* Studio: harden the data-recipe and inference consumer loops against pump death
Follow-up to #6643. The same single-unsupervised-consumer pattern the training
pump had lives in two sibling loops, with the same failure mode: one bad event
kills the only thread that updates the in-memory state every UI surface reads,
while the worker subprocess keeps running.
- data_recipe JobManager._pump_loop: a malformed worker log line that makes
parse_log_message raise no longer kills the pump. Guard _handle_event, the
queue read, and the worker-exit finalize, and broaden _drain_queue so a drain
error still finalizes the job instead of leaving it wedged "active" (which also
leaked the workflow-scoped API key until its 24h expiry).
- inference InferenceOrchestrator._dispatcher_loop: guard the routing body so a
malformed response or a mailbox put error can't kill the dispatcher and hang
every in-flight generation (callers key liveness on the subprocess, not on
this thread).
Adds regression tests for both.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: extend consumer-loop hardening to RAG, hub, auth, and stream-reader paths
Continuation of the data-recipe and inference pump hardening: the same
"background producer updates in-memory state that a single unsupervised
consumer surfaces to the UI" pattern shows up in several more Studio paths,
each able to silently freeze a UI surface while the worker keeps running.
RAG ingestion SSE (core/rag/ingestion.py):
- job_events polled the queue with a blocking get and never noticed client
disconnect or a dead worker, so a closed tab or a producer that died
without emitting a terminal event left the stream hanging. It now polls
with a timeout, emits heartbeats, ends on terminal job status, caps idle
time, and always pops the job registry in finally.
- Added _reap_finished_jobs() and call it from start_ingestion so finished
job state does not accumulate.
Startup reconcile (storage/rag_db.py, main.py):
- reconcile_orphaned_ingestion_jobs() marks ingestion jobs (and their
documents) that were left non-terminal by a previous crash as failed, so
the UI does not show jobs stuck "running" forever after a restart. Wired
in at startup next to cleanup_orphaned_runs().
Hub download watcher (hub/services/download_lifecycle.py):
- _watch() could leave a job pinned "running" if finalize raised. Body is
now guarded: on failure it logs and sets the job to error, and always
invalidates the hf cache scan in finally.
External provider stream (core/inference/external_provider.py):
- read timeout was None (no stall ceiling); set to 300s so a wedged
upstream surfaces as an error instead of an indefinitely hung stream.
Auth store (auth/storage.py):
- Enable WAL + busy_timeout on the auth DB so token validation (read on
every request) and login writes stop serialising on the rollback journal.
Matches studio_db / rag_db / providers_db.
Login rate limiter (routes/auth.py):
- _LOGIN_IP_BUCKETS could grow unbounded under spoofed-IP traffic; cap it
and prune stale buckets, mirroring the per-account bucket handling.
Training progress SSE (routes/training.py):
- Break promptly on client disconnect instead of waiting for the next
yield to fail on a closed socket, matching the export / data-recipe SSE
routes.
llama-server stdout drain (core/inference/llama_cpp.py):
- Broaden the drain guard so an unexpected decode/read error logs at debug
and stops the drainer cleanly instead of escaping the thread.
Frontend stream readers (chat-api.ts, rag-api.ts):
- Wrap the SSE read loops in try/finally + reader.cancel() so early return
([DONE]), thrown errors, and consumer aborts release the reader lock
instead of holding it until GC.
Tests:
- test_training_progress_stream_nan: fake request now implements the async
is_disconnected() the route polls, matching the other SSE route fakes.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: address Codex review feedback on the consumer-loop hardening
Four follow-ups from the automated review, all on code this PR introduced:
- Data-recipe pump (manager.py): a queue read that keeps raising an error
outside the read's narrow catch set (e.g. a broken queue pipe after the
child died) hit the `continue` guard and skipped the dead-worker finalize
below, spinning forever and leaving the job wedged "active" with its
workflow key unretired. On a read failure, fall through to finalize when
the worker is no longer alive. Added a regression test.
- RAG ingestion SSE (ingestion.py): the 5-minute idle cap could end the
stream while the job was still pending/running (a large document spends
minutes in embedding/storing with no per-batch progress event). The route
then sends [DONE], and the client treats a no-terminal-frame end as
completion, marking the document indexed mid-ingestion. Drop the idle cap:
while the worker is alive and non-terminal we keep heartbeating; the stream
ends only on terminal DB status, the None sentinel, or client disconnect.
- Login rate limiter (auth.py): the per-IP path pruned but then added the
new IP unconditionally, so a spoofed-source-IP spray kept _LOGIN_IP_BUCKETS
unbounded and made every new IP pay a full-dict prune scan. Gate the add on
the cap, mirroring the account path.
