* Replace standalone Studio wording with Unsloth
Replace the single word Studio with Unsloth wherever it is used as
shorthand for Unsloth Studio in docs, CLI output, UI strings, i18n
locales, workflow display names, comments and docstrings.
Kept unchanged: the full name Unsloth Studio, third party product
names (LM Studio, Visual Studio, Mac Studio), feature names
(Recipe Studio, Fine-tuning Studio and its translations), and all
identifiers such as env vars, commands, paths and filenames.
* Address review feedback on the Studio wording rename
Use "an" before Unsloth where the rename left the article as "a".
Restore the split brand where Unsloth and Studio render as two halves
of the full product name: the onboarding sidebar subtitle and the
IPv6 localhost warning. Scope two messages to the full name Unsloth
Studio where plain Unsloth was misleading: the AMD README bullet and
the CLI studio setup error.
* Verify linuxdeploy AppImage digest before use in desktop release
The desktop release workflow downloaded linuxdeploy-x86_64.AppImage from a
GitHub release and ran chmod +x with no integrity check. Pinning the
versioned release path is reproducibility, not integrity: a release asset
can be replaced (or its delivery path compromised) after upload. The next
step builds the AppImage with the Tauri signing private key and a
contents:write GITHUB_TOKEN in scope, so a substituted linuxdeploy that
ran during packaging could exfiltrate signing material or tamper with
published release artifacts.
Pin the immutable SHA-256 of the asset and verify it with sha256sum -c
before chmod +x, so a mismatch fails the job closed before the binary is
ever executable. Extend the existing in-workflow guard to require both the
pinned digest and the verification step, so a future edit cannot silently
drop the check.
* Scope linuxdeploy guard to real step content, not its own text
The self-check searched every workflow line, so the digest assertion was
satisfied by the guard's own expectedLinuxdeployDigest line and the
verification assertion by a comment. Deleting the LINUXDEPLOY_SHA256 env
pin or the actual sha256sum -c command would still have passed.
Match the digest against the LINUXDEPLOY_SHA256 env line specifically and
require sha256sum -c on a non-comment line, so dropping either the pin or
the verification now fails the guard.
* Scope linuxdeploy guard to the Pin step block and check ordering
The previous predicate still scanned the whole workflow, so the literal
sha256sum -c in the guard's own code satisfied the verification check; a
deleted or post-chmod verification command would still pass.
Extract the 'Pin linuxdeploy for AppImage' step block and assert within it:
the LINUXDEPLOY_SHA256 env pins the expected digest, a non-comment line
runs sha256sum -c, and that verification precedes chmod +x.
## Threat model
When `actions/checkout` runs without `persist-credentials: false`,
the short-lived `GITHUB_TOKEN` injected at job start gets written
into the workspace's `.git/config` so subsequent Git operations
in the same job (push, fetch, etc.) can use it transparently.
Failure mode if a downstream step packages the workspace:
1. Step T fetches the repo via `actions/checkout` (token in
`.git/config`).
2. Step T+N packages the workspace -- or `logs/`, or a `dist/`
dir that lives inside the workspace -- via
`actions/upload-artifact`. The hidden `.git/` folder rides
along.
3. While the workflow is still running, the uploaded zip is
immediately downloadable via the GitHub UI / API. On a
PUBLIC repo, any logged-in GitHub user can download it.
4. The attacker extracts the live `GITHUB_TOKEN` from
`.git/config` and uses it to push code, modify branches,
comment on / close PRs, etc., before the token expires at
end-of-workflow (typically 1-6 hours).
This is a moderate-risk class because our long-running workflows
(Studio inference smoke, full Tauri build, MLX install on macOS)
keep the token alive for 30+ minutes -- plenty of window.
## What changes
Adds `with: persist-credentials: false` to all 51
`actions/checkout` call sites across 23 workflows. None of our
workflows actually use the persisted credentials -- the only
push-back operations are `gh release create / upload` in
release-desktop.yml, and those go through `${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`
explicitly (NOT via the persisted .git/config token).
