# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only # Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. """Tests for the sandboxed-Python AST policy in core/inference/tools.py.""" import os import sys from pathlib import Path import pytest _BACKEND_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] if str(_BACKEND_ROOT) not in sys.path: sys.path.insert(0, str(_BACKEND_ROOT)) from core.inference.tools import _check_code_safety def _ok(code: str): assert _check_code_safety(code) is None, code def _blocked(code: str, *, expect_phrase: str): msg = _check_code_safety(code) assert msg is not None, code assert expect_phrase in msg, (expect_phrase, msg) class TestMetadataHostDenylist: def test_aws_imds_literal_blocked(self): _blocked( 'import requests; requests.get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")', expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host", ) def test_gcp_metadata_dns_blocked(self): _blocked( 'import requests; requests.get("http://metadata.google.internal/")', expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host", ) def test_alibaba_ecs_literal_blocked(self): _blocked( 'import socket; s=socket.socket(); s.connect(("100.100.100.200", 80))', expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host", ) def test_ipv6_imds_literal_blocked(self): _blocked( 'import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("http://[fd00:ec2::254]/")', expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host", ) def test_metadata_link_local_prefix_blocked(self): _blocked( 'import requests; requests.get("http://169.254.170.2/v3/")', expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host", ) class TestTrustedHostAllowlist: @pytest.mark.parametrize( "url", [ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Python_(programming_language)", "https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Python_(langage)", "https://www.google.com/search?q=foo", "https://duckduckgo.com/?q=foo", "https://huggingface.co/unsloth", "https://cdn-lfs.huggingface.co/repos/abc/def/file.bin", "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/foo/bar/main/README.md", "https://api.github.com/repos/foo/bar", "https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.12345", "https://export.arxiv.org/abs/2401.12345", "https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345", "https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/12345", "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript", "https://docs.python.org/3/library/asyncio.html", "https://pypi.org/project/requests/", "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/foo/bar.whl", "https://www.bbc.com/news", "https://api.weather.gov/points/40,-90", "https://numpy.org/doc/stable/", "https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/index.html", ], ) def test_trusted_host_passes(self, url): _ok(f"import requests; requests.get({url!r})") def test_wikipedia_subdomain_passes(self): _ok('import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("https://m.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foo")') def test_hf_co_short_form_passes(self): _ok('import requests; requests.get("https://hf.co/unsloth/Qwen3.5-4B-GGUF")') def test_github_io_pages_pass(self): _ok('import requests; requests.get("https://unslothai.github.io/")') class TestUntrustedHostBlock: def test_example_com_blocked(self): _blocked( 'import requests; requests.get("https://example.com/")', expect_phrase = "Blocked: host not in sandbox allowlist", ) def test_random_blog_blocked(self): _blocked( 'import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("https://random-blog-host.example/")', expect_phrase = "Blocked: host not in sandbox allowlist", ) def test_socket_connect_random_host_blocked(self): _blocked( 'import socket; s=socket.socket(); s.connect(("evil.example", 80))', expect_phrase = "Blocked: host not in sandbox allowlist", ) def test_dynamic_url_not_statically_blocked(self): # Static AST can't resolve runtime URLs; bash blocklist is the fallback. _ok('import requests; url = "https://example.com/"; requests.get(url)') class TestHostNormalization: def test_trailing_dot_treated_same(self): _ok('import requests; requests.get("https://wikipedia.org./")') def test_explicit_port_does_not_unblock_or_misblock(self): _ok('import requests; requests.get("https://en.wikipedia.org:443/wiki/Foo")') _blocked( 'import requests; requests.get("https://example.com:8080/")', expect_phrase = "Blocked: host not in sandbox allowlist", ) def test_userinfo_at_does_not_smuggle_metadata_host(self): _blocked( 'import requests; requests.get("https://wikipedia.org@169.254.169.254/latest/")', expect_phrase = "Blocked: cloud-metadata host", ) def test_uppercase_host_normalised(self): _ok('import requests; requests.get("https://EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG/wiki/Foo")') class TestUploadDenylist: def test_requests_post_files_blocked(self): _blocked( ( "import requests\n" 'requests.post("https://huggingface.co/api/repos/upload", ' 'files={"f": open("x.bin", "rb")})' ), expect_phrase = "Blocked: file upload disallowed in sandbox", ) def test_requests_put_data_bytes_blocked(self): _blocked( ( "import requests\n" 'requests.put("https://huggingface.co/api/repos/upload", ' 'data=b"\\x00\\x01\\x02")' ), expect_phrase = "Blocked: file upload disallowed in sandbox", ) def test_requests_post_data_open_handle_blocked(self): _blocked( ( "import requests\n" 'requests.post("https://huggingface.co/api/repos/upload", ' 'data=open("x.bin", "rb"))' ), expect_phrase = "Blocked: file upload disallowed in sandbox", ) def test_httpx_post_files_blocked(self): _blocked( ( "import httpx\n" 'httpx.post("https://huggingface.co/api/repos/upload", ' 'files={"f": open("x.bin", "rb")})' ), expect_phrase = "Blocked: file upload disallowed in sandbox", ) def test_hf_api_upload_sandbox_local_allowed(self): # Sandbox-local relative path is the canonical safe shape. _ok( "from huggingface_hub import HfApi\n" 'HfApi().upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin", ' 'path_in_repo="x.bin", repo_id="foo/bar")' ) def test_hf_module_upload_folder_sandbox_local_allowed(self): _ok( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_folder(folder_path="outputs", repo_id="foo/bar")' ) def test_hf_create_commit_empty_operations_allowed(self): _ok( "import huggingface_hub\n" "api = huggingface_hub.HfApi()\n" 'api.create_commit(repo_id="foo/bar", operations=[])' ) def test_hf_upload_absolute_path_blocked(self): _blocked( "from huggingface_hub import HfApi\n" 'HfApi().upload_file(path_or_fileobj="/etc/passwd", path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_hf_upload_parent_dir_escape_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="../escape.bin", path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_plain_post_json_not_blocked(self): _ok('import requests\nrequests.post("https://api.weather.gov/lookup", json={"k": "v"})') class TestSandboxEnvIsolation: """Sandbox env is built from a whitelist, so credential-shaped parent vars stay absent regardless of operator config (Linux/macOS/WSL/Windows).""" _SECRET_KEYS = ( # HF + ML tooling "HF_TOKEN", "HUGGING_FACE_HUB_TOKEN", "HUGGINGFACEHUB_API_TOKEN", "WANDB_API_KEY", "WANDB_USERNAME", "MLFLOW_TRACKING_TOKEN", "COMET_API_KEY", "NEPTUNE_API_TOKEN", # Generic cloud "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN", "GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY", "GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS", "AZURE_STORAGE_KEY", "AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET", # Forge / git / package "GH_TOKEN", "GITHUB_TOKEN", "GITLAB_TOKEN", "BITBUCKET_TOKEN", "NPM_TOKEN", "PYPI_TOKEN", "CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN", # LLM provider "OPENAI_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "GOOGLE_API_KEY", "MISTRAL_API_KEY", "COHERE_API_KEY", "TOGETHER_API_KEY", # Loader injection / sudo state "LD_PRELOAD", "LD_LIBRARY_PATH", "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES", "DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH", # Windows "USERPROFILE", "APPDATA", "LOCALAPPDATA", "ProgramData", ) def test_no_secret_keys_leak_into_sandbox(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env for key in self._SECRET_KEYS: monkeypatch.setenv(key, f"sentinel-{key}") env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) for key in self._SECRET_KEYS: assert key not in env, f"parent env var {key!r} leaked into sandbox env" def test_sandbox_env_is_minimal_whitelist(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env # Pollute parent env with arbitrary keys for key in ("EVIL", "RANDOM", "ATTACK_VEC", "MY_TOKEN", "X_API_KEY"): monkeypatch.setenv(key, "leak-me") env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) allowed = { "PATH", "HOME", "TMPDIR", "LANG", "TERM", "PYTHONIOENCODING", "PYTHONPATH", "VIRTUAL_ENV", "SystemRoot", "PATHEXT", # Windows only; minimal list so cwd scripts cannot hijack "NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath", # Windows only; no cwd-first lookup } extras = set(env.keys()) - allowed assert not extras, f"sandbox env added unexpected keys: {extras}" # PYTHONPATH is whitelist-built, never inherited: only the sandbox # sitecustomize shim dir (code-interpreter path remap). assert