* Make the unsloth_cli studio tests pass in isolation
Six tests in test_studio_run_parallel_flag.py and one in
test_studio_secure_flag.py only passed in a full-directory run. All of them
reach the in-venv branch of run(), which does `from state.tool_policy import
set_tool_policy`. That module lives under studio/backend, so it only imports
once something has put that directory on sys.path, and nothing in either file
does. They were relying on test_start.py, which calls
ensure_studio_backend_path() and leaks the sys.path entry, or on
test_studio_cloudflare_flag.py, which stubs the module.
Add a stub_tool_policy_state fixture in a new conftest and use it in the seven,
so the state comes from the test rather than from whatever ran first.
Every file in unsloth_cli/tests now passes on its own, and the suite is stable
across four pytest-randomly seeds.
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---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
unsloth_cli/tests had no CI at all. unsloth_cli/** was a paths trigger and a
ruff target, so the Backend CI job already fired on CLI changes but never ran
these 673 tests, which cover the studio launcher, the pre-exposure gate and the
auth secret writers. Four had been failing on main unnoticed.
Two were stale rather than broken code:
- test_studio_default_exposes_parallel_option pinned the plain --parallel
default to 1, but #7455 deliberately moved _PARALLEL_DEFAULT_PLAIN to 4 so a
new chat does not queue behind the previous one. Assert against the constant
so the two cannot drift again.
- test_reexec_forwards_api_only expected --secure --api-only to re-exec. The
pre-exposure gate now refuses that combination, because api-only serves no
login page and the bootstrap deadline does not apply, so a seeded password
could never be changed. Drop the case and assert the refusal instead.
Two only passed when a built frontend dist happened to be present, which it is
not in a fresh clone or on a runner. Both reach a public-launch path where the
missing-dist gate exits first, so they never got to the backend check and the
run_server call they are about. Stub _find_frontend_dist the way their siblings
already do.
Own step rather than folding into the tests/ discovery: pyproject's testpaths is
tests/, and this suite needs no PYTHONPATH or CUDA spoof, importing neither
unsloth nor torch. Its deps are already installed by the job (pydantic and
uvicorn, which brings click, via studio.txt; pyyaml explicitly).
* Replace standalone Studio wording with Unsloth
Replace the single word Studio with Unsloth wherever it is used as
shorthand for Unsloth Studio in docs, CLI output, UI strings, i18n
locales, workflow display names, comments and docstrings.
Kept unchanged: the full name Unsloth Studio, third party product
names (LM Studio, Visual Studio, Mac Studio), feature names
(Recipe Studio, Fine-tuning Studio and its translations), and all
identifiers such as env vars, commands, paths and filenames.
* Address review feedback on the Studio wording rename
Use "an" before Unsloth where the rename left the article as "a".
Restore the split brand where Unsloth and Studio render as two halves
of the full product name: the onboarding sidebar subtitle and the
IPv6 localhost warning. Scope two messages to the full name Unsloth
Studio where plain Unsloth was misleading: the AMD README bullet and
the CLI studio setup error.
* Studio: make the Cloudflare tunnel opt-in (off by default)
A wildcard bind (`-H 0.0.0.0`) auto-started a public trycloudflare.com
tunnel, so exposing Studio on the LAN also published it to the public
internet. Flip the default so the tunnel is opt-in.
- `--cloudflare` is now tri-state (Optional[bool], default None = off),
mirroring the existing --enable-tools/--disable-tools handling. Pass
--cloudflare to expose a public HTTPS link for a wildcard bind; --secure
still implies the tunnel.
- --secure + --no-cloudflare is still rejected as a contradiction.
- Update the parent-command guard, re-exec forwarding, startup-banner
wording, the colab comment, README, and tests.
* Studio: update installer/setup launch hints for opt-in Cloudflare
The post-install launch hints only mentioned --secure for a public link.
Now that the tunnel is opt-in, clarify that -H 0.0.0.0 exposes the raw
port on the LAN (not a public URL), and surface --cloudflare as the
explicit opt-in for a public HTTPS link (--secure keeps the raw port
private). Applied to install.ps1, install.sh, and studio/setup.sh.
* Studio: address review - keep cloudflare tri-state + harden run re-exec
Two review points from the bots:
- Gemini: keep `cloudflare` as Optional[bool] in run_server instead of
casting None -> False, so the startup banner can distinguish "OFF (default)"
(unset) from "OFF (--no-cloudflare)" (explicit). `_cloudflare_flag` and the
banner branch now carry the tri-state.
