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unsloth/studio/backend/tests/test_sandbox_tools.py
Michael Han fa4693685f Studio: close third-round sandbox guard review gaps 
Runtime guard (sitecustomize):
- Keep the network guard active when a sandbox child deletes
  UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED but still loads this shim from the sandbox_site dir
  on PYTHONPATH. Bypass runs under bypass_site (guard short-circuits on
  __name__), so an absent flag with sandbox_site loaded is tampering, not
  bypass. Regression test spawns a real deleted-flag child.

Terminal startup-guard (hard block in _bash_exec):
- A here-doc piped into a consumer (cat <<'PY' | python) keeps the post-delimiter
  pipeline so the body is scanned as that python's stdin program.
- Process substitution: recurse into <(...)/>(...) inner commands, and fail
  closed when python reads its program from one (python <(printf ...)).

render_html network gate (auto-approve path):
- Module re-exports (export * from 'https://...', export {a} from '/mod.js')
  are gated like static imports; relative specifiers stay static.
- A reassigned computed-key alias (var k='src'; img[k]=URL; var k='title') is
  position-dependent, so it is dropped from the flat alias map and fails closed
  on a network-looking assigned value.

Adds blocked + safe regression cases for each.

Not addressed: the spoofed-trusted-httpx-frame P1 (exec(compile(payload,
httpx.__file__,'exec'), httpx.__dict__)). Same same-interpreter forgeability
class already flagged for a below-the-Python-layer redesign; a frame check
keyed on caller-suppliable co_filename cannot close it robustly.
2026-07-21 23:26:35 -07:00

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# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved.
"""Tests for the sandboxed-Python AST policy in core/inference/tools.py."""
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
_BACKEND_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
if str(_BACKEND_ROOT) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(_BACKEND_ROOT))
from core.inference.tools import _check_code_safety
def _ok(code: str):
assert _check_code_safety(code) is None, code
def _blocked(code: str, *, expect_phrase: str):
msg = _check_code_safety(code)
assert msg is not None, code
assert expect_phrase in msg, (expect_phrase, msg)
class TestMetadataHostDenylist:
def test_aws_imds_literal_blocked(self):
_blocked(
'import requests; requests.get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host",
)
def test_gcp_metadata_dns_blocked(self):
_blocked(
'import requests; requests.get("http://metadata.google.internal/")',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host",
)
def test_alibaba_ecs_literal_blocked(self):
_blocked(
'import socket; s=socket.socket(); s.connect(("100.100.100.200", 80))',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host",
)
def test_ipv6_imds_literal_blocked(self):
_blocked(
'import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("http://[fd00:ec2::254]/")',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host",
)
def test_metadata_link_local_prefix_blocked(self):
_blocked(
'import requests; requests.get("http://169.254.170.2/v3/")',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host",
)
class TestTrustedHostAllowlist:
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"url",
[
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Python_(programming_language)",
"https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Python_(langage)",
"https://www.google.com/search?q=foo",
"https://duckduckgo.com/?q=foo",
"https://huggingface.co/unsloth",
"https://cdn-lfs.huggingface.co/repos/abc/def/file.bin",
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/foo/bar/main/README.md",
"https://api.github.com/repos/foo/bar",
"https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.12345",
"https://export.arxiv.org/abs/2401.12345",
"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345",
"https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/12345",
"https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript",
"https://docs.python.org/3/library/asyncio.html",
"https://pypi.org/project/requests/",
"https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/foo/bar.whl",
"https://www.bbc.com/news",
"https://api.weather.gov/points/40,-90",
"https://numpy.org/doc/stable/",
"https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/index.html",
],
)
def test_trusted_host_passes(self, url):
_ok(f"import requests; requests.get({url!r})")
def test_wikipedia_subdomain_passes(self):
_ok('import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("https://m.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foo")')
def test_hf_co_short_form_passes(self):
_ok('import requests; requests.get("https://hf.co/unsloth/Qwen3.5-4B-GGUF")')
def test_github_io_pages_pass(self):
_ok('import requests; requests.get("https://unslothai.github.io/")')
class TestUntrustedHostBlock:
def test_example_com_blocked(self):
_blocked(
'import requests; requests.get("https://example.com/")',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: host not in sandbox allowlist",
)
def test_random_blog_blocked(self):
_blocked(
'import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("https://random-blog-host.example/")',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: host not in sandbox allowlist",
)
def test_socket_connect_random_host_blocked(self):
_blocked(
'import socket; s=socket.socket(); s.connect(("evil.example", 80))',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: host not in sandbox allowlist",
)
def test_dynamic_url_not_statically_blocked(self):
