* Replace standalone Studio wording with Unsloth
Replace the single word Studio with Unsloth wherever it is used as
shorthand for Unsloth Studio in docs, CLI output, UI strings, i18n
locales, workflow display names, comments and docstrings.
Kept unchanged: the full name Unsloth Studio, third party product
names (LM Studio, Visual Studio, Mac Studio), feature names
(Recipe Studio, Fine-tuning Studio and its translations), and all
identifiers such as env vars, commands, paths and filenames.
* Address review feedback on the Studio wording rename
Use "an" before Unsloth where the rename left the article as "a".
Restore the split brand where Unsloth and Studio render as two halves
of the full product name: the onboarding sidebar subtitle and the
IPv6 localhost warning. Scope two messages to the full name Unsloth
Studio where plain Unsloth was misleading: the AMD README bullet and
the CLI studio setup error.
* Studio: make the Cloudflare tunnel opt-in (off by default)
A wildcard bind (`-H 0.0.0.0`) auto-started a public trycloudflare.com
tunnel, so exposing Studio on the LAN also published it to the public
internet. Flip the default so the tunnel is opt-in.
- `--cloudflare` is now tri-state (Optional[bool], default None = off),
mirroring the existing --enable-tools/--disable-tools handling. Pass
--cloudflare to expose a public HTTPS link for a wildcard bind; --secure
still implies the tunnel.
- --secure + --no-cloudflare is still rejected as a contradiction.
- Update the parent-command guard, re-exec forwarding, startup-banner
wording, the colab comment, README, and tests.
* Studio: update installer/setup launch hints for opt-in Cloudflare
The post-install launch hints only mentioned --secure for a public link.
Now that the tunnel is opt-in, clarify that -H 0.0.0.0 exposes the raw
port on the LAN (not a public URL), and surface --cloudflare as the
explicit opt-in for a public HTTPS link (--secure keeps the raw port
private). Applied to install.ps1, install.sh, and studio/setup.sh.
* Studio: address review - keep cloudflare tri-state + harden run re-exec
Two review points from the bots:
- Gemini: keep `cloudflare` as Optional[bool] in run_server instead of
casting None -> False, so the startup banner can distinguish "OFF (default)"
(unset) from "OFF (--no-cloudflare)" (explicit). `_cloudflare_flag` and the
banner branch now carry the tri-state.
- Codex (P1): `unsloth studio run` re-execs the studio venv's console script,
which can be an older build whose --cloudflare defaulted on; omitting the
flag let it re-enable the tunnel. That path now forwards the default polarity
explicitly (--no-cloudflare, or nothing under --secure since --secure implies
the tunnel). The plain `unsloth studio` path runs the same-version in-tree
run.py (resolved via _find_run_py), so it keeps forwarding only an explicit
polarity and still shows the accurate "(default)" banner.
Tests updated for the tri-state banner labels, the None gate cases, and the
new re-exec forwarding.
* Studio: forward --no-cloudflare on plain re-exec too (mixed install)
Codex follow-up: _find_run_py falls back to STUDIO_HOME/.../studio/backend/
run.py when the package copy is absent, so the plain `unsloth studio` re-exec
can land on an older run.py whose --cloudflare defaults on. Forward the default
polarity explicitly there too (--no-cloudflare, or nothing under --secure),
matching the run subcommand. The common in-venv launch skips the re-exec and
still shows the tri-state "(default)" banner.
* Studio: fix launch hint - --cloudflare needs the wildcard bind
Codex P3: the launch hint listed --cloudflare next to the loopback
`unsloth studio -p 8888` command, but the tunnel only starts for wildcard
binds, so `--cloudflare` alone on 127.0.0.1 does nothing. Show
`-H 0.0.0.0 --cloudflare` in the hints (install.ps1, install.sh,
studio/setup.sh) and clarify the same in the README.
* Studio: cross-platform masked terminal password prompt helper
Per-keystroke '*' echo (POSIX termios cbreak / Windows msvcrt.getwch),
backspace editing, Ctrl-C abort, EOF handling, confirmation loop with
re-prompt on mismatch or policy failure. Pure should_prompt gate for the
--secure/--cloudflare exposure paths.
* Studio CLI: force a terminal password change before public tunnel exposure
When a launch will start the Cloudflare tunnel (--secure, or --cloudflare on
a non-api-only wildcard bind) and the admin account still has its seeded
bootstrap password, prompt for a new password in the terminal (masked with
'*', confirmed, re-prompting until valid) before any re-exec or server
exists. The change is committed in the parent so it never crosses argv or
the environment and older studio-venv children see it immediately. Without
a terminal, warn and fall back to the backend bootstrap shutdown timer.
Mirrors backend update_password semantics in one transaction: rehash,
rotate the JWT secret, clear must_change_password, revoke refresh tokens,
drop the desktop secret, then remove the stale credential files.
* Studio: terminal password gate before the public tunnel (backend backstop)
Never publish a trycloudflare URL while the seeded admin password is
active: run_server now runs a terminal password-change gate after the
tunnel decision and strictly before start_studio_tunnel. Interactive
refusal fails closed (shutdown + exit 1, mirroring the secure gate);
without a tty it warns and keeps the bootstrap deadline. Success applies
the same effects as the change-password route (update_password +
revoke_user_refresh_tokens) and drops the stale
app.state.bootstrap_password. MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH centralised in
auth/storage.py and referenced by the HTTP schema. terminal_prompt.py
carries the pure gate helper (interactive loop stubbed; supplied by the
masked-input module). Also migrates the studio/setup.ps1 launch footer
that still showed the bare wildcard hint.
* README: reconcile remote-access section with opt-in Cloudflare tunnel
* Studio: harden the terminal password gate after review
- run.py: run the gate BEFORE the uvicorn socket binds. On a wildcard
--cloudflare launch the served HTML injects the bootstrap credential
for first login, so a pre-gate listener would hand the default
password to anyone who reaches the raw port while the operator is
still typing. The gate now also seeds the admin row itself (it can
run before lifespan startup).
- Headless launches that nothing would protect now fail closed: the
bootstrap deadline never arms for api-only serving and
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT=0 disables it, so warn-and-proceed
would have promised a shutdown that never comes. Both the CLI and the
backend refuse to publish in that case; the ordinary headless path
still warns and relies on the 1h deadline, and no longer auto-fills
the default credential into HTML served on a public URL.
- storage.update_password gains revoke_refresh_tokens to delete the
user's refresh tokens in the SAME transaction as the password commit;
the change-password route and the backend gate use it (a separable
follow-up delete could fail after the commit and leave a stale
refresh token able to mint access tokens under the rotated secret).
- clear_bootstrap_password is best-effort: a locked/undeletable file
must not surface as a failed password change.
- CLI masked reader: disable ISIG like the backend so Ctrl-Z cannot
suspend the process with the shared terminal stuck in no-echo mode;
handle Ctrl-C/Ctrl-Z as characters; treat stream EOF mid-line as an
abort instead of submitting a partial password. Both readers restore
terminal attrs from a SIGTERM/SIGHUP handler since a finally block
cannot run when a default-disposition signal terminates the process.
- Backend reader: decode byte-at-a-time through an incremental UTF-8
decoder so multi-byte characters split across read boundaries are no
longer dropped; isatty checks tolerate closed/None streams.
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* Studio: persist bootstrap suppression through lifespan startup
The pre-bind password gate nulled app.state.bootstrap_password, but the
FastAPI lifespan runs after it and re-reads the bootstrap password into
app.state on both admin paths, so a headless public launch could still
serve the injected credential in HTML. Carry a persistent
suppress_bootstrap_injection flag that the lifespan honors instead.
Also drop the quoted Tuple annotation on _terminal_password_gate that
tripped the import-hoist lint (the typing import looked unused).
* Studio CLI: keep the pre-exec auth DB private (0700 dir, 0600 db)
On a fresh install the pre-exposure password gate creates auth/ and
auth.db through the CLI before the backend ever runs, and
sqlite3.connect leaves the DB 0644 under a 022 umask. Mirror backend
storage.get_connection's chmod so the committed password hash and JWT
secret are never world-readable, even if the launch aborts before the
backend applies its own modes.
* Tighten pre-exposure password gate comments
* Studio: delete seeded bootstrap password before headless public re-exec
The headless warn-and-proceed path returns with the default admin
password still active, then re-execs a child Studio process. An old
studio-venv child (mixed-version install) predates the pre-bind gate and
its injection-suppress flag, so its lifespan reads .bootstrap_password
and injects the seeded credential into the public HTML for up to the
bootstrap deadline. A CLI-flag handshake cannot fix this uniformly: the
studio run path uses ignore_unknown_options and an old in-venv child
runs in-process, so it would never reject the flag.
Delete the seeded .bootstrap_password file in the parent before re-exec
so a fresh child of any version reads None and never serves it. This
covers both re-exec paths and both child versions. must_change_password
stays set, so the login page still forces a change and the bootstrap
shutdown timer still arms; only the plaintext-on-disk copy is removed.
Recovery is via a terminal-attached run or reset-password. Backend gate
and CLI warnings updated to match.
* Studio: commit the seeded admin before headless public re-exec
The headless-warn path deletes the seeded .bootstrap_password so a
re-exec'd child cannot inject it, but _ensure_cli_default_admin's INSERT
was never committed and rolled back on conn.close(). On a fresh
STUDIO_HOME an old studio-venv child then found no admin, regenerated a
fresh bootstrap password + file, and injected THAT into the public page,
defeating the deletion.
Commit the seeded admin right after _ensure_cli_default_admin so any
re-exec'd child sees the existing account and does not regenerate.
Regression tests cover both re-exec paths on a fresh (unseeded) DB.
* Studio: fail closed when the bootstrap password file cannot be removed
On the headless public path, deleting .bootstrap_password is the
protection against an old re-exec'd child injecting the seeded
credential. If unlink fails (locked file, read-only auth dir) the file
is still on disk, so warning and proceeding would still leak it for the
bootstrap-timeout window. Abort with a clear error instead. Regression
test covers the unlink-failure fail-closed path.
* Studio: hold no-echo for the whole password line, not per keystroke
The POSIX masked reader set cbreak/no-echo inside _getch_posix and restored
the terminal to echo-on in a finally after every single keystroke, because
_read_password calls _getch once per character. Between one char returning and
the next call re-entering cbreak, ECHO was on, so a keystroke arriving in that
window echoed the password in cleartext.
Move the terminal mode into a _prompt_raw_mode context that _read_password
holds around the entire line (mirroring unsloth_cli/commands/_password_prompt.py,
which already did this), restoring once when the line completes or aborts.
_getch_posix now only reads, since the mode is held by the caller. The context
is a no-op when stdin is not a real terminal, keeping the _getch test seam.
Add a regression test asserting the raw-mode context wraps the read exactly
once and every keystroke is read while it is active.
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* Studio: strip the seeded bootstrap password when the auth DB check fails
The pre-exposure gate returned early on two auth-DB inspection failures and
proceeded to re-exec without removing the seeded .bootstrap_password:
- _connect_auth_db() failure: a seeded credential from a prior run may still
be on disk.
- the must_change_password read-back failure: worse, _ensure_cli_default_admin
had already seeded the admin and the code committed it (writing
.bootstrap_password) right before the failing SELECT.
In the mixed-version case (a new outer CLI re-execing an old studio-venv child
that predates the pre-bind gate), that child would read the file back and
inject the default admin credential into the public Cloudflare page. The
sibling headless branch already deletes the file for exactly this reason, so
these returns were an inconsistent gap.
Factor the delete-or-fail-closed logic into
_strip_seeded_bootstrap_password_or_exit and call it on both inspection
failures (and reuse it in the headless branch): strip the seeded file first
(version-independent protection), failing closed if the removal itself fails.
must_change_password stays set, so the login page still forces a change and the
bootstrap shutdown timer still arms.
Add tests for both new paths (connect failure and post-commit read-back
failure strip the file and proceed; a failed strip fails closed).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Studio: fail closed when the seeded admin cannot be committed before exposure
The pre-exposure gate wrapped _ensure_cli_default_admin (the INSERT), its
conn.commit(), and the must_change_password read-back in one try, and the
except recovered by stripping .bootstrap_password and proceeding to re-exec on
the assumption the admin was already committed. That assumption only holds when
the failing statement is the SELECT. When the INSERT or the commit itself fails
(e.g. a write lock held past the busy timeout on a fresh install), no admin row
is committed: it rolls back on conn.close(), and a re-exec'd old studio-venv
child (no pre-bind gate) then finds no admin, regenerates a fresh bootstrap
password + file, and serves that default credential on the public Cloudflare
page. Stripping the file cannot stop a regeneration.
Split the seed+commit into its own try that fails closed (refuse the public
launch, best-effort removing any half-written seed file) since we cannot prove a
committed admin; keep the separate read-back failure on the strip-and-proceed
path, where the admin is committed so an old child finds it and will not
regenerate. Add a test for the seed-commit-failure path.
* Studio: decode the CLI masked password reader with errors="replace"
The CLI reader read keystrokes with text-mode sys.stdin.read(1), which raises
UnicodeDecodeError on a pasted non-UTF-8 password (e.g. Latin-1 bytes), or under
PYTHONUTF8 yields a lone surrogate that later crashes the pbkdf2 encode -- either
aborts the launch with a traceback. The backend mirror (terminal_prompt.py)
already reads raw bytes through an incremental decoder with errors="replace".
