Commit graph

16 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tai An
b72cf0af24
fix(studio/responses): forward chat_template_kwargs enable_thinking to chat request (#6202)
* fix(studio/responses): forward chat_template_kwargs enable_thinking to chat request

The /v1/responses translation in _build_chat_request dropped
chat_template_kwargs (e.g. {"enable_thinking": true}) sent via the
Responses extra-body, so reasoning control was silently ignored.
Lift enable_thinking onto the typed ChatCompletionRequest field,
mirroring openai_chat_completions, so both the non-streaming and
streaming Responses pass-through paths honor it.

Fixes #6198

Signed-off-by: Tai An <antai12232931@outlook.com>

* Fix/adjust Responses reasoning for PR #6202

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Fix/adjust reasoning none for PR #6202

* Fix/adjust structured reasoning for PR #6202

* Fix/adjust responses reasoning review findings for PR #6202

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Fix/adjust responses reasoning follow-ups for PR #6202

* Fix/adjust think parsing gate for PR #6202

---------

Signed-off-by: Tai An <antai12232931@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Wasim Yousef Said <wasimysdev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-12 13:20:07 +02:00
oobabooga
7f2986a413
Studio: Add inline confirmation (Allow/Always allow/Deny) for tool calls (#5869)
* Studio: Add inline confirmation (Allow/Always allow/Deny) for tool calls

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Fix race in tool-call confirmation gate

* Studio: gate built-in tool calls and harden the confirmation handshake

The Allow / Always allow / Deny controls only lived in the fallback tool
card, but the built-in tools (web search, python, terminal, code
execution, image generation) render with their own components and so
never showed the buttons. Those calls paused after tool_start with no way
to approve them, hanging until the 1 hour timeout. Only MCP tools, which
use the fallback renderer, actually worked.

Render the controls for every tool card by wrapping each registered tool
component (and the fallback) in thread.tsx with a shared
ToolConfirmationControls, so the gate applies uniformly.

Also make the handshake robust:
- The gate keys on a per-call approval_id minted by the backend and
  echoed in tool_start, instead of session_id alone, so a stale or
  concurrent confirmation can no longer resolve the wrong call.
- The approval slot is registered before tool_start is yielded, closing
  the race where a fast click or an auto "Always allow" could reach the
  backend before the waiter existed.
- The frontend resolves with the same session id the request was sent
  with (plus the approval_id), fixing the new-thread mismatch where the
  confirmation targeted a different session than the blocked stream.
- The confirm endpoint returns {resolved}; the UI keeps the buttons and
  shows a retry hint until the backend confirms a match, instead of
  hiding them on a failed or mistargeted post.
- The gate runs after the disabled-tool and duplicate-call checks, so a
  call that will not execute is not put up for approval. A denied call is
  still excluded from duplicate detection, so re-issuing and approving it
  works.
- "Always allow" is scoped per session to match the backend gate.

Add backend tests for the approval registry, the SSE no-deadlock
handshake, and the loop integration (allow, deny, disabled, duplicate,
re-issue after deny).

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Move "Confirm tool calls" to the Tools section

* Studio: Keep tool group open while a tool call awaits confirmation

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Fix tool confirmation session scope for PR #5869

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Fix confirmation follow-ups for PR #5869

* Apply pre-commit formatting for PR #5869

* Fix confirmation cleanup for PR #5869

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Harden confirmation lookups for PR #5869

* Studio: make the tool-call confirmation decision immutable

resolve_tool_decision accepted a second confirmation for the same approval_id
and overwrote slot["decision"] in the window before the waiter reads it and
pops the slot, so a duplicate or out-of-order POST could flip an Allow to Deny
(and returned a misleading resolved:true). Reject once the slot's event is
already set so the first decision wins. Adds a regression test.

* Fix/adjust tool confirmations for PR #5869

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wasimysaid <wasimysdev@gmail.com>
2026-06-12 10:55:26 +02:00
Daniel Han
bc85ecd145
Studio: report the real llama-server context window and add an opt-in overflow policy for OpenAI-compatible serving (#6164)
* Studio: report the real llama-server context window and add an opt-in overflow policy for OpenAI-compatible serving

A community report showed OpenCode failing tool calls every few minutes
against Studio's OpenAI-compatible API while the same GGUF was stable on
LM Studio. Root cause: Studio advertises the requested context length, but
llama-server can allocate less (memory-fit step on small GPUs, --parallel
slot split), so clients budget against a window that does not exist. Their
generations truncate mid tool call at the real wall (finish_reason=length
with cut JSON arguments) and eventually the prompt itself exceeds the real
window, returning a 400 that agentic clients treat as non-retryable.

Changes:
- After llama-server health, read default_generation_settings.n_ctx from
  /props and adopt it whenever it is below Studio's computed context, with
  a warning. The load response, status route, UI value, and the passthrough
  max_tokens ceiling all become honest automatically.
- Expose context_length and max_context_length on /v1/models so clients can
  budget against the enforced window.
- Accept empty role=tool content (commands with no output are routine in
  agentic loops; OpenAI and llama-server both accept it) instead of a 400.
- Add context_overflow=truncate_middle (per request, or server-wide via
  UNSLOTH_CONTEXT_OVERFLOW=truncate_middle): on exceed_context_size_error
  the passthrough drops whole middle turn-groups (system prompt, first turn,
  and recent turns kept; tool calls stay paired with their results), clips
  oversized contents middle-out when group-dropping is not enough, clamps
  max_tokens to the generation headroom, and retries. Default stays 'error'
  with code=context_length_exceeded so clients running their own compaction
  keep full control.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: allocate the requested context for real (kv-unified, fit-ctx floor)

Two launch-flag gaps caused the advertised vs allocated divergence at the
source:
- llama-server enables --kv-unified only when the slot count is auto; Studio
  always passes --parallel N, which silently splits -c into per-slot windows
  of -c/N. Pass --kv-unified when N > 1 so a single request can use the full
  advertised window (same total KV memory, shared pool).
- with --fit on the fit step may set ctx as low as 4096; pass
  --fit-ctx <requested> for explicit requests so fit offloads or fails into
  the existing --fit off retry instead of silently shrinking the window.

Both flags are gated on --help capability probing so older builds keep the
current behavior, where the /props readback remains the backstop. Verified
live: -c 98304 --parallel 4 now serves per-slot n_ctx 98304 (was 24576),
48k-token requests pass through the passthrough, and the readback warning no
longer fires.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-11 07:49:55 -07:00
oobabooga
53af33798d
Studio: forward preserve_thinking + reasoning_effort on the OpenAI passthrough (#6171)
* Studio: forward preserve_thinking + reasoning_effort on the OpenAI passthrough

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Provide _request_reasoning_kwargs on the responses passthrough test backend mock

The OpenAI passthrough body builder now asks the active backend for
capability-gated reasoning kwargs. The responses stream adapter test fakes
the backend with a bare SimpleNamespace, so give it the same method a
non-reasoning template would expose (returns None, keeping
chat_template_kwargs out of the captured body).