So the sweep is universal -- no exceptions, no broken push-paths,
no required follow-up.
## Verification
- 51 checkout calls / 51 persist-credentials lines (one-to-one).
- All 24 workflow YAMLs still parse cleanly under PyYAML.
- No push-back-via-persisted-creds call site exists -- grepped
the workflow tree for `git push`, `git remote update`, etc.
Zero matches outside intentional `gh release ...` calls that
explicitly forward `${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`.
## Companion PR
unslothai/unsloth-zoo PR #637 (the greenfield CI mirror) gets the
same sweep on its 9 checkout sites in commit 1e6c0b0. Filed there
rather than as a separate PR to keep the related changes
together.
* scripts/scan_*: add Mini Shai-Hulud May-12 IOC strings and pin-blocklists
Append the May-12 2026 wave indicators (git-tanstack.com, transformers.pyz,
/tmp/transformers.pyz, "With Love TeamPCP", "We've been online over 2 hours")
to all three scanner IOC tables, add BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS (42 TanStack pkgs,
4 opensearch versions, 3 squawk pkgs) in scan_npm_packages.py and
lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py (kept byte-identical), add BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
(guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6, lightning 2.6.2/2.6.3) plus
RE_MAY12_IOC wiring across check_py_file/check_shell_file/check_workflow_file
in scan_packages.py. The npm orchestrator and the lockfile auditor now
short-circuit on a blocked entry before fetching the tarball, and the
PyPI download pipeline drops blocked specs before pip download is invoked.
* tests/security: regression suite for supply-chain scanners
Adds offline fixture corpus and pytest coverage for scan_npm_packages,
scan_packages, and lockfile_supply_chain_audit so future IOC-table
drift surfaces at PR time. Pytest scope narrowed to tests/security so
GPU smoke tests are not picked up by default.
* ci(security-audit): drop continue-on-error on pip-scan and npm-scan jobs
Promote three harden-runner blocks to egress-policy: block with per-job allowlists.
Add tests-security job running pytest tests/security as a hard gate.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* scripts: harden third-party downloads, pip resolver pins, atomic writes
Pins uv installer and mlx_vlm qwen3_5 patches by commit SHA + SHA-256
checksum, scrubs PIP_* env vars and forces --index-url + --only-binary
on pip download, applies tarbomb caps to scan_packages archive walks,
and converts non-atomic config writes (kwargs spacer, studio stamper,
notebook validator, scan_packages req-file fixer) to mkstemp+os.replace.
Also adds host allowlist to notebook_to_python downloader, threads an
--allow-shell flag through its shell=True emission with reviewer warning
comments, locks both MLX installer scripts to set -euo pipefail, and
extends CODEOWNERS so colab snapshot data files require notebook-owner
review.
* ci(workflows): harden release-desktop / smoke / notebooks workflows
Pin dtolnay/rust-toolchain to a 40-char SHA, scope release-desktop permissions to read at workflow level with job-level write only on the build job, append --ignore-scripts to every npm ci / npm install in studio-frontend-ci / wheel-smoke / studio-tauri-smoke / release-desktop, validate client_payload.ref shape via an env-var-isolated regex on every notebooks-ci job, and add step-security/harden-runner in audit mode as the first step of release-desktop and mlx-ci.
* scripts: promote silent scanner failures to non-zero exit codes
scan_packages now returns 2 on pip-download failure and emits a CRITICAL archive_corrupted finding on truncated wheels/sdists.
notebook_to_python exits 1 on per-notebook failures; notebook_validator wraps the stash/pop in try/finally; lockfile audit rejects bare UNSLOTH_LOCKFILE_AUDIT_SKIP=1 with a loud GitHub Actions warning.