# Static AST can't resolve runtime URLs; bash blocklist is the fallback.
_ok('import requests; url = "https://example.com/"; requests.get(url)')
class TestLowLevelNetworkModules:
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"code",
[
'import httpcore; httpcore.request("GET", "https://example.com")',
'import boto3; boto3.client("s3").list_buckets()',
"from botocore.session import get_session; get_session()",
"m = __import__('boto3'); print(m.__name__)",
("import importlib as il; m = il.import_module('http' + 'core'); print(m.__name__)"),
(
"from importlib import import_module as load; "
"name = 'botocore.session'; print(load(name).__name__)"
),
(
"from builtins import __import__ as load; "
"loader = load; print(loader('boto3').__name__)"
),
(
"import importlib; "
"load = getattr(importlib, 'import_' + 'module'); "
"print(load('boto3').__name__)"
),
("import importlib; print(getattr(importlib, 'import_module')(name='boto3').__name__)"),
("import importlib; print(importlib.import_module(name='botocore.session').__name__)"),
("import importlib; print(vars(importlib)['import_module']('httpcore').__name__)"),
("import importlib; print(importlib.__dict__['import_module']('boto3').__name__)"),
("import builtins; print(getattr(builtins, '__import__')('botocore').__name__)"),
(
"import importlib.machinery, importlib.util\n"
"spec = importlib.util.find_spec('httpcore')\n"
"loader = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader('httpcore', spec.origin)\n"
"loader.load_module()"
),
],
)
def test_low_level_client_blocked(self, code):
_blocked(code, expect_phrase = "Blocked: low-level network module")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"code",
[
"m = __import__('statistics'); print(m.mean([1, 2]))",
("from importlib import import_module as load; print(load('statistics').mean([1, 2]))"),
(
"import importlib; "
"print(getattr(importlib, 'import_module')(name='statistics').mean([1, 2]))"
),
(
"import importlib; "
"print(vars(importlib)['import_module']('statistics').mean([1, 2]))"
),
],
)
def test_other_dynamic_imports_stay_available(self, code):
_ok(code)
class TestHostNormalization:
def test_trailing_dot_treated_same(self):
_ok('import requests; requests.get("https://wikipedia.org./")')
def test_explicit_port_does_not_unblock_or_misblock(self):
_ok('import requests; requests.get("https://en.wikipedia.org:443/wiki/Foo")')
_blocked(
'import requests; requests.get("https://example.com:8080/")',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: host not in sandbox allowlist",
)
def test_userinfo_at_does_not_smuggle_metadata_host(self):
_blocked(
'import requests; requests.get("https://wikipedia.org@169.254.169.254/latest/")',
expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host",
)
def test_uppercase_host_normalised(self):
_ok('import requests; requests.get("https://EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG/wiki/Foo")')
class TestUploadDenylist:
def test_requests_post_files_blocked(self):
_blocked(
(
"import requests\n"
'requests.post("https://huggingface.co/api/repos/upload", '
'files={"f": open("x.bin", "rb")})'
),
expect_phrase = "Blocked: file upload disallowed in sandbox",
)
def test_requests_put_data_bytes_blocked(self):
_blocked(
(
"import requests\n"
'requests.put("https://huggingface.co/api/repos/upload", '
'data=b"\\x00\\x01\\x02")'
),
expect_phrase = "Blocked: file upload disallowed in sandbox",
)
def test_requests_post_data_open_handle_blocked(self):
_blocked(
(
"import requests\n"
'requests.post("https://huggingface.co/api/repos/upload", '
'data=open("x.bin", "rb"))'
),
expect_phrase = "Blocked: file upload disallowed in sandbox",
)
def test_httpx_post_files_blocked(self):
_blocked(
(
"import httpx\n"
'httpx.post("https://huggingface.co/api/repos/upload", '
'files={"f": open("x.bin", "rb")})'
),
expect_phrase = "Blocked: file upload disallowed in sandbox",
)
def test_hf_api_upload_sandbox_local_allowed(self):