Mirror that here: read with os.read and an incremental decoder so invalid bytes
map to U+FFFD, iterating over each emitted char (one byte can complete a
replacement plus the next char).
* Studio: resolve the child launcher before the pre-exposure gate
The gate strips the seeded .bootstrap_password on a headless public launch, and
it ran before the re-exec launchability check (studio venv / run.py / console
script present). So a headless launch with an incomplete studio setup would seed
the admin, delete the bootstrap password, then abort because the child could not
be found, leaving the admin at must_change_password=1 with no password ever
shown or injectable: locked out until `unsloth studio reset-password`.
Resolve and validate the child launcher first, in both `studio` (studio_default)
and `studio run`, and only then run the gate, so an unlaunchable setup exits
before anything is stripped. Add a regression test that a missing venv exits
without removing the seeded file.
* Studio: fail closed when the auth DB cannot be opened before exposure
The connect-failure branch of the pre-exposure gate stripped .bootstrap_password
and proceeded, on the assumption a committed admin from a prior run made an old
child find it and not regenerate. But on a fresh public launch whose
_connect_auth_db() itself fails (transient lock during the schema/seed step, or
an unwritable home), no admin is committed, so a mixed-version re-exec child that
predates the backend gate can find no user, generate a fresh bootstrap password,
and serve it on the public Cloudflare page. Stripping a file we cannot vouch for
cannot stop a regeneration.
Make this branch fail closed like the seed/commit failure path: we only continue
past the DB inspection once a committed admin is confirmed. The existing file is
left untouched so a retry (after a transient lock clears) can still prompt.
Update the connect-failure test to assert fail-closed, and give the in-venv
--secure flag test a real STUDIO_HOME with an already-changed admin so the gate
is a no-op rather than relying on a DB-open failure.
* Studio: invalidate seeded bootstrap files before deleting auth.db on reset
reset-password deleted auth.db first, then best-effort unlinked the seeded
.bootstrap_password and desktop secret. unlink() only ignores
FileNotFoundError, so a locked or read-only file (Windows AV, read-only auth
dir) survived while auth.db was gone. The next server start then re-seeded
from that stale plaintext and re-validated the exact credential the reset was
meant to revoke.
Invalidate the credential files first, truncating any that cannot be
unlinked, then delete the DB, so a surviving file can never carry a reusable
secret. clear_bootstrap_password now truncates on unlink failure for the same
reason, and its warning says the contents were cleared rather than claiming
the stale password is already invalid.
* Studio: require a servable frontend before the pre-exposure gate can strip the seeded password
A headless public launch strips the seeded .bootstrap_password before the
re-exec'd child starts. If the child then cannot serve the login page (the only
in-band way to change the seeded password) the admin is locked out
(must_change_password=1, no file, no UI) until reset-password.
Add _require_servable_frontend_or_exit and call it before the gate on both
`unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run` public launches: fail closed if a
non-api-only public launch has no built frontend dist, before anything is
stripped. A user-supplied --frontend is validated to contain index.html so a
bad path cannot silently bypass the check; an auto-resolved dist is trusted
(_find_frontend_dist already requires index.html) and forwarded to the child.
Model-load aborts on `studio run` remain a residual: the parent must strip for
mixed-version safety (an old studio-venv child has no pre-bind gate) and model
loadability cannot be proven before exec, so that path stays recoverable via
reset-password.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Studio: harden reset-password ordering and validate the in-venv backend before the strip
Three follow-ups to the pre-exposure hardening:
reset-password now deletes auth.db FIRST and proves it is gone before touching
the seeded credential files. If the DB cannot be removed (a running Studio or
Windows holds it open, or a read-only auth dir) it aborts with the credential
files untouched, so a forgotten-password reset is not left half-done with the
recovery credentials deleted while an un-resettable must_change_password=1 DB
survives. After the DB is gone it invalidates the stale credential files
(unlink, else truncate) and fails closed if a file can be neither removed nor
truncated, since a surviving plaintext would be re-seeded by
generate_bootstrap_password() and re-validate the revoked password.
The in-venv (in-process) launch path had no analogue of the re-exec launcher
check: a headless public launch would seed the admin and strip the seeded
.bootstrap_password in the gate before _load_run_module() later failed on a
broken/partial venv, leaving must_change_password=1 with no password to log in.
Add _validate_inproc_backend_before_strip, called on the in-venv path (both
`unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run`) before the gate on the headless
public path, so a broken backend fails cleanly before anything is stripped. It
is scoped to the headless path so an interactive prompt is not delayed behind a
full backend import.
* Studio: validate the frontend and tunnel before the strip on every public path
Five follow-ups closing the remaining pre-exposure-strip lockouts:
The in-venv (in-process) paths of both `unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio
run` validated the backend but not the frontend before the gate, so a headless
public launch with a missing/bad dist would strip the seeded .bootstrap_password
and then abort in run_server() during frontend setup, leaving
must_change_password=1 with no login page. Both now validate a servable frontend
before the strip (cheap check first, backend import after) and serve the
resolved dist in-process.
The `studio run` re-exec discarded the dist that satisfied the pre-strip check
and only forwarded a user-supplied --frontend. In a shadowed install where the
parent finds a built dist the child cannot, it stripped and exec'd without the
path, and the child aborted during frontend setup. It now forwards the resolved
dist, matching `unsloth studio`.
On a headless --secure launch the bind is loopback, so the Cloudflare tunnel is
the only public exposure. If cloudflared is provably unavailable (found nowhere
and undownloadable) the tunnel cannot start, so stripping the recovery
credential would just lock the user out with no public URL ever served. Add
_tunnel_binary_confirmed_unavailable and, on --secure only, refuse the launch
with the credential preserved rather than strip. Wildcard --cloudflare binds
0.0.0.0 publicly regardless of the tunnel, so it still strips; any uncertainty
(helper not loadable) also still strips, since a possible credential leak
outweighs a recoverable lockout.
clear_bootstrap_password no longer claims it cleared the file's contents when
both unlink and truncate failed; it now reports the stale password is still on
disk and asks the user to remove it manually.
* Studio: fix cloudflared probe path and skip the bootstrap strip for a self-suppressing child
Two follow-ups to the --secure pre-exposure hardening:
The cloudflared availability probe loaded cloudflare_tunnel by file path but not
its backend deps: ensure_cloudflared() -> _cache_path() lazily imports
utils.paths.storage_roots, which only resolves when studio/backend is on
sys.path. From the outer CLI it is not, so the probe saw ensure_cloudflared()
return None (cache unresolvable) and wrongly treated the tunnel as unavailable,
refusing --secure even when cloudflared was cached or downloadable. Add the
backend dir to sys.path for the probe (and remove it after) so the cache path
resolves as it will in the child.
A headless --secure launch stripped the seeded .bootstrap_password before the
child proved the tunnel could actually connect, so a cloudflared that is present
but cannot establish the tunnel (blocked connectivity, Cloudflare outage) left
must_change_password=1 with no recovery credential. But the strip is only needed
when the re-exec'd child is an OLD studio-venv backend with no pre-bind
suppression: this install's own run.py sets app.state.suppress_bootstrap_injection
before binding and never serves the seeded credential publicly. Add
_child_self_suppresses (true in-process, or when the re-exec target is this
install's own run.py by path identity) and skip the strip in that case, keeping
.bootstrap_password as a local recovery credential; the strip stays fully in
force for the studio-venv console-script path and any venv-fallback run.py, where
an old child is actually possible.
* Studio: reword the pre-exposure terminal password prompt
* Studio: warn when -H is overridden by --secure; align pre-exposure prompt wording
- --secure/--secure run: emit a Note (not an error) when -H is a non-loopback
host, since --secure forces the loopback bind and would otherwise discard -H
silently.
- Reword the pre-exposure terminal prompt to 'exposed on the public internet'
in both the backend gate and the CLI mirror.
- Align the CLI success line with the backend ("Password updated for '<user>'.").
- Tests for the new -H warning (present when overridden, absent on loopback).
* Studio: add non-interactive --password to set the initial admin password
Headless hosts (CI, containers, systemd units) have no TTY, so the forced
first-exposure password change could not be completed unattended. Add a
non-interactive way to set the INITIAL admin password before the server binds:
- --password <value>, the UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD env var, or --password -
(read one line from stdin). Off by default; unset falls back to the normal
interactive terminal prompt / browser setup.
- Applies on any launch (public --secure/--cloudflare or a headless -H 0.0.0.0
bind), only when the account still has its seeded bootstrap password. An
already-set password is a hard error, never an override; an invalid value
(too short, or equal to the bootstrap) fails closed before bind.
- The CLI applies the change in the parent, never forwards --password to the
re-exec child, and strips UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD from the child env so the
secret never crosses to the child. run.py does the same on the direct path and
strips the env var so spawned subprocesses (cloudflared, llama-server, tools)
cannot inherit it.
Mirrors resolve_supplied_password across the CLI and backend, documents the
option in the README (including the argv-visibility caveat), and covers all
flows (env/stdin/literal, fail-closed cases, no-forward, env-strip,
reset-password roundtrip) in the CLI, backend, and unit suites.
* Studio: truncate the stale bootstrap file when unlink fails on a CLI password change
The post-change cleanup in _cli_update_password only warned when
.bootstrap_password could not be unlinked but was still writable (locked file,
read-only auth dir), leaving the old plaintext on disk. If auth.db is later
reset or removed, generate_bootstrap_password() reads that file back and
re-validates the revoked bootstrap password. Truncate the file on unlink
failure so its stale plaintext cannot be re-seeded, mirroring the backend
clear_bootstrap_password(); the password change is already committed, so this
never rolls it back. The warning now states truthfully whether the contents
were cleared or the file must be removed manually.
* Studio: tighten comments
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: harden the data-recipe and inference consumer loops against pump death
Follow-up to #6643. The same single-unsupervised-consumer pattern the training
pump had lives in two sibling loops, with the same failure mode: one bad event
kills the only thread that updates the in-memory state every UI surface reads,
while the worker subprocess keeps running.
- data_recipe JobManager._pump_loop: a malformed worker log line that makes
parse_log_message raise no longer kills the pump. Guard _handle_event, the
queue read, and the worker-exit finalize, and broaden _drain_queue so a drain
error still finalizes the job instead of leaving it wedged "active" (which also
leaked the workflow-scoped API key until its 24h expiry).
- inference InferenceOrchestrator._dispatcher_loop: guard the routing body so a
malformed response or a mailbox put error can't kill the dispatcher and hang
every in-flight generation (callers key liveness on the subprocess, not on
this thread).
Adds regression tests for both.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Studio: extend consumer-loop hardening to RAG, hub, auth, and stream-reader paths
Continuation of the data-recipe and inference pump hardening: the same
"background producer updates in-memory state that a single unsupervised
consumer surfaces to the UI" pattern shows up in several more Studio paths,
each able to silently freeze a UI surface while the worker keeps running.
RAG ingestion SSE (core/rag/ingestion.py):
- job_events polled the queue with a blocking get and never noticed client
disconnect or a dead worker, so a closed tab or a producer that died
without emitting a terminal event left the stream hanging. It now polls
with a timeout, emits heartbeats, ends on terminal job status, caps idle
time, and always pops the job registry in finally.
- Added _reap_finished_jobs() and call it from start_ingestion so finished
job state does not accumulate.
Startup reconcile (storage/rag_db.py, main.py):
- reconcile_orphaned_ingestion_jobs() marks ingestion jobs (and their
documents) that were left non-terminal by a previous crash as failed, so
the UI does not show jobs stuck "running" forever after a restart. Wired
in at startup next to cleanup_orphaned_runs().
Hub download watcher (hub/services/download_lifecycle.py):
- _watch() could leave a job pinned "running" if finalize raised. Body is
now guarded: on failure it logs and sets the job to error, and always
invalidates the hf cache scan in finally.
External provider stream (core/inference/external_provider.py):
- read timeout was None (no stall ceiling); set to 300s so a wedged
upstream surfaces as an error instead of an indefinitely hung stream.
Auth store (auth/storage.py):
- Enable WAL + busy_timeout on the auth DB so token validation (read on
every request) and login writes stop serialising on the rollback journal.
Matches studio_db / rag_db / providers_db.
Login rate limiter (routes/auth.py):
- _LOGIN_IP_BUCKETS could grow unbounded under spoofed-IP traffic; cap it
and prune stale buckets, mirroring the per-account bucket handling.
Training progress SSE (routes/training.py):
- Break promptly on client disconnect instead of waiting for the next
yield to fail on a closed socket, matching the export / data-recipe SSE
routes.
llama-server stdout drain (core/inference/llama_cpp.py):
- Broaden the drain guard so an unexpected decode/read error logs at debug
and stops the drainer cleanly instead of escaping the thread.
Frontend stream readers (chat-api.ts, rag-api.ts):
- Wrap the SSE read loops in try/finally + reader.cancel() so early return
([DONE]), thrown errors, and consumer aborts release the reader lock
instead of holding it until GC.
Tests:
- test_training_progress_stream_nan: fake request now implements the async
is_disconnected() the route polls, matching the other SSE route fakes.
