* Studio: require signed capability tokens for /p preview links The public /p preview routes added in #6486 run model load and chat generation as the admin user with no authentication. The only gate is the preview ref, a deterministic outputs-root path (run or run/checkpoint) that is guessable rather than secret. On a network-reachable Studio (--secure tunnel or -H 0.0.0.0), an unauthenticated caller who guesses a ref can consume GPU and probe a private fine-tuned checkpoint. Make the share link an unguessable, revocable capability: - Sign the canonical ref with a dedicated server-side secret (HMAC-SHA256, stored in app_secrets, independent of the JWT/login secret). - Require a valid token on every /p chat, models, and page request before resolving a checkpoint or loading a model; missing or invalid tokens get a generic 404 so the surface never confirms a ref exists. - Accept the token via ?k= (browser link and preview page) or Authorization: Bearer (OpenAI-compatible clients). - Rotate the secret to revoke every outstanding link (POST /api/settings/preview-links/rotate). - Clamp preview generation (max_tokens/max_completion_tokens <= 1024, n = 1) and set Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on the page so the token is not leaked via Referer. Training history hands the authenticated owner the signed token, and the copy-link button builds /p/{ref}?k={sig}. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: honor a lower caller token limit in the preview clamp Codex review: when only the legacy max_tokens was sent, the clamp left max_completion_tokens at the 1024 default, and _effective_max_tokens prefers max_completion_tokens, so a request like max_tokens=16 could still generate up to 1024 tokens. Derive one effective limit (max_completion_tokens wins, else the legacy max_tokens) and pin both fields to it so a caller's lower limit is kept. * Studio: add preview kill switch, rate limit, and revoke-links UI Follow-ups to the /p preview capability work: - Public-sharing kill switch: a persisted setting (default on) gates the public /p surface. When off, every preview request 404s even with a valid token, and the owner UI stops offering share links. GET/PUT /api/settings/preview-sharing; enforced in _verify_or_404. - Per-IP rate limit on the preview chat route: a coarse in-process sliding-window limiter (20 req/min/IP) returns 429 + Retry-After before the GPU lock is taken. Client IP honors X-Forwarded-For only when UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED is set, matching the login limiter's trust model. - Settings UI: a "Preview sharing" section with the public-sharing toggle and a "Revoke all preview links" button (confirm dialog) that rotates the secret. Tests cover the kill switch (404 when off), the 429 path, the sliding window, client-IP trust behavior, and the setting default. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: fix preview-fields sharing arg and refresh sigs after revoke Codex review: - P1: get_training_run_detail and update_training_run called _preview_fields with only output_dir after it gained a required sharing_on parameter, raising a 500 TypeError once get_run succeeded. Pass get_preview_sharing_enabled() at both sites; add a detail-endpoint regression test. - P2: after rotating the preview secret from settings, the history grid still held stale preview_sig values, so a freshly copied link would 404. Emit emitTrainingRunsChanged() after a successful revoke so the grid refetches freshly signed refs. * Studio: harden preview sharing controls (Codex review) - Fail closed: a read failure on the preview-sharing kill switch now returns False instead of defaulting to enabled, so an unavailable settings DB can't reopen the public surface. A missing key still defaults to enabled. - Per-IP rate limit behind the managed Cloudflare tunnel: client_ip now honors CF-Connecting-IP when the socket peer is loopback, so tunneled visitors are keyed by their real IP instead of collapsing onto the local cloudflared peer. - GET /p no longer mints key/share_url when sharing is disabled; it returns sharing_enabled=false so clients don't distribute links that 404. - Settings UI: toggling public sharing emits the training-runs-changed event so the history grid shows/hides Copy preview link without a manual refresh. * [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci * Studio: harden preview rate limiter and IP keying (Opus review) From a two-agent review of the PR: - Rate limiter no longer evicts an active bucket when the table is full: a flood of distinct keys could otherwise cycle out a throttled bucket and reset its counter. Evict only aged-out buckets; if the table is full of live clients, fail closed (deny the new key) instead. - client_ip keys on the rightmost (proxy-appended) X-Forwarded-For hop when the trust env is set; the leftmost is client-spoofable. Documented the append/overwrite-proxy assumption. - _verify_or_404 checks the capability token before the kill-switch DB read, so unauthenticated /p spam can't be used as an unbounded settings-DB sink and the response is identical regardless of the sharing on/off state. Tests: nested run/checkpoint happy path + wrong-ref rejection, the eviction fail-closed behavior, and route-level coverage for the rotate / preview-sharing settings endpoints. --------- Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
143 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
143 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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"""Unit coverage for the preview follow-ups: rate limiter, client IP, kill switch."""