- Hub download watcher (download_lifecycle.py): if finalize raised before it
reaped (proc.wait) and dropped the worker (e.g. an I/O error draining
stderr), the crash path published a terminal state while the live Popen
stayed registered and kept writing the cache, and the terminal set_job let
claim() admit a retry on the same repo. Terminate + drop the worker before
setting the terminal state.
* Studio: keep login throttling working when the per-IP bucket dict saturates
Review follow-up. The previous cap fix skipped creating a bucket for a new IP
once _LOGIN_IP_BUCKETS was full, returning ip_fails=0. Under a sustained spray
that also fills the account dict, every failure from such an IP then looked
first-seen and _login_blocked had no bucket to enforce, so the cap effectively
disabled throttling once saturated.
Bound the dict with a FIFO eviction instead: if the IP is new and the dict is
full, reclaim expired buckets (rate-limited so a burst of distinct IPs can't
make each failure an O(n) sweep) and, if still full, evict the oldest-inserted
IP. The new IP always gets a real bucket, so a saturating (e.g. spoofed
X-Forwarded-For) spray stays throttled while memory stays bounded. Added a
regression test that saturates the dict and asserts a later IP is still blocked.
* Studio: address Codex review (RAG queue lifecycle, stream error, orphan chunks)
Three follow-ups on the Phase 6 changes:
- RAG ingestion SSE (ingestion.py): job_events removed the per-job queue in its
finally on ANY exit, including an early client disconnect while the worker is
still running. That dropped the worker's later events (the queue is the only
one _emit writes to) and made a reconnect find no queue and receive only
[DONE], which the client treats as completion. Only drop the queue on a
terminal exit (None sentinel / terminal DB status); leftover terminal queues
are still swept by _reap_finished_jobs. Added queue-lifecycle tests.
- External provider stream (routes/inference.py): once the 300s read timeout can
fire, the stream's except path failed the monitor but ended without an error
frame or [DONE], so the chat client saw a bare EOF and saved the timed-out
answer as a successful partial with no error. Emit an SSE error frame (and
[DONE]) on stream failure so the client surfaces it.
- RAG startup reconcile (storage/rag_db.py): marking a half-ingested document
failed left its chunks/fts/vec rows intact, and retrieval filters by scope not
status, so a failed document could still be retrieved and cited. Purge the
document's chunks when reconciling it to failed (the doc row stays for
re-ingest).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: release the remaining SSE stream readers (training, data-recipe, export)
reviewer.py follow-up. The chat and RAG SSE readers were wrapped in
try/finally + reader.cancel(), but the other three readers built on the same
response.body.getReader() pattern were left without it: streamTrainingProgress,
streamRecipeJobEvents, and streamExportLogs leak the ReadableStreamDefaultReader
lock (held until GC) when the consumer aborts, returns early, or a parse/callback
throws. Wrap each in try/finally + reader.cancel() (export already had a
try/catch, so it only needed the finally). All five frontend SSE readers now
release the reader symmetrically.
* Tighten resilience comments and docstrings
Condense the verbose explanatory comments and internal-helper docstrings added
in this branch to shorter, clearer forms. Comment/whitespace only; verified no
code changed via AST diff. No behaviour change.
* Studio: keep chunks for completed docs during ingestion reconcile
Startup reconciliation flips orphaned (non-terminal) ingestion jobs to failed and
purges the document's chunks so a failed source can't be retrieved. But it dropped
the chunks unconditionally, so a document the worker had already committed as
'completed' before the crash (only its job row left non-terminal) lost every chunk
while still reporting 'completed'. That leaves an empty source that retrieval can't
return and dedup (status != 'failed') blocks from re-ingest.
Only purge chunks when the document UPDATE actually transitions it to failed; an
already-completed document keeps its chunks. Adds reconcile regression tests for
both the completed-doc and genuine in-flight-orphan cases.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: drop a finished RAG job's queue when the client disconnects
job_events kept the per-job queue until it consumed the None sentinel, so a UI
that stops on the terminal event (its reader.cancel aborts the stream before
[DONE]) left the queue registered until the next _reap_finished_jobs sweep; a
batch of uploads followed by idling retained them all.
_run writes the terminal DB status before emitting the terminal event, so on
generator exit, drop the queue when the job's DB row is already terminal (worker
done, nothing to resume) and keep it only while the worker is still running. Adds
a disconnect-after-terminal-event regression test.
* Remove stray async task output files committed by mistake
* Studio: harden login IP throttle and end progress stream on disconnect
Two Codex review items:
Login per-IP throttle: when the per-IP bucket dict saturated, FIFO eviction could
drop a still-hot (blocked) bucket, so an IP could flood the dict with distinct
(or spoofed) source IPs to push out its own bucket and retry as first-seen. Stop
evicting hot buckets; a new IP that can't fit now shares a bounded overflow
counter that still trips the per-IP threshold, so a saturating spray stays
throttled and no live counter is reset.