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* Studio: address Codex review feedback on the consumer-loop hardening
Four follow-ups from the automated review, all on code this PR introduced:
- Data-recipe pump (manager.py): a queue read that keeps raising an error
outside the read's narrow catch set (e.g. a broken queue pipe after the
child died) hit the `continue` guard and skipped the dead-worker finalize
below, spinning forever and leaving the job wedged "active" with its
workflow key unretired. On a read failure, fall through to finalize when
the worker is no longer alive. Added a regression test.
- RAG ingestion SSE (ingestion.py): the 5-minute idle cap could end the
stream while the job was still pending/running (a large document spends
minutes in embedding/storing with no per-batch progress event). The route
then sends [DONE], and the client treats a no-terminal-frame end as
completion, marking the document indexed mid-ingestion. Drop the idle cap:
while the worker is alive and non-terminal we keep heartbeating; the stream
ends only on terminal DB status, the None sentinel, or client disconnect.
- Login rate limiter (auth.py): the per-IP path pruned but then added the
new IP unconditionally, so a spoofed-source-IP spray kept _LOGIN_IP_BUCKETS
unbounded and made every new IP pay a full-dict prune scan. Gate the add on
the cap, mirroring the account path.
- Hub download watcher (download_lifecycle.py): if finalize raised before it
reaped (proc.wait) and dropped the worker (e.g. an I/O error draining
stderr), the crash path published a terminal state while the live Popen
stayed registered and kept writing the cache, and the terminal set_job let
claim() admit a retry on the same repo. Terminate + drop the worker before
setting the terminal state.
* Studio: keep login throttling working when the per-IP bucket dict saturates
Review follow-up. The previous cap fix skipped creating a bucket for a new IP
once _LOGIN_IP_BUCKETS was full, returning ip_fails=0. Under a sustained spray
that also fills the account dict, every failure from such an IP then looked
first-seen and _login_blocked had no bucket to enforce, so the cap effectively
disabled throttling once saturated.
Bound the dict with a FIFO eviction instead: if the IP is new and the dict is
full, reclaim expired buckets (rate-limited so a burst of distinct IPs can't
make each failure an O(n) sweep) and, if still full, evict the oldest-inserted
IP. The new IP always gets a real bucket, so a saturating (e.g. spoofed
X-Forwarded-For) spray stays throttled while memory stays bounded. Added a
regression test that saturates the dict and asserts a later IP is still blocked.
* Studio: address Codex review (RAG queue lifecycle, stream error, orphan chunks)
Three follow-ups on the Phase 6 changes:
- RAG ingestion SSE (ingestion.py): job_events removed the per-job queue in its
finally on ANY exit, including an early client disconnect while the worker is
still running. That dropped the worker's later events (the queue is the only
one _emit writes to) and made a reconnect find no queue and receive only
[DONE], which the client treats as completion. Only drop the queue on a
terminal exit (None sentinel / terminal DB status); leftover terminal queues
are still swept by _reap_finished_jobs. Added queue-lifecycle tests.
- External provider stream (routes/inference.py): once the 300s read timeout can
fire, the stream's except path failed the monitor but ended without an error
frame or [DONE], so the chat client saw a bare EOF and saved the timed-out
answer as a successful partial with no error. Emit an SSE error frame (and
[DONE]) on stream failure so the client surfaces it.
- RAG startup reconcile (storage/rag_db.py): marking a half-ingested document
failed left its chunks/fts/vec rows intact, and retrieval filters by scope not
status, so a failed document could still be retrieved and cited. Purge the
document's chunks when reconciling it to failed (the doc row stays for
re-ingest).
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* Studio: release the remaining SSE stream readers (training, data-recipe, export)
reviewer.py follow-up. The chat and RAG SSE readers were wrapped in
try/finally + reader.cancel(), but the other three readers built on the same
response.body.getReader() pattern were left without it: streamTrainingProgress,
streamRecipeJobEvents, and streamExportLogs leak the ReadableStreamDefaultReader
lock (held until GC) when the consumer aborts, returns early, or a parse/callback
throws. Wrap each in try/finally + reader.cancel() (export already had a
try/catch, so it only needed the finally). All five frontend SSE readers now
release the reader symmetrically.
* Tighten resilience comments and docstrings
Condense the verbose explanatory comments and internal-helper docstrings added
in this branch to shorter, clearer forms. Comment/whitespace only; verified no
code changed via AST diff. No behaviour change.
* Studio: keep chunks for completed docs during ingestion reconcile
Startup reconciliation flips orphaned (non-terminal) ingestion jobs to failed and
purges the document's chunks so a failed source can't be retrieved. But it dropped
the chunks unconditionally, so a document the worker had already committed as
'completed' before the crash (only its job row left non-terminal) lost every chunk
while still reporting 'completed'. That leaves an empty source that retrieval can't
return and dedup (status != 'failed') blocks from re-ingest.
Only purge chunks when the document UPDATE actually transitions it to failed; an
already-completed document keeps its chunks. Adds reconcile regression tests for
both the completed-doc and genuine in-flight-orphan cases.
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* Studio: drop a finished RAG job's queue when the client disconnects
job_events kept the per-job queue until it consumed the None sentinel, so a UI
that stops on the terminal event (its reader.cancel aborts the stream before
[DONE]) left the queue registered until the next _reap_finished_jobs sweep; a
batch of uploads followed by idling retained them all.
_run writes the terminal DB status before emitting the terminal event, so on
generator exit, drop the queue when the job's DB row is already terminal (worker
done, nothing to resume) and keep it only while the worker is still running. Adds
a disconnect-after-terminal-event regression test.
* Remove stray async task output files committed by mistake
* Studio: harden login IP throttle and end progress stream on disconnect
Two Codex review items:
Login per-IP throttle: when the per-IP bucket dict saturated, FIFO eviction could
drop a still-hot (blocked) bucket, so an IP could flood the dict with distinct
(or spoofed) source IPs to push out its own bucket and retry as first-seen. Stop
evicting hot buckets; a new IP that can't fit now shares a bounded overflow
counter that still trips the per-IP threshold, so a saturating spray stays
throttled and no live counter is reset.
Progress SSE: on client disconnect the polling loop only broke and fell through
to the unconditional final 'complete' frame, so a buffered or proxying consumer
could read a still-active run as completed. Return from the generator instead.
Adds regression tests for both (spray cannot reset a hot bucket; disconnect while
active emits no complete frame).
* Studio: shard the login overflow counter and stop cancelling chat stream after [DONE]
Two Codex review items:
Login throttle overflow: the single shared overflow counter meant that once a
saturating spray pushed it past the per-IP threshold, _login_blocked returned 429
for every new unbucketed source IP, before credentials were checked -- a global
login denial. Shard the overflow into a fixed array of counters keyed by hash(ip),
so a hot shard only throttles the IPs that map to it while a single source's
repeated failures still concentrate in one shard and stay throttled. Memory stays
bounded and no live bucket is evicted. Adds a regression test that a hot overflow
shard does not block an unrelated IP.
Chat stream: the reader.cancel() in the SSE finally fired even after a natural
[DONE]/EOF. The backend finalizes its api-monitor entry right after yielding the
sentinel (the local pass-through finishes after the last yield), so a client
cancel there can be observed as a disconnect and mark a completed request as
cancelled. Track natural completion and only cancel on an early/abnormal exit.
(No frontend unit test: the Studio frontend has no test harness.)
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* Studio: give prep-timeout test fakes an is_disconnected method
The progress stream now ends on client disconnect (await request.is_disconnected()
before falling through to the terminal frame). After merging that into the
prep-timeout tests added later on main, their _FakeRequest/_ReconnectRequest must
provide is_disconnected or the generator raises AttributeError under CI.
* Studio: keep the login overflow throttle when bucket capacity frees up
_login_blocked only consulted the per-IP overflow shard while the bucket dict was
still at capacity. If a slot freed before the 60s window expired (e.g. another
IP's successful login calls _clear_login_bucket), a source counted in a hot shard
stopped being blocked and its next failure got a fresh per-IP bucket, resetting
the throttle the overflow path exists to preserve. Always max in the IP's shard
(shards are empty outside saturation, so it is a no-op in the common case). Adds a
regression test that a hot source stays throttled after a bucket frees.
* Studio: clear a login IP's overflow throttle on successful login
_clear_login_bucket reset the per-IP and per-account buckets on a successful
login but not the overflow shard, so after the dict saturated and an IP was
counted in overflow, a later successful login left those entries behind and the
next failed attempt could immediately return 429.
Store overflow entries as (timestamp, ip) so a source is throttled by its own
count within the shard (also removing cross-IP collateral within a shard), and
drop just that IP's entries in _clear_login_bucket. Adds a regression test that a
successful login clears the overflow throttle.
* Studio: bound the login overflow shard memory under high-cardinality spray
The per-IP overflow tracked failures in a time-pruned deque of (timestamp, ip)
tuples, so a spoofed-X-Forwarded-For spray of distinct one-off IPs grew memory and
the per-check scan with request cardinality for the whole window -- undermining
the bucket cap that exists to bound memory. Replace each shard with a fixed-
capacity dict (ip -> [count, window_start]): O(1) lookups, and when a shard is
full a one-off IP evicts the lowest-count entry (Space-Saving) so memory is hard-
bounded while a persistent attacker keeps a high count and is never evicted. Adds
a regression test that shards stay within the per-shard cap under a 5000-IP spray.
* Studio: purge chunks for already-failed docs during ingestion reconcile
The reconcile chunk-purge was gated on the documents UPDATE actually flipping a
non-terminal doc to failed. A doc the worker had already marked 'failed' before
the crash (job row left non-terminal) was not re-flipped, so its committed chunks
were kept and stayed retrievable/citable, since retrieval filters by scope not
status. Purge chunks whenever the document is not 'completed' (failed, in-flight,
or gone), preserving the completed-doc carve-out. Adds a regression test.
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* Studio: don't inherit an evicted IP's count onto a new overflow source
When a full overflow shard evicted the lowest-count entry, the new source
inherited that count (Space-Saving base + 1). If a shard was saturated with hot
entries, an unrelated new IP could land at/over the threshold and be 429'd after a
single attempt -- cross-IP collateral despite the per-source-isolation intent.
New entries now start clean at count 1; the only cost is that a heavy hitter that
is the lowest-count entry in a fully saturated shard can briefly reset, which is
preferable to blocking a bystander. Adds a regression test.
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* Studio: carry overflow failures into a new IP bucket on transition
_login_blocked took max(per-IP bucket, overflow shard) rather than combining them,
so a source could log (threshold-1) failures in overflow during saturation and,
once a bucket slot freed, another (threshold-1) in a fresh bucket within the same
window -- roughly doubling the per-IP limit. When a saturated-era IP first gets a
real bucket, migrate its windowed overflow count into that bucket (and drop the
overflow entry) so the combined failures throttle at the intended limit. Adds a
regression test.
* Studio: reconcile a completed doc's orphaned job to completed, not failed
When a crash left an ingestion job non-terminal after its document was already
committed as completed, reconcile marked the job failed. After restart the upload
UI has no in-memory SSE queue and falls back to getJob(), which treats a failed
job as an indexing failure and removes/toasts a document that is actually
searchable. Mark the job completed (keeping its chunks) when its document is
completed. Extends the completed-doc reconcile test to assert the job status.
* Studio: clamp the overflow failure count migrated into a login bucket
A saturated source could accrue an unbounded overflow count, then materialize
one deque entry per recorded failure when a bucket slot freed, allocating an
arbitrarily large deque under the login lock. Only at-or-above the per-IP
threshold matters for blocking, so cap the count there at the record and take
sites; the migration is now bounded without weakening the limit.
* Studio: keep the RAG job stream alive on a transient status read
The heartbeat poll read the job row unguarded; a momentarily-locked DB would
raise out of job_events, which the SSE route turns into a terminal error frame,
and the UI drops a document whose worker is still running. Treat a failed status
read as non-terminal: heartbeat and retry, and keep the queue so a reconnect can
resume.
* Studio: set busy_timeout before journal_mode on the auth DB
Switching journal_mode needs a lock, so if a refresh-token write already holds
one, journal_mode=WAL raises SQLITE_BUSY and the shared try leaves the
connection on SQLite's default zero lock wait. Set busy_timeout first so the
switch waits instead of failing.
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* CLI: stop `unsloth connect` from leaking Studio credentials to unverified servers
`unsloth connect` (and `unsloth chat`) discovered a Studio base URL from
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL or the default localhost port after only an unauthenticated
/api/health probe, then sent credentials to it:
- keyless connect iterated every cached API key and sent each as a bearer token
to {base}/v1/models, so a malicious or port-preempting endpoint could harvest
all of them;
- with no cached key it self-issued a Studio JWT and POSTed it to
{base}/api/auth/api-keys;
- unsloth chat sent the same self-issued JWT to the discovered base.
The key cache was a flat, global list with no binding to a server identity, so a
key minted for one Studio could be replayed to any other.
Changes:
- Scope the agent key cache per base URL so a key is only ever replayed to the
exact server it was minted for. Pre-scoping flat caches are ignored rather
than replayed (at most one extra local mint on the next launch).