# Sandbox-local relative path is the canonical safe shape.
_ok(
"from huggingface_hub import HfApi\n"
'HfApi().upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin", '
'path_in_repo="x.bin", repo_id="foo/bar")'
)
def test_hf_module_upload_folder_sandbox_local_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_folder(folder_path="outputs", repo_id="foo/bar")'
)
def test_hf_create_commit_empty_operations_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
"api = huggingface_hub.HfApi()\n"
'api.create_commit(repo_id="foo/bar", operations=[])'
)
def test_hf_upload_absolute_path_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"from huggingface_hub import HfApi\n"
'HfApi().upload_file(path_or_fileobj="/etc/passwd", path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_hf_upload_parent_dir_escape_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="../escape.bin", path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_plain_post_json_not_blocked(self):
_ok('import requests\nrequests.post("https://api.weather.gov/lookup", json={"k": "v"})')
class TestSandboxEnvIsolation:
"""Sandbox env is built from a whitelist, so credential-shaped parent
vars stay absent regardless of operator config (Linux/macOS/WSL/Windows)."""
_SECRET_KEYS = (
# HF + ML tooling
"HF_TOKEN",
"HUGGING_FACE_HUB_TOKEN",
"HUGGINGFACEHUB_API_TOKEN",
"WANDB_API_KEY",
"WANDB_USERNAME",
"MLFLOW_TRACKING_TOKEN",
"COMET_API_KEY",
"NEPTUNE_API_TOKEN",
# Generic cloud
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID",
"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",
"AWS_SESSION_TOKEN",
"GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY",
"GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS",
"AZURE_STORAGE_KEY",
"AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET",
# Forge / git / package
"GH_TOKEN",
"GITHUB_TOKEN",
"GITLAB_TOKEN",
"BITBUCKET_TOKEN",
"NPM_TOKEN",
"PYPI_TOKEN",
"CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN",
# LLM provider
"OPENAI_API_KEY",
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
"GOOGLE_API_KEY",
"MISTRAL_API_KEY",
"COHERE_API_KEY",
"TOGETHER_API_KEY",
# Loader injection / sudo state
"LD_PRELOAD",
"LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
"DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES",
"DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH",
# Windows
"USERPROFILE",
"APPDATA",
"LOCALAPPDATA",
"ProgramData",
)
def test_no_secret_keys_leak_into_sandbox(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
for key in self._SECRET_KEYS:
monkeypatch.setenv(key, f"sentinel-{key}")
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path))
for key in self._SECRET_KEYS:
assert key not in env, f"parent env var {key!r} leaked into sandbox env"
def test_sandbox_env_is_minimal_whitelist(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
# Pollute parent env with arbitrary keys
for key in ("EVIL", "RANDOM", "ATTACK_VEC", "MY_TOKEN", "X_API_KEY"):
monkeypatch.setenv(key, "leak-me")
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path))
allowed = {
"PATH",
"HOME",
"TMPDIR",
"LANG",
"TERM",
"PYTHONIOENCODING",
"PYTHONPATH",
"UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED",
"VIRTUAL_ENV",
"SystemRoot",
}
extras = set(env.keys()) - allowed
assert not extras, f"sandbox env added unexpected keys: {extras}"
# PYTHONPATH is whitelist-built, never inherited: only the sandbox
# sitecustomize shim dir (code-interpreter path remap).
assert env["PYTHONPATH"].endswith("sandbox_site")
assert "leak-me" not in env["PYTHONPATH"]
assert env["UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED"] == "1"
def test_runtime_import_guard_does_not_apply_to_bypass(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_bypass_env, _build_safe_env
monkeypatch.setenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED", "1")
(tmp_path / "boto3.py").write_text("VALUE = 7\n", encoding = "utf-8")
code = (
"import sys\n"
"sys.meta_path[:] = [f for f in sys.meta_path "
"if not getattr(f, '_unsloth_blocked_network_guard', False)]\n"
"name = ''.join(['bo', 'to3'])\n"
"print(__import__(name).VALUE)"
)
sandboxed = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert sandboxed.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'boto3'" in sandboxed.stderr
bypass = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_bypass_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert bypass.returncode == 0, bypass.stderr
assert bypass.stdout.strip() == "7"
def test_runtime_import_guard_survives_global_tampering(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
