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2 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Han
6d8c18cd1a
Replace standalone Studio wording with Unsloth (#7221)
* Replace standalone Studio wording with Unsloth

Replace the single word Studio with Unsloth wherever it is used as
shorthand for Unsloth Studio in docs, CLI output, UI strings, i18n
locales, workflow display names, comments and docstrings.

Kept unchanged: the full name Unsloth Studio, third party product
names (LM Studio, Visual Studio, Mac Studio), feature names
(Recipe Studio, Fine-tuning Studio and its translations), and all
identifiers such as env vars, commands, paths and filenames.

* Address review feedback on the Studio wording rename

Use "an" before Unsloth where the rename left the article as "a".
Restore the split brand where Unsloth and Studio render as two halves
of the full product name: the onboarding sidebar subtitle and the
IPv6 localhost warning. Scope two messages to the full name Unsloth
Studio where plain Unsloth was misleading: the AMD README bullet and
the CLI studio setup error.
2026-07-19 00:47:04 -07:00
Daniel Han
80d3434d61
Studio: require signed capability tokens for /p preview links (#6666)
* Studio: require signed capability tokens for /p preview links

The public /p preview routes added in #6486 run model load and chat
generation as the admin user with no authentication. The only gate is the
preview ref, a deterministic outputs-root path (run or run/checkpoint) that
is guessable rather than secret. On a network-reachable Studio (--secure
tunnel or -H 0.0.0.0), an unauthenticated caller who guesses a ref can
consume GPU and probe a private fine-tuned checkpoint.

Make the share link an unguessable, revocable capability:

- Sign the canonical ref with a dedicated server-side secret (HMAC-SHA256,
  stored in app_secrets, independent of the JWT/login secret).
- Require a valid token on every /p chat, models, and page request before
  resolving a checkpoint or loading a model; missing or invalid tokens get a
  generic 404 so the surface never confirms a ref exists.
- Accept the token via ?k= (browser link and preview page) or
  Authorization: Bearer (OpenAI-compatible clients).
- Rotate the secret to revoke every outstanding link
  (POST /api/settings/preview-links/rotate).
- Clamp preview generation (max_tokens/max_completion_tokens <= 1024, n = 1)
  and set Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on the page so the token is not
  leaked via Referer.

Training history hands the authenticated owner the signed token, and the
copy-link button builds /p/{ref}?k={sig}.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: honor a lower caller token limit in the preview clamp

Codex review: when only the legacy max_tokens was sent, the clamp left
max_completion_tokens at the 1024 default, and _effective_max_tokens prefers
max_completion_tokens, so a request like max_tokens=16 could still generate up
to 1024 tokens. Derive one effective limit (max_completion_tokens wins, else the
legacy max_tokens) and pin both fields to it so a caller's lower limit is kept.

* Studio: add preview kill switch, rate limit, and revoke-links UI

Follow-ups to the /p preview capability work:

- Public-sharing kill switch: a persisted setting (default on) gates the public
  /p surface. When off, every preview request 404s even with a valid token, and
  the owner UI stops offering share links. GET/PUT /api/settings/preview-sharing;
  enforced in _verify_or_404.
- Per-IP rate limit on the preview chat route: a coarse in-process sliding-window
  limiter (20 req/min/IP) returns 429 + Retry-After before the GPU lock is taken.
  Client IP honors X-Forwarded-For only when UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED is
  set, matching the login limiter's trust model.
- Settings UI: a "Preview sharing" section with the public-sharing toggle and a
  "Revoke all preview links" button (confirm dialog) that rotates the secret.

Tests cover the kill switch (404 when off), the 429 path, the sliding window,
client-IP trust behavior, and the setting default.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: fix preview-fields sharing arg and refresh sigs after revoke

Codex review:
- P1: get_training_run_detail and update_training_run called _preview_fields
  with only output_dir after it gained a required sharing_on parameter, raising
  a 500 TypeError once get_run succeeded. Pass get_preview_sharing_enabled() at
  both sites; add a detail-endpoint regression test.
- P2: after rotating the preview secret from settings, the history grid still
  held stale preview_sig values, so a freshly copied link would 404. Emit
  emitTrainingRunsChanged() after a successful revoke so the grid refetches
  freshly signed refs.

* Studio: harden preview sharing controls (Codex review)

- Fail closed: a read failure on the preview-sharing kill switch now returns
  False instead of defaulting to enabled, so an unavailable settings DB can't
  reopen the public surface. A missing key still defaults to enabled.
- Per-IP rate limit behind the managed Cloudflare tunnel: client_ip now honors
  CF-Connecting-IP when the socket peer is loopback, so tunneled visitors are
  keyed by their real IP instead of collapsing onto the local cloudflared peer.
- GET /p no longer mints key/share_url when sharing is disabled; it returns
  sharing_enabled=false so clients don't distribute links that 404.
- Settings UI: toggling public sharing emits the training-runs-changed event so
  the history grid shows/hides Copy preview link without a manual refresh.

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Studio: harden preview rate limiter and IP keying (Opus review)

From a two-agent review of the PR:

- Rate limiter no longer evicts an active bucket when the table is full: a flood
  of distinct keys could otherwise cycle out a throttled bucket and reset its
  counter. Evict only aged-out buckets; if the table is full of live clients,
  fail closed (deny the new key) instead.
- client_ip keys on the rightmost (proxy-appended) X-Forwarded-For hop when the
  trust env is set; the leftmost is client-spoofable. Documented the
  append/overwrite-proxy assumption.
- _verify_or_404 checks the capability token before the kill-switch DB read, so
  unauthenticated /p spam can't be used as an unbounded settings-DB sink and the
  response is identical regardless of the sharing on/off state.

Tests: nested run/checkpoint happy path + wrong-ref rejection, the eviction
fail-closed behavior, and route-level coverage for the rotate / preview-sharing
settings endpoints.

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-25 21:40:48 -07:00