- Gate every automatic credential flow to loopback bases. A non-loopback
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL now requires an explicit --api-key and nothing is sent
automatically. SSH-tunnelled Studios that land on 127.0.0.1 keep working.
- Mint the API key locally against the Studio auth DB instead of POSTing a
self-issued JWT over the network, so no bearer token leaves the process on the
local path.
- Apply the same loopback gate to connect_studio_server (used by unsloth chat).
Fully closing same-host loopback-port preemption needs a signed /api/health
handshake so the client can verify the server identity before sending anything;
that is tracked as a server-side follow-up.
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* CLI: verify Studio server identity before auto-sending credentials
Adds a challenge-response so `unsloth connect` and `unsloth chat` can confirm a
discovered loopback endpoint is really this install's Studio (not a process
that preempted the port) before sending it a cached or freshly minted
credential. This closes the same-host loopback-preemption gap left open by the
previous commit, which could only limit the blast radius.
Server:
- storage.get_or_create_identity_secret(): a dedicated server-wide secret in
app_secrets (kept separate from the per-user JWT secret), readable only by
the same OS user.
- storage.compute_identity_proof(nonce) = HMAC-SHA256(identity secret, nonce).
- GET /api/auth/identity?nonce=<base64url>: unauthenticated, returns the proof.
The nonce is opaque to the server and the proof reveals nothing about the
secret, so answering is safe.
Client:
- verify_studio_identity(base): sends a fresh 32-byte nonce, recomputes the
expected HMAC from the local same-user secret, and constant-time compares.
Fails closed on any error.
- connect._agent_api_key gates the loopback cached-key replay and the local
mint on it; connect_studio_server (used by unsloth chat) gates the
self-issued JWT on it.
A server that cannot read this install's secret (a different OS user, or a
remote/fake endpoint) cannot produce a matching proof, so the client refuses
and falls back to an explicit --api-key.
Tests: studio/backend/tests/test_identity.py (proof determinism, secret
persistence and caching, route response and nonce validation) and additions to
test_connect.py (the verify gate refuses when unverified, an explicit key skips
the check, and an end-to-end client plus server handshake against a stub HTTP
server).
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* CLI: mint through the verified server instead of the local auth DB
CodeQL (py/clear-text-storage-sensitive-data) flagged the API key written to
the per-server cache and the agent config files once it was sourced from
storage.create_api_key(); the original HTTP-minted key did not trip the query.
Now that the identity handshake cryptographically confirms the loopback
responder really is this Studio before anything is sent, minting through the
server's /api/auth/api-keys endpoint with a self-issued JWT is safe again and
restores the original, CodeQL-clean data flow. The local-DB mint path is
removed.
The security properties are unchanged: discovery is still loopback-gated and
identity-verified, the key cache is still scoped per server, and a credential
reaches the server only after the handshake has proven its identity. The only
difference from the previous commit is that the self-issued JWT is sent to the
already-verified loopback server rather than the key being minted in-process.
Tests updated to mint through the fake server again.
* CLI: address review feedback on connect credential handling
- Reuse a saved per-server key before the loopback/identity gate. Keys are
scoped per base URL, so a key the user saved with --api-key for a remote or
SSH-tunnelled Studio (whose identity secret the local handshake can't match)
is replayed only to that exact server. The loopback + identity-handshake gate
now guards just auto-minting (self-issuing a JWT and creating a new key),
which is the path that needs a cryptographically verified local Studio. Fixes
keyless reuse being impossible for remote/tunnelled Studios the user had
saved a key for.
- connect_studio_server (unsloth chat / inference): when the user explicitly set
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL but the server can't be safely attached (non-loopback, or
identity unverifiable), fail with a clear message instead of silently loading
the model locally. Opportunistic discovery of the local default still falls
back to a local load.
- Harden cache parsing: tolerate a corrupt or hand-edited cache where a base
maps to a non-list (which would otherwise iterate a string into
single-character "keys"), and read the cache as UTF-8.
Tests updated and added: saved-key replay without the handshake for both local
and remote bases, keyless mint still refused when the loopback server is
unverified, and connect_studio_server erroring on an explicit remote while
falling back locally on default discovery.
* CLI: harden connect handshake against relay and gate cached minted keys
Addresses review feedback on the credential handshake:
- Refuse HTTP redirects on credential-bearing requests (the identity handshake,
/v1/models, key minting, and the chat HTTP backend). A process squatting the
discovered port could 302 /api/auth/identity to the real Studio and relay its
valid proof, or bounce a bearer-token request to another base, and urllib
follows redirects by default. A shared no-redirect opener now treats any 3xx
as an error.
- Give cached keys provenance. Keys the user supplied with --api-key are "saved"
and replay without the handshake (needed for remote or SSH-tunnelled Studios
whose secret the local handshake can't match). Keys we auto-mint are "minted"
and replay only after the identity handshake, so a port squatter can't collect
a previously minted localhost key just by answering the health check. New cache
shape: servers[base] = {"saved": [...], "minted": [...]}.
Known residual: a different-OS-user process that squats the port and can also
reach a genuine same-secret Studio elsewhere on loopback can still manually relay
the identity challenge. Fully closing that needs the proof bound to the server's
real listening port, or OS-level peer-credential checks; tracked as follow-up. A
same-user attacker is out of scope, since it can already read the 0600 key cache.
Tests: redirect rejection in the handshake, minted-cache requiring the handshake
while saved-cache bypasses it, and the existing suites updated for the new cache
shape. unsloth_cli (206) and test_identity.py (5) pass.
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* CLI: keep urllib imports function-local in the no-redirect opener
The repo's import-hoist safety linter (scripts/verify_import_hoist.py) flags
hoisting urllib to module level because it re-points the 'urllib' name in the
pre-existing HttpChatBackend._request scope. Build the no-redirect opener lazily
with function-local urllib imports instead, matching this module's convention,
and restore the local 'import urllib.request' in _request and
verify_studio_identity.
* test(identity): skip route tests when routes.auth import chain is unavailable
The identity route tests build a TestClient from routes.auth, which pulls the
whole routes package (routes/__init__ -> inference -> llama_cpp, ...). In a
minimal test matrix without the heavy backend deps, or when another test in the
same process has already broken that import chain, importing it raised and the
two route tests hard-failed. Skip in that case instead: the proof crypto is
covered by the storage-level tests, and the full backend CI still exercises the
route. No behaviour change where the deps are present (5 passed in isolation).
* test(connect): make connect tests pass on native Windows
unsloth connect supports Windows: --no-launch prints PowerShell ($env:X =
"v" / Remove-Item Env:X) instead of POSIX (export/unset), and the launch
path bridges env into a Windows agent .exe over WSLENV. The tests hardcoded
the POSIX shell forms, so on a real windows-latest runner 12 of them failed on
the assertion string even though every command exited 0.
Add OS-aware assertion helpers (_assert_env_set / _assert_env_unset) that check
the right shell syntax for the host OS, and skip the two WSL-from-Linux shim
tests on native Windows (os.name is 'posix' inside WSL, so that path can't run
there). No change on Linux/macOS (57 passed); the connect command's behaviour
is untouched. Validated on a windows-latest staging runner.
* style(connect): tighten comments in the credential-leak fix
Condense the verbose explanatory comments and multi-line docstrings added by
this PR to one or two lines each, drop a few that just restated the code, and
keep the security rationale where it is load-bearing. Comment/whitespace only;
verified with unslothai/scripts comment_tools.py (check --strip-docstrings:
6/6 'code unchanged'). Tests unchanged: connect 57 passed, identity 5 passed.
* CLI/Studio: harden the identity handshake (review round)
Addresses the latest Codex/Gemini review of the handshake:
- Store the identity secret privately. sqlite3.connect created the auth DB
world-readable under a 022 umask, so another OS user could read app_secrets
and forge proofs, defeating the same-user assumption the handshake rests on.
The auth dir and DB are now restricted to owner-only (0700/0600); the JWT
secret and password hashes there get the same protection.
- Bind the proof to the server's listening port. The stateless HMAC(secret,
nonce) was relayable: a process squatting the discovered port could proxy the
challenge to the real Studio on another port and pass it back. The proof now
covers the port the server actually listens on (from the socket, never the
Host header) and the client checks it against the port it connected to, so a
relayed proof from a different port no longer matches. Closes the manual-relay
residual left after the redirect fix.
- Cap the identity response read (the server is still unverified at that point)
and serve the identity route from a sync def so its first-call SQLite read
runs in the threadpool instead of the event loop.
Tests: port-bound proof + relayed-proof rejection added; identity (5) and
unsloth_cli (58) suites pass. Verified end to end against a real backend
(auth DB owner-only, handshake + mint still succeed).
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* CLI/Studio: bind the identity proof to the connection address, not just port
Follow-up to the port binding from the last review. Binding only to the port
left a cross-address relay: a squatter on a different loopback address but the
same port (for example localhost resolving to a squatter on ::1 while the real
Studio is on 127.0.0.1) could proxy the nonce to the real Studio and pass back
a proof that still matched, since both share the port.
The proof now covers the address and the port the connection landed on:
- Server: takes the address+port from request.scope, which uvicorn populates
from getsockname, so it is the real local address the client reached even
when Studio is bound to 0.0.0.0 (verified empirically), never the
client-controlled Host header.
- Client: resolves the base host to one concrete IP, talks to exactly that IP,
and binds the proof to (IP, port). A proof relayed from a Studio on a
different address or port was computed for that other endpoint and no longer
matches the one the client dialed.
Both sides normalise the address through ipaddress so equivalent forms compare
equal. Together with the private-secret and redirect fixes, this closes the
cross-user loopback relay an attacker can mount without reading the secret.
Tests: proof now bound to host+port; relayed-proof rejection retained; identity
(5) and unsloth_cli (58) suites pass. Verified end to end against a real backend
(handshake + mint still succeed).
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* CLI: pick the loopback address at discovery so localhost does not regress
find_studio_server now resolves a bare localhost base to its concrete loopback
addresses and returns the first that answers /api/health, IPv4 127.0.0.1 first
(where unsloth studio binds by default). The whole flow (health probe, identity
check, credential send) then targets that one address instead of racing
IPv4/IPv6 resolution, where localhost could resolve ::1-first and hide a Studio
bound to 127.0.0.1. A literal IP or remote name is unchanged.
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Trim and tighten code comments and docstrings across the repository. Comment-only: every changed file verified code-identical to main via AST/token comparison.
Trim and tighten code comments and docstrings across studio/ Python. Comment-only: every changed file verified code-identical to main via AST/token comparison.
Raise ruff line-length to 100 and extend the local pre-commit format pipeline (def-signature magic-comma normalization, short multi-line assert collapse, kwarg '=' spacing, blank-line-after-short-import removal, adjacent string-literal / f-string+plain merge, redundant-pass pruning). Every transform re-checks the file AST and is dropped if it would differ; the whole-repo reformat is verified AST-identical per file and idempotent.
Addresses review feedback on #5971. _reset_password_command() already
shell-quotes the launcher path on POSIX (shlex.quote), so wrapping the result in
another pair of single quotes in the error string produced a mangled hint for
installs / home dirs containing spaces, e.g.
Run ''/tmp/Unsloth Studio/.../unsloth' studio reset-password' in your terminal
which a shell mis-parses. Drop the outer quotes and put the command at the end of
the message so it is unambiguous and copy-pasteable in every case:
Incorrect password. To reset it, run this in your terminal: <cmd>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Studio login error rewrote the backend's PATH-based command into a relative Windows path (.\unsloth_studio\Scripts\unsloth.exe ...) that only resolves from inside the Studio home dir and fails with CommandNotFoundException elsewhere. Removes the Windows-only rewrite and the now-unused usePlatformStore import so the backend's unsloth studio reset-password command is shown as-is on all platforms.
* studio: proxy-aware login rate-limit; allow google favicons in CSP
Two follow-ups to #5375's auth + headers hardening.
Login rate-limit:
The per-IP bucket keyed on request.client.host alone. Behind any
reverse proxy or shared NAT it lumps everyone together (one user's
typos lock everyone out for 60 seconds; the 429 detail leaked the
proxy/internal IP back to clients). The bucket key is now
(client-ip, username.lower) so:
- one wrong-password run does not block another user from the same IP
- one IP does not block the same user from a different IP
The 429 detail body no longer interpolates the IP. Behind a proxy
clients can set UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED=1 so the limiter
honours X-Forwarded-For / Forwarded; off by default so a direct
caller cannot spoof the header.
CSP img-src:
components/assistant-ui/sources.tsx renders citation favicons from
https://www.google.com/s2/favicons. The current img-src allows
t0..t3.gstatic.com (used for other Google-hosted icons) but not the
main host the favicon URL points to, so every citation icon
CSP-blocks and falls back to gray initials. Adding www.google.com to
img-src is the same shape as #5409's connect-src HF allowlist fix.
Tests:
- test_login_rate_limit.py (new): _client_ip respects
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED for X-Forwarded-For and Forwarded;
bucket key is composed of (ip, lower(username)) and isolates
cross-user and cross-IP buckets; 429 detail does not contain the
client IP; Retry-After header preserved.
- test_middleware.py: new test_img_src_allows_google_favicons pins
that www.google.com is in the img-src directive and the existing
gstatic CDNs stay allowed.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: normalise forwarded IPs, IP-wide aggregate cap, unknown-user sentinel
Reviewer follow-ups to the proxy-aware login rate-limit PR.
