Recent supply-chain incidents that scan_packages would have missed:
- PyTorch Lightning 2.6.x: payload in _runtime/router_runtime.js
(14.8 MB), persistence via .claude/settings.json SessionStart
and .vscode/tasks.json folderOpen
- npm chalk/debug + Shai-Hulud: hex-var obfuscation, window.ethereum
Web3 hijack, .github/workflows/shai-hulud.yml repo takeover,
trufflehog credential exfil
- elementary-data 0.23.3: token harvesters with embedded gh{p,o,s}_
and AKIA regexes
- litellm 1.82.7: also covered by existing patterns, but anyone on
`>=` got it during the 40-min exposure window
- langchain-core CVE-2025-68664 / n8n CVE-2025-68668 / marimo
CVE-2026-39987: first-party design flaws, not malicious-author
scan_packages.py:
- Six new regexes: RE_DEV_TOOL_HIJACK, RE_TOKEN_REGEX,
RE_JS_OBFUSCATION, RE_WEB3_HIJACK, RE_WORKFLOW_INJECT,
RE_SHELL_DROPPER.
- Three new checkers: check_js_file, check_shell_file,
check_workflow_file. scan_archive now routes .js/.mjs/.cjs/.ts
to the JS checker, .sh/.bash to the shell checker, and
.github/workflows/*.yml to the workflow checker.
- JS checker fires CRITICAL on hex-var obfuscation OR Web3 hijack
OR (token regex + network) OR workflow-injection signature; HIGH
on a >100 KB JS bundle inside a Python wheel (the Lightning tell).
- Smoke-tested: every new pattern matches its canonical positive
and rejects four legitimate-looking false-positive baits.
security-audit.yml:
- OSV-Scanner step: cross-ecosystem advisory check (PyPI + npm
+ cargo) from one binary. OSV's feed is a superset of GitHub-
Advisory; catches CVEs that haven't propagated yet (e.g.
langchain-core was on OSV before GitHub Advisory).
- Semgrep step: p/supply-chain + p/python + p/javascript +
p/security-audit packs catch first-party logic bugs (CVEs 7/9/10
above) that pattern scanning never sees.
- Lockfile pin verifier: warns on every non-`==` spec in
requirements/*.txt. Currently surfaces 104 unpinned specs as
informational baseline; tighten to blocking once the baseline
is curated.
All new steps continue-on-error initially; they surface findings to
the workflow summary + advisory-audit-logs artifact.
The previous Security audit only covered Studio's backend requirements.
The unsloth pip package itself ships its own dep set via pyproject.toml
(typer/pydantic/pyyaml/nest-asyncio core, plus the huggingfacenotorch
extras: transformers/peft/accelerate/trl/datasets/diffusers/etc.) -- a
malicious upload to any of those would slip past us today. Build a
combined dep list from pyproject.toml + the six Studio requirements
files and feed it to both pip-audit and scan_packages.
Add scan_packages.py at scripts/scan_packages.py so the scanner ships
with the repo and CI does not depend on a network fetch at job time.
Pass --with-deps to scan_packages so the pre-install pattern scan
walks the full transitive closure -- supply-chain attacks usually land
several hops down (litellm 1.82.7 was a dep of a dep for most users;
top-level-only scanning would have missed it).
No installation in either job. pip-audit's -r mode resolves through
PyPI metadata, scan_packages downloads sdist/wheel archives raw and
inspects them without running install hooks. An attacker who has
compromised a transitive dep cannot execute code in this workflow.