# Sandbox code can restore builtins.__import__, detach the meta-path
# finder and rebind this module's globals, but the audit hook (which
# cannot be removed) freezes its decision in a closure and still blocks.
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
monkeypatch.setenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED", "1")
code = (
"import sys, builtins, sitecustomize\n"
"sitecustomize._blocked_network_module = lambda _: None\n"
"sitecustomize._BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODULES = frozenset()\n"
"builtins.__import__ = sitecustomize._original_import\n"
"sys.meta_path[:] = [f for f in sys.meta_path "
"if not getattr(f, '_unsloth_blocked_network_guard', False)]\n"
"name = ''.join(['bo', 'to3'])\n"
"print(__import__(name).__name__)\n"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'boto3'" in result.stderr
def test_runtime_import_guard_survives_env_flag_reset_for_children(self, tmp_path):
# Clearing UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED before spawning a child must not
# unguard the child: the child re-imports this shim from the sandbox site
# dir still on PYTHONPATH, which is itself the sandbox signal.
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
code = (
"import os, subprocess, sys\n"
"os.environ['UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED'] = '0'\n"
"r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, '-c', 'import boto3'], "
"capture_output=True, text=True)\n"
"sys.stdout.write('RC=%d\\n' % r.returncode)\n"
"sys.stdout.write('BLOCKED=%d\\n' % "
"(\"low-level network module 'boto3'\" in r.stderr))\n"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
assert "RC=1" in result.stdout
assert "BLOCKED=1" in result.stdout
def test_runtime_import_guard_survives_env_flag_deletion_for_children(self, tmp_path):
# Deleting UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED (not just setting it to "0") before
# spawning a child must not unguard it: the child still re-imports this
# shim from the sandbox site dir on PYTHONPATH, which is the real signal.
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
code = (
"import os, subprocess, sys\n"
"os.environ.pop('UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED', None)\n"
"r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, '-c', 'import boto3'], "
"capture_output=True, text=True)\n"
"sys.stdout.write('RC=%d\\n' % r.returncode)\n"
"sys.stdout.write('BLOCKED=%d\\n' % "
"(\"low-level network module 'boto3'\" in r.stderr))\n"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
assert "RC=1" in result.stdout
assert "BLOCKED=1" in result.stdout
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"code",
[
"name = ''.join(['http', 'core']); print(__import__(name).__name__)",
(
"import importlib; name = ''.join(['http', 'core']); "
"print(importlib.import_module(name).__name__)"
),
("import httpx; name = ''.join(['http', 'core']); print(__import__(name).__name__)"),
(
"import httpx, importlib; suffix = ''.join(['_', 'api']); "
"print(importlib.import_module('.' + suffix, package='httpcore')"
".__name__.split('.')[0])"
),
],
)
def test_runtime_import_guard_blocks_direct_dynamic_httpcore(self, tmp_path, code):
from core.inference.tools import _build_bypass_env, _build_safe_env
sandboxed = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert sandboxed.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'httpcore'" in sandboxed.stderr
bypass = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_bypass_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert bypass.returncode == 0, bypass.stderr
assert bypass.stdout.strip() == "httpcore"
def test_runtime_import_guard_rejects_spoofed_httpx_globals(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
code = (
"import httpx\n"
"__name__ = 'httpx._client'\n"
"__file__ = httpx.__file__\n"
"name = ''.join(['http', 'core'])\n"
"module = __import__(name)\n"
"print(module.__name__)\n"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'httpcore'" in result.stderr
def test_runtime_import_guard_blocks_legacy_loader_httpcore(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
code = (
"import importlib.machinery, importlib.util\n"
"name = ''.join(['http', 'core'])\n"
"spec = importlib.util.find_spec(name)\n"
"loader = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader(name, spec.origin)\n"
"loader.load_module()\n"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'httpcore'" in result.stderr
def test_runtime_import_guard_blocks_aliased_httpcore_origin(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
code = (
"import importlib.machinery, importlib.util, sys\n"
"spec = importlib.machinery.PathFinder.find_spec('httpcore')\n"
"alias = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\n"
" 'hc', spec.origin,\n"
" submodule_search_locations=list(spec.submodule_search_locations or []),\n"
")\n"
"module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(alias)\n"
"sys.modules['hc'] = module\n"
"alias.loader.exec_module(module)\n"
"module.request('GET', 'http://127.0.0.1:9')\n"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'httpcore'" in result.stderr
def test_runtime_import_guard_blocks_httpcore_backend_reflection(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
code = (
"import sys, types\n"
"import httpx\n"
"client = httpx.Client()\n"
"client.close()\n"
"module = sys.modules['httpcore._backends.sync']\n"
"module_dict = types.ModuleType.__getattribute__(module, '__dict__')\n"