Forwarded address normalisation: with
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED=1, raw `X-Forwarded-For` and
`Forwarded: for=` values such as `198.51.100.7:50001` or
`"[2001:db8::1]:50001"` were carried verbatim into the bucket key,
so one client emitting a fresh source port per attempt split into
many buckets and bypassed _LOGIN_MAX_FAILS. _normalize_forwarded_addr
now strips quotes, optional `[..]:port` for IPv6 and `host:port` for
IPv4, and validates as an IP literal; garbage values fall through to
the direct request.client.host. Forwarded parsing also isolates the
first forwarded-element so a multi-element header cannot create
attacker-controlled bucket strings.
Spray protection: the (ip, username) key removed the aggregate
per-IP throttle the pre-PR limiter provided. A client rotating
nonexistent usernames produced [401, 401, 401, 401, 401, 401] where
pre-PR produced [401, 401, 401, 401, 401, 429]. Restored the
aggregate via a parallel _LOGIN_IP_BUCKETS table (max 30 fails / 60s
per IP) checked alongside the per-(ip, username) bucket; both
buckets must be cleared on a successful login.
Bucket cardinality: every distinct unauthenticated username
allocated a new (ip, username) bucket entry without bound. 1,000
random usernames from one IP produced 1,000 buckets. Failures whose
username does not exist now record into a single sentinel key
(ip, "\x00unknown-user") so cardinality stays at one per IP for the
unknown path. The known-user path additionally enforces a global
hard cap (_LOGIN_MAX_BUCKETS = 4096) that prunes stale empty buckets
on overflow and otherwise folds the failure into the per-IP bucket
only.
Test:
- python -m pytest studio/backend/tests/test_login_rate_limit.py -q
-> 19 passed (was 12 before this commit; +5 forwarded-address
normalisation, +1 sentinel bucket, +1 bucket cap)
CSP comment refreshed to mention `www.google.com` alongside
*.gstatic.com so future readers see why the host is allowlisted.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: tokenise img-src assertion to silence CodeQL substring rule
The new CSP google-favicon test used 'host string in directive string'
which CodeQL flagged as py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization
(the substring could appear at an arbitrary position in a URL).
The assertion is checking a CSP directive, not URL sanitisation, but
splitting the directive on whitespace and asserting against the
tokenised source list expresses the same intent and matches the
exact CSP source expression. CodeQL no longer treats it as a URL
substring check.
Test: python -m pytest studio/backend/tests/test_middleware.py -q
-> 14 passed
* studio: use any(src == host) for CSP source asserts
CodeQL's py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization still flagged the
tokenised "host in img_sources" check. Switching to
`any(src == host for src in img_sources)` makes the comparison an
exact-equality (not substring) match, which the rule does not flag.
Test: python -m pytest studio/backend/tests/test_middleware.py -q
-> 14 passed
* studio: trim verbose rate-limit + CSP comments
Compress the 6-line constants header on _LOGIN_BUCKETS to 3 lines and
the per-helper docstrings on _trust_forwarded_for / _normalize_forwarded_addr
to one line each. Same code, fewer in-flow tutorials.
Note in the CSP comment that www.google.com is the active favicon host
(used by sources.tsx for s2/favicons citations); *.gstatic.com stays as
legacy faviconV2 coverage but the SPA no longer fetches it.
33 tests in test_login_rate_limit.py + test_middleware.py still pass.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* studio: contain export and dataset paths under their configured roots
resolve_under_root and resolve_dataset_path previously returned absolute
paths unchanged, so an authenticated client could supply
save_directory="/tmp/escape" (or any other absolute path) and have the
exporter drop adapter files anywhere the server user could write. This
turned up during a recent audit pass where an authenticated POST to
/api/export/export/lora with save_directory="/tmp/lora_escape_test"
returned 200 and wrote adapter_model.safetensors, adapter_config.json,
and tokenizer files under /tmp.
The fix is two-layered:
storage_roots.py adds an _assert_contained(resolved, root) helper that
runs after path resolution and rejects any result whose realpath does
not sit under realpath(root). resolve_under_root now rejects '..'
segments and null bytes outright, and only accepts absolute inputs when
they are already inside the configured root (internal call sites that
re-resolve a stored absolute path stay idempotent;
worker.py:resolve_output_dir(output_dir) etc. continue to work).
resolve_dataset_path picks up the same containment rule, scoped to the
three dataset roots.
models/export.py adds field_validator("save_directory", mode="before")
to ExportCommonOptions and ExportGGUFRequest so bad input fails fast at
422 with a clear message rather than a 500 deep inside the resolver.
The validator rejects empty/whitespace, null bytes, control chars,
strings longer than 255 chars, absolute paths, and '..' segments.
routes/export.py:_export_details now returns os.path.relpath(output_path,
exports_root()) so the Export Complete dialog and /api/models/loras no
longer leak the absolute install prefix to the UI; the basename is
used as a last-resort fallback.
Verified end to end:
- POST /api/export/export/lora {"save_directory":"/tmp/foo"} -> 422
"save_directory must be a name or relative path under the export
root; absolute paths are rejected". /tmp/foo is not created.
- "../../etc/escape" -> 422 "may not contain '..' segments".
- save_directory="my_subdir" -> still accepted (400 only because the
test had no checkpoint loaded yet, not because of validation).
- Internal idempotent re-resolve via resolve_export_dir(absolute path
that is already under exports_root) returns the same path unchanged.
* studio/sandbox: harden bash + python tool execution
The sandboxed Bash and Python tool channels in Chat ran with a thin
preexec hook (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS + RLIMIT_FSIZE only). Bash had a
small word blocklist; Python had an AST safety pass aimed at
signal-tampering and shell-escape primitives. An audit pass showed
several gaps that a tool-calling model could trigger inadvertently:
- bash curl/wget/nc reached AWS IMDSv2 and returned live STS
credentials for the instance role.
- python "import socket; s.connect((169.254.169.254, 80))"
reached the same endpoint regardless of the bash blocklist.
- "cat /etc/passwd" was blocked at the bash side (because "passwd"
is in the blocklist), but "open('/etc/passwd').read()" in Python
happily returned its contents.
- "chr(115)+chr(117)+chr(100)+chr(111)" style dynamic-arg
construction slipped through the AST shell-escape check.
- The supervisor used proc.kill() on timeout, which only signals
the immediate pid; bash-backgrounded children survived. A fork
bomb could spawn for the full 300s timeout window.
- Session work directories under ~/studio_sandbox/<id>/ were
created with default umask (0o755), so any other UID on the host
could enumerate them.
- session_id sanitisation used a one-shot str.replace("..",""),
which is non-iterative and a small footgun.
This commit takes a conservative middle path: the sandbox still
runs as the Studio UID with no namespace tricks where the kernel
disallows them, but every chokepoint is tightened.
_sandbox_preexec now:
- calls os.setsid() so children share a process group; the
supervisor uses os.killpg(SIGKILL) on timeout/cancel so
backgrounded children die with the parent (new _kill_process_tree
helper, wired into _cancel_watcher and both _bash_exec /
_python_exec timeout branches).
- calls os.umask(0o077) so files the child writes default to 0o600.
- applies PR_SET_PDEATHSIG=SIGKILL so an orphaned child dies if
Studio exits.
- best-effort unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) for a private network namespace
(failure is logged and swallowed; defense-in-depth is still in
place via the bash blocklist and the AST checker below).
- sets RLIMIT_NPROC=10000 (tunable via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_NPROC),
RLIMIT_AS=8GB, RLIMIT_CPU=300, RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024. The 10k NPROC
figure is chosen to sit well above the ~500 LWPs a healthy Studio
+ llama-server combination already uses while still capping a
runaway fork bomb. NPROC counts LWPs per real UID, so a lower
figure (e.g. 256) starves legitimate bash forks
("bash: fork: retry: Resource temporarily unavailable").
_get_workdir:
- rejects session_id that doesn't match [A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64};
non-matching values bucket into a shared "_invalid" dir.
- chmod 0o700 on both the workdir and on ~/studio_sandbox/ so
other UIDs cannot read another session's contents.
_BLOCKED_COMMANDS_COMMON gains: doas, pkexec, halt, poweroff, curl,
wget, nc, ncat, netcat, socat, ssh, scp, sftp, rsync, eval, source.
The intent is to keep general bash usage working (echo, ls, pipes,
loops, for, head, etc.) while denying the obvious egress and
escalation paths.
The AST checker (_check_signal_escape_patterns) is split into the
existing shell/signal/loop checks plus a new narrow IO denylist:
- Always flag non-literal args to anything in _SHELL_EXEC_FUNCS,
not just _STRING_SHELL_FUNCS. Closes the dynamic-arg bypass.
- Reject calls to socket.create_connection, socket.socket().connect,
urllib.request.urlopen, http.client.HTTP*Connection, requests.*,
httpx.* whose literal host argument is in a cloud-metadata
denylist (169.254.169.254 + 169.254.* + 100.64.*, plus the
GCP/Alibaba/ECS metadata hostnames and IPv6 link-local). Public
hosts (example.com, huggingface.co, ...) still work. Dynamic
hosts cannot be statically blocked; mitigated by the bash
blocklist + the netns where the kernel allows it.
- Reject literal open("/etc/passwd"), /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
/etc/ssh/*, and /proc/<pid>/environ. Other files
(/etc/os-release, /etc/hostname, /tmp/*, user dirs) still work.
The _check_code_safety summariser is updated to include the new
network_calls and sensitive_file_reads buckets in its error string.
Regression-checked: echo, sleep, ls /tmp, for loops, piped helpers
(echo a | tr a A), urllib.request.urlopen("http://example.com"),
socket.getaddrinfo("example.com",80), open("/etc/os-release"),
open("/tmp/...","w") all still succeed. curl, wget, nc, ssh, rm,
socket.create_connection(("169.254.169.254",80)),
open("/etc/passwd"), open("/proc/self/environ") all correctly
blocked.
* studio: rate-limit login, rotate refresh tokens, add logout, security headers, gate bootstrap injection
A pass over the auth surface found a cluster of related issues that this
commit closes together.
Login (routes/auth.py):
- Add an in-memory per-IP login rate limiter. Five failed POSTs to
/api/auth/login inside a 60s window produce 429 with Retry-After.
A successful login clears the bucket. Previously 30 wrong passwords
in under one second was accepted as 30x 401, which combined with
the (now fixed) admin-username leak from /api/auth/status made
brute-force trivial against a small password.
Logout (routes/auth.py):
- New POST /api/auth/logout returns 204 and calls
storage.revoke_user_refresh_tokens(subject) so the refresh token
is no longer valid. Previously POST /api/auth/logout returned 405
and there was no way to invalidate refresh tokens short of
changing the password. Frontend session.ts already calls
clearAuthTokens() to drop localStorage; the new endpoint lets the
client also tell the server to revoke server-side state.
Refresh-token rotation (routes/auth.py + auth/storage.py):
- New storage.consume_refresh_token(token) atomically validates +
deletes a refresh token, returning (username, is_desktop). The
/api/auth/refresh handler now mints both a new access AND a new
refresh token; the supplied token becomes invalid. Replaying a
consumed refresh returns 401 "Invalid or expired refresh token".
The previous refresh_access_token helper is left in place for
callers that intentionally want the non-rotating shape; nothing
in the route layer uses it now.
/api/auth/status no longer leaks default_username (models/auth.py +
routes/auth.py):
- AuthStatusResponse.default_username becomes Optional[str] with a
None default; the handler always returns None. The frontend already
hardcodes HIDDEN_LOGIN_USERNAME = "unsloth" (auth-form.tsx:82), so
no UI change is required.
window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__ no longer auto-injects (main.py):
- _inject_bootstrap is now opt-in via the
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP env var. The previous default
(inject whenever requires_password_change is true) embedded the
plaintext bootstrap password into the first-boot HTML for any
caller that hit /, /change-password, or any unknown SPA path.
Browser extensions and any XSS payload on the page could read it
trivially. With the new gate the bootstrap password lives only in
the auth/.bootstrap_password file (mode 0o600) where it has always
been; users typing it into a current-password field is the right
UX. routes/auth.py:change_password also clears
app.state.bootstrap_password defensively.
Security headers + server fingerprint (main.py + run.py):
- New SecurityHeadersMiddleware adds Content-Security-Policy,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(),
interest-cohort=(), and stamps server: unsloth-studio so the
generic uvicorn banner no longer fingerprints the stack. The
uvicorn.Config gains server_header=False so it stops emitting its
own Server header.
/api/health minimisation (main.py):
- Unauthenticated GET /api/health returns just
{"status":"healthy","timestamp":...} so load-balancer liveness
probes keep working without leaking version, device_type,
chat_only, desktop_protocol_version, or studio_root_id to
arbitrary callers. A request that presents a valid Bearer token
still gets the full diagnostic payload so internal launchers and
sibling-Studio detection (which compares studio_root_id) keep
working.
Verification:
- 30 wrong-password POSTs to /api/auth/login -> first 5 = 401, 6th
through 30th = 429.
- POST /api/auth/logout with a fresh token -> 204. The matching
refresh token then fails 401.