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Shorten the backend mock comment

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
2026-06-10 22:55:43 -07:00
Wasim Yousef Said
2554636ded
Studio: follow-up fix for GGUF developer prompts (#6115)
* Studio: merge developer prompts for GGUF chat

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-09 18:11:38 +02:00
oobabooga
57be5868f9
Studio: improve OpenAI- and Anthropic-compatible API spec compliance (#6010)
* Studio: fix OpenAI- and Anthropic-compatible API spec compliance

* Studio: fix API spec-compliance gaps on passthrough and streaming paths

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: carry context_length_exceeded through the OpenAI passthrough error path

* Studio: count tool-schema tokens in the Anthropic server-tool stream, and small stream-handling guards

* Studio: guard message_delta usage against None and normalize developer role before proxying

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: honor max_completion_tokens on the external-provider proxy path

* Studio: forward llama-server cached_tokens into OpenAI prompt_tokens_details

* Studio: sanitize messages in count_tokens to match the /v1/messages prompt

* Studio: report max_tokens for truncated tool calls and guard null usage in metadata events

* Studio: drop the request-id middleware (headers aren't declared in either spec)

* Studio: include the required request_id field in Anthropic error bodies

* Studio: honor max_completion_tokens on the audio (TTS / audio-input) paths

* Studio: add the _effective_max_tokens helper and route all max-token sites through it

* Studio: align API compatibility edge cases

* Studio: clarify multi-choice chat support

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: clarify logprobs chat support

* Studio: opt the local chat UI into the streaming usage chunk so the context bar and tok/s repopulate

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: forward seed to llama-server, and fix Anthropic server-tool stop_reason, tool_result id correlation, and parallel-tool execution cap

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: align OpenAI chat completion spec edge cases

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: align backend API compatibility tests

* Studio: honor tool caps and internal stream usage

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: coerce nullable stream usage counts

* Studio: preserve system prompts with developer messages

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: wasimysaid <wasimysdev@gmail.com>
2026-06-09 17:13:25 +02:00
Daniel Han
187144d4e7
Reduce and tighten code comments and docstrings repo-wide (#6095)
Trim and tighten code comments and docstrings across the repository. Comment-only: every changed file verified code-identical to main via AST/token comparison.
2026-06-08 23:09:51 -07:00
Daniel Han
8292e699e4
Studio: make code comments and docstrings more succinct (#6029)
Trim and tighten code comments and docstrings across studio/ Python. Comment-only: every changed file verified code-identical to main via AST/token comparison.
2026-06-08 23:07:28 -07:00
Daniel Han
3ce187da02
Formatting: ruff line-length 100, kwarg-spacing passes, drop blank after short local imports (#6079)
Raise ruff line-length to 100 and extend the local pre-commit format pipeline (def-signature magic-comma normalization, short multi-line assert collapse, kwarg '=' spacing, blank-line-after-short-import removal, adjacent string-literal / f-string+plain merge, redundant-pass pruning). Every transform re-checks the file AST and is dropped if it would differ; the whole-repo reformat is verified AST-identical per file and idempotent.
2026-06-08 04:24:13 -07:00
Lee Jackson
9806e36aa4
Studio: enable GGUF tools with vision inputs (#6009)
* fix: enable GGUF tools with vision inputs

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* fix: GGUF vision tool routing

* Dedupe system messages on GGUF vision tool path for PR #6009

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
2026-06-05 03:46:04 -07:00
alkinun
b01a1ba1c2
Fix GGUF multi-image chat handling (#5508)
Preserves per-turn OpenAI image_url content parts in the standard GGUF /v1/chat/completions path so multi-image chat history keeps each image attached to its original turn. Legacy top-level image_base64 is injected as a synthetic image_url part only when no message-level image exists. Tool use is disabled whenever any GGUF image is present. Fixes #5470.
2026-05-19 04:36:20 -07:00
Daniel Han
d79fd92798
studio: scope cancel-cleanup to in-flight tmp dirs; walk back tool_call_id (#5488)
* studio: scope cancel-cleanup to in-flight tmp dirs; walk back tool_call_id

Two follow-ups to #5375's training and chat hardening.

_cleanup_cancelled_checkpoints used to rmtree every checkpoint-N
directory on Cancel. That is the opposite of what the user expects.
A user cancelling an 8h run with save_steps=2000 loses every
completed checkpoint they could have resumed from. The 67 MB residue
the audit memo flagged is the HF Trainer atomic-rename partial
(tmp-checkpoint-N), not the completed ones. The cleanup now targets
only tmp-checkpoint subdirs; completed checkpoint-N directories are
user-owned and stay. Symlinked output_dir and symlinked children are
skipped so the realpath containment cannot be levered into deleting
arbitrary content via a symlink trick.

ChatMessage._validate_role_shape stamped a random secrets.token_hex
id on tool messages with no tool_call_id. That id is uncorrelated
with the prior assistant tool_calls id, so strict passthrough
backends (OpenAI, Anthropic) reject the request as orphaned and
llama.cpp treats the tool result as "no preceding call" and
hallucinates. The synthesis moves up to ChatCompletionRequest, where
the whole conversation is visible: for each tool message missing an
id we walk back to the most recent assistant turn with tool_calls
(stopping at user turns), prefer a function.name match, otherwise
take the first unconsumed tool_call. Synthesis is the fallback when
no candidate assistant turn exists, preserving the prior round-trip
guarantee for orphaned tool messages.

Tests:
  - test_cleanup_cancelled_checkpoints.py (new): pins that completed
    checkpoint subdirs survive, tmp-checkpoint partials are removed,
    non-int suffixes (checkpoint-final, checkpoint-best) are left
    alone, output_dir outside outputs_root is refused, symlinked
    output_dir and symlinked child are both skipped, missing dir is
    a no-op.
  - test_inference_model_validation.py: 6 new walkback cases covering
    name-match preference, first-unconsumed fallback, explicit-id
    passthrough, multi-tool-result pairing, synth-on-no-parent, and
    no-cross-user-turn invariant.
  - test_openai_tool_passthrough.py: the two ChatMessage-level
    synth-on-missing tests are rewritten to assert that the per-
    message validator now leaves tool_call_id untouched; resolution
    coverage lives in the request-level tests above.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* studio: explicit tool_call_id reserve, numeric tmp-checkpoint suffix only

Reviewer follow-ups to the training-cleanup + tool_call_id walkback PR.

tool_call_id walkback: a mixed assistant turn with [call_a, call_b]
followed by a tool result that carried tool_call_id="call_a" and a
sibling tool result with no id resolved to ['call_a', 'call_a']
because the explicit id never reserved call_a in the consumed set.
Added a pre-pass over the message list that walks back from every
role="tool" message carrying an explicit id and marks the matching
(asst_idx, tc_idx) consumed, then the missing-id walkback runs against
that pre-populated set. The second result now resolves to call_b.

While here, also harden the function-shape check: if a provider
ships a malformed tool_call where `function` is a string rather than
a dict, the old `(tc.get("function") or {}).get("name")` raised
AttributeError on the string's .get; now isinstance-gated so the
walkback falls through to the fallback id without raising.

Cancel cleanup: `tmp-checkpoint-*` is too broad. HF Trainer's
in-flight partials are always `tmp-checkpoint-<integer-step>`, so
constrain the cleanup regex to `^tmp-checkpoint-\d+$`. A user folder
named `tmp-checkpoint-final`, `tmp-checkpoint-backup`, or
`tmp-checkpoint-user-notes` is now preserved.

ChatMessage docstring still pointed at the pre-PR contract that
required `tool_call_id` on every role="tool" message. Updated to say
missing ids are accepted at message scope and resolved at
ChatCompletionRequest scope. Inline comment above the cancel-cleanup
call now describes the actual behaviour (in-flight tmp partials,
completed checkpoints preserved).

