Trim and tighten code comments and docstrings across studio/ Python. Comment-only: every changed file verified code-identical to main via AST/token comparison.
Raise ruff line-length to 100 and extend the local pre-commit format pipeline (def-signature magic-comma normalization, short multi-line assert collapse, kwarg '=' spacing, blank-line-after-short-import removal, adjacent string-literal / f-string+plain merge, redundant-pass pruning). Every transform re-checks the file AST and is dropped if it would differ; the whole-repo reformat is verified AST-identical per file and idempotent.
* studio: contain export and dataset paths under their configured roots
resolve_under_root and resolve_dataset_path previously returned absolute
paths unchanged, so an authenticated client could supply
save_directory="/tmp/escape" (or any other absolute path) and have the
exporter drop adapter files anywhere the server user could write. This
turned up during a recent audit pass where an authenticated POST to
/api/export/export/lora with save_directory="/tmp/lora_escape_test"
returned 200 and wrote adapter_model.safetensors, adapter_config.json,
and tokenizer files under /tmp.
The fix is two-layered:
storage_roots.py adds an _assert_contained(resolved, root) helper that
runs after path resolution and rejects any result whose realpath does
not sit under realpath(root). resolve_under_root now rejects '..'
segments and null bytes outright, and only accepts absolute inputs when
they are already inside the configured root (internal call sites that
re-resolve a stored absolute path stay idempotent;
worker.py:resolve_output_dir(output_dir) etc. continue to work).
resolve_dataset_path picks up the same containment rule, scoped to the
three dataset roots.
models/export.py adds field_validator("save_directory", mode="before")
to ExportCommonOptions and ExportGGUFRequest so bad input fails fast at
422 with a clear message rather than a 500 deep inside the resolver.
The validator rejects empty/whitespace, null bytes, control chars,
strings longer than 255 chars, absolute paths, and '..' segments.
routes/export.py:_export_details now returns os.path.relpath(output_path,
exports_root()) so the Export Complete dialog and /api/models/loras no
longer leak the absolute install prefix to the UI; the basename is
used as a last-resort fallback.
Verified end to end:
- POST /api/export/export/lora {"save_directory":"/tmp/foo"} -> 422
"save_directory must be a name or relative path under the export
root; absolute paths are rejected". /tmp/foo is not created.
- "../../etc/escape" -> 422 "may not contain '..' segments".
- save_directory="my_subdir" -> still accepted (400 only because the
test had no checkpoint loaded yet, not because of validation).
- Internal idempotent re-resolve via resolve_export_dir(absolute path
that is already under exports_root) returns the same path unchanged.
* studio/sandbox: harden bash + python tool execution
The sandboxed Bash and Python tool channels in Chat ran with a thin
preexec hook (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS + RLIMIT_FSIZE only). Bash had a
small word blocklist; Python had an AST safety pass aimed at
signal-tampering and shell-escape primitives. An audit pass showed
several gaps that a tool-calling model could trigger inadvertently:
- bash curl/wget/nc reached AWS IMDSv2 and returned live STS
credentials for the instance role.
- python "import socket; s.connect((169.254.169.254, 80))"
reached the same endpoint regardless of the bash blocklist.
- "cat /etc/passwd" was blocked at the bash side (because "passwd"
is in the blocklist), but "open('/etc/passwd').read()" in Python
happily returned its contents.
- "chr(115)+chr(117)+chr(100)+chr(111)" style dynamic-arg
construction slipped through the AST shell-escape check.
- The supervisor used proc.kill() on timeout, which only signals
the immediate pid; bash-backgrounded children survived. A fork
bomb could spawn for the full 300s timeout window.
- Session work directories under ~/studio_sandbox/<id>/ were
created with default umask (0o755), so any other UID on the host
could enumerate them.
- session_id sanitisation used a one-shot str.replace("..",""),
which is non-iterative and a small footgun.
This commit takes a conservative middle path: the sandbox still
runs as the Studio UID with no namespace tricks where the kernel
disallows them, but every chokepoint is tightened.
_sandbox_preexec now:
- calls os.setsid() so children share a process group; the
supervisor uses os.killpg(SIGKILL) on timeout/cancel so
backgrounded children die with the parent (new _kill_process_tree
helper, wired into _cancel_watcher and both _bash_exec /
_python_exec timeout branches).
- calls os.umask(0o077) so files the child writes default to 0o600.
- applies PR_SET_PDEATHSIG=SIGKILL so an orphaned child dies if
Studio exits.
- best-effort unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) for a private network namespace
(failure is logged and swallowed; defense-in-depth is still in
place via the bash blocklist and the AST checker below).
- sets RLIMIT_NPROC=10000 (tunable via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_NPROC),
RLIMIT_AS=8GB, RLIMIT_CPU=300, RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024. The 10k NPROC
figure is chosen to sit well above the ~500 LWPs a healthy Studio
+ llama-server combination already uses while still capping a
runaway fork bomb. NPROC counts LWPs per real UID, so a lower
figure (e.g. 256) starves legitimate bash forks
("bash: fork: retry: Resource temporarily unavailable").
_get_workdir:
- rejects session_id that doesn't match [A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64};
non-matching values bucket into a shared "_invalid" dir.
- chmod 0o700 on both the workdir and on ~/studio_sandbox/ so
other UIDs cannot read another session's contents.
_BLOCKED_COMMANDS_COMMON gains: doas, pkexec, halt, poweroff, curl,
wget, nc, ncat, netcat, socat, ssh, scp, sftp, rsync, eval, source.
The intent is to keep general bash usage working (echo, ls, pipes,
loops, for, head, etc.) while denying the obvious egress and
escalation paths.
The AST checker (_check_signal_escape_patterns) is split into the
existing shell/signal/loop checks plus a new narrow IO denylist:
- Always flag non-literal args to anything in _SHELL_EXEC_FUNCS,
not just _STRING_SHELL_FUNCS. Closes the dynamic-arg bypass.
- Reject calls to socket.create_connection, socket.socket().connect,
urllib.request.urlopen, http.client.HTTP*Connection, requests.*,
httpx.* whose literal host argument is in a cloud-metadata
denylist (169.254.169.254 + 169.254.* + 100.64.*, plus the
GCP/Alibaba/ECS metadata hostnames and IPv6 link-local). Public
hosts (example.com, huggingface.co, ...) still work. Dynamic
hosts cannot be statically blocked; mitigated by the bash
blocklist + the netns where the kernel allows it.