env["PYTHONPATH"].endswith("sandbox_site") assert "leak-me" not in env["PYTHONPATH"] def test_host_git_dir_appended_after_curated(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): # #7317: Windows Git lives under Program Files, not System32. Sandbox # PATH resolves bare `git` by appending the dir of the git the HOST # shell resolves (shutil.which), after the curated prefix. import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") prog = tmp_path / "Program Files" monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod, "_windows_program_roots", lambda: [str(prog)]) git_dir = prog / "Git" / "cmd" git_dir.mkdir(parents = True) monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: str(git_dir / "git.exe")) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) parts = env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep) assert str(git_dir) in parts # Curated prefix stays ahead of host Git so Studio python/pip win. assert parts.index(str(git_dir)) > 0 def test_host_path_dirs_not_inherited(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """Host PATH dirs (user-writable, git-lookalike) are never inherited; only the resolved git dir is. No git resolved -> nothing appended.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") venv_scripts = tmp_path / "venv" / "Scripts" venv_scripts.mkdir(parents = True) fake_git = tmp_path / "scratch" / "Git" / "cmd" fake_git.mkdir(parents = True) monkeypatch.setenv( "PATH", os.pathsep.join([str(venv_scripts), str(fake_git), os.environ.get("PATH", "")]), ) monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: None) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) parts = env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep) assert str(venv_scripts) not in parts # A git-suffixed but unresolved (user-writable) dir is NOT trusted. assert str(fake_git) not in parts def test_git_cmd_shim_extension_added_to_pathext(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """A host git resolved as a .cmd shim under a trusted root stays resolvable under the restricted PATHEXT (cwd lookup disabled).""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") prog = tmp_path / "Program Files" monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod, "_windows_program_roots", lambda: [str(prog)]) git_dir = prog / "Git" / "cmd" git_dir.mkdir(parents = True) monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: str(git_dir / "git.cmd")) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) assert str(git_dir) in env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep) assert env["PATHEXT"] == ".EXE;.COM;.CMD" def test_user_writable_git_dir_refused(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """Git resolved from a per-user manager (Scoop shims) is NOT trusted: an attacker could drop rg.exe beside it and hit the auto-approve gate.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") monkeypatch.setattr( tools_mod, "_windows_program_roots", lambda: [str(tmp_path / "Program Files")] ) shim_dir = tmp_path / "users" / "alice" / "scoop" / "shims" shim_dir.mkdir(parents = True) monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: str(shim_dir / "git.exe")) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) assert str(shim_dir) not in env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep) # No trusted git launcher -> PATHEXT stays minimal. assert env["PATHEXT"] == ".EXE;.COM" def test_trust_uses_known_folder_not_env_override(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """Trust is driven by the resolved Program Files roots, so a git under an attacker-overridden %ProgramFiles% env value is still refused.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") real_prog = tmp_path / "RealProgramFiles" (real_prog).mkdir() evil = tmp_path / "attacker" (evil / "Git" / "cmd").mkdir(parents = True) # Resolver returns the genuine root; env is overridden to the evil dir. monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod, "_windows_program_roots", lambda: [str(real_prog)]) monkeypatch.setenv("ProgramFiles", str(evil)) monkeypatch.setattr( tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: str(evil / "Git" / "cmd" / "git.exe") ) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) assert str(evil / "Git" / "cmd") not in env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep) def test_canonical_git_dir_appended(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """The PATH entry is the realpath of the trusted dir, not a junction alias, so it cannot be retargeted after the trust check.