Test:
  - python -m pytest studio/backend/tests/test_inference_model_validation.py
    studio/backend/tests/test_cleanup_cancelled_checkpoints.py
    studio/backend/tests/test_openai_tool_passthrough.py -q
    -> 76 passed (was 67 before this commit; +2 walkback regression
       tests, +1 numeric-suffix preservation test)

* studio: trim verbose comments in cleanup + tool_call_id walkback

Move the HF tmp-checkpoint regex to module scope as a named constant.
Drop the multi-paragraph docstring on _cleanup_cancelled_checkpoints
and the inline call-site rationale; the function name + the test
class already cover the why.

Compress _resolve_missing_tool_call_ids docstring from a six-line
explanation to two. Same logic, fewer in-flow tutorials.

76 tests in cleanup + inference-model-validation + tool-passthrough pass.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-18 00:01:48 -07:00
Ashwin Upadhyay
867b1e1873
studio/openai: align chat completions docstring with stream=false default (closes #5047) (#5524)
* studio/openai: align chat completions docstring with stream=false default

The schema and regression test for ChatCompletionRequest.stream were
already corrected to default `false` (matching OpenAI's spec), but the
route docstring still claimed streaming was the default -- misleading
for anyone reading the source while debugging the original report.

Updates the docstring to reflect the actual behavior, adds an explicit
note pointing to #5047, and tags the existing regression test with the
issue reference and the .NET / System.Text.Json client class so the
intent survives future cleanup.

Closes #5047

* studio/openai: address review — move #5047 ref out of OpenAPI doc, add route-level test

Two follow-ups on review feedback:

- Drop "(see #5047)" from the openai_chat_completions docstring so the
  internal issue number doesn't leak into the FastAPI-generated
  OpenAPI / Swagger schema. The reference now lives in a code comment
  next to the actual `if payload.stream:` branch, where it's most
  useful for the next person debugging the same class of report.

- Add test_post_without_stream_field_decodes_to_stream_false_over_http:
  a TestClient-based wire-level guard that POSTs a body without
  `stream` (the exact shape naive curl / .NET / System.Text.Json
  clients send) and asserts both that the request deserialises into
  stream=False *and* that the response Content-Type is
  application/json, never text/event-stream. The existing
  constructor-level test would silently miss regressions introduced
  by middleware or alias rewrites that mutate the body before the
  pydantic model is built.

Refs #5047

* studio/openai: route-level test mounts real router instead of synthetic echo app

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

---------

Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <115670425+rolandtannous@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <rolandtannous@gravityq.ai>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-18 01:19:50 +04:00
Daniel Han
0881a7a5d7
studio: security and hardening pass (auth rate-limit, sandbox, path containment, schema validation, headers) (#5375)
* studio: contain export and dataset paths under their configured roots

resolve_under_root and resolve_dataset_path previously returned absolute
paths unchanged, so an authenticated client could supply
save_directory="/tmp/escape" (or any other absolute path) and have the
exporter drop adapter files anywhere the server user could write. This
turned up during a recent audit pass where an authenticated POST to
/api/export/export/lora with save_directory="/tmp/lora_escape_test"
returned 200 and wrote adapter_model.safetensors, adapter_config.json,
and tokenizer files under /tmp.

The fix is two-layered:

storage_roots.py adds an _assert_contained(resolved, root) helper that
runs after path resolution and rejects any result whose realpath does
not sit under realpath(root). resolve_under_root now rejects '..'
segments and null bytes outright, and only accepts absolute inputs when
they are already inside the configured root (internal call sites that
re-resolve a stored absolute path stay idempotent;
worker.py:resolve_output_dir(output_dir) etc. continue to work).
resolve_dataset_path picks up the same containment rule, scoped to the
three dataset roots.

models/export.py adds field_validator("save_directory", mode="before")
to ExportCommonOptions and ExportGGUFRequest so bad input fails fast at
422 with a clear message rather than a 500 deep inside the resolver.
The validator rejects empty/whitespace, null bytes, control chars,
strings longer than 255 chars, absolute paths, and '..' segments.

routes/export.py:_export_details now returns os.path.relpath(output_path,
exports_root()) so the Export Complete dialog and /api/models/loras no
longer leak the absolute install prefix to the UI; the basename is
used as a last-resort fallback.

Verified end to end:
- POST /api/export/export/lora {"save_directory":"/tmp/foo"} -> 422
  "save_directory must be a name or relative path under the export
  root; absolute paths are rejected". /tmp/foo is not created.
- "../../etc/escape" -> 422 "may not contain '..' segments".
- save_directory="my_subdir" -> still accepted (400 only because the
  test had no checkpoint loaded yet, not because of validation).
- Internal idempotent re-resolve via resolve_export_dir(absolute path
  that is already under exports_root) returns the same path unchanged.

* studio/sandbox: harden bash + python tool execution

The sandboxed Bash and Python tool channels in Chat ran with a thin
preexec hook (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS + RLIMIT_FSIZE only). Bash had a
small word blocklist; Python had an AST safety pass aimed at
signal-tampering and shell-escape primitives. An audit pass showed
several gaps that a tool-calling model could trigger inadvertently:

- bash curl/wget/nc reached AWS IMDSv2 and returned live STS
  credentials for the instance role.
- python "import socket; s.connect((169.254.169.254, 80))"
  reached the same endpoint regardless of the bash blocklist.
- "cat /etc/passwd" was blocked at the bash side (because "passwd"
  is in the blocklist), but "open('/etc/passwd').read()" in Python
  happily returned its contents.
- "chr(115)+chr(117)+chr(100)+chr(111)" style dynamic-arg
  construction slipped through the AST shell-escape check.
- The supervisor used proc.kill() on timeout, which only signals
  the immediate pid; bash-backgrounded children survived. A fork
  bomb could spawn for the full 300s timeout window.
- Session work directories under ~/studio_sandbox/<id>/ were
  created with default umask (0o755), so any other UID on the host
  could enumerate them.
- session_id sanitisation used a one-shot str.replace("..",""),
  which is non-iterative and a small footgun.

This commit takes a conservative middle path: the sandbox still
runs as the Studio UID with no namespace tricks where the kernel
disallows them, but every chokepoint is tightened.

_sandbox_preexec now:
- calls os.setsid() so children share a process group; the
  supervisor uses os.killpg(SIGKILL) on timeout/cancel so
  backgrounded children die with the parent (new _kill_process_tree
  helper, wired into _cancel_watcher and both _bash_exec /
  _python_exec timeout branches).
- calls os.umask(0o077) so files the child writes default to 0o600.
- applies PR_SET_PDEATHSIG=SIGKILL so an orphaned child dies if
  Studio exits.
- best-effort unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) for a private network namespace
  (failure is logged and swallowed; defense-in-depth is still in
  place via the bash blocklist and the AST checker below).
- sets RLIMIT_NPROC=10000 (tunable via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_NPROC),
  RLIMIT_AS=8GB, RLIMIT_CPU=300, RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024. The 10k NPROC
  figure is chosen to sit well above the ~500 LWPs a healthy Studio
  + llama-server combination already uses while still capping a
  runaway fork bomb. NPROC counts LWPs per real UID, so a lower
  figure (e.g. 256) starves legitimate bash forks
  ("bash: fork: retry: Resource temporarily unavailable").