- Codex (P1): `unsloth studio run` re-execs the studio venv's console script,
which can be an older build whose --cloudflare defaulted on; omitting the
flag let it re-enable the tunnel. That path now forwards the default polarity
explicitly (--no-cloudflare, or nothing under --secure since --secure implies
the tunnel). The plain `unsloth studio` path runs the same-version in-tree
run.py (resolved via _find_run_py), so it keeps forwarding only an explicit
polarity and still shows the accurate "(default)" banner.
Tests updated for the tri-state banner labels, the None gate cases, and the
new re-exec forwarding.
* Studio: forward --no-cloudflare on plain re-exec too (mixed install)
Codex follow-up: _find_run_py falls back to STUDIO_HOME/.../studio/backend/
run.py when the package copy is absent, so the plain `unsloth studio` re-exec
can land on an older run.py whose --cloudflare defaults on. Forward the default
polarity explicitly there too (--no-cloudflare, or nothing under --secure),
matching the run subcommand. The common in-venv launch skips the re-exec and
still shows the tri-state "(default)" banner.
* Studio: fix launch hint - --cloudflare needs the wildcard bind
Codex P3: the launch hint listed --cloudflare next to the loopback
`unsloth studio -p 8888` command, but the tunnel only starts for wildcard
binds, so `--cloudflare` alone on 127.0.0.1 does nothing. Show
`-H 0.0.0.0 --cloudflare` in the hints (install.ps1, install.sh,
studio/setup.sh) and clarify the same in the README.
* Studio: cross-platform masked terminal password prompt helper
Per-keystroke '*' echo (POSIX termios cbreak / Windows msvcrt.getwch),
backspace editing, Ctrl-C abort, EOF handling, confirmation loop with
re-prompt on mismatch or policy failure. Pure should_prompt gate for the
--secure/--cloudflare exposure paths.
* Studio CLI: force a terminal password change before public tunnel exposure
When a launch will start the Cloudflare tunnel (--secure, or --cloudflare on
a non-api-only wildcard bind) and the admin account still has its seeded
bootstrap password, prompt for a new password in the terminal (masked with
'*', confirmed, re-prompting until valid) before any re-exec or server
exists. The change is committed in the parent so it never crosses argv or
the environment and older studio-venv children see it immediately. Without
a terminal, warn and fall back to the backend bootstrap shutdown timer.
Mirrors backend update_password semantics in one transaction: rehash,
rotate the JWT secret, clear must_change_password, revoke refresh tokens,
drop the desktop secret, then remove the stale credential files.
* Studio: terminal password gate before the public tunnel (backend backstop)
Never publish a trycloudflare URL while the seeded admin password is
active: run_server now runs a terminal password-change gate after the
tunnel decision and strictly before start_studio_tunnel. Interactive
refusal fails closed (shutdown + exit 1, mirroring the secure gate);
without a tty it warns and keeps the bootstrap deadline. Success applies
the same effects as the change-password route (update_password +
revoke_user_refresh_tokens) and drops the stale
app.state.bootstrap_password. MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH centralised in
auth/storage.py and referenced by the HTTP schema. terminal_prompt.py
carries the pure gate helper (interactive loop stubbed; supplied by the
masked-input module). Also migrates the studio/setup.ps1 launch footer
that still showed the bare wildcard hint.
* README: reconcile remote-access section with opt-in Cloudflare tunnel
* Studio: harden the terminal password gate after review
- run.py: run the gate BEFORE the uvicorn socket binds. On a wildcard
--cloudflare launch the served HTML injects the bootstrap credential
for first login, so a pre-gate listener would hand the default
password to anyone who reaches the raw port while the operator is
still typing. The gate now also seeds the admin row itself (it can
run before lifespan startup).
- Headless launches that nothing would protect now fail closed: the
bootstrap deadline never arms for api-only serving and
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT=0 disables it, so warn-and-proceed
would have promised a shutdown that never comes. Both the CLI and the
backend refuse to publish in that case; the ordinary headless path
still warns and relies on the 1h deadline, and no longer auto-fills
the default credential into HTML served on a public URL.
- storage.update_password gains revoke_refresh_tokens to delete the
user's refresh tokens in the SAME transaction as the password commit;
the change-password route and the backend gate use it (a separable
follow-up delete could fail after the commit and leave a stale
refresh token able to mint access tokens under the rotated secret).
- clear_bootstrap_password is best-effort: a locked/undeletable file
must not surface as a failed password change.