- Reject literal open("/etc/passwd"), /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
/etc/ssh/*, and /proc/<pid>/environ. Other files
(/etc/os-release, /etc/hostname, /tmp/*, user dirs) still work.
The _check_code_safety summariser is updated to include the new
network_calls and sensitive_file_reads buckets in its error string.
Regression-checked: echo, sleep, ls /tmp, for loops, piped helpers
(echo a | tr a A), urllib.request.urlopen("http://example.com"),
socket.getaddrinfo("example.com",80), open("/etc/os-release"),
open("/tmp/...","w") all still succeed. curl, wget, nc, ssh, rm,
socket.create_connection(("169.254.169.254",80)),
open("/etc/passwd"), open("/proc/self/environ") all correctly
blocked.
* studio: rate-limit login, rotate refresh tokens, add logout, security headers, gate bootstrap injection
A pass over the auth surface found a cluster of related issues that this
commit closes together.
Login (routes/auth.py):
- Add an in-memory per-IP login rate limiter. Five failed POSTs to
/api/auth/login inside a 60s window produce 429 with Retry-After.
A successful login clears the bucket. Previously 30 wrong passwords
in under one second was accepted as 30x 401, which combined with
the (now fixed) admin-username leak from /api/auth/status made
brute-force trivial against a small password.
Logout (routes/auth.py):
- New POST /api/auth/logout returns 204 and calls
storage.revoke_user_refresh_tokens(subject) so the refresh token
is no longer valid. Previously POST /api/auth/logout returned 405
and there was no way to invalidate refresh tokens short of
changing the password. Frontend session.ts already calls
clearAuthTokens() to drop localStorage; the new endpoint lets the
client also tell the server to revoke server-side state.
Refresh-token rotation (routes/auth.py + auth/storage.py):
- New storage.consume_refresh_token(token) atomically validates +
deletes a refresh token, returning (username, is_desktop). The
/api/auth/refresh handler now mints both a new access AND a new
refresh token; the supplied token becomes invalid. Replaying a
consumed refresh returns 401 "Invalid or expired refresh token".
The previous refresh_access_token helper is left in place for
callers that intentionally want the non-rotating shape; nothing
in the route layer uses it now.
/api/auth/status no longer leaks default_username (models/auth.py +
routes/auth.py):
- AuthStatusResponse.default_username becomes Optional[str] with a
None default; the handler always returns None. The frontend already
hardcodes HIDDEN_LOGIN_USERNAME = "unsloth" (auth-form.tsx:82), so
no UI change is required.
window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__ no longer auto-injects (main.py):
- _inject_bootstrap is now opt-in via the
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP env var. The previous default
(inject whenever requires_password_change is true) embedded the
plaintext bootstrap password into the first-boot HTML for any
caller that hit /, /change-password, or any unknown SPA path.
Browser extensions and any XSS payload on the page could read it
trivially. With the new gate the bootstrap password lives only in
the auth/.bootstrap_password file (mode 0o600) where it has always
been; users typing it into a current-password field is the right
UX. routes/auth.py:change_password also clears
app.state.bootstrap_password defensively.
Security headers + server fingerprint (main.py + run.py):
- New SecurityHeadersMiddleware adds Content-Security-Policy,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(),
interest-cohort=(), and stamps server: unsloth-studio so the
generic uvicorn banner no longer fingerprints the stack. The
uvicorn.Config gains server_header=False so it stops emitting its
own Server header.
/api/health minimisation (main.py):
- Unauthenticated GET /api/health returns just
{"status":"healthy","timestamp":...} so load-balancer liveness
probes keep working without leaking version, device_type,
chat_only, desktop_protocol_version, or studio_root_id to
arbitrary callers. A request that presents a valid Bearer token
still gets the full diagnostic payload so internal launchers and
sibling-Studio detection (which compares studio_root_id) keep
working.
Verification:
- 30 wrong-password POSTs to /api/auth/login -> first 5 = 401, 6th
through 30th = 429.
- POST /api/auth/logout with a fresh token -> 204. The matching
refresh token then fails 401.
- Login -> R1; /api/auth/refresh with R1 -> new access + R2 (R2 !=
R1); /api/auth/refresh with R1 again -> 401; /api/auth/refresh
with R2 -> still succeeds once and rotates again.
- curl /api/auth/status -> default_username: null.
- curl http://127.0.0.1/ does not contain __UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__.
- curl -I / shows CSP, X-Frame-Options: DENY,
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy, and server: unsloth-studio.
- curl /api/health unauthenticated -> {status, timestamp} only.
curl with Authorization: Bearer <valid> -> full payload.
- Existing /api/system, /api/models/list, /api/train/status,
/api/inference/status, /api/auth/api-keys, login flow, SPA root
all still return 200 after the changes (regression smoke).
* studio: add SecurityHeadersMiddleware, MaxBodyMiddleware, /recipes redirect, gate _inject_bootstrap, minimise /api/health
This commit lands the main.py-side changes that share a single
middleware-registration spot. They are kept together because every
change here is either (a) a top-level middleware definition that has
to be added next to LoggingMiddleware, or (b) a route handler at the
same file-level.
SecurityHeadersMiddleware (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options:
DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy, server: unsloth-studio). The previous responses
emitted no CSP, no XFO, no Referrer-Policy and were stamped
server: uvicorn.
MaxBodyMiddleware rejects POST/PUT/PATCH on the inference / dataset /
data-recipe / train / export prefixes when Content-Length exceeds
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB (default 100). The audit hit this by
attaching a 50 MB plain-text file to a chat message and watching
Studio base64-encode it into the JSON body; uvicorn has no enforced
cap so the only previous guard was the per-file 50 MB ceiling that
data-recipe upload routes already enforce. The new middleware extends
that ceiling to the OpenAI-compat path that the Chat attachments
flow through. Verified: a 200 MB JSON POST to /v1/chat/completions
returns HTTP 413 "Request body too large (209,715,264 bytes; max
104,857,600)". A small valid request continues to reach the handler.
_inject_bootstrap is gated behind UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP.
