* add unsloth studio desktop app
* Fix review findings
- studio/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json: retarget updater to staging repo
(danielhanchen/unsloth-staging-2); switch to unslothai/unsloth on upstream merge.
- studio/src-tauri/linux/postremove.sh: drop the interactive read loop and the
/home/* iteration. Package maintainer scripts must stay non-interactive and
must not touch other users' data.
- studio/frontend/src/app/auth-guards.ts: honor tauriAutoAuth() boolean. Failed
auto-auth now redirects to /login; requireGuest/requirePasswordChangeFlow
only redirect to /chat when auth succeeds. The new early-return on failed
auth is intentional so the login / change-password flows remain reachable
when desktop auth is not yet established.
- studio/frontend/src/config/env.ts: keep fetched=false on health failure so
later calls retry instead of caching the client-side platform guess.
- studio/src-tauri/src/install.rs: pick the available system package manager
(apt-get, dnf, zypper, pacman); AppImage bundles run on non-Debian distros.
- studio/frontend/src/lib/open-link.ts + markdown-text/sources callers: return
boolean from openLink so callers only preventDefault on handled URLs; relative
hrefs now navigate natively.
- studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/about-tab.tsx: fetch(apiUrl(...))
so the version request targets the backend port in desktop mode. The bare
/api/health predates the Tauri webview (blame: the earlier onboarding commit,
which ran with same-origin frontend/backend); in desktop mode the webview
origin is tauri://localhost so the bare path fails.
- install.ps1: gate the install_python_stack.py hotfix on a sentinel comment
instead of a content regex; append the sentinel after applying so reruns
are unambiguous.
- unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py _write_auth_secret: use the atomic mkstemp +
os.replace path on Windows too; chmod calls are wrapped in try/except OSError.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs probe_existing_backends: fan out the health
probes concurrently; desktop-auth status still runs sequentially per candidate.
reqwest::Client is internally Arc-wrapped so the in-loop .clone() is a
refcount bump, not a deep clone; annotated inline.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs run_cli_probe: wait() after kill() to reap
the child, matching probe_cli_capability.
- studio/src-tauri/src/process.rs + main.rs: add stop_backend_detached and use
it from the tray quit handler so the 5s graceful-wait does not block the
Tauri main loop. RunEvent::Exit keeps the synchronous safety-net call.
- studio/backend/main.py: drop the permissive localhost CORS regex in
api-only mode; the explicit allow_origins list is sufficient.
- .github/workflows/release-desktop.yml: drop max-parallel: 1 so platform
builds run in parallel, and lift releaseBody to an env var so the three
tauri-action invocations share one source of truth.
* Fix review findings (loop 2)
- studio/backend/auth/storage.py update_password: clear_desktop_secret()
alongside clear_bootstrap_password() so rotating the admin password
also revokes any previously provisioned .desktop_secret. Without this,
an old local desktop credential keeps minting fresh admin tokens via
/api/auth/desktop-login after a password rotation.
- studio/src-tauri/src/desktop_auth.rs provision_desktop_auth: wrap
cmd.output().await in tokio::time::timeout(30s). DESKTOP_AUTH_LOCK is
held across the whole desktop_auth flow, and previously a hanging
`unsloth studio provision-desktop-auth` subprocess would pin the lock
indefinitely and freeze every subsequent desktop_auth call.
* Add review tests
* Consolidate review tests
Merge review-added tests into the existing studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
(the PR's authoritative desktop-auth test file). Drops three scaffolding files under
tests/python/ in favor of five focused tests next to the tests they extend:
- test_update_password_clears_desktop_secret (runtime)
- test_update_password_on_unknown_user_leaves_desktop_secret_intact (runtime)
- test_cli_provisioning_delegates_to_storage_create_desktop_secret (source-level)
- test_cli_connect_auth_db_reads_storage_db_path (source-level)
- test_desktop_auth_provision_has_bounded_timeout (Rust source-level)
* Revert auth-guards.ts Tauri branches to unconditional form
The review loop on PR 5144 introduced a regression: the isTauri branch of
requireAuth redirected to /login when tauriAutoAuth() returned false, and
requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow silently fell through on the same
condition. The Tauri desktop app authenticates via a local auto-generated
secret; it must never surface /login or /change-password to the user. A
failed auto-auth should let the startup layer retry, not expose a password
form.
Restore the three Tauri branches to the author's original unconditional
form (requireAuth: return; requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow: throw
redirect({to: '/chat'})). Keep the rest of the review fixes -- the
apiUrl() fetch wrapping, authRedirect helper, and fetchAuthStatus refactor
are all legitimate improvements and are preserved.
* Revert release-desktop.yml to author's version
The review loop's workflow-file tweaks (drop max-parallel: 1, lift releaseBody
to an env var) are cosmetic. OAuth tokens cannot push workflow-file changes,
and fine-grained PATs cannot honor maintainerCanModify on a third-party fork.