- CLI masked reader: disable ISIG like the backend so Ctrl-Z cannot
suspend the process with the shared terminal stuck in no-echo mode;
handle Ctrl-C/Ctrl-Z as characters; treat stream EOF mid-line as an
abort instead of submitting a partial password. Both readers restore
terminal attrs from a SIGTERM/SIGHUP handler since a finally block
cannot run when a default-disposition signal terminates the process.
- Backend reader: decode byte-at-a-time through an incremental UTF-8
decoder so multi-byte characters split across read boundaries are no
longer dropped; isatty checks tolerate closed/None streams.
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* Studio: persist bootstrap suppression through lifespan startup
The pre-bind password gate nulled app.state.bootstrap_password, but the
FastAPI lifespan runs after it and re-reads the bootstrap password into
app.state on both admin paths, so a headless public launch could still
serve the injected credential in HTML. Carry a persistent
suppress_bootstrap_injection flag that the lifespan honors instead.
Also drop the quoted Tuple annotation on _terminal_password_gate that
tripped the import-hoist lint (the typing import looked unused).
* Studio CLI: keep the pre-exec auth DB private (0700 dir, 0600 db)
On a fresh install the pre-exposure password gate creates auth/ and
auth.db through the CLI before the backend ever runs, and
sqlite3.connect leaves the DB 0644 under a 022 umask. Mirror backend
storage.get_connection's chmod so the committed password hash and JWT
secret are never world-readable, even if the launch aborts before the
backend applies its own modes.
* Tighten pre-exposure password gate comments
* Studio: delete seeded bootstrap password before headless public re-exec
The headless warn-and-proceed path returns with the default admin
password still active, then re-execs a child Studio process. An old
studio-venv child (mixed-version install) predates the pre-bind gate and
its injection-suppress flag, so its lifespan reads .bootstrap_password
and injects the seeded credential into the public HTML for up to the
bootstrap deadline. A CLI-flag handshake cannot fix this uniformly: the
studio run path uses ignore_unknown_options and an old in-venv child
runs in-process, so it would never reject the flag.
Delete the seeded .bootstrap_password file in the parent before re-exec
so a fresh child of any version reads None and never serves it. This
covers both re-exec paths and both child versions. must_change_password
stays set, so the login page still forces a change and the bootstrap
shutdown timer still arms; only the plaintext-on-disk copy is removed.
Recovery is via a terminal-attached run or reset-password. Backend gate
and CLI warnings updated to match.
* Studio: commit the seeded admin before headless public re-exec
The headless-warn path deletes the seeded .bootstrap_password so a
re-exec'd child cannot inject it, but _ensure_cli_default_admin's INSERT
was never committed and rolled back on conn.close(). On a fresh
STUDIO_HOME an old studio-venv child then found no admin, regenerated a
fresh bootstrap password + file, and injected THAT into the public page,
defeating the deletion.
Commit the seeded admin right after _ensure_cli_default_admin so any
re-exec'd child sees the existing account and does not regenerate.
Regression tests cover both re-exec paths on a fresh (unseeded) DB.
* Studio: fail closed when the bootstrap password file cannot be removed
On the headless public path, deleting .bootstrap_password is the
protection against an old re-exec'd child injecting the seeded
credential. If unlink fails (locked file, read-only auth dir) the file
is still on disk, so warning and proceeding would still leak it for the
bootstrap-timeout window. Abort with a clear error instead. Regression
test covers the unlink-failure fail-closed path.
* Studio: hold no-echo for the whole password line, not per keystroke
The POSIX masked reader set cbreak/no-echo inside _getch_posix and restored
the terminal to echo-on in a finally after every single keystroke, because
_read_password calls _getch once per character. Between one char returning and
the next call re-entering cbreak, ECHO was on, so a keystroke arriving in that
window echoed the password in cleartext.
Move the terminal mode into a _prompt_raw_mode context that _read_password
holds around the entire line (mirroring unsloth_cli/commands/_password_prompt.py,
which already did this), restoring once when the line completes or aborts.
_getch_posix now only reads, since the mode is held by the caller. The context
is a no-op when stdin is not a real terminal, keeping the _getch test seam.
Add a regression test asserting the raw-mode context wraps the read exactly
once and every keystroke is read while it is active.
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* Studio: strip the seeded bootstrap password when the auth DB check fails
The pre-exposure gate returned early on two auth-DB inspection failures and
proceeded to re-exec without removing the seeded .bootstrap_password:
- _connect_auth_db() failure: a seeded credential from a prior run may still
be on disk.
- the must_change_password read-back failure: worse, _ensure_cli_default_admin
had already seeded the admin and the code committed it (writing
.bootstrap_password) right before the failing SELECT.