The previous default was to inline window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__ =
{username, password} into the first-boot HTML whenever
requires_password_change was true, which exposed the plaintext
bootstrap password to any browser extension, page script, or LAN
caller on -H 0.0.0.0. The bootstrap password remains in the on-disk
.bootstrap_password file (mode 0o600) where it has always lived;
users typing it into a current-password field is the right UX.
/api/health unauthenticated returns {"status":"healthy","timestamp":
...} only; the previous payload (version, device_type, chat_only,
desktop_protocol_version, supports_desktop_auth, studio_root_id,
native_path_leases_supported) is preserved for callers that present
a valid Bearer token, so internal launchers and sibling-Studio
detection (which compares studio_root_id) keep working.
/recipes -> /data-recipes 308 redirect. The Data Recipes page lives
at /data-recipes; users typing /recipes hit the SPA catch-all and
saw "Not Found". The redirect also preserves any tail path, so
/recipes/<rest> -> /data-recipes/<rest>.
Verified end to end with curl: CSP / XFO / X-Content-Type-Options /
Referrer-Policy / Permissions-Policy all present on /, server header
is now unsloth-studio (uvicorn's own banner is suppressed via
server_header=False in run.py from the auth-batch commit). Followed
the /recipes redirect lands on the SPA HTML.
* studio: bound TrainingStartRequest hyperparameters at the schema level
POST /api/train/start accepted any value for learning_rate, batch_size,
max_steps, max_seq_length, warmup_steps, warmup_ratio, num_epochs,
save_steps, weight_decay, gradient_accumulation_steps, lora_r,
lora_alpha and lora_dropout, including -1, 0, 1e9, and non-numeric
strings like 'abc' or 'two' (which silently coerce to 0 in the
trainer). Probing showed the API returning 200 to learning_rate=-1
and batch_size=0; only max_steps had any partial clamping.
This commit adds field_validator on every numeric hyperparameter.
Bounds are chosen wide enough to span realistic single-host
configurations (B200 with 180 GB of memory comfortably fits the
upper end) while rejecting the values that always produce broken
training:
- learning_rate: parses str/float, requires 0 < lr < 1.0. Non-numeric
input raises with "learning_rate must be parseable as float (got
'abc')" instead of silently coercing to 0.
- batch_size: [1, 1024].
- gradient_accumulation_steps: [1, 4096].
- num_epochs: [1, 1000].
- max_steps: [1, 1_000_000].
- max_seq_length: [1, 131072].
- warmup_steps: [0, max_steps].
- warmup_ratio: [0.0, 1.0].
- save_steps: [0, 1_000_000].
- weight_decay: [0, 10] (typical 0..0.1).
- lora_r: [1, 512].
- lora_alpha: [1, 1024].
- lora_dropout: [0.0, 1.0).
Each validator names the offending field in its ValueError message
so the 422 response body identifies which input is bad. The
learning_rate validator returns its result as str (the schema field
type is str("2e-4") for backwards compatibility) so existing call
sites that float() the value continue to work.
Verified:
- learning_rate=-1 -> 422 "learning_rate must be > 0 (got -1.0);
typical range is 1e-6 .. 1e-3".
- learning_rate='abc' -> 422 "must be parseable as float".
- batch_size=-1 / 0 / 999999 -> 422 "batch_size must be in [1, 1024]".
- batch_size='two' -> 422 (pydantic int parser).
- max_steps=0 / -5 -> 422 "must be a positive int".
- max_seq_length=200000 -> 422 "must be in [1, 131072]".
- warmup_ratio=2.5 -> 422 "must be in [0.0, 1.0]".
- lora_dropout=1.5 -> 422 "must be in [0.0, 1.0)".
- Valid request with learning_rate='2e-4', batch_size=1, max_steps=5
passes validation and the training run starts as normal.
* studio: redact image-decode errors, clean checkpoint dirs on cancel, tolerate Stop-button + tool-result message shapes
Three small fixes that fall under "do not let the audit findings
become user-visible papercuts".
routes/inference.py - image-decode error redaction (the audit hit
this with a 0-byte / malformed / wrong-extension image upload). The
three image-normalise sites previously raised HTTPException(400,
detail=f"Failed to process image: {e}"). When PIL raised
UnidentifiedImageError(io.BytesIO(raw)) the message string included
"<_io.BytesIO object at 0x7e40a5d7bf60>", leaking both the Python
class name (confirming the PIL/io stack) and a heap address (mildly
useful for ASLR-bypass chaining if another memory-corruption bug is
ever found). Each site now catches UnidentifiedImageError and
returns the generic "Unsupported or corrupt image format"; the
fall-through generic except returns "Failed to process image". No
exception-repr is interpolated into a response body anywhere along
these paths.
core/training/training.py - checkpoint cleanup on cancel. When a
user clicks Cancel Training, the trainer flips _cancel_requested=True
and the supervisor force-terminates the subprocess. The trainer
writes checkpoint-<step> directories under output_dir every
save_steps; previously these survived the cancel and accumulated on
disk (the audit recorded ~67 MB stuck after a 200-step cancel with
save_steps=20). New helper _cleanup_cancelled_checkpoints(output_dir)
globs checkpoint-<int> entries and removes them. It is gated by a
realpath containment check against outputs_root() so it cannot
accidentally rmtree anything outside the configured outputs root.
force_terminate() invokes the helper after the subprocess join when
_cancel_requested is true. Stop-and-Save runs are unaffected because
that path keeps _cancel_requested=False.
models/inference.py - chat message shape tolerance. Two related
frontend interactions used to crash the request validator:
- After the Stop button truncates a generation, the frontend
retained {role:"assistant", content:""} in the conversation
history and replayed it on the next send. ChatMessage previously
required role="assistant" to have non-empty content or tool_calls,
so the next message returned 422 and the thread was permanently
broken. The validator now normalises empty assistant content to
None so the request round-trips and the trailing empty turn can
be ignored downstream.
- The frontend's second-round tool POST drops the streamed
tool_call_id, hitting the strict-spec check "role=tool requires
tool_call_id". The validator now synthesises an opaque id
(call_<8 hex>) when missing, so the request reaches the handler
and the model's final summarising response gets generated. The
proper fix lives in the frontend (carry the streamed id through
the second POST) and will follow.