_get_workdir:
- rejects session_id that doesn't match [A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64};
  non-matching values bucket into a shared "_invalid" dir.
- chmod 0o700 on both the workdir and on ~/studio_sandbox/ so
  other UIDs cannot read another session's contents.

_BLOCKED_COMMANDS_COMMON gains: doas, pkexec, halt, poweroff, curl,
wget, nc, ncat, netcat, socat, ssh, scp, sftp, rsync, eval, source.
The intent is to keep general bash usage working (echo, ls, pipes,
loops, for, head, etc.) while denying the obvious egress and
escalation paths.

The AST checker (_check_signal_escape_patterns) is split into the
existing shell/signal/loop checks plus a new narrow IO denylist:
- Always flag non-literal args to anything in _SHELL_EXEC_FUNCS,
  not just _STRING_SHELL_FUNCS. Closes the dynamic-arg bypass.
- Reject calls to socket.create_connection, socket.socket().connect,
  urllib.request.urlopen, http.client.HTTP*Connection, requests.*,
  httpx.* whose literal host argument is in a cloud-metadata
  denylist (169.254.169.254 + 169.254.* + 100.64.*, plus the
  GCP/Alibaba/ECS metadata hostnames and IPv6 link-local). Public
  hosts (example.com, huggingface.co, ...) still work. Dynamic
  hosts cannot be statically blocked; mitigated by the bash
  blocklist + the netns where the kernel allows it.
- Reject literal open("/etc/passwd"), /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
  /etc/ssh/*, and /proc/<pid>/environ. Other files
  (/etc/os-release, /etc/hostname, /tmp/*, user dirs) still work.

The _check_code_safety summariser is updated to include the new
network_calls and sensitive_file_reads buckets in its error string.

Regression-checked: echo, sleep, ls /tmp, for loops, piped helpers
(echo a | tr a A), urllib.request.urlopen("http://example.com"),
socket.getaddrinfo("example.com",80), open("/etc/os-release"),
open("/tmp/...","w") all still succeed. curl, wget, nc, ssh, rm,
socket.create_connection(("169.254.169.254",80)),
open("/etc/passwd"), open("/proc/self/environ") all correctly
blocked.

* studio: rate-limit login, rotate refresh tokens, add logout, security headers, gate bootstrap injection

A pass over the auth surface found a cluster of related issues that this
commit closes together.

Login (routes/auth.py):
- Add an in-memory per-IP login rate limiter. Five failed POSTs to
  /api/auth/login inside a 60s window produce 429 with Retry-After.
  A successful login clears the bucket. Previously 30 wrong passwords
  in under one second was accepted as 30x 401, which combined with
  the (now fixed) admin-username leak from /api/auth/status made
  brute-force trivial against a small password.

Logout (routes/auth.py):
- New POST /api/auth/logout returns 204 and calls
  storage.revoke_user_refresh_tokens(subject) so the refresh token
  is no longer valid. Previously POST /api/auth/logout returned 405
  and there was no way to invalidate refresh tokens short of
  changing the password. Frontend session.ts already calls
  clearAuthTokens() to drop localStorage; the new endpoint lets the
  client also tell the server to revoke server-side state.

Refresh-token rotation (routes/auth.py + auth/storage.py):
- New storage.consume_refresh_token(token) atomically validates +
  deletes a refresh token, returning (username, is_desktop). The
  /api/auth/refresh handler now mints both a new access AND a new
  refresh token; the supplied token becomes invalid. Replaying a
  consumed refresh returns 401 "Invalid or expired refresh token".
  The previous refresh_access_token helper is left in place for
  callers that intentionally want the non-rotating shape; nothing
  in the route layer uses it now.

/api/auth/status no longer leaks default_username (models/auth.py +
routes/auth.py):
- AuthStatusResponse.default_username becomes Optional[str] with a
  None default; the handler always returns None. The frontend already
  hardcodes HIDDEN_LOGIN_USERNAME = "unsloth" (auth-form.tsx:82), so
  no UI change is required.

window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__ no longer auto-injects (main.py):
- _inject_bootstrap is now opt-in via the
  UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP env var. The previous default
  (inject whenever requires_password_change is true) embedded the
  plaintext bootstrap password into the first-boot HTML for any
  caller that hit /, /change-password, or any unknown SPA path.
  Browser extensions and any XSS payload on the page could read it
  trivially. With the new gate the bootstrap password lives only in
  the auth/.bootstrap_password file (mode 0o600) where it has always
  been; users typing it into a current-password field is the right
  UX. routes/auth.py:change_password also clears
  app.state.bootstrap_password defensively.

Security headers + server fingerprint (main.py + run.py):
- New SecurityHeadersMiddleware adds Content-Security-Policy,
  X-Frame-Options: DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
  Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(),
  interest-cohort=(), and stamps server: unsloth-studio so the
  generic uvicorn banner no longer fingerprints the stack. The
  uvicorn.Config gains server_header=False so it stops emitting its
  own Server header.

/api/health minimisation (main.py):
- Unauthenticated GET /api/health returns just
  {"status":"healthy","timestamp":...} so load-balancer liveness
  probes keep working without leaking version, device_type,
  chat_only, desktop_protocol_version, or studio_root_id to
  arbitrary callers. A request that presents a valid Bearer token
  still gets the full diagnostic payload so internal launchers and
  sibling-Studio detection (which compares studio_root_id) keep
  working.

Verification:
- 30 wrong-password POSTs to /api/auth/login -> first 5 = 401, 6th
  through 30th = 429.
- POST /api/auth/logout with a fresh token -> 204. The matching
  refresh token then fails 401.
- Login -> R1; /api/auth/refresh with R1 -> new access + R2 (R2 !=
  R1); /api/auth/refresh with R1 again -> 401; /api/auth/refresh
  with R2 -> still succeeds once and rotates again.
- curl /api/auth/status -> default_username: null.
- curl http://127.0.0.1/ does not contain __UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__.
- curl -I / shows CSP, X-Frame-Options: DENY,
  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
  Permissions-Policy, and server: unsloth-studio.
- curl /api/health unauthenticated -> {status, timestamp} only.
  curl with Authorization: Bearer <valid> -> full payload.
- Existing /api/system, /api/models/list, /api/train/status,
  /api/inference/status, /api/auth/api-keys, login flow, SPA root
  all still return 200 after the changes (regression smoke).

* studio: add SecurityHeadersMiddleware, MaxBodyMiddleware, /recipes redirect, gate _inject_bootstrap, minimise /api/health

This commit lands the main.py-side changes that share a single
middleware-registration spot. They are kept together because every
change here is either (a) a top-level middleware definition that has
to be added next to LoggingMiddleware, or (b) a route handler at the
same file-level.

SecurityHeadersMiddleware (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options:
DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy, server: unsloth-studio). The previous responses
emitted no CSP, no XFO, no Referrer-Policy and were stamped
server: uvicorn.

MaxBodyMiddleware rejects POST/PUT/PATCH on the inference / dataset /
data-recipe / train / export prefixes when Content-Length exceeds
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB (default 100). The audit hit this by
attaching a 50 MB plain-text file to a chat message and watching
Studio base64-encode it into the JSON body; uvicorn has no enforced
cap so the only previous guard was the per-file 50 MB ceiling that
data-recipe upload routes already enforce. The new middleware extends
that ceiling to the OpenAI-compat path that the Chat attachments
flow through. Verified: a 200 MB JSON POST to /v1/chat/completions
returns HTTP 413 "Request body too large (209,715,264 bytes; max
104,857,600)". A small valid request continues to reach the handler.