In the mixed-version case (a new outer CLI re-execing an old studio-venv child
that predates the pre-bind gate), that child would read the file back and
inject the default admin credential into the public Cloudflare page. The
sibling headless branch already deletes the file for exactly this reason, so
these returns were an inconsistent gap.
Factor the delete-or-fail-closed logic into
_strip_seeded_bootstrap_password_or_exit and call it on both inspection
failures (and reuse it in the headless branch): strip the seeded file first
(version-independent protection), failing closed if the removal itself fails.
must_change_password stays set, so the login page still forces a change and the
bootstrap shutdown timer still arms.
Add tests for both new paths (connect failure and post-commit read-back
failure strip the file and proceed; a failed strip fails closed).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
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* Studio: fail closed when the seeded admin cannot be committed before exposure
The pre-exposure gate wrapped _ensure_cli_default_admin (the INSERT), its
conn.commit(), and the must_change_password read-back in one try, and the
except recovered by stripping .bootstrap_password and proceeding to re-exec on
the assumption the admin was already committed. That assumption only holds when
the failing statement is the SELECT. When the INSERT or the commit itself fails
(e.g. a write lock held past the busy timeout on a fresh install), no admin row
is committed: it rolls back on conn.close(), and a re-exec'd old studio-venv
child (no pre-bind gate) then finds no admin, regenerates a fresh bootstrap
password + file, and serves that default credential on the public Cloudflare
page. Stripping the file cannot stop a regeneration.
Split the seed+commit into its own try that fails closed (refuse the public
launch, best-effort removing any half-written seed file) since we cannot prove a
committed admin; keep the separate read-back failure on the strip-and-proceed
path, where the admin is committed so an old child finds it and will not
regenerate. Add a test for the seed-commit-failure path.
* Studio: decode the CLI masked password reader with errors="replace"
The CLI reader read keystrokes with text-mode sys.stdin.read(1), which raises
UnicodeDecodeError on a pasted non-UTF-8 password (e.g. Latin-1 bytes), or under
PYTHONUTF8 yields a lone surrogate that later crashes the pbkdf2 encode -- either
aborts the launch with a traceback. The backend mirror (terminal_prompt.py)
already reads raw bytes through an incremental decoder with errors="replace".
Mirror that here: read with os.read and an incremental decoder so invalid bytes
map to U+FFFD, iterating over each emitted char (one byte can complete a
replacement plus the next char).
* Studio: resolve the child launcher before the pre-exposure gate
The gate strips the seeded .bootstrap_password on a headless public launch, and
it ran before the re-exec launchability check (studio venv / run.py / console
script present). So a headless launch with an incomplete studio setup would seed
the admin, delete the bootstrap password, then abort because the child could not
be found, leaving the admin at must_change_password=1 with no password ever
shown or injectable: locked out until `unsloth studio reset-password`.
Resolve and validate the child launcher first, in both `studio` (studio_default)
and `studio run`, and only then run the gate, so an unlaunchable setup exits
before anything is stripped. Add a regression test that a missing venv exits
without removing the seeded file.
* Studio: fail closed when the auth DB cannot be opened before exposure
The connect-failure branch of the pre-exposure gate stripped .bootstrap_password
and proceeded, on the assumption a committed admin from a prior run made an old
child find it and not regenerate. But on a fresh public launch whose
_connect_auth_db() itself fails (transient lock during the schema/seed step, or
an unwritable home), no admin is committed, so a mixed-version re-exec child that
predates the backend gate can find no user, generate a fresh bootstrap password,
and serve it on the public Cloudflare page. Stripping a file we cannot vouch for
cannot stop a regeneration.
Make this branch fail closed like the seed/commit failure path: we only continue
past the DB inspection once a committed admin is confirmed. The existing file is
left untouched so a retry (after a transient lock clears) can still prompt.
Update the connect-failure test to assert fail-closed, and give the in-venv
--secure flag test a real STUDIO_HOME with an already-changed admin so the gate
is a no-op rather than relying on a DB-open failure.
* Studio: invalidate seeded bootstrap files before deleting auth.db on reset
reset-password deleted auth.db first, then best-effort unlinked the seeded
.bootstrap_password and desktop secret. unlink() only ignores
FileNotFoundError, so a locked or read-only file (Windows AV, read-only auth
dir) survived while auth.db was gone. The next server start then re-seeded
from that stale plaintext and re-validated the exact credential the reset was
meant to revoke.