Verified end to end with curl: HTTP 400 (model not loaded) on both
the empty-assistant history shape and the tool-result-without-id
shape, instead of HTTP 422 from the schema validator.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: tighten code comments from security-hardening pass
Trim verbose docstrings and inline finding references added in the
previous commits in this branch. Functionality unchanged.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: await get_current_subject in /api/health and make refresh-token consumption atomic
The /api/health auth probe called get_current_subject(creds) without
awaiting it. The coroutine object is truthy, so any caller presenting a
Bearer header (valid or not) received the full diagnostic payload
including version, device_type, studio_root_id, etc. Await the coroutine
and treat HTTPException as 'fall back to the minimal liveness payload'.
consume_refresh_token did SELECT then DELETE WHERE id under default
autocommit isolation. Two concurrent POST /api/auth/refresh requests
could both win the SELECT before either DELETE ran, defeating
single-use refresh-token rotation. Replace with a single
DELETE ... WHERE token_hash = ? AND expires_at >= ? RETURNING ...
statement so the validate-and-delete lands as one atomic op under
SQLite's write lock (3.45.1 supports RETURNING; min was 3.35).
* studio: enforce body cap on chunked uploads and drop unsafe-inline from script-src
MaxBodyMiddleware previously only inspected the declared Content-Length
header; clients omitting it or sending Transfer-Encoding: chunked
bypassed the cap and could still drive an OOM via the downstream
JSON / file readers on /v1/chat/completions, /api/inference, /api/data-recipe,
/api/datasets, /api/train, /api/export. Rewrite as a raw ASGI middleware
that drains and counts http.request frames, replies 413 once the running
total exceeds UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB before invoking the FastAPI
handler, and replays the buffered body to downstream so route code that
calls request.json() / await request.body() works unchanged.
CSP previously included 'unsafe-inline' on script-src, which defeats the
main XSS protection. The frontend bundle does not need inline scripts;
the only inline <script> the backend ever emits is _inject_bootstrap,
which is opt-in via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP. Drop 'unsafe-inline'
from script-src by default; when _inject_bootstrap fires, generate a
per-response nonce, embed it on the inlined <script>, and have
SecurityHeadersMiddleware splice 'nonce-XXX' into the CSP for that one
response (the internal x-internal-script-nonce header is popped before
the response leaves the server). 'unsafe-inline' stays on style-src for
Vite-injected styles.
* studio: drop empty assistant sentinel before passthrough
ChatMessage._validate_role_shape normalises role="assistant", content=""
(the post-Stop sentinel emitted by the frontend) to content=None so the
in-process path can drop it via _extract_content_parts. The passthrough
path then ran m.model_dump(exclude_none=True), which strips the now-None
content key entirely, sending {"role":"assistant"} to llama-server / the
OpenAI-compat backend. That fails upstream and leaves the user without a
recoverable Stop->resume.
Add _drop_empty_assistant_sentinels and call it at both passthrough
message origins: _openai_messages_for_passthrough (covers
/v1/chat/completions and the Responses API which routes through it) and
the anthropic_messages_to_openai output before
_anthropic_passthrough_*. Assistant messages that carry only tool_calls
(no content) are preserved.
* studio/tests: cover audit-fix surfaces and rebase pre-existing tests
Adds and updates pytest coverage for the four bot-flagged audit fixes
landed earlier in this branch and rebases two pre-existing tests that
were broken by the relaxed-validator and /api/health auth-gate changes.
studio/backend/tests/test_middleware.py (new)
MaxBodyMiddleware: small protected, large declared, unprotected
passthrough, chunked-upload-over-cap rejection (the regression for
the original Content-Length-only gap), and chunked-under-cap replay.
SecurityHeadersMiddleware: script-src no longer carries
'unsafe-inline', style-src still does, default headers
(XFO/XCTO/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy/server), and the
internal x-internal-script-nonce header is consumed by the
middleware and converted to 'nonce-XXX' in the CSP.
/api/health: no auth -> minimal, invalid Bearer -> minimal
(the await regression), valid Bearer -> full diagnostic payload.
studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
consume_refresh_token: second-call returns None, expired returns
None, and a 64-thread concurrent pile-up against the same hash
produces exactly one successful consumer (regression for the
SELECT-then-DELETE race).
test_health_response_reports_desktop_capability_fields: rebase
against the new health_check(request) signature by going through
TestClient with a real bearer instead of asyncio.run-ing the
handler directly.
studio/backend/tests/test_openai_tool_passthrough.py
Pin the new ChatMessage tolerance: assistant without content or
tool_calls is tolerated (normalises content -> None), empty-string
and empty-list assistant content normalise to None, and a missing
/ empty tool_call_id on role='tool' is synthesised as call_<hex>
rather than raising. Tests for _drop_empty_assistant_sentinels
cover the three drop shapes (empty string, empty list, missing
content key), preservation of assistant text and tool_calls-only
messages, and end-to-end through
_openai_messages_for_passthrough.
studio/backend/main.py
SecurityHeadersMiddleware.dispatch used response.headers.pop(...)
for the nonce-header handoff; Starlette's MutableHeaders has no
pop. Read-then-del so the internal handoff header is still
stripped before the response leaves the server.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* studio/tests: rebase three more pre-existing CI tests against this branch
CI on PR #5375 was red on three tests that were tuned for behaviour
predating this branch. Updates each so the assertions match what the
audit fixes intentionally changed; no production code touched.
studio/backend/tests/test_trained_model_scan.py
test_scan_trained_models_includes_lora_and_full_finetune_outputs
passed an absolute tmp_path through scan_trained_models, which now
runs resolve_output_dir / _assert_contained against outputs_root().
Repoint outputs_root() at tmp_path via monkeypatch so the fixture
dirs land under the configured root and the realpath containment
check passes.
tests/test_studio_install_workspace_guard.py
test_health_endpoint_exposes_studio_root_id_not_raw_path read
the first 1500 bytes after @app.get("/api/health") and asserted on
the studio_root_id literal. The handler grew (unauth short-circuit
+ await dependency gate) and the literal slid past the byte window.
