it gained a required sharing_on parameter, raising a 500 TypeError once get_run succeeded. Pass get_preview_sharing_enabled() at both sites; add a detail-endpoint regression test. - P2: after rotating the preview secret from settings, the history grid still held stale preview_sig values, so a freshly copied link would 404. Emit emitTrainingRunsChanged() after a successful revoke so the grid refetches freshly signed refs. * Studio: harden preview sharing controls (Codex review) - Fail closed: a read failure on the preview-sharing kill switch now returns False instead of defaulting to enabled, so an unavailable settings DB can't reopen the public surface. A missing key still defaults to enabled. - Per-IP rate limit behind the managed Cloudflare tunnel: client_ip now honors CF-Connecting-IP when the socket peer is loopback, so tunneled visitors are keyed by their real IP instead of collapsing onto the local cloudflared peer. - GET /p no longer mints key/share_url when sharing is disabled; it returns sharing_enabled=false so clients don't distribute links that 404. - Settings UI: toggling public sharing emits the training-runs-changed event so the history grid shows/hides Copy preview link without a manual refresh. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: harden preview rate limiter and IP keying (Opus review) From a two-agent review of the PR: - Rate limiter no longer evicts an active bucket when the table is full: a flood of distinct keys could otherwise cycle out a throttled bucket and reset its counter. Evict only aged-out buckets; if the table is full of live clients, fail closed (deny the new key) instead. - client_ip keys on the rightmost (proxy-appended) X-Forwarded-For hop when the trust env is set; the leftmost is client-spoofable. Documented the append/overwrite-proxy assumption. - _verify_or_404 checks the capability token before the kill-switch DB read, so unauthenticated /p spam can't be used as an unbounded settings-DB sink and the response is identical regardless of the sharing on/off state. Tests: nested run/checkpoint happy path + wrong-ref rejection, the eviction fail-closed behavior, and route-level coverage for the rotate / preview-sharing settings endpoints. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
67 lines
2.3 KiB
Python
67 lines
2.3 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""Coarse per-IP sliding-window rate limit for the public ``/p`` preview chat.
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A signed link stops ref guessing, but anyone with a link can still drive GPU
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generation. This bounds sustained abuse from a single source. In-process and
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single-worker only (like the login limiter in ``routes/auth.py``); Studio runs as
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one uvicorn process, so a shared store isn't needed.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import threading
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import time
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from collections import deque
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# Window / ceiling for preview chat-completions per client IP.
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_WINDOW_SECONDS = 60.0
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_MAX_REQUESTS = 20
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# Bound memory on a public surface (many distinct IPs).
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_MAX_BUCKETS = 4096
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_buckets: dict[str, deque] = {}
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_lock = threading.Lock()
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def _prune(bucket: deque, now: float) -> None:
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while bucket and now - bucket[0] > _WINDOW_SECONDS:
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bucket.popleft()
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def _evict_aged(now: float) -> None:
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"""Drop only buckets that have fully aged out. Never evict an active bucket:
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evicting a throttled key would reset its counter, so a flood of distinct keys
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could cycle the table and clear a victim's (or its own) limit."""
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for key in list(_buckets.keys()):
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_prune(_buckets[key], now)
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if not _buckets[key]:
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del _buckets[key]
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def check_rate_limit(key: str) -> int:
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"""Record a hit for ``key``; return seconds-to-wait if over the limit, else 0."""
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now = time.monotonic()
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with _lock:
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bucket = _buckets.get(key)
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if bucket is None:
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if len(_buckets) >= _MAX_BUCKETS:
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_evict_aged(now)
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if len(_buckets) >= _MAX_BUCKETS:
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# Table is full of currently-active clients. Fail closed: deny the
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# new key rather than evict a live bucket (which would hand out a
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# rate-limit reset). Pathological only (>= _MAX_BUCKETS live IPs).
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return max(1, int(_WINDOW_SECONDS))
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bucket = _buckets[key] = deque()
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_prune(bucket, now)
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if len(bucket) >= _MAX_REQUESTS:
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return max(1, int(_WINDOW_SECONDS - (now - bucket[0])) + 1)
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bucket.append(now)
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return 0
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def reset() -> None:
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"""Clear all buckets (test isolation)."""
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with _lock:
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_buckets.clear()
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