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") real_prog = tmp_path / "Program Files" real_git = real_prog / "Git" / "cmd" real_git.mkdir(parents = True) link = tmp_path / "link" try: link.symlink_to(real_prog, target_is_directory = True) except (OSError, NotImplementedError): pytest.skip("symlink unsupported in this environment") monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod, "_windows_program_roots", lambda: [str(real_prog)]) monkeypatch.setattr( tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: str(link / "Git" / "cmd" / "git.exe"), ) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) parts = env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep) assert str(real_git) in parts # canonical, not the `link/...` alias def test_windows_temp_git_dir_refused(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """A git under a world-writable %SystemRoot% subdir (Windows\\Temp) is NOT trusted, even though it sits under the Windows root.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") monkeypatch.setattr( tools_mod, "_windows_program_roots", lambda: [str(tmp_path / "Program Files")] ) temp_git = tmp_path / "Windows" / "Temp" / "Git" / "cmd" temp_git.mkdir(parents = True) monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: str(temp_git / "git.exe")) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) assert str(temp_git) not in env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep) def test_trusted_program_dir_matches_via_realpath(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """The trust check canonicalizes paths, so a symlinked/short alias of Program Files still matches (stand-in for 8.3 PROGRA~1 on Windows).""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") real_prog = tmp_path / "Program Files" (real_prog / "Git" / "cmd").mkdir(parents = True) alias = tmp_path / "PROGRA~1" try: alias.symlink_to(real_prog, target_is_directory = True) except (OSError, NotImplementedError): pytest.skip("symlink unsupported in this environment") monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod, "_windows_program_roots", lambda: [str(real_prog)]) git_via_alias = alias / "Git" / "cmd" / "git.exe" monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: str(git_via_alias)) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) parts = [os.path.normcase(os.path.realpath(p)) for p in env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep)] assert os.path.normcase(str(real_prog / "Git" / "cmd")) in parts def test_scan_past_untrusted_git_shim(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """When an untrusted shim sorts first on PATH, the scan still finds a later trusted Program Files git.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") prog = tmp_path / "Program Files" trusted_git = prog / "Git" / "cmd" trusted_git.mkdir(parents = True) (trusted_git / "git.EXE").write_text("") # match PATHEXT case on this FS shim = tmp_path / "scoop" / "shims" shim.mkdir(parents = True) (shim / "git.EXE").write_text("") monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod, "_windows_program_roots", lambda: [str(prog)]) # shutil.which returns the untrusted shim first. monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: str(shim / "git.EXE")) monkeypatch.setenv("PATH", os.pathsep.join([str(shim), str(trusted_git)])) monkeypatch.setenv("PATHEXT", ".EXE") env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) parts = env["PATH"].split(os.pathsep) assert str(trusted_git) in parts assert str(shim) not in parts def test_program_roots_fails_closed_without_known_folder_api(self, monkeypatch): """When the known-folder API is unavailable, no roots are trusted: env vars (even %SystemDrive%) are caller-overrideable, so we never derive a trusted root from them.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod # ctypes fails on this Linux host, so the API path raises and we fail # closed. Any attacker override of these env vars must be irrelevant. monkeypatch.setenv("ProgramFiles", r"D:\attacker-writable") monkeypatch.setenv("ProgramW6432", r"D:\attacker-writable") monkeypatch.setenv("SystemDrive", "D:") assert tools_mod._windows_program_roots() == [] def test_augment_native_program_roots_derives_native_sibling(self): """A 32-bit process only sees the x86 root; the native sibling is derived by stripping the ` (x86)` suffix.