"backend_type = module_dict['SyncBackend']\n"
"guarded = type.__getattribute__(backend_type, '__dict__')['connect_tcp']\n"
"dispatch = key = None\n"
"for cell in guarded.__closure__ or ():\n"
" value = cell.cell_contents\n"
" if callable(value) and getattr(value, '__name__', '') == 'dispatch':\n"
" dispatch = value\n"
" elif type(value) is object:\n"
" key = value\n"
"originals = None\n"
"for cell in dispatch.__closure__ or ():\n"
" value = cell.cell_contents\n"
" if type(value) is dict:\n"
" originals = value\n"
"original = originals[key]\n"
"original(\n"
" backend_type(), '127.0.0.1', 9,\n"
" timeout=0.01, local_address=None, socket_options=None,\n"
")\n"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'httpcore'" in result.stderr
def test_runtime_import_guard_allows_httpx_backend_connect(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
code = (
"import httpx\n"
"try:\n"
" httpx.get('http://127.0.0.1:9/probe', timeout=0.01)\n"
"except Exception as exc:\n"
" print(type(exc).__name__)\n"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
assert "Blocked: low-level network module" not in result.stderr
def test_runtime_import_guard_blocks_local_module_httpcore_import(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
(tmp_path / "loader.py").write_text(
"name = ''.join(['http', 'core'])\nprint(__import__(name).__name__)\n",
encoding = "utf-8",
)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", "import loader"],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'httpcore'" in result.stderr
@pytest.mark.parametrize("module_name", ["loader", "httpx"])
def test_runtime_import_guard_blocks_external_module_httpcore_import(
self, tmp_path, module_name
):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
workdir = tmp_path / "sandbox"
external = tmp_path / "external"
workdir.mkdir()
external.mkdir()
(external / f"{module_name}.py").write_text(
"name = ''.join(['http', 'core'])\nprint(__import__(name).__name__)\n",
encoding = "utf-8",
)
code = f"import sys; sys.path.insert(0, {str(external)!r}); import {module_name}"
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = workdir,
env = _build_safe_env(str(workdir)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'httpcore'" in result.stderr
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"code",
[
(
"import httpx, sys; client = httpx.Client(); client.close(); "
"print(sys.modules['httpcore'].request)"
),
(
"import httpx, sys; client = httpx.Client(); client.close(); "
"print(sys.modules['httpcore._sync.connection_pool'].ConnectionPool)"
),
(
"import httpx, sys, types; client = httpx.Client(); client.close(); "
"module = sys.modules['httpcore']; "
"request = types.ModuleType.__getattribute__(module, 'request'); "
"request('GET', 'http://127.0.0.1:9/probe')"
),
(
"import asyncio, httpx, sys, types\n"
"async def main():\n"
" async with httpx.AsyncClient():\n"
" pass\n"
" module = sys.modules['httpcore']\n"
" pool_type = types.ModuleType.__getattribute__(module, 'AsyncConnectionPool')\n"
" async with pool_type() as pool:\n"
" await pool.request('GET', 'http://127.0.0.1:9/probe')\n"
"asyncio.run(main())"
),
],
)
def test_runtime_import_guard_blocks_cached_httpcore_access(self, tmp_path, code):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'httpcore'" in result.stderr
@pytest.mark.parametrize("module", ["httpx", "requests", "huggingface_hub"])
def test_runtime_import_guard_keeps_supported_clients_available(self, tmp_path, module):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", f"import {module}; print({module}.__name__)"],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
assert result.stdout.strip() == module
def test_runtime_import_guard_keeps_httpx_transport_available(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
code = "import httpx; client = httpx.Client(); print(type(client).__name__); client.close()"
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
cwd = tmp_path,
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
capture_output = True,
text = True,
check = False,
)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
assert result.stdout.strip() == "Client"
def test_home_points_at_sandbox_workdir(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path))
assert env["HOME"] == str(tmp_path)
assert env["TMPDIR"] == str(tmp_path)
def test_term_is_dumb(self, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
# Avoid re-using the operator's TERM (e.g. xterm-256color) that
# could trigger color-escape parsing in downstream tools.
env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path))
assert env["TERM"] == "dumb"
def test_bypass_env_installs_sitecustomize_path_shim(self, tmp_path):
# Bypass mode keeps path remapping without installing network guards.
from core.inference.tools import _BYPASS_SITE_DIR, _build_bypass_env
env = _build_bypass_env(str(tmp_path))
assert _BYPASS_SITE_DIR in env["PYTHONPATH"].split(os.pathsep)
def test_bypass_env_prepends_shim_and_keeps_inherited_pythonpath(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from core.inference.tools import _BYPASS_SITE_DIR, _build_bypass_env
monkeypatch.setenv("PYTHONPATH", "/operator/libs")
env = _build_bypass_env(str(tmp_path))
parts = env["PYTHONPATH"].split(os.pathsep)
# Shim first so its open()/makedirs remap wins, operator entries kept.
assert parts[0] == _BYPASS_SITE_DIR
assert "/operator/libs" in parts
class TestSandboxCpuRlimitDefault:
"""Pin the default so a regression below 600s without opt-in is caught."""