Replace the fixed window with a slice up to the next top-level
@app.* decorator so the test surveys the whole handler regardless
of size.
tests/studio/studio_api_smoke.py
The "login burst (5x wrong pw) -> 401 each" assertion was tagged
"When/if we add one, this assertion updates in the same PR." We
added the per-IP rate-limit in routes/auth.py
(_LOGIN_MAX_FAILS=5/60s) but missed the assertion update. Rewrite
the burst probe to observe the new invariant: at least one 401,
eventual transition to 429, and Retry-After present on the 429.
Adds a small _login_with_headers helper since the existing login()
helper drops response headers.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* ci(studio-ui): set UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP=1 for Playwright Studios
The Chat UI Playwright test drives the first-boot change-password
form, which (per playwright_chat_ui.py step "1. Change-password
through the UI") pre-seeds the hidden current_password field from
window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__. That global is only emitted when the
backend's _inject_bootstrap path fires, which since the security
pass on this branch is gated behind UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP
and defaults to off. Without the global, the React form's
current_password validator never satisfies, the submit button stays
disabled, and the composer.wait_for() probe times out on
/change-password.
Re-enable injection only for the CI Studios that drive the chat UI
across linux/mac/windows. Production deployments are unaffected: the
env var has to be explicitly opted into, and the on-disk
auth/.bootstrap_password remains the source of truth for human users
typing the password in by hand.
Covers all eight Studio launch sites: the primary chat-ui boot and
the "extra UI tests" boot for each of the three OSes, plus the
pipeTransport JSON-crash retry relaunches in the macOS workflow that
re-spawn Studio mid-job.
A follow-up frontend PR will add a visible current_password input so
the form satisfies its own validator without needing the bootstrap
auto-fill at all; once that lands this CI knob can come back out.
* studio/sandbox: drop unshare(CLONE_NEWNET); add trusted-host allowlist; block sandbox file uploads; raise CPU rlimit default to 600 s
CLONE_NEWNET inside _sandbox_preexec silently killed every outbound
HTTP request from sandboxed Python whenever the kernel allowed
unprivileged user namespaces. requests.get('https://huggingface.co'),
urllib.request.urlopen('https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...'),
socket.connect(('arxiv.org', 443)) all failed despite the AST visitor
intending to allow them. The bash blocklist (curl / wget / nc / ssh /
scp / sftp / rsync / socat / eval / source) plus the AST-level
metadata-host denylist still carry the network policy after this
change; CLONE_NEWNET was redundant with both.
Add _TRUSTED_PUBLIC_HOST_LITERALS + _TRUSTED_PUBLIC_HOST_SUFFIXES
(~100 informational hosts: Wikipedia language subdomains, Wikimedia,
Wikidata, Google search, Bing, DuckDuckGo, HuggingFace, GitHub,
raw.githubusercontent.com, arXiv, StackOverflow / Stack Exchange,
MDN, docs.python.org, PyTorch / TensorFlow / NumPy / pandas docs,
pypi / files.pythonhosted.org / npmjs / crates.io, ReadTheDocs,
arXiv, Britannica, BBC / Reuters / Nature / Science, NASA / CDC /
NIH / WHO open data, api.weather.gov). The visitor now blocks
literal hosts that are neither metadata nor trusted with a short
LLM-readable string so the model can retry with an allowed source
instead of choking on a multi-line error.
Block upload-shape calls regardless of host: requests.post / put /
patch / delete / request with files= or data=open(...) /
data=bytes_literal; httpx equivalents; urllib.request.urlopen /
Request with data=...; HuggingFace upload_file / upload_folder /
upload_large_folder / create_commit (module-level FQ paths AND
method-name match on any receiver). Message: "Blocked: file upload
disallowed in sandbox".
Bump UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S default 300 -> 600 s so long
agentic chains that span multiple tool calls don't get SIGXCPU'd
mid-stride. Env-var override path is unchanged.
Host normalisation now strips trailing dot, userinfo @, and explicit
port before allowlist / denylist comparison so trailing-DNS-dot,
userinfo-smuggling, and explicit-:443 URLs are decided correctly.
* studio: raise default request-body cap from 100 MB to 500 MB
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB default goes 100 -> 500 to comfortably
cover vision + audio + multi-recipe-batch JSON payloads. The
MaxBodyMiddleware stream-counting logic from this branch's earlier
06ec088 already handles chunked bodies up to the new cap; env-var
override path is unchanged for callers that want a tighter limit.
* studio/auth: restore /api/auth/status.default_username to 'unsloth'
This branch's earlier b39e9a4 changed default_username to None on the
public /api/auth/status endpoint so the username field didn't leak to
unauthenticated callers. In practice this regressed third-party
clients (and the in-tree React login form's pre-fill UX) without
adding meaningful security: the bootstrap password is the actual
secret, and the username 'unsloth' is the documented default.
Pin default_username to storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME ('unsloth')
and tighten the response model so the field is required rather than
Optional. Anyone who needs anonymisation can still reach for an
allow-list deployment with auth disabled.
* studio/training: raise max_seq_length / batch_size / lora_r / lora_alpha caps
This branch's 7102815 introduced field validators with conservative
caps. The follow-up loosens them so long-context experiments and
high-rank LoRA exploration aren't gated at the schema layer:
_MAX_BATCH_SIZE 1024 -> 4096
_MAX_SEQ_LENGTH 131_072 -> 2_000_000 (2M tokens)
lora_r cap 512 -> 16_384 (_MAX_LORA_R)
lora_alpha cap 1024 -> 32_768 (_MAX_LORA_ALPHA)
_MAX_GRAD_ACCUM / _MAX_STEPS / _MAX_EPOCHS / lora_dropout /
warmup_ratio / weight_decay are unchanged. Hardware (VRAM, host
RAM, kernel launch latency) is now the binding constraint at the
new caps, which is the correct ordering -- the validator stays a
sanity check on -1 / 0 / 'abc' style garbage, not a usability gate.
* studio/tests: cover sandbox allowlist + upload block + raised training caps
studio/backend/tests/test_sandbox_tools.py (new):
TestMetadataHostDenylist -- short "Blocked: cloud-metadata host"
message on AWS IMDS, GCP metadata,
Alibaba ECS, AWS IPv6 IMDS, 169.254/16.