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod roots = tools_mod._augment_native_program_roots([r"C:\Program Files (x86)"]) lowered = [r.lower() for r in roots] assert r"c:\program files (x86)" in lowered assert r"c:\program files" in lowered def test_no_default_current_directory_in_exe_path_set_on_windows(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): """cmd/CreateProcess must not search cwd for bare names in the sandbox.""" import core.inference.tools as tools_mod from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "platform", "win32") monkeypatch.setattr(tools_mod.shutil, "which", lambda name: None) env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) assert env["NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath"] == "1" def test_home_points_at_sandbox_workdir(self, tmp_path): from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) assert env["HOME"] == str(tmp_path) assert env["TMPDIR"] == str(tmp_path) def test_term_is_dumb(self, tmp_path): from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env # Avoid re-using the operator's TERM (e.g. xterm-256color) that # could trigger color-escape parsing in downstream tools. env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)) assert env["TERM"] == "dumb" def test_bypass_env_installs_sitecustomize_path_shim(self, tmp_path): # Bypass mode must install the same /mnt/data path-remap shim as the safe # env (finding 17), else /mnt/data writes work only in normal mode. from core.inference.tools import _SANDBOX_SITE_DIR, _build_bypass_env env = _build_bypass_env(str(tmp_path)) assert _SANDBOX_SITE_DIR in env["PYTHONPATH"].split(os.pathsep) def test_bypass_env_prepends_shim_and_keeps_inherited_pythonpath(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path): from core.inference.tools import _SANDBOX_SITE_DIR, _build_bypass_env monkeypatch.setenv("PYTHONPATH", "/operator/libs") env = _build_bypass_env(str(tmp_path)) parts = env["PYTHONPATH"].split(os.pathsep) # Shim first so its open()/makedirs remap wins, operator entries kept. assert parts[0] == _SANDBOX_SITE_DIR assert "/operator/libs" in parts class TestSandboxCpuRlimitDefault: """Pin the default so a regression below 600s without opt-in is caught.""" def test_default_cpu_s_is_600(self): src = (_BACKEND_ROOT / "core" / "inference" / "tools.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8") assert 'UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S", "600"' in src def test_clone_newnet_removed(self): src = (_BACKEND_ROOT / "core" / "inference" / "tools.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8") assert "_libc.unshare(0x40000000)" not in src # Explanatory comment retained. assert "CLONE_NEWNET" in src def test_nofile_env_tunable(self): src = (_BACKEND_ROOT / "core" / "inference" / "tools.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8") # Parity with the other rlimits: must come from the env, not be hardcoded. assert "UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_NOFILE" in src class TestMaxBodyDefault: def test_default_is_500_mb(self): src = (_BACKEND_ROOT / "utils" / "upload_limits.py").read_text(encoding = "utf-8") assert "DEFAULT_UPLOAD_LIMIT_MB = 500" in src assert "UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB" in src class TestBashBlocklistPosition: """The blocklist must fire at command position only, so args like `grep -r curl .` and `echo source` are not falsely rejected.""" @staticmethod def _find(): from core.inference.tools import _find_blocked_commands return _find_blocked_commands # ---- argument-position: must NOT be blocked ---- def test_grep_for_curl_string_allowed(self): assert self._find()("grep -r curl .") == set() def test_echo_source_allowed(self): assert self._find()("echo source the data") == set() def test_cat_with_word_source_allowed(self): # 'source' is an argument to echo, and echo isn't blocked either. assert self._find()("cat README.md && echo source") == set() assert "source" not in self._find()("cat README.md && echo source") assert "echo" not in self._find()("cat README.md && echo source") def test_ls_path_containing_curl_allowed(self): assert self._find()("ls /usr/bin/curl") == set() def test_find_for_wget_string_allowed(self): assert self._find()("find . -name wget") == set() def test_quoted_curl_arg_allowed(self): assert self._find()('echo "curl is a tool"') == set() # ---- command-position: must be blocked ---- def test_bare_rm_blocked(self): assert "rm" in self._find()("rm -rf /") def test_curl_at_command_position_blocked(self): assert "curl" in self._find()("curl https://example.com") def test_after_semicolon_blocked(self): # `rm` after `;` even without surrounding whitespace. assert "rm" in self._find()("echo done; rm -rf /tmp/x") assert "rm" in self._find()("echo done;rm -rf /tmp/x") def test_after_double_ampersand_blocked(self): assert "wget" in self._find()("cd /tmp && wget https://bad") def test_split_quotes_obfuscation_blocked(self): # shlex collapses 'r''m' -> 'rm' at command position. assert "rm" in self._find()("r''m -rf /") def