Progress SSE: on client disconnect the polling loop only broke and fell through
to the unconditional final 'complete' frame, so a buffered or proxying consumer
could read a still-active run as completed. Return from the generator instead.
Adds regression tests for both (spray cannot reset a hot bucket; disconnect while
active emits no complete frame).
* Studio: shard the login overflow counter and stop cancelling chat stream after [DONE]
Two Codex review items:
Login throttle overflow: the single shared overflow counter meant that once a
saturating spray pushed it past the per-IP threshold, _login_blocked returned 429
for every new unbucketed source IP, before credentials were checked -- a global
login denial. Shard the overflow into a fixed array of counters keyed by hash(ip),
so a hot shard only throttles the IPs that map to it while a single source's
repeated failures still concentrate in one shard and stay throttled. Memory stays
bounded and no live bucket is evicted. Adds a regression test that a hot overflow
shard does not block an unrelated IP.
Chat stream: the reader.cancel() in the SSE finally fired even after a natural
[DONE]/EOF. The backend finalizes its api-monitor entry right after yielding the
sentinel (the local pass-through finishes after the last yield), so a client
cancel there can be observed as a disconnect and mark a completed request as
cancelled. Track natural completion and only cancel on an early/abnormal exit.
(No frontend unit test: the Studio frontend has no test harness.)
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: give prep-timeout test fakes an is_disconnected method
The progress stream now ends on client disconnect (await request.is_disconnected()
before falling through to the terminal frame). After merging that into the
prep-timeout tests added later on main, their _FakeRequest/_ReconnectRequest must
provide is_disconnected or the generator raises AttributeError under CI.
* Studio: keep the login overflow throttle when bucket capacity frees up
_login_blocked only consulted the per-IP overflow shard while the bucket dict was
still at capacity. If a slot freed before the 60s window expired (e.g. another
IP's successful login calls _clear_login_bucket), a source counted in a hot shard
stopped being blocked and its next failure got a fresh per-IP bucket, resetting
the throttle the overflow path exists to preserve. Always max in the IP's shard
(shards are empty outside saturation, so it is a no-op in the common case). Adds a
regression test that a hot source stays throttled after a bucket frees.
* Studio: clear a login IP's overflow throttle on successful login
_clear_login_bucket reset the per-IP and per-account buckets on a successful
login but not the overflow shard, so after the dict saturated and an IP was
counted in overflow, a later successful login left those entries behind and the
next failed attempt could immediately return 429.
Store overflow entries as (timestamp, ip) so a source is throttled by its own
count within the shard (also removing cross-IP collateral within a shard), and
drop just that IP's entries in _clear_login_bucket. Adds a regression test that a
successful login clears the overflow throttle.
* Studio: bound the login overflow shard memory under high-cardinality spray
The per-IP overflow tracked failures in a time-pruned deque of (timestamp, ip)
tuples, so a spoofed-X-Forwarded-For spray of distinct one-off IPs grew memory and
the per-check scan with request cardinality for the whole window -- undermining
the bucket cap that exists to bound memory. Replace each shard with a fixed-
capacity dict (ip -> [count, window_start]): O(1) lookups, and when a shard is
full a one-off IP evicts the lowest-count entry (Space-Saving) so memory is hard-
bounded while a persistent attacker keeps a high count and is never evicted. Adds
a regression test that shards stay within the per-shard cap under a 5000-IP spray.
* Studio: purge chunks for already-failed docs during ingestion reconcile
The reconcile chunk-purge was gated on the documents UPDATE actually flipping a
non-terminal doc to failed. A doc the worker had already marked 'failed' before
the crash (job row left non-terminal) was not re-flipped, so its committed chunks
were kept and stayed retrievable/citable, since retrieval filters by scope not
status. Purge chunks whenever the document is not 'completed' (failed, in-flight,
or gone), preserving the completed-doc carve-out. Adds a regression test.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: don't inherit an evicted IP's count onto a new overflow source
When a full overflow shard evicted the lowest-count entry, the new source
inherited that count (Space-Saving base + 1). If a shard was saturated with hot
entries, an unrelated new IP could land at/over the threshold and be 429'd after a
single attempt -- cross-IP collateral despite the per-source-isolation intent.