TestTrustedHostAllowlist -- Wikipedia (any language subdomain),
Google, DuckDuckGo, HF, raw GitHub,
arXiv, StackOverflow / family,
MDN, docs.python.org, pypi, BBC,
api.weather.gov, NumPy / PyTorch docs.
TestUntrustedHostBlock -- example.com / random unlisted host
rejected with the short "Blocked: host
not in sandbox allowlist; use an
allowed informational source" message.
Dynamic URLs (computed var) still pass
-- documented limit of static analysis.
TestHostNormalization -- trailing dot, explicit :443, uppercase,
userinfo-@-smuggle all decided
correctly without false-block /
false-pass.
TestUploadDenylist -- requests / httpx / urllib.urlopen with
files= / data=open / data=bytes,
HfApi().upload_file / upload_folder /
create_commit, module-level
huggingface_hub.upload_folder. POST
json= to trusted host still passes.
TestSandboxCpuRlimitDefault -- pin UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S=600
default and confirm CLONE_NEWNET
source line is gone.
TestMaxBodyDefault -- pin UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB=500
default.
studio/backend/tests/test_studio_train_validation.py (new):
Pin at-cap-accepts / over-cap-rejects boundaries for
max_seq_length=2_000_000, batch_size=4_096, lora_r=16_384,
lora_alpha=32_768 so a future regression that tightens them back
without explicit user opt-in is caught.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: tighten code comments across the security-hardening pass
* studio: always inject bootstrap credentials on first boot
The UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP gate added an extra
terminal-to-browser copy-paste on every fresh install. In practice
the LAN credential leak it guarded against is narrow: the password
is one-time, the user rotates it on the very next click, the
default Studio bind is 127.0.0.1, and -H 0.0.0.0 already exposes
the entire API surface. Drop the gate so the inject fires whenever
a bootstrap password is still pending. The CSP nonce wiring stays
in place; the inline script remains the only inline script the
backend ever emits.
The three Playwright UI smoke workflows lose their
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP=1 lines along with the explanatory
comment blocks since the inject now happens by default.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Wasim Yousef Said <wasimysdev@gmail.com>
* add unsloth studio desktop app
* Fix review findings
- studio/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json: retarget updater to staging repo
(danielhanchen/unsloth-staging-2); switch to unslothai/unsloth on upstream merge.
- studio/src-tauri/linux/postremove.sh: drop the interactive read loop and the
/home/* iteration. Package maintainer scripts must stay non-interactive and
must not touch other users' data.
- studio/frontend/src/app/auth-guards.ts: honor tauriAutoAuth() boolean. Failed
auto-auth now redirects to /login; requireGuest/requirePasswordChangeFlow
only redirect to /chat when auth succeeds. The new early-return on failed
auth is intentional so the login / change-password flows remain reachable
when desktop auth is not yet established.
- studio/frontend/src/config/env.ts: keep fetched=false on health failure so
later calls retry instead of caching the client-side platform guess.
- studio/src-tauri/src/install.rs: pick the available system package manager
(apt-get, dnf, zypper, pacman); AppImage bundles run on non-Debian distros.
- studio/frontend/src/lib/open-link.ts + markdown-text/sources callers: return
boolean from openLink so callers only preventDefault on handled URLs; relative
hrefs now navigate natively.
- studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/about-tab.tsx: fetch(apiUrl(...))
so the version request targets the backend port in desktop mode. The bare
/api/health predates the Tauri webview (blame: the earlier onboarding commit,
which ran with same-origin frontend/backend); in desktop mode the webview
origin is tauri://localhost so the bare path fails.
- install.ps1: gate the install_python_stack.py hotfix on a sentinel comment
instead of a content regex; append the sentinel after applying so reruns
are unambiguous.
- unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py _write_auth_secret: use the atomic mkstemp +
os.replace path on Windows too; chmod calls are wrapped in try/except OSError.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs probe_existing_backends: fan out the health
probes concurrently; desktop-auth status still runs sequentially per candidate.
reqwest::Client is internally Arc-wrapped so the in-loop .clone() is a
refcount bump, not a deep clone; annotated inline.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs run_cli_probe: wait() after kill() to reap
the child, matching probe_cli_capability.
- studio/src-tauri/src/process.rs + main.rs: add stop_backend_detached and use
it from the tray quit handler so the 5s graceful-wait does not block the
Tauri main loop. RunEvent::Exit keeps the synchronous safety-net call.
- studio/backend/main.py: drop the permissive localhost CORS regex in
api-only mode; the explicit allow_origins list is sufficient.
- .github/workflows/release-desktop.yml: drop max-parallel: 1 so platform
builds run in parallel, and lift releaseBody to an env var so the three
tauri-action invocations share one source of truth.
* Fix review findings (loop 2)
- studio/backend/auth/storage.py update_password: clear_desktop_secret()
alongside clear_bootstrap_password() so rotating the admin password
also revokes any previously provisioned .desktop_secret. Without this,
an old local desktop credential keeps minting fresh admin tokens via
/api/auth/desktop-login after a password rotation.
- studio/src-tauri/src/desktop_auth.rs provision_desktop_auth: wrap
cmd.output().await in tokio::time::timeout(30s). DESKTOP_AUTH_LOCK is
held across the whole desktop_auth flow, and previously a hanging
`unsloth studio provision-desktop-auth` subprocess would pin the lock
indefinitely and freeze every subsequent desktop_auth call.
* Add review tests
* Consolidate review tests
Merge review-added tests into the existing studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
(the PR's authoritative desktop-auth test file). Drops three scaffolding files under
tests/python/ in favor of five focused tests next to the tests they extend:
- test_update_password_clears_desktop_secret (runtime)
- test_update_password_on_unknown_user_leaves_desktop_secret_intact (runtime)
- test_cli_provisioning_delegates_to_storage_create_desktop_secret (source-level)
- test_cli_connect_auth_db_reads_storage_db_path (source-level)
- test_desktop_auth_provision_has_bounded_timeout (Rust source-level)
* Revert auth-guards.ts Tauri branches to unconditional form
The review loop on PR 5144 introduced a regression: the isTauri branch of
requireAuth redirected to /login when tauriAutoAuth() returned false, and
requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow silently fell through on the same
condition. The Tauri desktop app authenticates via a local auto-generated
secret; it must never surface /login or /change-password to the user. A
failed auto-auth should let the startup layer retry, not expose a password
form.