Invalidate the credential files first, truncating any that cannot be
unlinked, then delete the DB, so a surviving file can never carry a reusable
secret. clear_bootstrap_password now truncates on unlink failure for the same
reason, and its warning says the contents were cleared rather than claiming
the stale password is already invalid.
* Studio: require a servable frontend before the pre-exposure gate can strip the seeded password
A headless public launch strips the seeded .bootstrap_password before the
re-exec'd child starts. If the child then cannot serve the login page (the only
in-band way to change the seeded password) the admin is locked out
(must_change_password=1, no file, no UI) until reset-password.
Add _require_servable_frontend_or_exit and call it before the gate on both
`unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run` public launches: fail closed if a
non-api-only public launch has no built frontend dist, before anything is
stripped. A user-supplied --frontend is validated to contain index.html so a
bad path cannot silently bypass the check; an auto-resolved dist is trusted
(_find_frontend_dist already requires index.html) and forwarded to the child.
Model-load aborts on `studio run` remain a residual: the parent must strip for
mixed-version safety (an old studio-venv child has no pre-bind gate) and model
loadability cannot be proven before exec, so that path stays recoverable via
reset-password.
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* Studio: harden reset-password ordering and validate the in-venv backend before the strip
Three follow-ups to the pre-exposure hardening:
reset-password now deletes auth.db FIRST and proves it is gone before touching
the seeded credential files. If the DB cannot be removed (a running Studio or
Windows holds it open, or a read-only auth dir) it aborts with the credential
files untouched, so a forgotten-password reset is not left half-done with the
recovery credentials deleted while an un-resettable must_change_password=1 DB
survives. After the DB is gone it invalidates the stale credential files
(unlink, else truncate) and fails closed if a file can be neither removed nor
truncated, since a surviving plaintext would be re-seeded by
generate_bootstrap_password() and re-validate the revoked password.
The in-venv (in-process) launch path had no analogue of the re-exec launcher
check: a headless public launch would seed the admin and strip the seeded
.bootstrap_password in the gate before _load_run_module() later failed on a
broken/partial venv, leaving must_change_password=1 with no password to log in.
Add _validate_inproc_backend_before_strip, called on the in-venv path (both
`unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run`) before the gate on the headless
public path, so a broken backend fails cleanly before anything is stripped. It
is scoped to the headless path so an interactive prompt is not delayed behind a
full backend import.
* Studio: validate the frontend and tunnel before the strip on every public path
Five follow-ups closing the remaining pre-exposure-strip lockouts:
The in-venv (in-process) paths of both `unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio
run` validated the backend but not the frontend before the gate, so a headless
public launch with a missing/bad dist would strip the seeded .bootstrap_password
and then abort in run_server() during frontend setup, leaving
must_change_password=1 with no login page. Both now validate a servable frontend
before the strip (cheap check first, backend import after) and serve the
resolved dist in-process.
The `studio run` re-exec discarded the dist that satisfied the pre-strip check
and only forwarded a user-supplied --frontend. In a shadowed install where the
parent finds a built dist the child cannot, it stripped and exec'd without the
path, and the child aborted during frontend setup. It now forwards the resolved
dist, matching `unsloth studio`.
On a headless --secure launch the bind is loopback, so the Cloudflare tunnel is
the only public exposure. If cloudflared is provably unavailable (found nowhere
and undownloadable) the tunnel cannot start, so stripping the recovery
credential would just lock the user out with no public URL ever served. Add
_tunnel_binary_confirmed_unavailable and, on --secure only, refuse the launch
with the credential preserved rather than strip. Wildcard --cloudflare binds
0.0.0.0 publicly regardless of the tunnel, so it still strips; any uncertainty
(helper not loadable) also still strips, since a possible credential leak
outweighs a recoverable lockout.
clear_bootstrap_password no longer claims it cleared the file's contents when
both unlink and truncate failed; it now reports the stale password is still on
disk and asks the user to remove it manually.
* Studio: fix cloudflared probe path and skip the bootstrap strip for a self-suppressing child
Two follow-ups to the --secure pre-exposure hardening:
The cloudflared availability probe loaded cloudflare_tunnel by file path but not
its backend deps: ensure_cloudflared() -> _cache_path() lazily imports
utils.paths.storage_roots, which only resolves when studio/backend is on
sys.path. From the outer CLI it is not, so the probe saw ensure_cloudflared()
return None (cache unresolvable) and wrongly treated the tunnel as unavailable,
refusing --secure even when cloudflared was cached or downloadable. Add the
backend dir to sys.path for the probe (and remove it after) so the cache path
resolves as it will in the child.