def test_default_cpu_s_is_600(self):
src = (_BACKEND_ROOT / "core" / "inference" / "tools.py").read_text()
assert 'UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S", "600"' in src
def test_clone_newnet_removed(self):
src = (_BACKEND_ROOT / "core" / "inference" / "tools.py").read_text()
assert "_libc.unshare(0x40000000)" not in src
# Explanatory comment retained.
assert "CLONE_NEWNET" in src
def test_nofile_env_tunable(self):
src = (_BACKEND_ROOT / "core" / "inference" / "tools.py").read_text()
# Parity with the other rlimits: must come from the env, not be hardcoded.
assert "UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_NOFILE" in src
class TestMaxBodyDefault:
def test_default_is_500_mb(self):
src = (_BACKEND_ROOT / "utils" / "upload_limits.py").read_text()
assert "DEFAULT_UPLOAD_LIMIT_MB = 500" in src
assert "UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB" in src
class TestBashBlocklistPosition:
"""The blocklist must fire at command position only, so args like
`grep -r curl .` and `echo source` are not falsely rejected."""
@staticmethod
def _find():
from core.inference.tools import _find_blocked_commands
return _find_blocked_commands
# ---- argument-position: must NOT be blocked ----
def test_grep_for_curl_string_allowed(self):
assert self._find()("grep -r curl .") == set()
def test_echo_source_allowed(self):
assert self._find()("echo source the data") == set()
def test_cat_with_word_source_allowed(self):
# 'source' is an argument to echo, and echo isn't blocked either.
assert self._find()("cat README.md && echo source") == set()
assert "source" not in self._find()("cat README.md && echo source")
assert "echo" not in self._find()("cat README.md && echo source")
def test_ls_path_containing_curl_allowed(self):
assert self._find()("ls /usr/bin/curl") == set()
def test_find_for_wget_string_allowed(self):
assert self._find()("find . -name wget") == set()
def test_quoted_curl_arg_allowed(self):
assert self._find()('echo "curl is a tool"') == set()
# ---- command-position: must be blocked ----
def test_bare_rm_blocked(self):
assert "rm" in self._find()("rm -rf /")
def test_curl_at_command_position_blocked(self):
assert "curl" in self._find()("curl https://example.com")
def test_after_semicolon_blocked(self):
# `rm` after `;` even without surrounding whitespace.
assert "rm" in self._find()("echo done; rm -rf /tmp/x")
assert "rm" in self._find()("echo done;rm -rf /tmp/x")
def test_after_double_ampersand_blocked(self):
assert "wget" in self._find()("cd /tmp && wget https://bad")
def test_split_quotes_obfuscation_blocked(self):
# shlex collapses 'r''m' -> 'rm' at command position.
assert "rm" in self._find()("r''m -rf /")
def test_path_prefixed_command_blocked(self):
assert "sudo" in self._find()("/usr/bin/sudo whoami")
def test_nested_bash_c_blocked(self):