_inject_bootstrap is gated behind UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP.
The previous default was to inline window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__ =
{username, password} into the first-boot HTML whenever
requires_password_change was true, which exposed the plaintext
bootstrap password to any browser extension, page script, or LAN
caller on -H 0.0.0.0. The bootstrap password remains in the on-disk
.bootstrap_password file (mode 0o600) where it has always lived;
users typing it into a current-password field is the right UX.

/api/health unauthenticated returns {"status":"healthy","timestamp":
...} only; the previous payload (version, device_type, chat_only,
desktop_protocol_version, supports_desktop_auth, studio_root_id,
native_path_leases_supported) is preserved for callers that present
a valid Bearer token, so internal launchers and sibling-Studio
detection (which compares studio_root_id) keep working.

/recipes -> /data-recipes 308 redirect. The Data Recipes page lives
at /data-recipes; users typing /recipes hit the SPA catch-all and
saw "Not Found". The redirect also preserves any tail path, so
/recipes/<rest> -> /data-recipes/<rest>.

Verified end to end with curl: CSP / XFO / X-Content-Type-Options /
Referrer-Policy / Permissions-Policy all present on /, server header
is now unsloth-studio (uvicorn's own banner is suppressed via
server_header=False in run.py from the auth-batch commit). Followed
the /recipes redirect lands on the SPA HTML.

* studio: bound TrainingStartRequest hyperparameters at the schema level

POST /api/train/start accepted any value for learning_rate, batch_size,
max_steps, max_seq_length, warmup_steps, warmup_ratio, num_epochs,
save_steps, weight_decay, gradient_accumulation_steps, lora_r,
lora_alpha and lora_dropout, including -1, 0, 1e9, and non-numeric
strings like 'abc' or 'two' (which silently coerce to 0 in the
trainer). Probing showed the API returning 200 to learning_rate=-1
and batch_size=0; only max_steps had any partial clamping.

This commit adds field_validator on every numeric hyperparameter.
Bounds are chosen wide enough to span realistic single-host
configurations (B200 with 180 GB of memory comfortably fits the
upper end) while rejecting the values that always produce broken
training:

- learning_rate: parses str/float, requires 0 < lr < 1.0. Non-numeric
  input raises with "learning_rate must be parseable as float (got
  'abc')" instead of silently coercing to 0.
- batch_size: [1, 1024].
- gradient_accumulation_steps: [1, 4096].
- num_epochs: [1, 1000].
- max_steps: [1, 1_000_000].
- max_seq_length: [1, 131072].
- warmup_steps: [0, max_steps].
- warmup_ratio: [0.0, 1.0].
- save_steps: [0, 1_000_000].
- weight_decay: [0, 10] (typical 0..0.1).
- lora_r: [1, 512].
- lora_alpha: [1, 1024].
- lora_dropout: [0.0, 1.0).

Each validator names the offending field in its ValueError message
so the 422 response body identifies which input is bad. The
learning_rate validator returns its result as str (the schema field
type is str("2e-4") for backwards compatibility) so existing call
sites that float() the value continue to work.

Verified:
- learning_rate=-1 -> 422 "learning_rate must be > 0 (got -1.0);
  typical range is 1e-6 .. 1e-3".
- learning_rate='abc' -> 422 "must be parseable as float".
- batch_size=-1 / 0 / 999999 -> 422 "batch_size must be in [1, 1024]".
- batch_size='two' -> 422 (pydantic int parser).
- max_steps=0 / -5 -> 422 "must be a positive int".
- max_seq_length=200000 -> 422 "must be in [1, 131072]".
- warmup_ratio=2.5 -> 422 "must be in [0.0, 1.0]".
- lora_dropout=1.5 -> 422 "must be in [0.0, 1.0)".
- Valid request with learning_rate='2e-4', batch_size=1, max_steps=5
  passes validation and the training run starts as normal.

* studio: redact image-decode errors, clean checkpoint dirs on cancel, tolerate Stop-button + tool-result message shapes

Three small fixes that fall under "do not let the audit findings
become user-visible papercuts".

routes/inference.py - image-decode error redaction (the audit hit
this with a 0-byte / malformed / wrong-extension image upload). The
three image-normalise sites previously raised HTTPException(400,
detail=f"Failed to process image: {e}"). When PIL raised
UnidentifiedImageError(io.BytesIO(raw)) the message string included
"<_io.BytesIO object at 0x7e40a5d7bf60>", leaking both the Python
class name (confirming the PIL/io stack) and a heap address (mildly
useful for ASLR-bypass chaining if another memory-corruption bug is
ever found). Each site now catches UnidentifiedImageError and
returns the generic "Unsupported or corrupt image format"; the
fall-through generic except returns "Failed to process image". No
exception-repr is interpolated into a response body anywhere along
these paths.

core/training/training.py - checkpoint cleanup on cancel. When a
user clicks Cancel Training, the trainer flips _cancel_requested=True
and the supervisor force-terminates the subprocess. The trainer
writes checkpoint-<step> directories under output_dir every
save_steps; previously these survived the cancel and accumulated on
disk (the audit recorded ~67 MB stuck after a 200-step cancel with
save_steps=20). New helper _cleanup_cancelled_checkpoints(output_dir)
globs checkpoint-<int> entries and removes them. It is gated by a
realpath containment check against outputs_root() so it cannot
accidentally rmtree anything outside the configured outputs root.
force_terminate() invokes the helper after the subprocess join when
_cancel_requested is true. Stop-and-Save runs are unaffected because
that path keeps _cancel_requested=False.

models/inference.py - chat message shape tolerance. Two related
frontend interactions used to crash the request validator:

- After the Stop button truncates a generation, the frontend
  retained {role:"assistant", content:""} in the conversation
  history and replayed it on the next send. ChatMessage previously
  required role="assistant" to have non-empty content or tool_calls,
  so the next message returned 422 and the thread was permanently
  broken. The validator now normalises empty assistant content to
  None so the request round-trips and the trailing empty turn can
  be ignored downstream.

- The frontend's second-round tool POST drops the streamed
  tool_call_id, hitting the strict-spec check "role=tool requires
  tool_call_id". The validator now synthesises an opaque id
  (call_<8 hex>) when missing, so the request reaches the handler
  and the model's final summarising response gets generated. The
  proper fix lives in the frontend (carry the streamed id through
  the second POST) and will follow.

Verified end to end with curl: HTTP 400 (model not loaded) on both
the empty-assistant history shape and the tool-result-without-id
shape, instead of HTTP 422 from the schema validator.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* studio: tighten code comments from security-hardening pass

Trim verbose docstrings and inline finding references added in the
previous commits in this branch. Functionality unchanged.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* studio: await get_current_subject in /api/health and make refresh-token consumption atomic

The /api/health auth probe called get_current_subject(creds) without
awaiting it. The coroutine object is truthy, so any caller presenting a
Bearer header (valid or not) received the full diagnostic payload
including version, device_type, studio_root_id, etc. Await the coroutine
and treat HTTPException as 'fall back to the minimal liveness payload'.

consume_refresh_token did SELECT then DELETE WHERE id under default
autocommit isolation. Two concurrent POST /api/auth/refresh requests
could both win the SELECT before either DELETE ran, defeating
single-use refresh-token rotation. Replace with a single
DELETE ... WHERE token_hash = ? AND expires_at >= ? RETURNING ...
statement so the validate-and-delete lands as one atomic op under
SQLite's write lock (3.45.1 supports RETURNING; min was 3.35).