A headless --secure launch stripped the seeded .bootstrap_password before the
child proved the tunnel could actually connect, so a cloudflared that is present
but cannot establish the tunnel (blocked connectivity, Cloudflare outage) left
must_change_password=1 with no recovery credential. But the strip is only needed
when the re-exec'd child is an OLD studio-venv backend with no pre-bind
suppression: this install's own run.py sets app.state.suppress_bootstrap_injection
before binding and never serves the seeded credential publicly. Add
_child_self_suppresses (true in-process, or when the re-exec target is this
install's own run.py by path identity) and skip the strip in that case, keeping
.bootstrap_password as a local recovery credential; the strip stays fully in
force for the studio-venv console-script path and any venv-fallback run.py, where
an old child is actually possible.
* Studio: reword the pre-exposure terminal password prompt
* Studio: warn when -H is overridden by --secure; align pre-exposure prompt wording
- --secure/--secure run: emit a Note (not an error) when -H is a non-loopback
host, since --secure forces the loopback bind and would otherwise discard -H
silently.
- Reword the pre-exposure terminal prompt to 'exposed on the public internet'
in both the backend gate and the CLI mirror.
- Align the CLI success line with the backend ("Password updated for '<user>'.").
- Tests for the new -H warning (present when overridden, absent on loopback).
* Studio: add non-interactive --password to set the initial admin password
Headless hosts (CI, containers, systemd units) have no TTY, so the forced
first-exposure password change could not be completed unattended. Add a
non-interactive way to set the INITIAL admin password before the server binds:
- --password <value>, the UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD env var, or --password -
(read one line from stdin). Off by default; unset falls back to the normal
interactive terminal prompt / browser setup.
- Applies on any launch (public --secure/--cloudflare or a headless -H 0.0.0.0
bind), only when the account still has its seeded bootstrap password. An
already-set password is a hard error, never an override; an invalid value
(too short, or equal to the bootstrap) fails closed before bind.
- The CLI applies the change in the parent, never forwards --password to the
re-exec child, and strips UNSLOTH_STUDIO_PASSWORD from the child env so the
secret never crosses to the child. run.py does the same on the direct path and
strips the env var so spawned subprocesses (cloudflared, llama-server, tools)
cannot inherit it.
Mirrors resolve_supplied_password across the CLI and backend, documents the
option in the README (including the argv-visibility caveat), and covers all
flows (env/stdin/literal, fail-closed cases, no-forward, env-strip,
reset-password roundtrip) in the CLI, backend, and unit suites.
* Studio: truncate the stale bootstrap file when unlink fails on a CLI password change
The post-change cleanup in _cli_update_password only warned when
.bootstrap_password could not be unlinked but was still writable (locked file,
read-only auth dir), leaving the old plaintext on disk. If auth.db is later
reset or removed, generate_bootstrap_password() reads that file back and
re-validates the revoked bootstrap password. Truncate the file on unlink
failure so its stale plaintext cannot be re-seeded, mirroring the backend
clear_bootstrap_password(); the password change is already committed, so this
never rolls it back. The warning now states truthfully whether the contents
were cleared or the file must be removed manually.
* Studio: tighten comments
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: accept --not-secure as a back-compat alias for --no-secure
PR #6560 renamed the negative secure flag from --not-secure to --no-secure
to match argparse.BooleanOptionalAction. Re-add --not-secure as a hidden,
deprecated alias at both CLI layers so existing scripts and muscle memory
keep working, while --no-secure stays the documented spelling.
- studio/backend/run.py: extract the CLI parser into _build_arg_parser() so
the flag wiring is unit-testable, and register --not-secure as a hidden
store_false alias for --no-secure. Last flag wins, matching
BooleanOptionalAction semantics.
- unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py: add a hidden --not-secure option to
`unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run`; it forces secure off and
forwards the canonical --no-secure to the backend.
- Tests at both layers for the alias and its polarity.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: address review on --not-secure alias
- run.py: use argparse.SUPPRESS for the --not-secure default so the alias
never contributes a namespace default (the canonical --secure owns it).
- studio.py: resolve --not-secure last-wins from argv via _resolve_secure()
so `--not-secure --secure` keeps secure on, matching the backend's
BooleanOptionalAction and how --secure/--no-secure already behave.
- Add a CLI last-wins test covering both flag orders.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
studio.backend.run.__main__ adds "--secure" argument via argparse.BooleanOptionalAction, which automatically creates negative --no-secure, that is with **NO** prefix, instead of **NOT**.
