The previous Security audit only covered Studio's backend requirements.
The unsloth pip package itself ships its own dep set via pyproject.toml
(typer/pydantic/pyyaml/nest-asyncio core, plus the huggingfacenotorch
extras: transformers/peft/accelerate/trl/datasets/diffusers/etc.) -- a
malicious upload to any of those would slip past us today. Build a
combined dep list from pyproject.toml + the six Studio requirements
files and feed it to both pip-audit and scan_packages.
Add scan_packages.py at scripts/scan_packages.py so the scanner ships
with the repo and CI does not depend on a network fetch at job time.
Pass --with-deps to scan_packages so the pre-install pattern scan
walks the full transitive closure -- supply-chain attacks usually land
several hops down (litellm 1.82.7 was a dep of a dep for most users;
top-level-only scanning would have missed it).
No installation in either job. pip-audit's -r mode resolves through
PyPI metadata, scan_packages downloads sdist/wheel archives raw and
inspects them without running install hooks. An attacker who has
compromised a transitive dep cannot execute code in this workflow.