* studio: enforce body cap on chunked uploads and drop unsafe-inline from script-src

MaxBodyMiddleware previously only inspected the declared Content-Length
header; clients omitting it or sending Transfer-Encoding: chunked
bypassed the cap and could still drive an OOM via the downstream
JSON / file readers on /v1/chat/completions, /api/inference, /api/data-recipe,
/api/datasets, /api/train, /api/export. Rewrite as a raw ASGI middleware
that drains and counts http.request frames, replies 413 once the running
total exceeds UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB before invoking the FastAPI
handler, and replays the buffered body to downstream so route code that
calls request.json() / await request.body() works unchanged.

CSP previously included 'unsafe-inline' on script-src, which defeats the
main XSS protection. The frontend bundle does not need inline scripts;
the only inline <script> the backend ever emits is _inject_bootstrap,
which is opt-in via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP. Drop 'unsafe-inline'
from script-src by default; when _inject_bootstrap fires, generate a
per-response nonce, embed it on the inlined <script>, and have
SecurityHeadersMiddleware splice 'nonce-XXX' into the CSP for that one
response (the internal x-internal-script-nonce header is popped before
the response leaves the server). 'unsafe-inline' stays on style-src for
Vite-injected styles.

* studio: drop empty assistant sentinel before passthrough

ChatMessage._validate_role_shape normalises role="assistant", content=""
(the post-Stop sentinel emitted by the frontend) to content=None so the
in-process path can drop it via _extract_content_parts. The passthrough
path then ran m.model_dump(exclude_none=True), which strips the now-None
content key entirely, sending {"role":"assistant"} to llama-server / the
OpenAI-compat backend. That fails upstream and leaves the user without a
recoverable Stop->resume.

Add _drop_empty_assistant_sentinels and call it at both passthrough
message origins: _openai_messages_for_passthrough (covers
/v1/chat/completions and the Responses API which routes through it) and
the anthropic_messages_to_openai output before
_anthropic_passthrough_*. Assistant messages that carry only tool_calls
(no content) are preserved.

* studio/tests: cover audit-fix surfaces and rebase pre-existing tests

Adds and updates pytest coverage for the four bot-flagged audit fixes
landed earlier in this branch and rebases two pre-existing tests that
were broken by the relaxed-validator and /api/health auth-gate changes.

studio/backend/tests/test_middleware.py (new)
  MaxBodyMiddleware: small protected, large declared, unprotected
  passthrough, chunked-upload-over-cap rejection (the regression for
  the original Content-Length-only gap), and chunked-under-cap replay.
  SecurityHeadersMiddleware: script-src no longer carries
  'unsafe-inline', style-src still does, default headers
  (XFO/XCTO/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy/server), and the
  internal x-internal-script-nonce header is consumed by the
  middleware and converted to 'nonce-XXX' in the CSP.
  /api/health: no auth -> minimal, invalid Bearer -> minimal
  (the await regression), valid Bearer -> full diagnostic payload.

studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
  consume_refresh_token: second-call returns None, expired returns
  None, and a 64-thread concurrent pile-up against the same hash
  produces exactly one successful consumer (regression for the
  SELECT-then-DELETE race).
  test_health_response_reports_desktop_capability_fields: rebase
  against the new health_check(request) signature by going through
  TestClient with a real bearer instead of asyncio.run-ing the
  handler directly.

studio/backend/tests/test_openai_tool_passthrough.py
  Pin the new ChatMessage tolerance: assistant without content or
  tool_calls is tolerated (normalises content -> None), empty-string
  and empty-list assistant content normalise to None, and a missing
  / empty tool_call_id on role='tool' is synthesised as call_<hex>
  rather than raising. Tests for _drop_empty_assistant_sentinels
  cover the three drop shapes (empty string, empty list, missing
  content key), preservation of assistant text and tool_calls-only
  messages, and end-to-end through
  _openai_messages_for_passthrough.

studio/backend/main.py
  SecurityHeadersMiddleware.dispatch used response.headers.pop(...)
  for the nonce-header handoff; Starlette's MutableHeaders has no
  pop. Read-then-del so the internal handoff header is still
  stripped before the response leaves the server.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* studio/tests: rebase three more pre-existing CI tests against this branch

CI on PR #5375 was red on three tests that were tuned for behaviour
predating this branch. Updates each so the assertions match what the
audit fixes intentionally changed; no production code touched.

studio/backend/tests/test_trained_model_scan.py
  test_scan_trained_models_includes_lora_and_full_finetune_outputs
  passed an absolute tmp_path through scan_trained_models, which now
  runs resolve_output_dir / _assert_contained against outputs_root().
  Repoint outputs_root() at tmp_path via monkeypatch so the fixture
  dirs land under the configured root and the realpath containment
  check passes.

tests/test_studio_install_workspace_guard.py
  test_health_endpoint_exposes_studio_root_id_not_raw_path read
  the first 1500 bytes after @app.get("/api/health") and asserted on
  the studio_root_id literal. The handler grew (unauth short-circuit
  + await dependency gate) and the literal slid past the byte window.
  Replace the fixed window with a slice up to the next top-level
  @app.* decorator so the test surveys the whole handler regardless
  of size.

tests/studio/studio_api_smoke.py
  The "login burst (5x wrong pw) -> 401 each" assertion was tagged
  "When/if we add one, this assertion updates in the same PR." We
  added the per-IP rate-limit in routes/auth.py
  (_LOGIN_MAX_FAILS=5/60s) but missed the assertion update. Rewrite
  the burst probe to observe the new invariant: at least one 401,
  eventual transition to 429, and Retry-After present on the 429.
  Adds a small _login_with_headers helper since the existing login()
  helper drops response headers.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* ci(studio-ui): set UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP=1 for Playwright Studios

The Chat UI Playwright test drives the first-boot change-password
form, which (per playwright_chat_ui.py step "1. Change-password
through the UI") pre-seeds the hidden current_password field from
window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__. That global is only emitted when the
backend's _inject_bootstrap path fires, which since the security
pass on this branch is gated behind UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP
and defaults to off. Without the global, the React form's
current_password validator never satisfies, the submit button stays
disabled, and the composer.wait_for() probe times out on
/change-password.

Re-enable injection only for the CI Studios that drive the chat UI
across linux/mac/windows. Production deployments are unaffected: the
env var has to be explicitly opted into, and the on-disk
auth/.bootstrap_password remains the source of truth for human users
typing the password in by hand.

Covers all eight Studio launch sites: the primary chat-ui boot and
the "extra UI tests" boot for each of the three OSes, plus the
pipeTransport JSON-crash retry relaunches in the macOS workflow that
re-spawn Studio mid-job.

A follow-up frontend PR will add a visible current_password input so
the form satisfies its own validator without needing the bootstrap
auto-fill at all; once that lands this CI knob can come back out.