* Keep server-side tools enabled under --secure and on every bind
--secure binds loopback and exposes Studio only through an authenticated
Cloudflare HTTPS tunnel, but it was grouped with a raw 0.0.0.0 bind and
force-disabled all server-side tools (web search, Python, terminal). The
process tool policy overrode the client's enable_tools request, so the
model was never told the tools existed and answered in plain text. The
plain 'unsloth studio' command had no way to re-enable and printed nothing.
Tools now default on for every bind. The bind host and --secure no longer
change the tool policy; only an explicit --enable-tools/--disable-tools
forces it on or off. Both 'unsloth studio' and 'unsloth studio run' accept
the flags and the startup banner states the resolved policy.
- run.py: replace _apply_default_tool_policy(host, secure) with
_apply_cli_tool_policy(enable_tools); add an enable_tools kwarg to
run_server and --enable-tools/--disable-tools to the argparse.
- _tool_policy.py: resolve_tool_policy defaults to on for every host and
no longer prompts on a network bind.
- studio.py: drop the secure-as-public tool gating, add the flags to the
plain command, and reword the startup banner.
- Update and extend the secure-flag and tool-policy tests.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Add tool-policy notice to plain server banner and refresh run --help
Follow-up to PR review:
- run.py: the plain 'unsloth studio' / --secure / direct run.py path went
through _emit_startup_output without any tool-policy line, so a
network-reachable launch was silent about code execution now that tools
default on. Thread enable_tools through _emit_startup_output /
_emit_secure_startup_output and print a one-line policy notice, followed by
a single stop hint.
- studio.py: the 'unsloth studio run' --enable-tools/--disable-tools and --yes
help still described the removed loopback-on/network-off default and the
confirmation prompt; reword to match the new policy.
- Add tests for the banner notice and the refreshed help text.
* Update CI tool-policy resolver tests for default-on behavior
tests/python/test_unsloth_run_tool_policy_resolver.py still asserted the
removed network-bind policy (0.0.0.0 and LAN IP default off, explicit enable
prompts and aborts on a declined prompt), so it failed the Python CI jobs.
Rewrite the truth table: every bind defaults on, explicit on/off always wins,
and the resolver never prompts (yes/silent/prompt kept for compatibility).
* Trim comments for the tool-policy change
Shorten the verbose docstrings and block comments added for --secure tool
handling; keep the security-relevant intent. Verified comment-only via an AST
diff (code unchanged).
* Add deterministic test that server-side tools execute under --secure
Drive the GGUF agentic tool loop with a fake llama-server stream and let the
real execute_tool run: python counts 1..100, terminal returns a UTC datetime,
and web_search runs through real _web_search with only the ddgs network
boundary mocked. A policy assertion pins that the post-fix --secure path
(policy None + per-request enable_tools) is what keeps these executions
reachable. No model, GPU, or live network; runs in the existing backend CI.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Align _emit_startup_output banner test with the moved stop hint
The tool-policy notice now prints between the access banner and the stop
hint, so the stop hint is emitted once at the end instead of inline in the
banner (include_stop_hint is False and print_studio_stop_hint runs once).
Update the plain-localhost case to match; the mismatch and wildcard cases
already asserted this wiring.
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Han <michaelhan2050@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: add --secure Cloudflare-only mode and revamp API usage examples
--secure / --not-secure on `unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run`:
- --secure binds 127.0.0.1, requires the Cloudflare tunnel, and advertises only
the Cloudflare link. cloudflared reaches the server over localhost, so the raw
port is never exposed on a public interface.
- If the tunnel cannot start, fail closed with a clear message instead of
silently leaving a raw 0.0.0.0 link.
- Default stays not-secure (no behavior change); coexists with the existing
--cloudflare/--no-cloudflare flag. Host defaults are unchanged.
- /api/health (authed) now reports the live tunnel URL.
API usage examples (Profile > API):
- Example tabs for curl, Python, curl + tools, Python + tools, plus an OS row
(Linux/macOS/WSL vs Windows) auto-detected from the platform.
- Windows curl passes the JSON body via a file so PowerShell does not strip the
quotes when calling curl.exe.
- Python + tools forwards enable_tools/enabled_tools through extra_body and
guards chunk.choices, since tool-lifecycle events carry no choices.
- Shows the loaded model name and the real API key while it is still revealed.
- A Cloudflare Tunnel toggle (default on) shows the public tunnel URL and uses
it as the base_url in the examples when a tunnel is running.