New entries now start clean at count 1; the only cost is that a heavy hitter that
is the lowest-count entry in a fully saturated shard can briefly reset, which is
preferable to blocking a bystander. Adds a regression test.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: carry overflow failures into a new IP bucket on transition
_login_blocked took max(per-IP bucket, overflow shard) rather than combining them,
so a source could log (threshold-1) failures in overflow during saturation and,
once a bucket slot freed, another (threshold-1) in a fresh bucket within the same
window -- roughly doubling the per-IP limit. When a saturated-era IP first gets a
real bucket, migrate its windowed overflow count into that bucket (and drop the
overflow entry) so the combined failures throttle at the intended limit. Adds a
regression test.
* Studio: reconcile a completed doc's orphaned job to completed, not failed
When a crash left an ingestion job non-terminal after its document was already
committed as completed, reconcile marked the job failed. After restart the upload
UI has no in-memory SSE queue and falls back to getJob(), which treats a failed
job as an indexing failure and removes/toasts a document that is actually
searchable. Mark the job completed (keeping its chunks) when its document is
completed. Extends the completed-doc reconcile test to assert the job status.
* Studio: clamp the overflow failure count migrated into a login bucket
A saturated source could accrue an unbounded overflow count, then materialize
one deque entry per recorded failure when a bucket slot freed, allocating an
arbitrarily large deque under the login lock. Only at-or-above the per-IP
threshold matters for blocking, so cap the count there at the record and take
sites; the migration is now bounded without weakening the limit.
* Studio: keep the RAG job stream alive on a transient status read
The heartbeat poll read the job row unguarded; a momentarily-locked DB would
raise out of job_events, which the SSE route turns into a terminal error frame,
and the UI drops a document whose worker is still running. Treat a failed status
read as non-terminal: heartbeat and retry, and keep the queue so a reconnect can
resume.
* Studio: set busy_timeout before journal_mode on the auth DB
Switching journal_mode needs a lock, so if a refresh-token write already holds
one, journal_mode=WAL raises SQLITE_BUSY and the shared try leaves the
connection on SQLite's default zero lock wait. Set busy_timeout first so the
switch waits instead of failing.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: set the admin password before exposing it on the network
On first run Studio seeds the default `unsloth` admin with a random
bootstrap password and embeds it into index.html (window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__)
so the local user can change it without typing it. A request with no Origin
header counts as same-origin, which is what a normal top-level GET sends, so
the page hands out the password to whoever loads it. That is harmless on the
default 127.0.0.1 bind, but `--secure` (public Cloudflare tunnel) and
`--host 0.0.0.0` (raw port reachable on the network) would serve the plaintext
admin password to remote visitors during the bootstrap window.
Fix this at the source: when launching a network-exposed web UI, prompt the
operator in the terminal for a real admin password (with confirmation) before
the socket binds or the tunnel opens, and persist it via update_password (which
clears must_change_password and deletes the .bootstrap_password file). After
that there is no bootstrap secret to leak. Non-interactive launches can supply
it via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_ADMIN_PASSWORD. The masked reader echoes '*' per
character and works on Linux, macOS, and Windows (PowerShell/cmd). Loopback
binds, --api-only (no web UI), and Colab are unaffected.
As defense in depth, the index handler now embeds the bootstrap object only for
a direct local navigation: same-origin AND a loopback TCP peer with no
proxy/tunnel forwarding headers (cf-ray, cf-connecting-ip, x-forwarded-for,
x-forwarded-host, x-real-ip, forwarded). Colab stays exempt. This keeps the
password off the wire even when the prompt is skipped (no TTY and no env var).
Adds unit coverage for the prompt/confirm/decision logic, an integration test
that provisioning clears the bootstrap state, and regression tests for the
local-direct gate (loopback/IPv6/mapped/localhost peers, LAN/public peers,
missing client, each forwarding header, spoofed XFF, and the Colab exemption).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: fail fast on an explicitly empty admin-password env var
resolve_admin_password_source treated UNSLOTH_STUDIO_ADMIN_PASSWORD="" like
the var was unset and fell back to the bootstrap backstop. Treat any set value
(including empty) as the env source so it reaches the minimum-length guard and
refuses to expose the server instead of silently keeping the seeded password.
* Studio: apply repo kwarg-spacing format to the secure-admin-password files
* Studio: drop the pre-exposure password prompt; keep the local-direct gate
Per review, the blocking prompt added friction for --secure / 0.0.0.0 first-run
launches without extra security: the local-direct injection gate in main.py
already keeps the bootstrap password off the network for any remote request.
Remove the prompt module and its tests; the gate plus the existing
must_change_password first-login flow are the fix.
* Studio: shut down an exposed first-run instance if the admin password is never changed
The local-direct gate keeps the seeded bootstrap password off the network, but
it stays a valid credential until first login changes it. For an exposed web UI
(--secure / 0.0.0.0, not --api-only, not Colab), arm a daemon timer: if the
password is still the seeded one after the deadline (UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT,
default 3600s, 0 disables), print a message and shut Studio down via the existing
graceful-shutdown path; if it was changed, leave Studio running.