# Recursion into the nested command string catches command-position curl.
assert "curl" in self._find()("bash -c 'curl https://x'")
def test_subshell_command_blocked(self):
assert "rm" in self._find()("echo $(rm -rf /tmp)")
def test_backtick_command_blocked(self):
assert "rm" in self._find()("echo `rm -rf /tmp`")
# ---- shell prefixes / wrappers: must still be blocked ----
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"command, blocked_cmd",
[
("FOO=bar curl https://example.com", "curl"),
("HTTPS_PROXY=http://x wget https://bad", "wget"),
("env curl https://example.com", "curl"),
("env FOO=1 /usr/bin/curl https://x", "curl"),
("/usr/bin/env rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"),
("command rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"),
("time curl https://example.com", "curl"),
("nice rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"),
("nohup wget https://bad", "wget"),
("timeout 1 rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"),
("setsid rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"),
("stdbuf -oL rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"),
("sudo rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"),
("cd /tmp; FOO=bar rm -rf x", "rm"),
],
)
def test_command_prefix_wrappers_blocked(self, command, blocked_cmd):
assert blocked_cmd in self._find()(command)
# ---- split-quoted command name after attached separators ----
def test_split_quotes_after_semicolon_blocked(self):
assert "rm" in self._find()("echo done; r''m -rf /tmp/x")
assert "rm" in self._find()("echo done;r''m -rf /tmp/x")
assert "curl" in self._find()("echo done; c''url --version")
assert "curl" in self._find()("echo done; /usr/bin/c''url --version")
# ---- find -exec / xargs invoke a command directly ----
def test_find_exec_blocked(self):
assert "rm" in self._find()("find . -type f -exec rm -f {} +")
assert "rm" in self._find()("find . -type f -exec rm -f {} ';'")
assert "rm" in self._find()("find . -execdir rm -f {} ';'")
def test_xargs_command_blocked(self):
assert "rm" in self._find()("printf /tmp/x | xargs rm")
assert "rm" in self._find()("printf /tmp/x | xargs -- rm")
# ---- brace groups and bash compound statements ----
def test_brace_group_blocked(self):
assert "rm" in self._find()("{ rm -rf /tmp/x; }")
def test_if_then_blocked(self):
assert "curl" in self._find()("if true; then curl --version; fi")
def test_while_do_blocked(self):
assert "curl" in self._find()("while true; do curl --version; break; done")
class TestHfUploadImportGate:
"""Upload-method blocking requires an HF import in scope, so paramiko /
boto3 / internal SDKs with the same method names don't false-positive."""
def test_paramiko_upload_file_allowed_without_hf_import(self):
_ok("import paramiko; sftp=None; sftp.upload_file('a','b')")
def test_boto3_create_commit_allowed_without_hf_import(self):
_ok("client=None; client.create_commit(Repo='x')")
def test_hf_api_upload_safe_path_allowed(self):
# Sandbox-local relative path -- the permitted call shape.
_ok("from huggingface_hub import HfApi; HfApi().upload_file('a','b','c')")
def test_hf_upload_file_fq_safe_path_allowed(self):
_ok("import huggingface_hub; huggingface_hub.upload_file('a','b','c')")
def test_dynamic_builtin_import_safe_path_allowed(self):
# `__import__('huggingface_hub')` puts HF in scope; relative literal is safe.
_ok("hf=__import__('huggingface_hub'); hf.HfApi().upload_file('a','b','c')")
def test_dynamic_importlib_safe_path_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import importlib; hf=importlib.import_module('huggingface_hub');"
" hf.HfApi().upload_file('a','b','c')"
)
def test_from_importlib_import_module_safe_create_commit_allowed(self):
_ok(
"from importlib import import_module;"
" api=import_module('huggingface_hub').HfApi(); api.create_commit()"
)
def test_hf_bare_name_upload_safe_path_allowed(self):
# Bare `upload_file(...)` (imported from huggingface_hub) with a
# sandbox-local relative-path literal is allowed.
_ok(
"from huggingface_hub import upload_file;"
" upload_file(path_or_fileobj='x', path_in_repo='x', repo_id='r')"
)
def test_hf_bare_name_upload_folder_safe_allowed(self):
_ok(
"from huggingface_hub import upload_folder; upload_folder(folder_path='x', repo_id='r')"
)
def test_hf_bare_name_create_commit_safe_allowed(self):
_ok("from huggingface_hub import create_commit; create_commit(operations=[], repo_id='r')")
def test_bare_name_upload_file_without_hf_import_allowed(self):
# No HF import -- local helper named upload_file passes.
_ok("def upload_file(*a, **k):\n pass\nupload_file('x', 'y', 'z')")
class TestHfUploadSandboxLocalPaths:
"""HF upload gate allows only files in the sandbox workdir. Absolute paths,
`..` traversal, home expansion, and Windows drives are rejected (they could
lift secrets from outside the sandbox)."""