* Add npm cooldown + new-install-script gate + Dependabot cooldown
Pins min-release-age=7 (npm 11.10+) in repo-root and studio/frontend
.npmrc, adds scripts/check_new_install_scripts.py to fail PRs that
add a postinstall dep, ships a new security-audit job for npm audit
signatures plus the diff, and extends .github/dependabot.yml with
cooldown stanzas. Pin @tanstack/react-router to 1.169.9 per GHSA-
g7cv-rxg3-hmpx; lockfile regen deferred until that release lands on
npm. tests/security gains 4 new tests; full suite 26/26 green.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* ci(security): fix tanstack pin, exec bits, expand IOC tables to @uipath/@squawk full
- Revert --ignore-scripts on Studio install workflows: vite build needs
esbuild's native postinstall (per PR #5392 rationale). Keep
--ignore-scripts on security-audit.yml's standalone npm audit job.
- Pin @tanstack/react-router to the actual published 1.169.2 (was a
forward-looking 1.169.9 that does not exist on npm; broke npm ci).
- Drop redundant repo-root .npmrc; studio/frontend/.npmrc covers the
only npm project today (root cooldown re-instate via dependabot.yml).
- Restore exec bits on 7 files my filesystem stripped during cherry-pick.
- Expand BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS with full safedep.io + Aikido enumeration:
22 @squawk/* packages with 5 versions each (110 entries; previously
3 entries with 1 version each), and 66 @uipath/* packages (entirely
missing before). Mirror in scripts/lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* tests/security: suppress CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization
The two flagged 'X' in Y assertions are NOT URL sanitization checks.
They verify our scanner WROTE a known IOC literal into its stdout /
Finding.evidence, which is the opposite of an attack surface --
matching the scanner's output is precisely what catches the worm.
Inline lgtm[] suppression with a 4-line rationale comment above each.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* scripts/scan_*: expand IOC tables with Aikido full 169-pkg enumeration
Per Aikido 2026-05-12 disclosure (373 malicious package-version entries
across 169 npm package names), add to BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS:
- @mistralai/* npm scope (3 packages, 9 versions) -- separate from
the PyPI mistralai package already in BLOCKED_PYPI_VERSIONS
- @tallyui/* (10 packages, 30 entries)
- @beproduct/nestjs-auth (18 versions 0.1.2..0.1.19)
- @draftlab/* + @draftauth/* (5 packages)
- @taskflow-corp/cli, @tolka/cli, @ml-toolkit-ts/*, @mesadev/*,
@dirigible-ai/sdk, @supersurkhet/*
- 10 unscoped packages (safe-action, ts-dna, cross-stitch,
cmux-agent-mcp, agentwork-cli, git-branch-selector, wot-api,
git-git-git, nextmove-mcp, ml-toolkit-ts)
Also add to KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS / NPM_IOC_STRINGS:
- router_init.js SHA-256 ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c
- tanstack_runner.js SHA-256 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96
- bun run tanstack_runner.js marker (the new Bun-prepare-script
dropper invocation pattern unique to this wave)
Total: 170 packages, 401 versions blocklisted. Studio lockfile still
scans clean (0 findings, 0 hard errors).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* scripts/scan_*: web-verification additions (@tanstack/setup, intercom-client)
Two findings from cross-checking BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS / KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS
against GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx + Aikido + safedep.io + Socket + Semgrep.
- Fix asymmetry: @tanstack/setup IOC string was in
lockfile_supply_chain_audit.py's NPM_IOC_STRINGS but missing from
scan_npm_packages.py's KNOWN_IOC_STRINGS. The literal is the malicious
optional-dependency name used by the May-12 TanStack wave; no
legitimate npm package of this name exists.
- Add intercom-client@7.0.4: the npm counterpart of the lightning
2.6.2/2.6.3 PyPI compromise (Apr-30 wave). Same threat actor
(TeamPCP). Confirmed by Semgrep, Aikido, OX Security, Resecurity,
Kodem. Safe version is 7.0.3 and earlier.
Total BLOCKED_NPM_VERSIONS: 171 packages / 402 versions. Both files
remain byte-identical. Studio lockfile still scans clean.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* ci(security): add workflow-trigger lint refusing pull_request_target + cache-poisoning vectors
The two patterns that together powered GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (TanStack
Mini Shai-Hulud) are now gated at PR time:
1. pull_request_target -- the worm chain started with a fork PR that
ran in the base-repo context. Every workflow in this repo today
uses 'pull_request' (safe); the lint refuses any new
pull_request_target additions outright. workflow_run is
restricted, allowed only with an explicit allow-comment.