Restore the three Tauri branches to the author's original unconditional
form (requireAuth: return; requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow: throw
redirect({to: '/chat'})). Keep the rest of the review fixes -- the
apiUrl() fetch wrapping, authRedirect helper, and fetchAuthStatus refactor
are all legitimate improvements and are preserved.
* Revert release-desktop.yml to author's version
The review loop's workflow-file tweaks (drop max-parallel: 1, lift releaseBody
to an env var) are cosmetic. OAuth tokens cannot push workflow-file changes,
and fine-grained PATs cannot honor maintainerCanModify on a third-party fork.
Reverting the workflow file to wasimysaid's version lets the push go through
without needing a classic PAT with both repo and workflow scopes.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Lee Jackson <130007945+Imagineer99@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <unslothai@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: add API key authentication for programmatic access
External users want to hit the Studio API (chat completions with tool
calling, training, export, etc.) without going through the browser
login flow. This adds sk-unsloth- prefixed API keys that work as a
drop-in replacement for JWTs in the Authorization: Bearer header.
Backend:
- New api_keys table in SQLite (storage.py)
- create/list/revoke/validate functions with SHA-256 hashed storage
- API key detection in _get_current_subject before the JWT path
- POST/GET/DELETE /api/auth/api-keys endpoints on the auth router
Frontend:
- /api-keys page with create form, one-time key reveal, keys table
- API Keys link in desktop and mobile navbar
- Route registered with requireAuth guard
Zero changes to any existing route handler -- every endpoint that uses
Depends(get_current_subject) automatically works with API keys.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Use actual origin in API key usage examples
The examples on /api-keys were hardcoded to localhost:8888 which is
wrong for remote users. Use window.location.origin so the examples
show the correct URL regardless of where the user is connecting from.
* Add `unsloth studio run` CLI command for one-liner model serving
Adds a `run` subcommand that starts Studio, loads a model, creates an
API key, and prints a ready-to-use curl command -- similar to
`ollama run` or `vllm serve`.
Usage: unsloth studio run -m unsloth/Qwen3-1.7B-GGUF --gguf-variant UD-Q4_K_XL
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Add end-to-end tests for `unsloth studio run` and API key usage
Tests the 4 usage examples from the API Keys page:
1. curl basic (non-streaming) chat completions
2. curl streaming (SSE) chat completions
3. OpenAI Python SDK streaming completions
4. curl with tools (web_search + python)
Also tests --help output, invalid key rejection, and no-key rejection.
All 7 tests pass against Qwen3-1.7B-GGUF.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Add /v1/completions, /v1/embeddings, /v1/responses endpoints and --parallel support
- llama_cpp.py: accept n_parallel param, pass to llama-server --parallel
- run.py: plumb llama_parallel_slots through to app.state
- inference.py: add /completions and /embeddings as transparent proxies to
llama-server, add /responses as application-level endpoint that converts
to ChatCompletionRequest; thread n_parallel through load_model
- studio.py: set llama_parallel_slots=4 for `unsloth studio run` path
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Make /v1/responses endpoint match OpenAI Responses API format
The existing /v1/responses shim returned Chat Completions format, which
broke OpenAI SDK clients using openai.responses.create(). This commit
replaces the endpoint with a proper implementation that:
- Returns `output` array with `output_text` content parts instead of
`choices` with `message`
- Uses `input_tokens`/`output_tokens` instead of `prompt_tokens`/
`completion_tokens` in usage
- Sets `object: "response"` and `id: "resp_..."`
- Emits named SSE events for streaming (response.created,
response.output_text.delta, response.completed, etc.)
- Accepts all OpenAI Responses API fields (tools, store, metadata,
previous_response_id) without erroring -- silently ignored
- Maps `developer` role to `system` and `input_text`/`input_image`
content parts to the internal Chat format
Adds Pydantic schemas for request/response models and 23 unit tests
covering schema validation, input normalisation, and response format.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: add Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages endpoint (#4981)
* Add Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages endpoint with tool support
Translate Anthropic Messages API format to/from internal OpenAI format
and reuse the existing server-side agentic tool loop. Supports streaming
SSE (message_start, content_block_delta, etc.) and non-streaming JSON.
Includes offline unit tests and e2e tests in test_studio_run.py.
* Add enable_tools, enabled_tools, session_id to /v1/messages endpoint
Support the same shorthand as /v1/chat/completions: enable_tools=true
with an optional enabled_tools list uses built-in server tools without
requiring full Anthropic tool definitions. session_id is passed through
for sandbox isolation. max_tokens is now optional.
* Strip leaked tool-call XML from Anthropic endpoint content
Apply _TOOL_XML_RE to content events in both streaming and
non-streaming tool paths, matching the OpenAI endpoint behavior.
* Emit custom tool_result SSE event in Anthropic stream
Adds a non-standard tool_result event between the tool_use block close
and the next text block, so clients can see server-side tool execution
results. Anthropic SDKs ignore unknown event types.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Split /v1/messages into server-side and client-side tool paths
enable_tools=true runs the existing server-side agentic loop with
built-in tools (web_search/python/terminal). A bare tools=[...] field
now triggers a client-side pass-through: client-provided tools are
forwarded to llama-server and any tool_use output is returned to the
caller with stop_reason=tool_use for client execution.
This fixes Claude Code (and any Anthropic SDK client) which sends
tools=[...] expecting client-side execution but was previously routed
through execute_tool() and failing with 'Unknown tool'.
Adds AnthropicPassthroughEmitter to convert llama-server OpenAI SSE
chunks into Anthropic SSE events, plus unit tests covering text
blocks, tool_use blocks, mixed, stop reasons, and usage.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Fix httpcore GeneratorExit in /v1/messages passthrough stream
Explicitly aclose aiter_lines() before the surrounding async with
blocks unwind, mirroring the prior fix in external_provider.py
(a41160d3) and cc757b78's RuntimeError suppression.