- Login -> R1; /api/auth/refresh with R1 -> new access + R2 (R2 !=
R1); /api/auth/refresh with R1 again -> 401; /api/auth/refresh
with R2 -> still succeeds once and rotates again.
- curl /api/auth/status -> default_username: null.
- curl http://127.0.0.1/ does not contain __UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__.
- curl -I / shows CSP, X-Frame-Options: DENY,
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy, and server: unsloth-studio.
- curl /api/health unauthenticated -> {status, timestamp} only.
curl with Authorization: Bearer <valid> -> full payload.
- Existing /api/system, /api/models/list, /api/train/status,
/api/inference/status, /api/auth/api-keys, login flow, SPA root
all still return 200 after the changes (regression smoke).
* studio: add SecurityHeadersMiddleware, MaxBodyMiddleware, /recipes redirect, gate _inject_bootstrap, minimise /api/health
This commit lands the main.py-side changes that share a single
middleware-registration spot. They are kept together because every
change here is either (a) a top-level middleware definition that has
to be added next to LoggingMiddleware, or (b) a route handler at the
same file-level.
SecurityHeadersMiddleware (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options:
DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy, server: unsloth-studio). The previous responses
emitted no CSP, no XFO, no Referrer-Policy and were stamped
server: uvicorn.
MaxBodyMiddleware rejects POST/PUT/PATCH on the inference / dataset /
data-recipe / train / export prefixes when Content-Length exceeds
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB (default 100). The audit hit this by
attaching a 50 MB plain-text file to a chat message and watching
Studio base64-encode it into the JSON body; uvicorn has no enforced
cap so the only previous guard was the per-file 50 MB ceiling that
data-recipe upload routes already enforce. The new middleware extends
that ceiling to the OpenAI-compat path that the Chat attachments
flow through. Verified: a 200 MB JSON POST to /v1/chat/completions
returns HTTP 413 "Request body too large (209,715,264 bytes; max
104,857,600)". A small valid request continues to reach the handler.
_inject_bootstrap is gated behind UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP.
The previous default was to inline window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__ =
{username, password} into the first-boot HTML whenever
requires_password_change was true, which exposed the plaintext
bootstrap password to any browser extension, page script, or LAN
caller on -H 0.0.0.0. The bootstrap password remains in the on-disk
.bootstrap_password file (mode 0o600) where it has always lived;
users typing it into a current-password field is the right UX.
/api/health unauthenticated returns {"status":"healthy","timestamp":
...} only; the previous payload (version, device_type, chat_only,
desktop_protocol_version, supports_desktop_auth, studio_root_id,
native_path_leases_supported) is preserved for callers that present
a valid Bearer token, so internal launchers and sibling-Studio
detection (which compares studio_root_id) keep working.
/recipes -> /data-recipes 308 redirect. The Data Recipes page lives
at /data-recipes; users typing /recipes hit the SPA catch-all and
saw "Not Found". The redirect also preserves any tail path, so
/recipes/<rest> -> /data-recipes/<rest>.
Verified end to end with curl: CSP / XFO / X-Content-Type-Options /
Referrer-Policy / Permissions-Policy all present on /, server header
is now unsloth-studio (uvicorn's own banner is suppressed via
server_header=False in run.py from the auth-batch commit). Followed
the /recipes redirect lands on the SPA HTML.
* studio: bound TrainingStartRequest hyperparameters at the schema level
POST /api/train/start accepted any value for learning_rate, batch_size,
max_steps, max_seq_length, warmup_steps, warmup_ratio, num_epochs,
save_steps, weight_decay, gradient_accumulation_steps, lora_r,
lora_alpha and lora_dropout, including -1, 0, 1e9, and non-numeric
strings like 'abc' or 'two' (which silently coerce to 0 in the
trainer). Probing showed the API returning 200 to learning_rate=-1
and batch_size=0; only max_steps had any partial clamping.
This commit adds field_validator on every numeric hyperparameter.
Bounds are chosen wide enough to span realistic single-host
configurations (B200 with 180 GB of memory comfortably fits the
upper end) while rejecting the values that always produce broken
training:
- learning_rate: parses str/float, requires 0 < lr < 1.0. Non-numeric
input raises with "learning_rate must be parseable as float (got
'abc')" instead of silently coercing to 0.
- batch_size: [1, 1024].
- gradient_accumulation_steps: [1, 4096].
- num_epochs: [1, 1000].
- max_steps: [1, 1_000_000].
- max_seq_length: [1, 131072].
- warmup_steps: [0, max_steps].
- warmup_ratio: [0.0, 1.0].
- save_steps: [0, 1_000_000].
- weight_decay: [0, 10] (typical 0..0.1).
- lora_r: [1, 512].
- lora_alpha: [1, 1024].
- lora_dropout: [0.0, 1.0).
Each validator names the offending field in its ValueError message
so the 422 response body identifies which input is bad. The
learning_rate validator returns its result as str (the schema field
type is str("2e-4") for backwards compatibility) so existing call
sites that float() the value continue to work.
Verified:
- learning_rate=-1 -> 422 "learning_rate must be > 0 (got -1.0);
typical range is 1e-6 .. 1e-3".
- learning_rate='abc' -> 422 "must be parseable as float".
- batch_size=-1 / 0 / 999999 -> 422 "batch_size must be in [1, 1024]".
- batch_size='two' -> 422 (pydantic int parser).
- max_steps=0 / -5 -> 422 "must be a positive int".
- max_seq_length=200000 -> 422 "must be in [1, 131072]".
- warmup_ratio=2.5 -> 422 "must be in [0.0, 1.0]".
- lora_dropout=1.5 -> 422 "must be in [0.0, 1.0)".
- Valid request with learning_rate='2e-4', batch_size=1, max_steps=5
passes validation and the training run starts as normal.
* studio: redact image-decode errors, clean checkpoint dirs on cancel, tolerate Stop-button + tool-result message shapes
Three small fixes that fall under "do not let the audit findings
become user-visible papercuts".
routes/inference.py - image-decode error redaction (the audit hit
this with a 0-byte / malformed / wrong-extension image upload). The
three image-normalise sites previously raised HTTPException(400,
detail=f"Failed to process image: {e}"). When PIL raised
UnidentifiedImageError(io.BytesIO(raw)) the message string included
"<_io.BytesIO object at 0x7e40a5d7bf60>", leaking both the Python
class name (confirming the PIL/io stack) and a heap address (mildly
useful for ASLR-bypass chaining if another memory-corruption bug is
ever found). Each site now catches UnidentifiedImageError and
returns the generic "Unsupported or corrupt image format"; the
fall-through generic except returns "Failed to process image". No
exception-repr is interpolated into a response body anywhere along
these paths.
core/training/training.py - checkpoint cleanup on cancel. When a
user clicks Cancel Training, the trainer flips _cancel_requested=True
and the supervisor force-terminates the subprocess. The trainer
writes checkpoint-<step> directories under output_dir every
save_steps; previously these survived the cancel and accumulated on
disk (the audit recorded ~67 MB stuck after a 200-step cancel with
save_steps=20). New helper _cleanup_cancelled_checkpoints(output_dir)
globs checkpoint-<int> entries and removes them. It is gated by a
realpath containment check against outputs_root() so it cannot
accidentally rmtree anything outside the configured outputs root.
force_terminate() invokes the helper after the subprocess join when
_cancel_requested is true. Stop-and-Save runs are unaffected because
that path keeps _cancel_requested=False.
models/inference.py - chat message shape tolerance. Two related
frontend interactions used to crash the request validator:
- After the Stop button truncates a generation, the frontend
retained {role:"assistant", content:""} in the conversation
history and replayed it on the next send. ChatMessage previously
required role="assistant" to have non-empty content or tool_calls,
so the next message returned 422 and the thread was permanently
broken. The validator now normalises empty assistant content to
None so the request round-trips and the trailing empty turn can
be ignored downstream.
- The frontend's second-round tool POST drops the streamed
tool_call_id, hitting the strict-spec check "role=tool requires
tool_call_id". The validator now synthesises an opaque id
(call_<8 hex>) when missing, so the request reaches the handler
and the model's final summarising response gets generated. The
proper fix lives in the frontend (carry the streamed id through
the second POST) and will follow.
Verified end to end with curl: HTTP 400 (model not loaded) on both
the empty-assistant history shape and the tool-result-without-id
shape, instead of HTTP 422 from the schema validator.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: tighten code comments from security-hardening pass
Trim verbose docstrings and inline finding references added in the
previous commits in this branch. Functionality unchanged.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: await get_current_subject in /api/health and make refresh-token consumption atomic
The /api/health auth probe called get_current_subject(creds) without
awaiting it. The coroutine object is truthy, so any caller presenting a
Bearer header (valid or not) received the full diagnostic payload
including version, device_type, studio_root_id, etc. Await the coroutine
and treat HTTPException as 'fall back to the minimal liveness payload'.
consume_refresh_token did SELECT then DELETE WHERE id under default
autocommit isolation. Two concurrent POST /api/auth/refresh requests
could both win the SELECT before either DELETE ran, defeating
single-use refresh-token rotation. Replace with a single
DELETE ... WHERE token_hash = ? AND expires_at >= ? RETURNING ...
statement so the validate-and-delete lands as one atomic op under
SQLite's write lock (3.45.1 supports RETURNING; min was 3.35).
* studio: enforce body cap on chunked uploads and drop unsafe-inline from script-src
MaxBodyMiddleware previously only inspected the declared Content-Length
header; clients omitting it or sending Transfer-Encoding: chunked
bypassed the cap and could still drive an OOM via the downstream
JSON / file readers on /v1/chat/completions, /api/inference, /api/data-recipe,
/api/datasets, /api/train, /api/export. Rewrite as a raw ASGI middleware
that drains and counts http.request frames, replies 413 once the running
total exceeds UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB before invoking the FastAPI
handler, and replays the buffered body to downstream so route code that
calls request.json() / await request.body() works unchanged.
CSP previously included 'unsafe-inline' on script-src, which defeats the
main XSS protection. The frontend bundle does not need inline scripts;
the only inline <script> the backend ever emits is _inject_bootstrap,
which is opt-in via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP. Drop 'unsafe-inline'
from script-src by default; when _inject_bootstrap fires, generate a
per-response nonce, embed it on the inlined <script>, and have
SecurityHeadersMiddleware splice 'nonce-XXX' into the CSP for that one
response (the internal x-internal-script-nonce header is popped before
the response leaves the server). 'unsafe-inline' stays on style-src for
Vite-injected styles.
* studio: drop empty assistant sentinel before passthrough
ChatMessage._validate_role_shape normalises role="assistant", content=""
(the post-Stop sentinel emitted by the frontend) to content=None so the
in-process path can drop it via _extract_content_parts. The passthrough
path then ran m.model_dump(exclude_none=True), which strips the now-None
content key entirely, sending {"role":"assistant"} to llama-server / the
OpenAI-compat backend. That fails upstream and leaves the user without a
recoverable Stop->resume.
Add _drop_empty_assistant_sentinels and call it at both passthrough
message origins: _openai_messages_for_passthrough (covers
/v1/chat/completions and the Responses API which routes through it) and
the anthropic_messages_to_openai output before
_anthropic_passthrough_*. Assistant messages that carry only tool_calls
(no content) are preserved.
* studio/tests: cover audit-fix surfaces and rebase pre-existing tests
Adds and updates pytest coverage for the four bot-flagged audit fixes
landed earlier in this branch and rebases two pre-existing tests that
were broken by the relaxed-validator and /api/health auth-gate changes.
studio/backend/tests/test_middleware.py (new)
MaxBodyMiddleware: small protected, large declared, unprotected
passthrough, chunked-upload-over-cap rejection (the regression for
the original Content-Length-only gap), and chunked-under-cap replay.
SecurityHeadersMiddleware: script-src no longer carries
'unsafe-inline', style-src still does, default headers
(XFO/XCTO/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy/server), and the
internal x-internal-script-nonce header is consumed by the
middleware and converted to 'nonce-XXX' in the CSP.
/api/health: no auth -> minimal, invalid Bearer -> minimal
(the await regression), valid Bearer -> full diagnostic payload.
studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
consume_refresh_token: second-call returns None, expired returns
None, and a 64-thread concurrent pile-up against the same hash
produces exactly one successful consumer (regression for the
SELECT-then-DELETE race).
test_health_response_reports_desktop_capability_fields: rebase
against the new health_check(request) signature by going through
TestClient with a real bearer instead of asyncio.run-ing the
handler directly.
studio/backend/tests/test_openai_tool_passthrough.py
Pin the new ChatMessage tolerance: assistant without content or
tool_calls is tolerated (normalises content -> None), empty-string
and empty-list assistant content normalise to None, and a missing
/ empty tool_call_id on role='tool' is synthesised as call_<hex>
rather than raising. Tests for _drop_empty_assistant_sentinels
cover the three drop shapes (empty string, empty list, missing
content key), preservation of assistant text and tool_calls-only
messages, and end-to-end through
_openai_messages_for_passthrough.
studio/backend/main.py
SecurityHeadersMiddleware.dispatch used response.headers.pop(...)
for the nonce-header handoff; Starlette's MutableHeaders has no
pop. Read-then-del so the internal handoff header is still
stripped before the response leaves the server.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* studio/tests: rebase three more pre-existing CI tests against this branch
CI on PR #5375 was red on three tests that were tuned for behaviour
predating this branch. Updates each so the assertions match what the
audit fixes intentionally changed; no production code touched.
studio/backend/tests/test_trained_model_scan.py
test_scan_trained_models_includes_lora_and_full_finetune_outputs
passed an absolute tmp_path through scan_trained_models, which now
runs resolve_output_dir / _assert_contained against outputs_root().