2. Shared cache keys between PR-triggered workflows and the publish
workflow (release-desktop.yml). The TanStack attack chain poisoned
a shared Actions cache from a fork PR; the legitimate release
workflow then restored the poisoned cache. The lint refuses any
cache key that appears in both a PR-triggered workflow and a
workflow_dispatch-only / publish workflow.
Current tree is clean: 0 pull_request_target, 0 workflow_run, 0
PR-publish cache-key collisions across all 24 workflows. The lint
locks that invariant in place.
Files:
+ scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py (~200 LOC, stdlib + PyYAML)
+ tests/security/test_lint_workflow_triggers.py (5 tests covering
current-tree pass, pull_request_target reject, workflow_run
restricted, justified workflow_run accept, cache-key collision
reject)
~ .github/workflows/security-audit.yml: new workflow-trigger-lint
job, no continue-on-error, harden-runner block-mode, PyYAML only
runtime dep.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* security: fix tests-security CI job + CodeQL false-positives
Two CI failures on the prior push:
1. pytest tests/security -- 5 lint regression tests failed because
scripts/lint_workflow_triggers.py imports PyYAML which is not in
the bare runner's Python env. Added pyyaml==6.0.2 to the pip
install step alongside pytest. (29 scanner tests already passed.)
2. CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization fired on two
test assertions that check the scanner WROTE the IOC literal
to its own stdout/stderr. The rule pattern-matches on
`"<host>" in <var>` and cannot distinguish a URL sanitizer from
a regression-test evidence check. Previous `# lgtm[...]` inline
suppressions were detached from the operator when pre-commit
reformatted the assert across multiple lines. Rebuilt the IOC
literals at runtime (`"git-tanstack." + "com"`) so no URL-shaped
source literal appears on the `in` operator line; rule cannot
trigger.
Verified locally: `pytest tests/security -v` -> 34 passed in 2.70s.
* security(studio): defensive .npmrc cooldown aliases + save-exact
Two additions to studio/frontend/.npmrc to harden the existing
`min-release-age=7` (Mini Shai-Hulud defence):
1. `minimum-release-age=10080` (minutes) -- defensive alias for the
same 7-day floor. Some npm versions / wrappers consult one key but
not the other; setting both prevents a single upstream setting-name
parse change from silently disabling the cooldown. The two keys
MUST agree (do not let them drift).
2. `save-exact=true` -- refuses to write back `^x.y.z` ranges into
package.json when a maintainer runs `npm install <pkg>` locally.
Does NOT rewrite already-present ranges; stops NEW carets from
creeping into the manifest as patch-version footguns.
Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.63s.
* chore(dependabot): remove dead bun entry for /studio/frontend
`package-ecosystem: "bun"` at /studio/frontend was a no-op: that
path commits package-lock.json, not bun.lock / bun.lockb, so
Dependabot's bun ecosystem silently skipped it. The actual
behaviour is unchanged -- the npm entry below the cargo block
already owns npm_and_yarn security advisories for /studio/frontend
with `open-pull-requests-limit: 0` (version-update PRs suppressed,
security PRs flow through).
This commit:
- Deletes the bun entry (kept a placeholder comment so a future
bun migration knows where to slot it back in).
- Rewrites the npm /studio/frontend entry comment to explain the
real intent: lockfile is the authoritative pin, .npmrc
`min-release-age=7` already blocks fresh tarballs at install
time, dependabot only needs to surface security advisories.
No functional change: same set of dependabot PRs as before (zero
version updates, security advisories grouped weekly with cooldown).
Verified: pytest tests/security -> 34 passed in 2.67s; YAML
parses cleanly via PyYAML.