test_path_prefixed_command_blocked(self): assert "sudo" in self._find()("/usr/bin/sudo whoami") def test_nested_bash_c_blocked(self): # Recursion into the nested command string catches command-position curl. assert "curl" in self._find()("bash -c 'curl https://x'") def test_subshell_command_blocked(self): assert "rm" in self._find()("echo $(rm -rf /tmp)") def test_backtick_command_blocked(self): assert "rm" in self._find()("echo `rm -rf /tmp`") # ---- shell prefixes / wrappers: must still be blocked ---- @pytest.mark.parametrize( "command, blocked_cmd", [ ("FOO=bar curl https://example.com", "curl"), ("HTTPS_PROXY=http://x wget https://bad", "wget"), ("env curl https://example.com", "curl"), ("env FOO=1 /usr/bin/curl https://x", "curl"), ("/usr/bin/env rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"), ("command rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"), ("time curl https://example.com", "curl"), ("nice rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"), ("nohup wget https://bad", "wget"), ("timeout 1 rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"), ("setsid rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"), ("stdbuf -oL rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"), ("sudo rm -rf /tmp/x", "rm"), ("cd /tmp; FOO=bar rm -rf x", "rm"), ], ) def test_command_prefix_wrappers_blocked(self, command, blocked_cmd): assert blocked_cmd in self._find()(command) # ---- split-quoted command name after attached separators ---- def test_split_quotes_after_semicolon_blocked(self): assert "rm" in self._find()("echo done; r''m -rf /tmp/x") assert "rm" in self._find()("echo done;r''m -rf /tmp/x") assert "curl" in self._find()("echo done; c''url --version") assert "curl" in self._find()("echo done; /usr/bin/c''url --version") # ---- find -exec / xargs invoke a command directly ---- def test_find_exec_blocked(self): assert "rm" in self._find()("find . -type f -exec rm -f {} +") assert "rm" in self._find()("find . -type f -exec rm -f {} ';'") assert "rm" in self._find()("find . -execdir rm -f {} ';'") def test_xargs_command_blocked(self): assert "rm" in self._find()("printf /tmp/x | xargs rm") assert "rm" in self._find()("printf /tmp/x | xargs -- rm") # ---- brace groups and bash compound statements ---- def test_brace_group_blocked(self): assert "rm" in self._find()("{ rm -rf /tmp/x; }") def test_if_then_blocked(self): assert "curl" in self._find()("if true; then curl --version; fi") def test_while_do_blocked(self): assert "curl" in self._find()("while true; do curl --version; break; done") # ---- `.` is the POSIX synonym for the blocked `source` builtin ---- def test_dot_source_blocked(self): assert "." in self._find()(". ./script.sh") assert "." in self._find()("cat x && . ./payload") def test_dot_in_argument_position_allowed(self): assert self._find()("find . -type f") == set() assert self._find()("ls .") == set() assert self._find()("cd .") == set() # ---- ANSI-C quoting must not hide a blocked command name ---- def test_ansi_c_quoted_command_blocked(self): assert "ssh" in self._find()("$'ssh' user@host") assert "source" in self._find()("$'source' ./payload") def test_ansi_c_data_with_newline_is_not_a_command(self): # $'...' expands to a single word, so a newline inside it is data for # printf, not a separator that starts a second command. payload = "printf '%s' $'hello\\n" + "rm" + " -rf x\\n'" assert self._find()(payload) == set() def test_command_position_glob_matches_blocked_name(self): # Bash expands the pattern to the blocked name after this scan runs. assert "rm" in self._find()("/bin/r[m] -rf /tmp/victim") assert "rm" in self._find()("/bin/r? -rf /tmp/victim") def test_glob_without_literal_character_allowed(self): # A bracket expression in argument position is not a command word. assert self._find()("echo '[a]'") == set() def test_attached_exec_flag_value_blocked(self): # fd accepts the command attached to the flag, so the value is what runs. assert "rm" in self._find()("fd victim . --exec=rm") assert "rm" in self._find()("fd victim . --exec-batch=rm") def test_short_flag_neighbour_not_read_as_command(self): # Only the long spellings carry an attached command; -x belongs to too # many other utilities to read its neighbour as one. assert self._find()("grep -x rm file.txt") == set() def test_alias_body_scanned_as_command(self): # `alias zap='rm -rf'` stores a command bash runs when zap is invoked. assert "rm" in self._find()("alias zap='rm -rf'") assert self._find()("alias ll='ls -la'") == set() class TestHfUploadImportGate: """Upload-method blocking requires an HF import in scope, so paramiko / boto3 / internal SDKs with the same method names