* studio/sandbox: drop unshare(CLONE_NEWNET); add trusted-host allowlist; block sandbox file uploads; raise CPU rlimit default to 600 s

CLONE_NEWNET inside _sandbox_preexec silently killed every outbound
HTTP request from sandboxed Python whenever the kernel allowed
unprivileged user namespaces. requests.get('https://huggingface.co'),
urllib.request.urlopen('https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...'),
socket.connect(('arxiv.org', 443)) all failed despite the AST visitor
intending to allow them. The bash blocklist (curl / wget / nc / ssh /
scp / sftp / rsync / socat / eval / source) plus the AST-level
metadata-host denylist still carry the network policy after this
change; CLONE_NEWNET was redundant with both.

Add _TRUSTED_PUBLIC_HOST_LITERALS + _TRUSTED_PUBLIC_HOST_SUFFIXES
(~100 informational hosts: Wikipedia language subdomains, Wikimedia,
Wikidata, Google search, Bing, DuckDuckGo, HuggingFace, GitHub,
raw.githubusercontent.com, arXiv, StackOverflow / Stack Exchange,
MDN, docs.python.org, PyTorch / TensorFlow / NumPy / pandas docs,
pypi / files.pythonhosted.org / npmjs / crates.io, ReadTheDocs,
arXiv, Britannica, BBC / Reuters / Nature / Science, NASA / CDC /
NIH / WHO open data, api.weather.gov). The visitor now blocks
literal hosts that are neither metadata nor trusted with a short
LLM-readable string so the model can retry with an allowed source
instead of choking on a multi-line error.

Block upload-shape calls regardless of host: requests.post / put /
patch / delete / request with files= or data=open(...) /
data=bytes_literal; httpx equivalents; urllib.request.urlopen /
Request with data=...; HuggingFace upload_file / upload_folder /
upload_large_folder / create_commit (module-level FQ paths AND
method-name match on any receiver). Message: "Blocked: file upload
disallowed in sandbox".

Bump UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S default 300 -> 600 s so long
agentic chains that span multiple tool calls don't get SIGXCPU'd
mid-stride. Env-var override path is unchanged.

Host normalisation now strips trailing dot, userinfo @, and explicit
port before allowlist / denylist comparison so trailing-DNS-dot,
userinfo-smuggling, and explicit-:443 URLs are decided correctly.

* studio: raise default request-body cap from 100 MB to 500 MB

UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB default goes 100 -> 500 to comfortably
cover vision + audio + multi-recipe-batch JSON payloads. The
MaxBodyMiddleware stream-counting logic from this branch's earlier
06ec088 already handles chunked bodies up to the new cap; env-var
override path is unchanged for callers that want a tighter limit.

* studio/auth: restore /api/auth/status.default_username to 'unsloth'

This branch's earlier b39e9a4 changed default_username to None on the
public /api/auth/status endpoint so the username field didn't leak to
unauthenticated callers. In practice this regressed third-party
clients (and the in-tree React login form's pre-fill UX) without
adding meaningful security: the bootstrap password is the actual
secret, and the username 'unsloth' is the documented default.

Pin default_username to storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME ('unsloth')
and tighten the response model so the field is required rather than
Optional. Anyone who needs anonymisation can still reach for an
allow-list deployment with auth disabled.

* studio/training: raise max_seq_length / batch_size / lora_r / lora_alpha caps

This branch's 7102815 introduced field validators with conservative
caps. The follow-up loosens them so long-context experiments and
high-rank LoRA exploration aren't gated at the schema layer:

  _MAX_BATCH_SIZE   1024     -> 4096
  _MAX_SEQ_LENGTH   131_072  -> 2_000_000   (2M tokens)
  lora_r cap        512      -> 16_384      (_MAX_LORA_R)
  lora_alpha cap    1024     -> 32_768      (_MAX_LORA_ALPHA)

_MAX_GRAD_ACCUM / _MAX_STEPS / _MAX_EPOCHS / lora_dropout /
warmup_ratio / weight_decay are unchanged. Hardware (VRAM, host
RAM, kernel launch latency) is now the binding constraint at the
new caps, which is the correct ordering -- the validator stays a
sanity check on -1 / 0 / 'abc' style garbage, not a usability gate.

* studio/tests: cover sandbox allowlist + upload block + raised training caps

studio/backend/tests/test_sandbox_tools.py (new):
  TestMetadataHostDenylist     -- short "Blocked: cloud-metadata host"
                                  message on AWS IMDS, GCP metadata,
                                  Alibaba ECS, AWS IPv6 IMDS, 169.254/16.
  TestTrustedHostAllowlist     -- Wikipedia (any language subdomain),
                                  Google, DuckDuckGo, HF, raw GitHub,
                                  arXiv, StackOverflow / family,
                                  MDN, docs.python.org, pypi, BBC,
                                  api.weather.gov, NumPy / PyTorch docs.
  TestUntrustedHostBlock       -- example.com / random unlisted host
                                  rejected with the short "Blocked: host
                                  not in sandbox allowlist; use an
                                  allowed informational source" message.
                                  Dynamic URLs (computed var) still pass
                                  -- documented limit of static analysis.
  TestHostNormalization        -- trailing dot, explicit :443, uppercase,
                                  userinfo-@-smuggle all decided
                                  correctly without false-block /
                                  false-pass.
  TestUploadDenylist           -- requests / httpx / urllib.urlopen with
                                  files= / data=open / data=bytes,
                                  HfApi().upload_file / upload_folder /
                                  create_commit, module-level
                                  huggingface_hub.upload_folder. POST
                                  json= to trusted host still passes.
  TestSandboxCpuRlimitDefault  -- pin UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S=600
                                  default and confirm CLONE_NEWNET
                                  source line is gone.
  TestMaxBodyDefault           -- pin UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB=500
                                  default.

studio/backend/tests/test_studio_train_validation.py (new):
  Pin at-cap-accepts / over-cap-rejects boundaries for
  max_seq_length=2_000_000, batch_size=4_096, lora_r=16_384,
  lora_alpha=32_768 so a future regression that tightens them back
  without explicit user opt-in is caught.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* studio: tighten code comments across the security-hardening pass

* studio: always inject bootstrap credentials on first boot

The UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP gate added an extra
terminal-to-browser copy-paste on every fresh install. In practice
the LAN credential leak it guarded against is narrow: the password
is one-time, the user rotates it on the very next click, the
default Studio bind is 127.0.0.1, and -H 0.0.0.0 already exposes
the entire API surface. Drop the gate so the inject fires whenever
a bootstrap password is still pending. The CSP nonce wiring stays
in place; the inline script remains the only inline script the
backend ever emits.

The three Playwright UI smoke workflows lose their
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP=1 lines along with the explanatory
comment blocks since the inject now happens by default.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Wasim Yousef Said <wasimysdev@gmail.com>
2026-05-13 06:12:18 -07:00
Lee Jackson
ff759ba7e4
Studio: Fix image-only chat requests failing validation (#5212)
* fix: allow image-only chat messages

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* test: deduplicate empty content validation coverage

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-28 14:49:13 -07:00
Roland Tannous
ac2daf8b7a
Studio: forward standard OpenAI tools / tool_choice to llama-server (#5099)
* fix(studio): forward OpenAI tools/tool_choice to llama-server (#4999)

Studio's /v1/chat/completions silently stripped standard OpenAI `tools`
and `tool_choice` fields, so clients using standard function calling
(opencode, Claude Code, Cursor, Continue, ...) never got structured
tool_calls back. Adds a client-side pass-through path mirroring the
existing Anthropic /v1/messages flow: when `tools` is present without
Studio's `enable_tools` shorthand, the request is forwarded to
llama-server verbatim so the client sees native id, finish_reason
("tool_calls"), delta.tool_calls, and accurate usage tokens.