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from pathlib import Path
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import sys
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import types as _types
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_BACKEND_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
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if _BACKEND_DIR not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, _BACKEND_DIR)
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_loggers_stub = _types.ModuleType("loggers")
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_loggers_stub.get_logger = lambda name: __import__("logging").getLogger(name)
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sys.modules.setdefault("loggers", _loggers_stub)
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import utils.preview_rate_limit as rl
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from utils.client_ip import client_ip
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from utils.preview_sharing_settings import (
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DEFAULT_PREVIEW_SHARING_ENABLED,
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_coerce_bool,
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get_preview_sharing_enabled,
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)
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# ── Rate limiter ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_rate_limit_per_key(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setattr(rl, "_MAX_REQUESTS", 3)
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rl.reset()
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("ip1") == 0
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("ip1") == 0
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("ip1") == 0
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# 4th request over the ceiling -> positive retry-after seconds.
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("ip1") > 0
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# A different client is unaffected.
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("ip2") == 0
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def test_rate_limit_window_rolls_off(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setattr(rl, "_MAX_REQUESTS", 1)
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monkeypatch.setattr(rl, "_WINDOW_SECONDS", 10.0)
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rl.reset()
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t = {"now": 1000.0}
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monkeypatch.setattr(rl.time, "monotonic", lambda: t["now"])
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("ip") == 0
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("ip") > 0 # immediately over
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t["now"] += 11.0 # window elapsed
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("ip") == 0
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def test_rate_limit_eviction_does_not_reset_active_bucket(monkeypatch):
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# A flood of distinct keys must not cycle the table and clear a live limit.
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monkeypatch.setattr(rl, "_MAX_REQUESTS", 1)
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monkeypatch.setattr(rl, "_MAX_BUCKETS", 2)
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rl.reset()
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("a") == 0
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("a") > 0 # 'a' throttled (active)
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("b") == 0
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("b") > 0 # 'b' throttled; table now full of actives
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# A new key can't evict an active bucket -> denied (fail closed)...
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("c") > 0
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# ...and the flood did not reset 'a'.
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assert rl.check_rate_limit("a") > 0
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# ── Client IP ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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class _Req:
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def __init__(
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self,
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host,
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headers = None,
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):
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self.client = _types.SimpleNamespace(host = host) if host else None
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self.headers = headers or {}
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def test_client_ip_uses_socket_peer_by_default(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.delenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED", raising = False)
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# Forwarded header is ignored unless the operator opts in.
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req = _Req("203.0.113.9", {"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.7"})
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assert client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.9"
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assert client_ip(None) == "_unknown"
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def test_client_ip_uses_rightmost_forwarded_when_trusted(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED", "1")
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# Leftmost is client-spoofable; the trusted proxy appends the real peer on the
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# right, so the rightmost hop is the one we key on.
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req = _Req("127.0.0.1", {"x-forwarded-for": "1.2.3.4, 198.51.100.7"})
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assert client_ip(req) == "198.51.100.7"
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def test_client_ip_uses_cf_connecting_ip_on_loopback(monkeypatch):
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# Managed Cloudflare tunnel terminates at loopback; key by the real visitor.
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monkeypatch.delenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED", raising = False)
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req = _Req("127.0.0.1", {"cf-connecting-ip": "198.51.100.7"})
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assert client_ip(req) == "198.51.100.7"
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def test_client_ip_ignores_cf_header_from_non_loopback(monkeypatch):
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# A direct (non-loopback) caller can't spoof CF-Connecting-IP to skew the limit.
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monkeypatch.delenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED", raising = False)
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req = _Req("203.0.113.9", {"cf-connecting-ip": "198.51.100.7"})
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assert client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.9"
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def test_client_ip_loopback_without_cf_returns_peer(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.delenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED", raising = False)
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assert client_ip(_Req("127.0.0.1")) == "127.0.0.1"
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# ── Kill-switch setting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_sharing_defaults_enabled_and_coerces():
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assert DEFAULT_PREVIEW_SHARING_ENABLED is True
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assert _coerce_bool("off") is False
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assert _coerce_bool("on") is True
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assert _coerce_bool(True) is True
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assert _coerce_bool("nonsense") is None
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def test_sharing_missing_key_defaults_enabled(monkeypatch):
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import storage.studio_db as sdb
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monkeypatch.setattr(sdb, "get_app_setting", lambda key, fallback = None: None)
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assert get_preview_sharing_enabled() is True
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def test_sharing_read_error_fails_closed(monkeypatch):
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# A transient settings-DB failure must not reopen the public surface.
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import storage.studio_db as sdb
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def _boom(*args, **kwargs):
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raise RuntimeError("settings db unavailable")
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monkeypatch.setattr(sdb, "get_app_setting", _boom)
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assert get_preview_sharing_enabled() is False
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