* Studio: revert the local-direct injection gate; keep the 1-hour auto-shutdown
Per maintainer decision, keep the first-run auto-fill behavior unchanged (the
bootstrap password still seeds the login form for convenience) and rely on the
exposed-instance auto-shutdown to bound the window: an exposed web UI that never
changes the seeded admin password is torn down after UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT
(default 1h). Restores studio/backend/main.py and its origin test to upstream.
* Studio: render the bootstrap-timeout shutdown message with a human duration
The message hardcoded 'minute(s)' via timeout//60, so a sub-minute timeout
(e.g. a 30s test value) printed 'within 1 minute(s)'. Add _format_duration so
it reads '30 seconds' / '1 minute 30 seconds' / '60 minutes' as appropriate.
The default 3600s still renders '60 minutes'.
* Studio: drop stale local-direct gate reference from bootstrap_timeout docstring
The gate was reverted (timer-only), so the module docstring should not describe
a main.py gate that no longer exists.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: require signed capability tokens for /p preview links
The public /p preview routes added in #6486 run model load and chat
generation as the admin user with no authentication. The only gate is the
preview ref, a deterministic outputs-root path (run or run/checkpoint) that
is guessable rather than secret. On a network-reachable Studio (--secure
tunnel or -H 0.0.0.0), an unauthenticated caller who guesses a ref can
consume GPU and probe a private fine-tuned checkpoint.
Make the share link an unguessable, revocable capability:
- Sign the canonical ref with a dedicated server-side secret (HMAC-SHA256,
stored in app_secrets, independent of the JWT/login secret).
- Require a valid token on every /p chat, models, and page request before
resolving a checkpoint or loading a model; missing or invalid tokens get a
generic 404 so the surface never confirms a ref exists.
- Accept the token via ?k= (browser link and preview page) or
Authorization: Bearer (OpenAI-compatible clients).
- Rotate the secret to revoke every outstanding link
(POST /api/settings/preview-links/rotate).
- Clamp preview generation (max_tokens/max_completion_tokens <= 1024, n = 1)
and set Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on the page so the token is not
leaked via Referer.
Training history hands the authenticated owner the signed token, and the
copy-link button builds /p/{ref}?k={sig}.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: honor a lower caller token limit in the preview clamp
Codex review: when only the legacy max_tokens was sent, the clamp left
max_completion_tokens at the 1024 default, and _effective_max_tokens prefers
max_completion_tokens, so a request like max_tokens=16 could still generate up
to 1024 tokens. Derive one effective limit (max_completion_tokens wins, else the
legacy max_tokens) and pin both fields to it so a caller's lower limit is kept.
* Studio: add preview kill switch, rate limit, and revoke-links UI
Follow-ups to the /p preview capability work:
- Public-sharing kill switch: a persisted setting (default on) gates the public
/p surface. When off, every preview request 404s even with a valid token, and
the owner UI stops offering share links. GET/PUT /api/settings/preview-sharing;
enforced in _verify_or_404.
- Per-IP rate limit on the preview chat route: a coarse in-process sliding-window
limiter (20 req/min/IP) returns 429 + Retry-After before the GPU lock is taken.
Client IP honors X-Forwarded-For only when UNSLOTH_STUDIO_TRUST_FORWARDED is
set, matching the login limiter's trust model.
- Settings UI: a "Preview sharing" section with the public-sharing toggle and a
"Revoke all preview links" button (confirm dialog) that rotates the secret.
Tests cover the kill switch (404 when off), the 429 path, the sliding window,
client-IP trust behavior, and the setting default.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: fix preview-fields sharing arg and refresh sigs after revoke
Codex review:
- P1: get_training_run_detail and update_training_run called _preview_fields
with only output_dir after it gained a required sharing_on parameter, raising
a 500 TypeError once get_run succeeded. Pass get_preview_sharing_enabled() at
both sites; add a detail-endpoint regression test.
- P2: after rotating the preview secret from settings, the history grid still
held stale preview_sig values, so a freshly copied link would 404. Emit
emitTrainingRunsChanged() after a successful revoke so the grid refetches
freshly signed refs.
* Studio: harden preview sharing controls (Codex review)
- Fail closed: a read failure on the preview-sharing kill switch now returns
False instead of defaulting to enabled, so an unavailable settings DB can't
reopen the public surface. A missing key still defaults to enabled.
- Per-IP rate limit behind the managed Cloudflare tunnel: client_ip now honors
CF-Connecting-IP when the socket peer is loopback, so tunneled visitors are
keyed by their real IP instead of collapsing onto the local cloudflared peer.