don't false-positive.""" def test_paramiko_upload_file_allowed_without_hf_import(self): _ok("import paramiko; sftp=None; sftp.upload_file('a','b')") def test_boto3_create_commit_allowed_without_hf_import(self): _ok("client=None; client.create_commit(Repo='x')") def test_hf_api_upload_safe_path_allowed(self): # Sandbox-local relative path -- the permitted call shape. _ok("from huggingface_hub import HfApi; HfApi().upload_file('a','b','c')") def test_hf_upload_file_fq_safe_path_allowed(self): _ok("import huggingface_hub; huggingface_hub.upload_file('a','b','c')") def test_dynamic_builtin_import_safe_path_allowed(self): # `__import__('huggingface_hub')` puts HF in scope; relative literal is safe. _ok("hf=__import__('huggingface_hub'); hf.HfApi().upload_file('a','b','c')") def test_dynamic_importlib_safe_path_allowed(self): _ok( "import importlib; hf=importlib.import_module('huggingface_hub');" " hf.HfApi().upload_file('a','b','c')" ) def test_from_importlib_import_module_safe_create_commit_allowed(self): _ok( "from importlib import import_module;" " api=import_module('huggingface_hub').HfApi(); api.create_commit()" ) def test_hf_bare_name_upload_safe_path_allowed(self): # Bare `upload_file(...)` (imported from huggingface_hub) with a # sandbox-local relative-path literal is allowed. _ok( "from huggingface_hub import upload_file;" " upload_file(path_or_fileobj='x', path_in_repo='x', repo_id='r')" ) def test_hf_bare_name_upload_folder_safe_allowed(self): _ok( "from huggingface_hub import upload_folder; upload_folder(folder_path='x', repo_id='r')" ) def test_hf_bare_name_create_commit_safe_allowed(self): _ok("from huggingface_hub import create_commit; create_commit(operations=[], repo_id='r')") def test_bare_name_upload_file_without_hf_import_allowed(self): # No HF import -- local helper named upload_file passes. _ok("def upload_file(*a, **k):\n pass\nupload_file('x', 'y', 'z')") class TestHfUploadSandboxLocalPaths: """HF upload gate allows only files in the sandbox workdir. Absolute paths, `..` traversal, home expansion, and Windows drives are rejected (they could lift secrets from outside the sandbox).""" def test_relative_literal_allowed(self): _ok( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="model.bin",' ' path_in_repo="model.bin", repo_id="me/r")' ) def test_dotted_relative_allowed(self): _ok( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="./outputs/m.bin",' ' path_in_repo="m.bin", repo_id="me/r")' ) def test_nested_relative_allowed(self): _ok( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="outputs/run42/model.bin",' ' path_in_repo="m.bin", repo_id="me/r")' ) def test_open_of_relative_literal_allowed(self): _ok( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=open("model.bin", "rb"),' ' path_in_repo="m.bin", repo_id="me/r")' ) def test_inline_bytes_literal_allowed(self): _ok( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=b"\\x00\\x01\\x02",' ' path_in_repo="m.bin", repo_id="me/r")' ) def test_absolute_unix_path_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="/etc/passwd",' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_absolute_windows_drive_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="C:\\\\Windows\\\\creds",' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_home_expansion_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="~/.aws/credentials",' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_parent_traversal_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="../../etc/shadow",' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_parent_traversal_mid_path_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="outputs/../../../etc",' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_open_of_absolute_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=open("/etc/passwd","rb"),' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_open_of_parent_traversal_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=open("../escape","rb"),' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_dynamic_variable_path_blocked(self): # A non-literal expr could resolve to any path at runtime; the # static checker can't prove safety, so block. _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, os\n" "p = os.path.join('outputs', 'x.bin')\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=p, path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_upload_folder_absolute_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_folder(folder_path="/var/log", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_upload_folder_parent_traversal_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_folder(folder_path="../..", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_upload_large_folder_absolute_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_large_folder(folder_path="/etc", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) def