Repoint outputs_root() at tmp_path via monkeypatch so the fixture
dirs land under the configured root and the realpath containment
check passes.
tests/test_studio_install_workspace_guard.py
test_health_endpoint_exposes_studio_root_id_not_raw_path read
the first 1500 bytes after @app.get("/api/health") and asserted on
the studio_root_id literal. The handler grew (unauth short-circuit
+ await dependency gate) and the literal slid past the byte window.
Replace the fixed window with a slice up to the next top-level
@app.* decorator so the test surveys the whole handler regardless
of size.
tests/studio/studio_api_smoke.py
The "login burst (5x wrong pw) -> 401 each" assertion was tagged
"When/if we add one, this assertion updates in the same PR." We
added the per-IP rate-limit in routes/auth.py
(_LOGIN_MAX_FAILS=5/60s) but missed the assertion update. Rewrite
the burst probe to observe the new invariant: at least one 401,
eventual transition to 429, and Retry-After present on the 429.
Adds a small _login_with_headers helper since the existing login()
helper drops response headers.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* ci(studio-ui): set UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP=1 for Playwright Studios
The Chat UI Playwright test drives the first-boot change-password
form, which (per playwright_chat_ui.py step "1. Change-password
through the UI") pre-seeds the hidden current_password field from
window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__. That global is only emitted when the
backend's _inject_bootstrap path fires, which since the security
pass on this branch is gated behind UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP
and defaults to off. Without the global, the React form's
current_password validator never satisfies, the submit button stays
disabled, and the composer.wait_for() probe times out on
/change-password.
Re-enable injection only for the CI Studios that drive the chat UI
across linux/mac/windows. Production deployments are unaffected: the
env var has to be explicitly opted into, and the on-disk
auth/.bootstrap_password remains the source of truth for human users
typing the password in by hand.
Covers all eight Studio launch sites: the primary chat-ui boot and
the "extra UI tests" boot for each of the three OSes, plus the
pipeTransport JSON-crash retry relaunches in the macOS workflow that
re-spawn Studio mid-job.
A follow-up frontend PR will add a visible current_password input so
the form satisfies its own validator without needing the bootstrap
auto-fill at all; once that lands this CI knob can come back out.
* studio/sandbox: drop unshare(CLONE_NEWNET); add trusted-host allowlist; block sandbox file uploads; raise CPU rlimit default to 600 s
CLONE_NEWNET inside _sandbox_preexec silently killed every outbound
HTTP request from sandboxed Python whenever the kernel allowed
unprivileged user namespaces. requests.get('https://huggingface.co'),
urllib.request.urlopen('https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...'),
socket.connect(('arxiv.org', 443)) all failed despite the AST visitor
intending to allow them. The bash blocklist (curl / wget / nc / ssh /
scp / sftp / rsync / socat / eval / source) plus the AST-level
metadata-host denylist still carry the network policy after this
change; CLONE_NEWNET was redundant with both.
Add _TRUSTED_PUBLIC_HOST_LITERALS + _TRUSTED_PUBLIC_HOST_SUFFIXES
(~100 informational hosts: Wikipedia language subdomains, Wikimedia,
Wikidata, Google search, Bing, DuckDuckGo, HuggingFace, GitHub,
raw.githubusercontent.com, arXiv, StackOverflow / Stack Exchange,
MDN, docs.python.org, PyTorch / TensorFlow / NumPy / pandas docs,
pypi / files.pythonhosted.org / npmjs / crates.io, ReadTheDocs,
arXiv, Britannica, BBC / Reuters / Nature / Science, NASA / CDC /
NIH / WHO open data, api.weather.gov). The visitor now blocks
literal hosts that are neither metadata nor trusted with a short
LLM-readable string so the model can retry with an allowed source
instead of choking on a multi-line error.
Block upload-shape calls regardless of host: requests.post / put /
patch / delete / request with files= or data=open(...) /
data=bytes_literal; httpx equivalents; urllib.request.urlopen /
Request with data=...; HuggingFace upload_file / upload_folder /
upload_large_folder / create_commit (module-level FQ paths AND
method-name match on any receiver). Message: "Blocked: file upload
disallowed in sandbox".
Bump UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S default 300 -> 600 s so long
agentic chains that span multiple tool calls don't get SIGXCPU'd
mid-stride. Env-var override path is unchanged.
Host normalisation now strips trailing dot, userinfo @, and explicit
port before allowlist / denylist comparison so trailing-DNS-dot,
userinfo-smuggling, and explicit-:443 URLs are decided correctly.
* studio: raise default request-body cap from 100 MB to 500 MB
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB default goes 100 -> 500 to comfortably
cover vision + audio + multi-recipe-batch JSON payloads. The
MaxBodyMiddleware stream-counting logic from this branch's earlier
06ec088 already handles chunked bodies up to the new cap; env-var
override path is unchanged for callers that want a tighter limit.
* studio/auth: restore /api/auth/status.default_username to 'unsloth'
This branch's earlier b39e9a4 changed default_username to None on the
public /api/auth/status endpoint so the username field didn't leak to
unauthenticated callers. In practice this regressed third-party
clients (and the in-tree React login form's pre-fill UX) without
adding meaningful security: the bootstrap password is the actual
secret, and the username 'unsloth' is the documented default.
Pin default_username to storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME ('unsloth')
and tighten the response model so the field is required rather than
Optional. Anyone who needs anonymisation can still reach for an
allow-list deployment with auth disabled.
* studio/training: raise max_seq_length / batch_size / lora_r / lora_alpha caps
This branch's 7102815 introduced field validators with conservative
caps. The follow-up loosens them so long-context experiments and
high-rank LoRA exploration aren't gated at the schema layer:
_MAX_BATCH_SIZE 1024 -> 4096
_MAX_SEQ_LENGTH 131_072 -> 2_000_000 (2M tokens)
lora_r cap 512 -> 16_384 (_MAX_LORA_R)
lora_alpha cap 1024 -> 32_768 (_MAX_LORA_ALPHA)
_MAX_GRAD_ACCUM / _MAX_STEPS / _MAX_EPOCHS / lora_dropout /
warmup_ratio / weight_decay are unchanged. Hardware (VRAM, host
RAM, kernel launch latency) is now the binding constraint at the
new caps, which is the correct ordering -- the validator stays a
sanity check on -1 / 0 / 'abc' style garbage, not a usability gate.
* studio/tests: cover sandbox allowlist + upload block + raised training caps
studio/backend/tests/test_sandbox_tools.py (new):
TestMetadataHostDenylist -- short "Blocked: cloud-metadata host"
message on AWS IMDS, GCP metadata,
Alibaba ECS, AWS IPv6 IMDS, 169.254/16.
TestTrustedHostAllowlist -- Wikipedia (any language subdomain),
Google, DuckDuckGo, HF, raw GitHub,
arXiv, StackOverflow / family,
MDN, docs.python.org, pypi, BBC,
api.weather.gov, NumPy / PyTorch docs.
TestUntrustedHostBlock -- example.com / random unlisted host
rejected with the short "Blocked: host
not in sandbox allowlist; use an
allowed informational source" message.
Dynamic URLs (computed var) still pass
-- documented limit of static analysis.
TestHostNormalization -- trailing dot, explicit :443, uppercase,
userinfo-@-smuggle all decided
correctly without false-block /
false-pass.
TestUploadDenylist -- requests / httpx / urllib.urlopen with
files= / data=open / data=bytes,
HfApi().upload_file / upload_folder /
create_commit, module-level
huggingface_hub.upload_folder. POST
json= to trusted host still passes.
TestSandboxCpuRlimitDefault -- pin UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S=600
default and confirm CLONE_NEWNET
source line is gone.
TestMaxBodyDefault -- pin UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB=500
default.
studio/backend/tests/test_studio_train_validation.py (new):
Pin at-cap-accepts / over-cap-rejects boundaries for
max_seq_length=2_000_000, batch_size=4_096, lora_r=16_384,
lora_alpha=32_768 so a future regression that tightens them back
without explicit user opt-in is caught.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: tighten code comments across the security-hardening pass
* studio: always inject bootstrap credentials on first boot
The UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP gate added an extra
terminal-to-browser copy-paste on every fresh install. In practice
the LAN credential leak it guarded against is narrow: the password
is one-time, the user rotates it on the very next click, the
default Studio bind is 127.0.0.1, and -H 0.0.0.0 already exposes
the entire API surface. Drop the gate so the inject fires whenever
a bootstrap password is still pending. The CSP nonce wiring stays
in place; the inline script remains the only inline script the
backend ever emits.
The three Playwright UI smoke workflows lose their
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP=1 lines along with the explanatory
comment blocks since the inject now happens by default.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Wasim Yousef Said <wasimysdev@gmail.com>
* add unsloth studio desktop app
* Fix review findings
- studio/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json: retarget updater to staging repo
(danielhanchen/unsloth-staging-2); switch to unslothai/unsloth on upstream merge.
- studio/src-tauri/linux/postremove.sh: drop the interactive read loop and the
/home/* iteration. Package maintainer scripts must stay non-interactive and
must not touch other users' data.
- studio/frontend/src/app/auth-guards.ts: honor tauriAutoAuth() boolean. Failed
auto-auth now redirects to /login; requireGuest/requirePasswordChangeFlow
only redirect to /chat when auth succeeds. The new early-return on failed
auth is intentional so the login / change-password flows remain reachable
when desktop auth is not yet established.
- studio/frontend/src/config/env.ts: keep fetched=false on health failure so
later calls retry instead of caching the client-side platform guess.
- studio/src-tauri/src/install.rs: pick the available system package manager
(apt-get, dnf, zypper, pacman); AppImage bundles run on non-Debian distros.
- studio/frontend/src/lib/open-link.ts + markdown-text/sources callers: return
boolean from openLink so callers only preventDefault on handled URLs; relative
hrefs now navigate natively.
- studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/about-tab.tsx: fetch(apiUrl(...))
so the version request targets the backend port in desktop mode. The bare
/api/health predates the Tauri webview (blame: the earlier onboarding commit,
which ran with same-origin frontend/backend); in desktop mode the webview
origin is tauri://localhost so the bare path fails.
- install.ps1: gate the install_python_stack.py hotfix on a sentinel comment
instead of a content regex; append the sentinel after applying so reruns
are unambiguous.
- unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py _write_auth_secret: use the atomic mkstemp +
os.replace path on Windows too; chmod calls are wrapped in try/except OSError.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs probe_existing_backends: fan out the health
probes concurrently; desktop-auth status still runs sequentially per candidate.
reqwest::Client is internally Arc-wrapped so the in-loop .clone() is a
refcount bump, not a deep clone; annotated inline.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs run_cli_probe: wait() after kill() to reap
the child, matching probe_cli_capability.
- studio/src-tauri/src/process.rs + main.rs: add stop_backend_detached and use
it from the tray quit handler so the 5s graceful-wait does not block the
Tauri main loop. RunEvent::Exit keeps the synchronous safety-net call.
- studio/backend/main.py: drop the permissive localhost CORS regex in
api-only mode; the explicit allow_origins list is sufficient.
- .github/workflows/release-desktop.yml: drop max-parallel: 1 so platform
builds run in parallel, and lift releaseBody to an env var so the three
tauri-action invocations share one source of truth.
* Fix review findings (loop 2)
- studio/backend/auth/storage.py update_password: clear_desktop_secret()
alongside clear_bootstrap_password() so rotating the admin password
also revokes any previously provisioned .desktop_secret. Without this,
an old local desktop credential keeps minting fresh admin tokens via
/api/auth/desktop-login after a password rotation.
- studio/src-tauri/src/desktop_auth.rs provision_desktop_auth: wrap
cmd.output().await in tokio::time::timeout(30s). DESKTOP_AUTH_LOCK is
held across the whole desktop_auth flow, and previously a hanging
`unsloth studio provision-desktop-auth` subprocess would pin the lock
indefinitely and freeze every subsequent desktop_auth call.
* Add review tests
* Consolidate review tests
Merge review-added tests into the existing studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
(the PR's authoritative desktop-auth test file). Drops three scaffolding files under
tests/python/ in favor of five focused tests next to the tests they extend:
- test_update_password_clears_desktop_secret (runtime)
- test_update_password_on_unknown_user_leaves_desktop_secret_intact (runtime)
- test_cli_provisioning_delegates_to_storage_create_desktop_secret (source-level)
- test_cli_connect_auth_db_reads_storage_db_path (source-level)
- test_desktop_auth_provision_has_bounded_timeout (Rust source-level)
* Revert auth-guards.ts Tauri branches to unconditional form
The review loop on PR 5144 introduced a regression: the isTauri branch of
requireAuth redirected to /login when tauriAutoAuth() returned false, and
requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow silently fell through on the same
condition. The Tauri desktop app authenticates via a local auto-generated
secret; it must never surface /login or /change-password to the user. A
failed auto-auth should let the startup layer retry, not expose a password
form.