- GET /p no longer mints key/share_url when sharing is disabled; it returns
sharing_enabled=false so clients don't distribute links that 404.
- Settings UI: toggling public sharing emits the training-runs-changed event so
the history grid shows/hides Copy preview link without a manual refresh.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: harden preview rate limiter and IP keying (Opus review)
From a two-agent review of the PR:
- Rate limiter no longer evicts an active bucket when the table is full: a flood
of distinct keys could otherwise cycle out a throttled bucket and reset its
counter. Evict only aged-out buckets; if the table is full of live clients,
fail closed (deny the new key) instead.
- client_ip keys on the rightmost (proxy-appended) X-Forwarded-For hop when the
trust env is set; the leftmost is client-spoofable. Documented the
append/overwrite-proxy assumption.
- _verify_or_404 checks the capability token before the kill-switch DB read, so
unauthenticated /p spam can't be used as an unbounded settings-DB sink and the
response is identical regardless of the sharing on/off state.
Tests: nested run/checkpoint happy path + wrong-ref rejection, the eviction
fail-closed behavior, and route-level coverage for the rotate / preview-sharing
settings endpoints.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* CLI: stop `unsloth connect` from leaking Studio credentials to unverified servers
`unsloth connect` (and `unsloth chat`) discovered a Studio base URL from
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL or the default localhost port after only an unauthenticated
/api/health probe, then sent credentials to it:
- keyless connect iterated every cached API key and sent each as a bearer token
to {base}/v1/models, so a malicious or port-preempting endpoint could harvest
all of them;
- with no cached key it self-issued a Studio JWT and POSTed it to
{base}/api/auth/api-keys;
- unsloth chat sent the same self-issued JWT to the discovered base.
The key cache was a flat, global list with no binding to a server identity, so a
key minted for one Studio could be replayed to any other.
Changes:
- Scope the agent key cache per base URL so a key is only ever replayed to the
exact server it was minted for. Pre-scoping flat caches are ignored rather
than replayed (at most one extra local mint on the next launch).
- Gate every automatic credential flow to loopback bases. A non-loopback
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL now requires an explicit --api-key and nothing is sent
automatically. SSH-tunnelled Studios that land on 127.0.0.1 keep working.
- Mint the API key locally against the Studio auth DB instead of POSTing a
self-issued JWT over the network, so no bearer token leaves the process on the
local path.
- Apply the same loopback gate to connect_studio_server (used by unsloth chat).
Fully closing same-host loopback-port preemption needs a signed /api/health
handshake so the client can verify the server identity before sending anything;
that is tracked as a server-side follow-up.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI: verify Studio server identity before auto-sending credentials
Adds a challenge-response so `unsloth connect` and `unsloth chat` can confirm a
discovered loopback endpoint is really this install's Studio (not a process
that preempted the port) before sending it a cached or freshly minted
credential. This closes the same-host loopback-preemption gap left open by the
previous commit, which could only limit the blast radius.
Server:
- storage.get_or_create_identity_secret(): a dedicated server-wide secret in
app_secrets (kept separate from the per-user JWT secret), readable only by
the same OS user.
- storage.compute_identity_proof(nonce) = HMAC-SHA256(identity secret, nonce).
- GET /api/auth/identity?nonce=<base64url>: unauthenticated, returns the proof.
The nonce is opaque to the server and the proof reveals nothing about the
secret, so answering is safe.
Client:
- verify_studio_identity(base): sends a fresh 32-byte nonce, recomputes the
expected HMAC from the local same-user secret, and constant-time compares.
Fails closed on any error.
- connect._agent_api_key gates the loopback cached-key replay and the local
mint on it; connect_studio_server (used by unsloth chat) gates the
self-issued JWT on it.
A server that cannot read this install's secret (a different OS user, or a
remote/fake endpoint) cannot produce a matching proof, so the client refuses
and falls back to an explicit --api-key.
Tests: studio/backend/tests/test_identity.py (proof determinism, secret
persistence and caching, route response and nonce validation) and additions to
test_connect.py (the verify gate refuses when unverified, an explicit key skips
the check, and an end-to-end client plus server handshake against a stub HTTP
server).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI: mint through the verified server instead of the local auth DB
CodeQL (py/clear-text-storage-sensitive-data) flagged the API key written to
the per-server cache and the agent config files once it was sourced from
storage.create_api_key(); the original HTTP-minted key did not trip the query.
Now that the identity handshake cryptographically confirms the loopback
responder really is this Studio before anything is sent, minting through the
server's /api/auth/api-keys endpoint with a self-issued JWT is safe again and
restores the original, CodeQL-clean data flow. The local-DB mint path is
removed.