* Wire stop_sequences through /v1/messages; warn on tool_choice
Plumb payload.stop_sequences to all three code paths (server-side
tool loop, no-tool plain, client-side passthrough) so Anthropic SDK
clients setting stop_sequences get the behavior they expect. The
llama_cpp backend already accepted `stop` on both generate_chat_
completion and generate_chat_completion_with_tools; the Anthropic
handler simply wasn't passing it.
tool_choice remains declared on the request model for Anthropic SDK
compatibility (the SDK often sets it by default) but is not yet
honored. Log a structured warning on each request carrying a non-
null tool_choice so the silent drop is visible to operators.
* Wire min_p / repetition_penalty / presence_penalty through /v1/messages
Align the Anthropic endpoint's sampling surface with /v1/chat/completions.
Adds the three fields as x-unsloth extensions on AnthropicMessagesRequest
and threads them through all three code paths: server-side tool loop,
no-tool plain, and client-side passthrough.
The passthrough builder emits "repeat_penalty" (not "repetition_penalty")
because that is llama-server's field name; the backend methods already
apply the same rename internally.
* Fix block ordering and prev_text reset in non-streaming tool path
_anthropic_tool_non_streaming was building the response by appending
all tool_use blocks first, then a single concatenated text block at
the end — losing generation order and merging pre-tool and post-tool
text into one block. It also never reset prev_text between synthesis
turns, so the first N characters of each post-tool turn were dropped
(where N = length of the prior turn's final cumulative text).
Rewrite to build content_blocks incrementally in generation order,
matching the streaming emitter's behavior: deltas within a turn are
merged into the trailing text block, tool_use blocks interrupt the
text sequence, and prev_text is reset on tool_end so turn N+1 diffs
against an empty baseline.
Caught by gemini-code-assist[bot] review on #4981.
* Make test_studio_run.py e2e tests pytest-compatible
Add a hybrid session-scoped studio_server fixture in conftest.py that
feeds base_url / api_key into the existing e2e test functions. Three
invocation modes are now supported:
1. Script mode (unchanged) — python tests/test_studio_run.py
2. Pytest + external server — point at a running instance via
UNSLOTH_E2E_BASE_URL / UNSLOTH_E2E_API_KEY env vars, no per-run
GGUF load cost
3. Pytest + fixture-managed server — pytest drives _start_server /
_kill_server itself via --unsloth-model / --unsloth-gguf-variant,
CI-friendly
The existing _start_server / _kill_server helpers and main() stay
untouched so the script entry point keeps working exactly as before.
Test function signatures are unchanged — the (base_url, api_key)
parameters now resolve via the new fixtures when running under
pytest.
* Rename test_studio_run.py -> test_studio_api.py
The file is entirely about HTTP API endpoint testing (OpenAI-compatible
/v1/chat/completions, Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages, API key auth,
plus a CLI --help sanity check on the command that runs the API). None
of its tests cover training, export, chat-UI, or internal-Python-API
concerns.
The old name misleadingly suggested "tests for the unsloth studio run
CLI subcommand" — the new name reflects the actual scope.
Updates:
- git mv the file (rename tracked, history preserved)
- Rewrite opening docstring to state the API surface focus and call
out what is explicitly out of scope
- Update all 4 Usage-block path references to the new filename
- LOG_FILE renamed to test_studio_api.log
- conftest.py fixture import rewritten from test_studio_run to
test_studio_api, plus 7 docstring/comment references updated
No functional changes to test logic, signatures, or main().
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix httpcore asyncgen cleanup in /v1/messages and /v1/completions
The earlier fix in 985e92a9 was incomplete: it closed aiter_lines()
explicitly but still used `async with httpx.AsyncClient()` /
`async with client.stream()` inside the generator. When the generator
is orphaned (e.g. client disconnects mid-stream and Starlette drops
the StreamingResponse iterator without explicitly calling aclose()),
Python's asyncgen finalizer runs the cleanup in a DIFFERENT task than
the one that originally entered the httpx context managers. The
`async with` exits then trigger httpcore's HTTP11ConnectionByteStream
.aclose(), which enters anyio.CancelScope.__exit__ with a mismatched
task and raises RuntimeError("Attempted to exit cancel scope in a
different task"). That error escapes any user-owned try/except
because it happens during GC finalization.
Replace `async with` with manual client/response lifecycle in both
/v1/messages passthrough and /v1/completions proxy. Close the
response and client in a finally block wrapped in
`try: ... except Exception: pass`. This suppresses RuntimeError (and
other Exception subclasses) from the anyio cleanup noise while
letting GeneratorExit (a BaseException, not Exception) propagate
cleanly so the generator terminates as Python expects.
Traceback observed in user report:
File ".../httpcore/_async/connection_pool.py", line 404, in __aiter__
yield part
RuntimeError: async generator ignored GeneratorExit
...
File ".../anyio/_backends/_asyncio.py", line 455, in __exit__
raise RuntimeError(
RuntimeError: Attempted to exit cancel scope in a different task
* Expand unsloth studio run banner with SDK base URL and more curl examples
Add an explicit "OpenAI / Anthropic SDK base URL" line inside the info
box so SDK users don't accidentally copy the bare server URL (without
/v1) into their OpenAI/Anthropic SDK constructors and hit 404s.
Replace the single /v1/chat/completions curl example with three
labeled blocks: chat/completions, Anthropic /messages, and OpenAI
Responses. The Anthropic example includes max_tokens (Anthropic SDKs
require it even though Studio accepts None).
All examples derived from a computed sdk_base_url so the /v1 prefix
stays in sync if the public path ever changes.
* Hash API keys with HMAC-SHA256 + persistent server secret
Stores the HMAC secret in a new app_secrets singleton table. Fixes
CodeQL py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing alert on storage.py:74-76,
394-395. Refresh tokens stay on plain SHA-256 (unchanged _hash_token)
so existing user sessions survive upgrade — API keys are new on this
branch so there is no migration.
* Use PBKDF2 for API key hashing per CodeQL recommendation
HMAC-SHA256 was still flagged by py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing.
Switch to hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac, which is in CodeQL's recommended
allowlist (Argon2/scrypt/bcrypt/PBKDF2). Persistent server-side
salt stays in app_secrets for defense-in-depth. 100k iterations to
match auth/hashing.py's password hasher.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <115670425+rolandtannous@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <rolandtannous@gravityq.ai>
* fix: quotation marks
* diceware passphrase generation
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <rolandtannous@gravityq.ai>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Daniel Han