def test_relative_literal_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="model.bin",'
' path_in_repo="model.bin", repo_id="me/r")'
)
def test_dotted_relative_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="./outputs/m.bin",'
' path_in_repo="m.bin", repo_id="me/r")'
)
def test_nested_relative_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="outputs/run42/model.bin",'
' path_in_repo="m.bin", repo_id="me/r")'
)
def test_open_of_relative_literal_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=open("model.bin", "rb"),'
' path_in_repo="m.bin", repo_id="me/r")'
)
def test_inline_bytes_literal_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=b"\\x00\\x01\\x02",'
' path_in_repo="m.bin", repo_id="me/r")'
)
def test_absolute_unix_path_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="/etc/passwd",'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_absolute_windows_drive_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="C:\\\\Windows\\\\creds",'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_home_expansion_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="~/.aws/credentials",'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_parent_traversal_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="../../etc/shadow",'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_parent_traversal_mid_path_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="outputs/../../../etc",'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_open_of_absolute_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=open("/etc/passwd","rb"),'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_open_of_parent_traversal_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=open("../escape","rb"),'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_dynamic_variable_path_blocked(self):
# A non-literal expr could resolve to any path at runtime; the
# static checker can't prove safety, so block.
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, os\n"
"p = os.path.join('outputs', 'x.bin')\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=p, path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_upload_folder_absolute_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_folder(folder_path="/var/log", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_upload_folder_parent_traversal_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_folder(folder_path="../..", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_upload_large_folder_absolute_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_large_folder(folder_path="/etc", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
def test_create_commit_operation_safe_allowed(self):
_ok(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
"from huggingface_hub import CommitOperationAdd\n"
"huggingface_hub.HfApi().create_commit(\n"
" repo_id='r',\n"
" operations=[CommitOperationAdd(path_or_fileobj='m.bin', path_in_repo='m.bin')],\n"
")"
)
def test_create_commit_operation_absolute_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
"from huggingface_hub import CommitOperationAdd\n"
"huggingface_hub.HfApi().create_commit(\n"
" repo_id='r',\n"
" operations=[CommitOperationAdd(path_or_fileobj='/etc/passwd', path_in_repo='x')],\n"
")",
expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal",
)
class TestHfUploadEnvAndSecretLeakBlock:
"""HF upload gate rejects any arg sourced from os.environ / os.getenv /
subprocess env reads, since a script can reach the parent env directly
despite the safe-env shell wrapper."""
def test_path_from_os_environ_subscript_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, os\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=os.environ["HF_TOKEN"],'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ",
)
def test_path_from_os_environ_get_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, os\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=os.environ.get("HF_TOKEN"),'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ",
)
def test_path_from_os_getenv_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, os\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=os.getenv("HF_TOKEN"),'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ",
)
def test_path_from_bare_getenv_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
"from os import getenv\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=getenv("HF_TOKEN"),'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ",
)
def test_path_from_subprocess_printenv_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, subprocess\n"
"huggingface_hub.upload_file("
'path_or_fileobj=subprocess.check_output(["printenv","HF_TOKEN"]),'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ",
)
def test_token_kwarg_with_literal_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin",'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r", token="hf_xyzabc123")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload token= cannot be set",
)
def test_hf_token_kwarg_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin",'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r", hf_token="hf_secret")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload hf_token= cannot be set",
)
def test_api_key_kwarg_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_folder(folder_path="outputs",'
' repo_id="r", api_key="abc")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload api_key= cannot be set",
)
def test_token_kwarg_from_env_blocked(self):
# Both rules fire; the sensitive-kwarg check trips first.
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, os\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin",'
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r", token=os.environ["HF_TOKEN"])',
expect_phrase = "HF upload token= cannot be set",
)
def test_env_dict_unpacked_via_environ_attr_blocked(self):
# Bare `os.environ` reference (passed somewhere it gets serialized).
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, os\n"
"huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=str(os.environ),"
' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ",
)
def test_repo_id_from_env_also_blocked(self):
# Non-path args must not source env vars either -- an attacker
# could encode secrets in repo_id or path_in_repo.
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, os\n"
'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin",'
' path_in_repo=os.environ["HF_TOKEN"], repo_id="r")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ",
)
def test_create_commit_with_env_in_operation_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub, os\n"
"from huggingface_hub import CommitOperationAdd\n"
"huggingface_hub.HfApi().create_commit(\n"
" repo_id='r',\n"
" operations=[CommitOperationAdd("
'path_or_fileobj=os.environ["HF_TOKEN"], path_in_repo="x")],\n'
")",
expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ",
)
def test_create_commit_token_kwarg_blocked(self):
_blocked(
"import huggingface_hub\n"
'huggingface_hub.HfApi().create_commit(repo_id="r",'
' operations=[], token="hf_xxx")',
expect_phrase = "HF upload token= cannot be set",
)
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