The security properties are unchanged: discovery is still loopback-gated and
identity-verified, the key cache is still scoped per server, and a credential
reaches the server only after the handshake has proven its identity. The only
difference from the previous commit is that the self-issued JWT is sent to the
already-verified loopback server rather than the key being minted in-process.
Tests updated to mint through the fake server again.
* CLI: address review feedback on connect credential handling
- Reuse a saved per-server key before the loopback/identity gate. Keys are
scoped per base URL, so a key the user saved with --api-key for a remote or
SSH-tunnelled Studio (whose identity secret the local handshake can't match)
is replayed only to that exact server. The loopback + identity-handshake gate
now guards just auto-minting (self-issuing a JWT and creating a new key),
which is the path that needs a cryptographically verified local Studio. Fixes
keyless reuse being impossible for remote/tunnelled Studios the user had
saved a key for.
- connect_studio_server (unsloth chat / inference): when the user explicitly set
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_URL but the server can't be safely attached (non-loopback, or
identity unverifiable), fail with a clear message instead of silently loading
the model locally. Opportunistic discovery of the local default still falls
back to a local load.
- Harden cache parsing: tolerate a corrupt or hand-edited cache where a base
maps to a non-list (which would otherwise iterate a string into
single-character "keys"), and read the cache as UTF-8.
Tests updated and added: saved-key replay without the handshake for both local
and remote bases, keyless mint still refused when the loopback server is
unverified, and connect_studio_server erroring on an explicit remote while
falling back locally on default discovery.
* CLI: harden connect handshake against relay and gate cached minted keys
Addresses review feedback on the credential handshake:
- Refuse HTTP redirects on credential-bearing requests (the identity handshake,
/v1/models, key minting, and the chat HTTP backend). A process squatting the
discovered port could 302 /api/auth/identity to the real Studio and relay its
valid proof, or bounce a bearer-token request to another base, and urllib
follows redirects by default. A shared no-redirect opener now treats any 3xx
as an error.
- Give cached keys provenance. Keys the user supplied with --api-key are "saved"
and replay without the handshake (needed for remote or SSH-tunnelled Studios
whose secret the local handshake can't match). Keys we auto-mint are "minted"
and replay only after the identity handshake, so a port squatter can't collect
a previously minted localhost key just by answering the health check. New cache
shape: servers[base] = {"saved": [...], "minted": [...]}.
Known residual: a different-OS-user process that squats the port and can also
reach a genuine same-secret Studio elsewhere on loopback can still manually relay
the identity challenge. Fully closing that needs the proof bound to the server's
real listening port, or OS-level peer-credential checks; tracked as follow-up. A
same-user attacker is out of scope, since it can already read the 0600 key cache.
Tests: redirect rejection in the handshake, minted-cache requiring the handshake
while saved-cache bypasses it, and the existing suites updated for the new cache
shape. unsloth_cli (206) and test_identity.py (5) pass.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI: keep urllib imports function-local in the no-redirect opener
The repo's import-hoist safety linter (scripts/verify_import_hoist.py) flags
hoisting urllib to module level because it re-points the 'urllib' name in the
pre-existing HttpChatBackend._request scope. Build the no-redirect opener lazily
with function-local urllib imports instead, matching this module's convention,
and restore the local 'import urllib.request' in _request and
verify_studio_identity.
* test(identity): skip route tests when routes.auth import chain is unavailable
The identity route tests build a TestClient from routes.auth, which pulls the
whole routes package (routes/__init__ -> inference -> llama_cpp, ...). In a
minimal test matrix without the heavy backend deps, or when another test in the
same process has already broken that import chain, importing it raised and the
two route tests hard-failed. Skip in that case instead: the proof crypto is
covered by the storage-level tests, and the full backend CI still exercises the
route. No behaviour change where the deps are present (5 passed in isolation).
* test(connect): make connect tests pass on native Windows
unsloth connect supports Windows: --no-launch prints PowerShell ($env:X =
"v" / Remove-Item Env:X) instead of POSIX (export/unset), and the launch
path bridges env into a Windows agent .exe over WSLENV. The tests hardcoded
the POSIX shell forms, so on a real windows-latest runner 12 of them failed on
the assertion string even though every command exited 0.
Add OS-aware assertion helpers (_assert_env_set / _assert_env_unset) that check
the right shell syntax for the host OS, and skip the two WSL-from-Linux shim
tests on native Windows (os.name is 'posix' inside WSL, so that path can't run
there). No change on Linux/macOS (57 passed); the connect command's behaviour
is untouched. Validated on a windows-latest staging runner.