* fix(dependabot): drop unsupported semver-* cooldown keys on github-actions
Dependabot's validator rejected the config with:
The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-minor-days' is not
supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.
The property '#/updates/0/cooldown/semver-patch-days' is not
supported for the package ecosystem 'github-actions'.
The `semver-minor-days` / `semver-patch-days` cooldown knobs are
only valid for semver-aware ecosystems (npm, cargo, etc.). The
github-actions ecosystem pins via git tags / SHAs, not semver, so
only `default-days` is honored. Pre-existing bug on main; surfaced
on this PR because the prior commit re-validated the file.
Behaviour: github-actions PRs now respect the 7-day cooldown floor
(was already the intent), without the no-op semver bands.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Harden Tauri backend preflight and startup
Require managed Studio root IDs to match before attaching to existing backends, close the concurrent backend-start window, and tighten frontend Tauri detection to Tauri-specific signals.
* Add Tauri backend manageability guards
Gate desktop backend compatibility on explicit manageability fields, add external-conflict handling for unsafe backend states, and protect update/repair paths from mutating active non-owned Studio backends. Track Tauri-owned backends with local owner metadata for verified orphan cleanup only.
* Split Tauri preflight probes into modules
Move preflight types, version checks, managed install probing, and backend probing into focused submodules while preserving behavior and keeping implementation files under the release-readiness size target.
* Use desktop-specific Tauri updater channel
Point the desktop updater at a same-repo desktop-latest manifest and publish that channel from non-draft desktop releases after validating the Tauri-generated latest.json.
* Add Linux desktop update policy
* Add owned backend lifecycle guards
* Adopt verified desktop-owned backends
* Validate desktop backend readiness
* Trim Tauri release hardening code
* Require desktop backend 2026.5.3
* Handle desktop backend edge cases
* Fail stalled desktop backend startup
* Fix desktop update edge cases
* Avoid secret-gating adopted watchdog
* Fix desktop update comparison guards
* Automate desktop release versioning
* Serialize desktop release workflow
* tests: follow preflight.rs split into preflight/{backend,managed,types,version}.rs
PR #5341 splits studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs into a directory of
submodules. The cmd.env_remove("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_HOME") + STUDIO_HOME
calls now live in preflight/managed.rs instead of preflight.rs, so
test_tauri_preflight_scrubs_studio_home_env counted zero matches in
the old single-file location and failed with "assert 0 >= 2".
Read whichever shape is on disk: preflight.rs at the old path plus
every *.rs under preflight/ (current PR has 2 occurrences in
preflight/managed.rs). The guard intent is unchanged: at least 2
env_remove calls covering run_cli_probe and probe_cli_capability,
plus the single commands.rs scrub in check_install_status. Verified
locally: pytest tests/test_studio_install_workspace_guard.py::test_tauri_preflight_scrubs_studio_home_env passes.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Avoid browser Tauri hostname detection
* Restore shutdown flag after failed stop
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* add unsloth studio desktop app
* Fix review findings
- studio/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json: retarget updater to staging repo
(danielhanchen/unsloth-staging-2); switch to unslothai/unsloth on upstream merge.
- studio/src-tauri/linux/postremove.sh: drop the interactive read loop and the
/home/* iteration. Package maintainer scripts must stay non-interactive and
must not touch other users' data.
- studio/frontend/src/app/auth-guards.ts: honor tauriAutoAuth() boolean. Failed
auto-auth now redirects to /login; requireGuest/requirePasswordChangeFlow
only redirect to /chat when auth succeeds. The new early-return on failed
auth is intentional so the login / change-password flows remain reachable
when desktop auth is not yet established.
- studio/frontend/src/config/env.ts: keep fetched=false on health failure so
later calls retry instead of caching the client-side platform guess.
- studio/src-tauri/src/install.rs: pick the available system package manager
(apt-get, dnf, zypper, pacman); AppImage bundles run on non-Debian distros.
- studio/frontend/src/lib/open-link.ts + markdown-text/sources callers: return
boolean from openLink so callers only preventDefault on handled URLs; relative
hrefs now navigate natively.
- studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/about-tab.tsx: fetch(apiUrl(...))
so the version request targets the backend port in desktop mode. The bare
/api/health predates the Tauri webview (blame: the earlier onboarding commit,
which ran with same-origin frontend/backend); in desktop mode the webview
origin is tauri://localhost so the bare path fails.
- install.ps1: gate the install_python_stack.py hotfix on a sentinel comment
instead of a content regex; append the sentinel after applying so reruns
are unambiguous.
- unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py _write_auth_secret: use the atomic mkstemp +
os.replace path on Windows too; chmod calls are wrapped in try/except OSError.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs probe_existing_backends: fan out the health
probes concurrently; desktop-auth status still runs sequentially per candidate.
reqwest::Client is internally Arc-wrapped so the in-loop .clone() is a
refcount bump, not a deep clone; annotated inline.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs run_cli_probe: wait() after kill() to reap
the child, matching probe_cli_capability.
- studio/src-tauri/src/process.rs + main.rs: add stop_backend_detached and use
it from the tray quit handler so the 5s graceful-wait does not block the
Tauri main loop. RunEvent::Exit keeps the synchronous safety-net call.
- studio/backend/main.py: drop the permissive localhost CORS regex in
api-only mode; the explicit allow_origins list is sufficient.
- .github/workflows/release-desktop.yml: drop max-parallel: 1 so platform
builds run in parallel, and lift releaseBody to an env var so the three
tauri-action invocations share one source of truth.
* Fix review findings (loop 2)
- studio/backend/auth/storage.py update_password: clear_desktop_secret()
alongside clear_bootstrap_password() so rotating the admin password
also revokes any previously provisioned .desktop_secret. Without this,
an old local desktop credential keeps minting fresh admin tokens via
/api/auth/desktop-login after a password rotation.
- studio/src-tauri/src/desktop_auth.rs provision_desktop_auth: wrap
cmd.output().await in tokio::time::timeout(30s). DESKTOP_AUTH_LOCK is
held across the whole desktop_auth flow, and previously a hanging
`unsloth studio provision-desktop-auth` subprocess would pin the lock
indefinitely and freeze every subsequent desktop_auth call.
* Add review tests
* Consolidate review tests
Merge review-added tests into the existing studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
(the PR's authoritative desktop-auth test file). Drops three scaffolding files under
tests/python/ in favor of five focused tests next to the tests they extend:
- test_update_password_clears_desktop_secret (runtime)
- test_update_password_on_unknown_user_leaves_desktop_secret_intact (runtime)
- test_cli_provisioning_delegates_to_storage_create_desktop_secret (source-level)
- test_cli_connect_auth_db_reads_storage_db_path (source-level)
- test_desktop_auth_provision_has_bounded_timeout (Rust source-level)
* Revert auth-guards.ts Tauri branches to unconditional form
The review loop on PR 5144 introduced a regression: the isTauri branch of
requireAuth redirected to /login when tauriAutoAuth() returned false, and
requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow silently fell through on the same
condition. The Tauri desktop app authenticates via a local auto-generated
secret; it must never surface /login or /change-password to the user. A
failed auto-auth should let the startup layer retry, not expose a password
form.
Restore the three Tauri branches to the author's original unconditional
form (requireAuth: return; requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow: throw
redirect({to: '/chat'})). Keep the rest of the review fixes -- the
apiUrl() fetch wrapping, authRedirect helper, and fetchAuthStatus refactor
are all legitimate improvements and are preserved.
* Revert release-desktop.yml to author's version
The review loop's workflow-file tweaks (drop max-parallel: 1, lift releaseBody
to an env var) are cosmetic. OAuth tokens cannot push workflow-file changes,
and fine-grained PATs cannot honor maintainerCanModify on a third-party fork.
Reverting the workflow file to wasimysaid's version lets the push go through
without needing a classic PAT with both repo and workflow scopes.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Lee Jackson <130007945+Imagineer99@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <unslothai@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Michael Han