Restore the three Tauri branches to the author's original unconditional
form (requireAuth: return; requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow: throw
redirect({to: '/chat'})). Keep the rest of the review fixes -- the
apiUrl() fetch wrapping, authRedirect helper, and fetchAuthStatus refactor
are all legitimate improvements and are preserved.
* Revert release-desktop.yml to author's version
The review loop's workflow-file tweaks (drop max-parallel: 1, lift releaseBody
to an env var) are cosmetic. OAuth tokens cannot push workflow-file changes,
and fine-grained PATs cannot honor maintainerCanModify on a third-party fork.
Reverting the workflow file to wasimysaid's version lets the push go through
without needing a classic PAT with both repo and workflow scopes.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Lee Jackson <130007945+Imagineer99@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <unslothai@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: add API key authentication for programmatic access
External users want to hit the Studio API (chat completions with tool
calling, training, export, etc.) without going through the browser
login flow. This adds sk-unsloth- prefixed API keys that work as a
drop-in replacement for JWTs in the Authorization: Bearer header.
Backend:
- New api_keys table in SQLite (storage.py)
- create/list/revoke/validate functions with SHA-256 hashed storage
- API key detection in _get_current_subject before the JWT path
- POST/GET/DELETE /api/auth/api-keys endpoints on the auth router
Frontend:
- /api-keys page with create form, one-time key reveal, keys table
- API Keys link in desktop and mobile navbar
- Route registered with requireAuth guard
Zero changes to any existing route handler -- every endpoint that uses
Depends(get_current_subject) automatically works with API keys.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Use actual origin in API key usage examples
The examples on /api-keys were hardcoded to localhost:8888 which is
wrong for remote users. Use window.location.origin so the examples
show the correct URL regardless of where the user is connecting from.
* Add `unsloth studio run` CLI command for one-liner model serving
Adds a `run` subcommand that starts Studio, loads a model, creates an
API key, and prints a ready-to-use curl command -- similar to
`ollama run` or `vllm serve`.
Usage: unsloth studio run -m unsloth/Qwen3-1.7B-GGUF --gguf-variant UD-Q4_K_XL
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Add end-to-end tests for `unsloth studio run` and API key usage
Tests the 4 usage examples from the API Keys page:
1. curl basic (non-streaming) chat completions
2. curl streaming (SSE) chat completions
3. OpenAI Python SDK streaming completions
4. curl with tools (web_search + python)
Also tests --help output, invalid key rejection, and no-key rejection.
All 7 tests pass against Qwen3-1.7B-GGUF.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Add /v1/completions, /v1/embeddings, /v1/responses endpoints and --parallel support
- llama_cpp.py: accept n_parallel param, pass to llama-server --parallel
- run.py: plumb llama_parallel_slots through to app.state
- inference.py: add /completions and /embeddings as transparent proxies to
llama-server, add /responses as application-level endpoint that converts
to ChatCompletionRequest; thread n_parallel through load_model
- studio.py: set llama_parallel_slots=4 for `unsloth studio run` path
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Make /v1/responses endpoint match OpenAI Responses API format
The existing /v1/responses shim returned Chat Completions format, which
broke OpenAI SDK clients using openai.responses.create(). This commit
replaces the endpoint with a proper implementation that:
- Returns `output` array with `output_text` content parts instead of
`choices` with `message`
- Uses `input_tokens`/`output_tokens` instead of `prompt_tokens`/
`completion_tokens` in usage
- Sets `object: "response"` and `id: "resp_..."`
- Emits named SSE events for streaming (response.created,
response.output_text.delta, response.completed, etc.)
- Accepts all OpenAI Responses API fields (tools, store, metadata,
previous_response_id) without erroring -- silently ignored
- Maps `developer` role to `system` and `input_text`/`input_image`
content parts to the internal Chat format
Adds Pydantic schemas for request/response models and 23 unit tests
covering schema validation, input normalisation, and response format.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Studio: add Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages endpoint (#4981)
* Add Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages endpoint with tool support
Translate Anthropic Messages API format to/from internal OpenAI format
and reuse the existing server-side agentic tool loop. Supports streaming
SSE (message_start, content_block_delta, etc.) and non-streaming JSON.
Includes offline unit tests and e2e tests in test_studio_run.py.
* Add enable_tools, enabled_tools, session_id to /v1/messages endpoint
Support the same shorthand as /v1/chat/completions: enable_tools=true
with an optional enabled_tools list uses built-in server tools without
requiring full Anthropic tool definitions. session_id is passed through
for sandbox isolation. max_tokens is now optional.
* Strip leaked tool-call XML from Anthropic endpoint content
Apply _TOOL_XML_RE to content events in both streaming and
non-streaming tool paths, matching the OpenAI endpoint behavior.
* Emit custom tool_result SSE event in Anthropic stream
Adds a non-standard tool_result event between the tool_use block close
and the next text block, so clients can see server-side tool execution
results. Anthropic SDKs ignore unknown event types.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Split /v1/messages into server-side and client-side tool paths
enable_tools=true runs the existing server-side agentic loop with
built-in tools (web_search/python/terminal). A bare tools=[...] field
now triggers a client-side pass-through: client-provided tools are
forwarded to llama-server and any tool_use output is returned to the
caller with stop_reason=tool_use for client execution.
This fixes Claude Code (and any Anthropic SDK client) which sends
tools=[...] expecting client-side execution but was previously routed
through execute_tool() and failing with 'Unknown tool'.
Adds AnthropicPassthroughEmitter to convert llama-server OpenAI SSE
chunks into Anthropic SSE events, plus unit tests covering text
blocks, tool_use blocks, mixed, stop reasons, and usage.
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* Fix httpcore GeneratorExit in /v1/messages passthrough stream
Explicitly aclose aiter_lines() before the surrounding async with
blocks unwind, mirroring the prior fix in external_provider.py
(a41160d3) and cc757b78's RuntimeError suppression.
* Wire stop_sequences through /v1/messages; warn on tool_choice
Plumb payload.stop_sequences to all three code paths (server-side
tool loop, no-tool plain, client-side passthrough) so Anthropic SDK
clients setting stop_sequences get the behavior they expect. The
llama_cpp backend already accepted `stop` on both generate_chat_
completion and generate_chat_completion_with_tools; the Anthropic
handler simply wasn't passing it.
tool_choice remains declared on the request model for Anthropic SDK
compatibility (the SDK often sets it by default) but is not yet
honored. Log a structured warning on each request carrying a non-
null tool_choice so the silent drop is visible to operators.
* Wire min_p / repetition_penalty / presence_penalty through /v1/messages
Align the Anthropic endpoint's sampling surface with /v1/chat/completions.
Adds the three fields as x-unsloth extensions on AnthropicMessagesRequest
and threads them through all three code paths: server-side tool loop,
no-tool plain, and client-side passthrough.
The passthrough builder emits "repeat_penalty" (not "repetition_penalty")
because that is llama-server's field name; the backend methods already
apply the same rename internally.
* Fix block ordering and prev_text reset in non-streaming tool path
_anthropic_tool_non_streaming was building the response by appending
all tool_use blocks first, then a single concatenated text block at
the end — losing generation order and merging pre-tool and post-tool
text into one block. It also never reset prev_text between synthesis
turns, so the first N characters of each post-tool turn were dropped
(where N = length of the prior turn's final cumulative text).
Rewrite to build content_blocks incrementally in generation order,
matching the streaming emitter's behavior: deltas within a turn are
merged into the trailing text block, tool_use blocks interrupt the
text sequence, and prev_text is reset on tool_end so turn N+1 diffs
against an empty baseline.
Caught by gemini-code-assist[bot] review on #4981.
* Make test_studio_run.py e2e tests pytest-compatible
Add a hybrid session-scoped studio_server fixture in conftest.py that
feeds base_url / api_key into the existing e2e test functions. Three
invocation modes are now supported:
1. Script mode (unchanged) — python tests/test_studio_run.py
2. Pytest + external server — point at a running instance via
UNSLOTH_E2E_BASE_URL / UNSLOTH_E2E_API_KEY env vars, no per-run
GGUF load cost
3. Pytest + fixture-managed server — pytest drives _start_server /
_kill_server itself via --unsloth-model / --unsloth-gguf-variant,
CI-friendly
The existing _start_server / _kill_server helpers and main() stay
untouched so the script entry point keeps working exactly as before.
Test function signatures are unchanged — the (base_url, api_key)
parameters now resolve via the new fixtures when running under
pytest.
* Rename test_studio_run.py -> test_studio_api.py
The file is entirely about HTTP API endpoint testing (OpenAI-compatible
/v1/chat/completions, Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages, API key auth,
plus a CLI --help sanity check on the command that runs the API). None
of its tests cover training, export, chat-UI, or internal-Python-API
concerns.
The old name misleadingly suggested "tests for the unsloth studio run
CLI subcommand" — the new name reflects the actual scope.
Updates:
- git mv the file (rename tracked, history preserved)
- Rewrite opening docstring to state the API surface focus and call
out what is explicitly out of scope
- Update all 4 Usage-block path references to the new filename
- LOG_FILE renamed to test_studio_api.log
- conftest.py fixture import rewritten from test_studio_run to
test_studio_api, plus 7 docstring/comment references updated
No functional changes to test logic, signatures, or main().
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix httpcore asyncgen cleanup in /v1/messages and /v1/completions
The earlier fix in 985e92a9 was incomplete: it closed aiter_lines()
explicitly but still used `async with httpx.AsyncClient()` /
`async with client.stream()` inside the generator. When the generator
is orphaned (e.g. client disconnects mid-stream and Starlette drops
the StreamingResponse iterator without explicitly calling aclose()),
Python's asyncgen finalizer runs the cleanup in a DIFFERENT task than
the one that originally entered the httpx context managers. The
`async with` exits then trigger httpcore's HTTP11ConnectionByteStream
.aclose(), which enters anyio.CancelScope.__exit__ with a mismatched
task and raises RuntimeError("Attempted to exit cancel scope in a
different task"). That error escapes any user-owned try/except
because it happens during GC finalization.
Replace `async with` with manual client/response lifecycle in both
/v1/messages passthrough and /v1/completions proxy. Close the
response and client in a finally block wrapped in
`try: ... except Exception: pass`. This suppresses RuntimeError (and
other Exception subclasses) from the anyio cleanup noise while
letting GeneratorExit (a BaseException, not Exception) propagate
cleanly so the generator terminates as Python expects.
Traceback observed in user report:
File ".../httpcore/_async/connection_pool.py", line 404, in __aiter__
yield part
RuntimeError: async generator ignored GeneratorExit
...
File ".../anyio/_backends/_asyncio.py", line 455, in __exit__
raise RuntimeError(
RuntimeError: Attempted to exit cancel scope in a different task
* Expand unsloth studio run banner with SDK base URL and more curl examples
Add an explicit "OpenAI / Anthropic SDK base URL" line inside the info
box so SDK users don't accidentally copy the bare server URL (without
/v1) into their OpenAI/Anthropic SDK constructors and hit 404s.
Replace the single /v1/chat/completions curl example with three
labeled blocks: chat/completions, Anthropic /messages, and OpenAI
Responses. The Anthropic example includes max_tokens (Anthropic SDKs
require it even though Studio accepts None).
All examples derived from a computed sdk_base_url so the /v1 prefix
stays in sync if the public path ever changes.
* Hash API keys with HMAC-SHA256 + persistent server secret
Stores the HMAC secret in a new app_secrets singleton table. Fixes
CodeQL py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing alert on storage.py:74-76,
394-395. Refresh tokens stay on plain SHA-256 (unchanged _hash_token)
so existing user sessions survive upgrade — API keys are new on this
branch so there is no migration.
* Use PBKDF2 for API key hashing per CodeQL recommendation
HMAC-SHA256 was still flagged by py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing.
Switch to hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac, which is in CodeQL's recommended
allowlist (Argon2/scrypt/bcrypt/PBKDF2). Persistent server-side
salt stays in app_secrets for defense-in-depth. 100k iterations to
match auth/hashing.py's password hasher.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <115670425+rolandtannous@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <rolandtannous@gravityq.ai>
* studio: switch helper model to Qwen3.5-4B-GGUF
Replace Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507-GGUF with Qwen3.5-4B-GGUF as the
default helper model for LLM-assisted dataset detection. Same
UD-Q4_K_XL variant.
* studio: fix stale GGUF metadata when switching models (#4347)
Reset _supports_reasoning, _supports_tools, _context_length, and
_chat_template at the start of _read_gguf_metadata() to prevent
stale settings from a previous model leaking into the next load.
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <daniel@unsloth.ai>
* studio: change login error to "Incorrect password", add reset-password CLI
- Login error now says "Incorrect password" instead of the generic
"Incorrect username or password" since Studio only has one account.
- Add `unsloth studio reset-password` command that deletes the auth
database so a fresh admin account with a new random password is
created on the next server start.
* studio: include reset command in login error message
* studio: change password setup subtitle wording
* fix: quotation marks
* diceware passphrase generation
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <rolandtannous@gravityq.ai>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Michael Han