Tests cover the tunnel start gate and the --secure flag on both commands.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: gate --secure tools on public exposure and harden API examples
In secure mode the server binds loopback but is reachable via the public
Cloudflare tunnel, so resolve the tool policy against the public exposure
(0.0.0.0) rather than the loopback bind. This keeps server-side tools off by
default and prompts before enabling them, instead of inheriting the loopback
default of on. The startup tool notice now names the public surface.
Also reject --secure with --no-cloudflare directly in run_server and the
run.py argparse (not only the CLI), JSON-encode interpolated model names so
Windows paths and quotes cannot produce invalid JSON or broken snippets, and
force-refresh /api/health on the API panel so a tunnel that starts after the
first health read still surfaces its URL.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: API examples show direct host when tunnel toggle is off; move Copy onto code
The Cloudflare Tunnel toggle had no visible effect when Studio was opened
through the tunnel: the off state fell back to window.location.origin, which
equals the tunnel URL in that case. /api/health now reports the direct
host:port (server_url), and the API panel uses it for the off state so it shows
the real non-tunnel base. Also move the Copy button out of the tab row and onto
the code block.
* Studio: highlight API examples, add advanced tabs, fix tunnel toggle row
Syntax-highlight the curl/PowerShell/Python snippets with the app's shared
shiki plugin (bash/powershell/python). Add 'curl + advanced' and
'Python + advanced' tabs that set temperature/top_p/top_k/min_p/
repetition_penalty/max_tokens, enable thinking, and turn on all tools.
The Cloudflare Tunnel row no longer shifts the code block: the tunnel URL is
always rendered (dimmed when off) so toggling keeps the row height constant.
Key the highlighted block on its content so it remounts when only the base URL
changes (the renderer's block memo otherwise kept a stale URL).
* Studio: rename API tunnel toggle to Secure HTTPS, hint --secure when exposed
Rename the API examples toggle from Cloudflare Tunnel to Secure HTTPS. When the
server was not launched with --secure, show an info tooltip noting the raw
0.0.0.0 port is still globally reachable and pointing at --secure. /api/health
now reports whether --secure was used so the hint is hidden in secure mode.
* Studio: force tools off for plain network/secure launches
The plain 'unsloth studio --secure' (and '-H 0.0.0.0') launcher re-execs run.py
and never installed a tool policy, so the process default (honor per-request
enable_tools) let any API-key holder run Python/terminal tools over the public
endpoint. Force the policy off at the run.py entrypoint when network-reachable
(0.0.0.0 or --secure); 'unsloth studio run' still installs its own resolved
policy and does not go through this path.
* Studio: apply default tool policy in run_server, not the run.py entrypoint
The plain launcher runs from the studio venv and calls run_server directly, so
it never hit the run.py __main__ guard. Move the network/secure default-off tool
policy into run_server so every launch path (plain, --secure, direct run.py)
gets it; the run subcommand still overrides it with its resolved policy.
* Studio: clarify --secure help text on the network exposure tradeoff
Spell out in --help (both unsloth studio and unsloth studio run, plus the
run.py argparse) that --not-secure also serves the raw 0.0.0.0 port reachable
from anywhere on the network, matching the API panel's Secure HTTPS hint.
* Studio: cache API-key PBKDF2 derivation to cut per-request /v1 auth overhead
validate_api_key re-ran the 100k-round PBKDF2 on every authenticated
request, adding ~15ms to each /v1 call made with an sk-unsloth- key.
Benchmarked against the bare llama-server it proxies to, API-key requests
carried ~22ms of fixed overhead vs ~7ms for the JWT path; the gap was
entirely this redundant key derivation (Pydantic validation measured
0.005ms, so it is not a factor).
The raw-key to hash mapping is a pure deterministic function of the fixed
server salt, so memoize it per process, keyed by a salted HMAC of the key
(never the key or a recoverable digest). The cached value equals what is
already stored at rest. Revocation and expiry remain enforced by the
SQLite read on every call, so a cache hit only skips the KDF, never the
active or expiry checks. Only keys that exist in the DB are cached, so
unknown-key spam cannot grow it.
After the change the API-key /v1 overhead drops to ~8ms, at parity with
JWT, while the at-rest PBKDF2 hashing is unchanged.
Adds test_api_key_expiry.py covering API-key and JWT expiry enforcement
and the new cache: it skips the KDF on repeat and still rejects revoked
or expired keys.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: tighten comments across the secure-tunnel and API-key changes
Condense multi-line comments and docstrings to one or two lines, drop the
ones that restate obvious code, and remove an orphaned test section header.
Comment-only: verified with comment_tools.py check (9/9 code unchanged), the
auth/secure-tunnel/CLI test suites, and a clean frontend typecheck and build.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Daniel Han