Also wires Anthropic tool_choice forwarding: /v1/messages previously
accepted tool_choice on the request model but silently dropped it with
a warning. Translate the four Anthropic shapes to OpenAI format and
forward them so agentic clients can actually enforce tool use.

- ChatCompletionRequest: add tools, tool_choice, stop; extra="allow"
- ChatMessage: accept role="tool", optional tool_call_id / tool_calls /
  name; content is now optional (assistant with only tool_calls)
- routes/inference.py: _openai_passthrough_stream /
  _openai_passthrough_non_streaming helpers, routing branch in
  openai_chat_completions, vision+tools via content-parts injection
- _build_passthrough_payload: tool_choice parameter (default "auto")
- anthropic_compat: anthropic_tool_choice_to_openai() translator
- tests/test_openai_tool_passthrough.py: Pydantic + translator unit tests
- tests/test_studio_api.py: 5 new E2E tests (non-stream, stream,
  multi-turn, OpenAI SDK, Anthropic tool_choice=any regression)

* fix(studio): surface httpx transport errors from OpenAI passthrough

When the managed llama-server subprocess crashes mid-request, the
async pass-through helpers in routes/inference.py used to return a
bare 500 (non-streaming) or an "An internal error occurred" SSE chunk
(streaming) because _friendly_error only recognized the sync path's
"Lost connection to llama-server" substring -- httpx transport
failures (ConnectError / ReadError / RemoteProtocolError /
ReadTimeout) stringify differently and fell through to the generic
case.

- _friendly_error: map any httpx.RequestError subclass to the same
  "Lost connection to the model server" message the sync chat path
  emits. Placed before the substring heuristics so the streaming path
  automatically picks it up via its existing except Exception catch.
- _openai_passthrough_non_streaming: wrap the httpx.AsyncClient.post
  in a try/except httpx.RequestError and re-raise as HTTPException
  502 with the friendly detail.
- tests/test_openai_tool_passthrough.py: new TestFriendlyErrorHttpx
  class pinning the mapping for ConnectError, ReadError,
  RemoteProtocolError, ReadTimeout, and confirming non-httpx paths
  (context-size heuristic, generic fallback) are unchanged.

* fix(studio): close aiter_bytes/aiter_lines explicitly in passthroughs

The httpcore asyncgen cleanup fix in 5cedd9a5 is incomplete on Python
3.13 + httpcore 1.0.x: it switched to manual client/response lifecycle
but still used anonymous `async for raw_line in resp.aiter_lines():`
patterns in all three streaming paths. Python's async for does NOT
auto-close the iterator on break/return, so the aiter_lines /
aiter_bytes async generator remains alive, reachable only from the
surrounding coroutine frame. Once `_stream()` returns the frame is
GC'd and the orphaned asyncgen is finalized on a LATER GC pass in a
DIFFERENT asyncio task, where httpcore's
HTTP11ConnectionByteStream.aclose() enters anyio.CancelScope.__exit__
with a mismatched task and prints "Exception ignored in: <async
generator>" / "async generator ignored GeneratorExit" / "Attempted
to exit cancel scope in a different task" to the server log.

User observed this on /v1/messages after successful (status 200)
requests, with the traceback pointing at HTTP11ConnectionByteStream
.__aiter__ / .aclose inside httpcore.

Fix: save resp.aiter_lines() / resp.aiter_bytes() as a variable and
explicitly `await iter.aclose()` in the finally block BEFORE
resp.aclose() / client.aclose(). This closes the asyncgen inside the
current task's event loop, so the internal httpcore byte stream is
cleaned up before Python's asyncgen GC hook has anything orphaned to
finalize. Each aclose is wrapped in try/except Exception so nested
anyio cleanup noise can't bubble out.

Applied to all three streaming passthrough paths:
- _anthropic_passthrough_stream (/v1/messages client-side tool path)
- _openai_passthrough_stream (/v1/chat/completions client-side tool
  path, new in this PR)
- openai_completions (/v1/completions bytes proxy from PR #4956)

* fix(studio): default ChatCompletionRequest.stream to false per OpenAI spec

OpenAI's /v1/chat/completions spec defaults `stream` to false, so
clients that omit the field (naive curl, minimal integrations) expect
a single JSON response back. Studio was defaulting to true, silently
switching those clients into SSE and breaking any parser that didn't
also handle streaming. ResponsesRequest and AnthropicMessagesRequest
already default to false correctly; only ChatCompletionRequest was
wrong.

Studio's own frontend always sets `stream` explicitly on every
chat-adapter / chat-api / runtime-provider call site, so the flip has
no UI impact. SDK users (OpenAI Python/JS SDK, opencode, Claude Code,
Cursor, Continue) also always pass `stream` explicitly, so they're
unaffected. The only clients feeling the change are raw-curl users
who were relying on the wrong default -- those get the correct OpenAI
behavior now.

Added a regression test pinning the default so it can't silently
flip back.

* fix(studio): reject images in OpenAI tool passthrough for text-only GGUFs

The new tool passthrough branch runs before _extract_content_parts,
skipping the existing not is_vision guard. Requests combining tools
with an image on a text-only tool-capable GGUF were forwarded to
llama-server, producing opaque upstream errors instead of the
pre-existing clear 400. Restore the guard inline at the dispatch
point, checking both legacy image_base64 and inline image_url parts.

* fix(studio): require tool_call_id on role=tool chat messages

Enforce the OpenAI spec rule that role="tool" messages must carry a
tool_call_id. Without it, upstream backends cannot associate a tool
result with the assistant's prior tool_calls entry and the request
fails in non-obvious ways through the passthrough path. Reject at the
request boundary with a 422 instead.

* fix(studio): harden OpenAI tool passthrough validation and error surfacing

Three related fixes called out by the PR review:

1. Preserve upstream status codes in the streaming passthrough. The
   httpx request is now dispatched before the StreamingResponse is
   constructed. Non-200 upstream responses and httpx RequestError
   transport failures raise HTTPException with the real status
   instead of being buried inside a 200 SSE error frame, so OpenAI
   SDK clients see APIError/BadRequestError/... as expected.

2. Require non-empty content on user/system/tool messages. Per the
   OpenAI spec, content may only be omitted on assistant messages
   that carry tool_calls; enforce that at the request boundary so
   malformed messages never reach the passthrough path.

3. Role-constrain tool-call metadata. tool_calls is only valid on
   role=assistant, tool_call_id and name only on role=tool. Without
   this, a user/system message with tool_calls would flip the
   passthrough branch on and be forwarded to llama-server, surfacing
   as an opaque upstream error.

* fix(studio): normalize image mode and passthrough JSON verbatim

Two Gemini-code-assist review findings on PR #5099:

1. Unconditionally convert decoded images to RGB before PNG encoding.
   The prior code only handled RGBA, letting CMYK/I/F images crash
   at img.save(format="PNG") and surface as opaque 400s. Applied to
   both the passthrough helper and the non-passthrough GGUF path
   that originally carried this pattern, keeping the two sites in
   sync.

2. Return the upstream JSON body as raw bytes via Response rather
   than parse-then-re-serialize with JSONResponse. Matches the
   passthrough helper's "verbatim" contract and drops a redundant
   round-trip.

---------

Co-authored-by: Lee Jackson <130007945+Imagineer99@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
2026-04-18 12:53:23 +04:00