Reverting the workflow file to wasimysaid's version lets the push go through
without needing a classic PAT with both repo and workflow scopes.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Lee Jackson <130007945+Imagineer99@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <unslothai@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
220 lines
6.5 KiB
Python
220 lines
6.5 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
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import secrets
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from typing import Optional, Tuple
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from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status
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from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
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import jwt
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from .storage import (
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API_KEY_PREFIX,
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get_jwt_secret,
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get_user_and_secret,
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load_jwt_secret,
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save_refresh_token,
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validate_api_key,
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verify_refresh_token,
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)
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ALGORITHM = "HS256"
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ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES = 60
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REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS = 7
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security = HTTPBearer() # Reads Authorization: Bearer <token>
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def _get_secret_for_subject(subject: str) -> str:
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secret = get_jwt_secret(subject)
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if secret is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Invalid or expired token",
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)
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return secret
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def _decode_subject_without_verification(token: str) -> Optional[str]:
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try:
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payload = jwt.decode(
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token,
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options = {"verify_signature": False, "verify_exp": False},
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)
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except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
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return None
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subject = payload.get("sub")
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return subject if isinstance(subject, str) else None
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def create_access_token(
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subject: str,
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expires_delta: Optional[timedelta] = None,
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*,
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desktop: bool = False,
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) -> str:
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"""
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Create a signed JWT for the given subject (e.g. username).
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Tokens are valid across restarts because the signing secret is stored in SQLite.
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"""
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to_encode = {"sub": subject}
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if desktop:
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to_encode["desktop"] = True
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expire = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + (
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expires_delta or timedelta(minutes = ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES)
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)
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to_encode.update({"exp": expire})
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return jwt.encode(
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to_encode,
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_get_secret_for_subject(subject),
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algorithm = ALGORITHM,
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)
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def is_desktop_access_token(token: str) -> bool:
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"""Return true only for a valid desktop-issued JWT access token."""
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if token.startswith(API_KEY_PREFIX):
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return False
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subject = _decode_subject_without_verification(token)
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if subject is None:
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return False
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record = get_user_and_secret(subject)
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if record is None:
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return False
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_salt, _pwd_hash, jwt_secret, _must_change_password = record
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try:
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payload = jwt.decode(token, jwt_secret, algorithms = [ALGORITHM])
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except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
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return False
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return payload.get("sub") == subject and payload.get("desktop") is True
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def create_refresh_token(subject: str, *, desktop: bool = False) -> str:
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"""
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Create a random refresh token, store its hash in SQLite, and return it.
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Refresh tokens are opaque (not JWTs) and expire after REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS.
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"""
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token = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
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expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days = REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS)
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save_refresh_token(token, subject, expires_at.isoformat(), is_desktop = desktop)
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return token
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def refresh_access_token(
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refresh_token: str,
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) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str], bool]:
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"""
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Validate a refresh token and issue a new access token.
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The refresh token itself is NOT consumed — it stays valid until expiry.
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Returns a new access_token or None if the refresh token is invalid/expired.
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"""
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verified = verify_refresh_token(refresh_token)
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if verified is None:
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return None, None, False
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username, is_desktop = verified
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return (
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create_access_token(subject = username, desktop = is_desktop),
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username,
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is_desktop,
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)
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def reload_secret() -> None:
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"""
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Keep legacy API compatibility for callers expecting auth storage init.
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Auth now resolves the current signing secret directly from SQLite.
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"""
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load_jwt_secret()
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async def get_current_subject(
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credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(security),
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) -> str:
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"""Validate JWT and require the password-change flow to be completed."""
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return await _get_current_subject(
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credentials,
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allow_password_change = False,
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)
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async def get_current_subject_allow_password_change(
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credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(security),
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) -> str:
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"""Validate JWT but allow access to the password-change endpoint."""
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return await _get_current_subject(
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credentials,
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allow_password_change = True,
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)
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async def _get_current_subject(
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credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials,
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*,
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allow_password_change: bool,
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) -> str:
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"""
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FastAPI dependency to validate the JWT and return the subject.
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Use this as a dependency on routes that should be protected, e.g.:
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@router.get("/secure")
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async def secure_endpoint(current_subject: str = Depends(get_current_subject)):
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...
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"""
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token = credentials.credentials
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# --- API key path (sk-unsloth-...) ---
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if token.startswith(API_KEY_PREFIX):
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username = validate_api_key(token)
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if username is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Invalid or expired API key",
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)
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return username
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# --- JWT path ---
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subject = _decode_subject_without_verification(token)
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if subject is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Invalid token payload",
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)
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record = get_user_and_secret(subject)
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if record is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Invalid or expired token",
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)
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_salt, _pwd_hash, jwt_secret, must_change_password = record
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try:
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payload = jwt.decode(token, jwt_secret, algorithms = [ALGORITHM])
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if payload.get("sub") != subject:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Invalid token payload",
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)
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is_desktop = payload.get("desktop") is True
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if must_change_password and not allow_password_change and not is_desktop:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail = "Password change required",
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)
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return subject
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except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail = "Invalid or expired token",
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)
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