test_create_commit_operation_safe_allowed(self): _ok( "import huggingface_hub\n" "from huggingface_hub import CommitOperationAdd\n" "huggingface_hub.HfApi().create_commit(\n" " repo_id='r',\n" " operations=[CommitOperationAdd(path_or_fileobj='m.bin', path_in_repo='m.bin')],\n" ")" ) def test_create_commit_operation_absolute_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" "from huggingface_hub import CommitOperationAdd\n" "huggingface_hub.HfApi().create_commit(\n" " repo_id='r',\n" " operations=[CommitOperationAdd(path_or_fileobj='/etc/passwd', path_in_repo='x')],\n" ")", expect_phrase = "HF upload path must be a sandbox-local relative-path literal", ) class TestHfUploadEnvAndSecretLeakBlock: """HF upload gate rejects any arg sourced from os.environ / os.getenv / subprocess env reads, since a script can reach the parent env directly despite the safe-env shell wrapper.""" def test_path_from_os_environ_subscript_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, os\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=os.environ["HF_TOKEN"],' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ", ) def test_path_from_os_environ_get_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, os\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=os.environ.get("HF_TOKEN"),' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ", ) def test_path_from_os_getenv_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, os\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=os.getenv("HF_TOKEN"),' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ", ) def test_path_from_bare_getenv_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" "from os import getenv\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=getenv("HF_TOKEN"),' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ", ) def test_path_from_subprocess_printenv_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, subprocess\n" "huggingface_hub.upload_file(" 'path_or_fileobj=subprocess.check_output(["printenv","HF_TOKEN"]),' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ", ) def test_token_kwarg_with_literal_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin",' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r", token="hf_xyzabc123")', expect_phrase = "HF upload token= cannot be set", ) def test_hf_token_kwarg_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin",' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r", hf_token="hf_secret")', expect_phrase = "HF upload hf_token= cannot be set", ) def test_api_key_kwarg_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_folder(folder_path="outputs",' ' repo_id="r", api_key="abc")', expect_phrase = "HF upload api_key= cannot be set", ) def test_token_kwarg_from_env_blocked(self): # Both rules fire; the sensitive-kwarg check trips first. _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, os\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin",' ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r", token=os.environ["HF_TOKEN"])', expect_phrase = "HF upload token= cannot be set", ) def test_env_dict_unpacked_via_environ_attr_blocked(self): # Bare `os.environ` reference (passed somewhere it gets serialized). _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, os\n" "huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj=str(os.environ)," ' path_in_repo="x", repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ", ) def test_repo_id_from_env_also_blocked(self): # Non-path args must not source env vars either -- an attacker # could encode secrets in repo_id or path_in_repo. _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, os\n" 'huggingface_hub.upload_file(path_or_fileobj="x.bin",' ' path_in_repo=os.environ["HF_TOKEN"], repo_id="r")', expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ", ) def test_create_commit_with_env_in_operation_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub, os\n" "from huggingface_hub import CommitOperationAdd\n" "huggingface_hub.HfApi().create_commit(\n" " repo_id='r',\n" " operations=[CommitOperationAdd(" 'path_or_fileobj=os.environ["HF_TOKEN"], path_in_repo="x")],\n' ")", expect_phrase = "HF upload cannot include os.environ", ) def test_create_commit_token_kwarg_blocked(self): _blocked( "import huggingface_hub\n" 'huggingface_hub.HfApi().create_commit(repo_id="r",' ' operations=[], token="hf_xxx")', expect_phrase = "HF upload token= cannot be set", )