* style(connect): tighten comments in the credential-leak fix
Condense the verbose explanatory comments and multi-line docstrings added by
this PR to one or two lines each, drop a few that just restated the code, and
keep the security rationale where it is load-bearing. Comment/whitespace only;
verified with unslothai/scripts comment_tools.py (check --strip-docstrings:
6/6 'code unchanged'). Tests unchanged: connect 57 passed, identity 5 passed.
* CLI/Studio: harden the identity handshake (review round)
Addresses the latest Codex/Gemini review of the handshake:
- Store the identity secret privately. sqlite3.connect created the auth DB
world-readable under a 022 umask, so another OS user could read app_secrets
and forge proofs, defeating the same-user assumption the handshake rests on.
The auth dir and DB are now restricted to owner-only (0700/0600); the JWT
secret and password hashes there get the same protection.
- Bind the proof to the server's listening port. The stateless HMAC(secret,
nonce) was relayable: a process squatting the discovered port could proxy the
challenge to the real Studio on another port and pass it back. The proof now
covers the port the server actually listens on (from the socket, never the
Host header) and the client checks it against the port it connected to, so a
relayed proof from a different port no longer matches. Closes the manual-relay
residual left after the redirect fix.
- Cap the identity response read (the server is still unverified at that point)
and serve the identity route from a sync def so its first-call SQLite read
runs in the threadpool instead of the event loop.
Tests: port-bound proof + relayed-proof rejection added; identity (5) and
unsloth_cli (58) suites pass. Verified end to end against a real backend
(auth DB owner-only, handshake + mint still succeed).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI/Studio: bind the identity proof to the connection address, not just port
Follow-up to the port binding from the last review. Binding only to the port
left a cross-address relay: a squatter on a different loopback address but the
same port (for example localhost resolving to a squatter on ::1 while the real
Studio is on 127.0.0.1) could proxy the nonce to the real Studio and pass back
a proof that still matched, since both share the port.
The proof now covers the address and the port the connection landed on:
- Server: takes the address+port from request.scope, which uvicorn populates
from getsockname, so it is the real local address the client reached even
when Studio is bound to 0.0.0.0 (verified empirically), never the
client-controlled Host header.
- Client: resolves the base host to one concrete IP, talks to exactly that IP,
and binds the proof to (IP, port). A proof relayed from a Studio on a
different address or port was computed for that other endpoint and no longer
matches the one the client dialed.
Both sides normalise the address through ipaddress so equivalent forms compare
equal. Together with the private-secret and redirect fixes, this closes the
cross-user loopback relay an attacker can mount without reading the secret.
Tests: proof now bound to host+port; relayed-proof rejection retained; identity
(5) and unsloth_cli (58) suites pass. Verified end to end against a real backend
(handshake + mint still succeed).
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* CLI: pick the loopback address at discovery so localhost does not regress
find_studio_server now resolves a bare localhost base to its concrete loopback
addresses and returns the first that answers /api/health, IPv4 127.0.0.1 first
(where unsloth studio binds by default). The whole flow (health probe, identity
check, credential send) then targets that one address instead of racing
IPv4/IPv6 resolution, where localhost could resolve ::1-first and hide a Studio
bound to 127.0.0.1. A literal IP or remote name is unchanged.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: add --secure Cloudflare-only mode and revamp API usage examples
--secure / --not-secure on `unsloth studio` and `unsloth studio run`:
- --secure binds 127.0.0.1, requires the Cloudflare tunnel, and advertises only
the Cloudflare link. cloudflared reaches the server over localhost, so the raw
port is never exposed on a public interface.
- If the tunnel cannot start, fail closed with a clear message instead of
silently leaving a raw 0.0.0.0 link.
- Default stays not-secure (no behavior change); coexists with the existing
--cloudflare/--no-cloudflare flag. Host defaults are unchanged.
- /api/health (authed) now reports the live tunnel URL.
API usage examples (Profile > API):
- Example tabs for curl, Python, curl + tools, Python + tools, plus an OS row
(Linux/macOS/WSL vs Windows) auto-detected from the platform.
- Windows curl passes the JSON body via a file so PowerShell does not strip the
quotes when calling curl.exe.
- Python + tools forwards enable_tools/enabled_tools through extra_body and
guards chunk.choices, since tool-lifecycle events carry no choices.
- Shows the loaded model name and the real API key while it is still revealed.
- A Cloudflare Tunnel toggle (default on) shows the public tunnel URL and uses
it as the base_url in the examples when a tunnel is running.
Tests cover the tunnel start gate and the --secure flag on both commands.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: gate --secure tools on public exposure and harden API examples
In secure mode the server binds loopback but is reachable via the public
Cloudflare tunnel, so resolve the tool policy against the public exposure
(0.0.0.0) rather than the loopback bind. This keeps server-side tools off by
default and prompts before enabling them, instead of inheriting the loopback
default of on. The startup tool notice now names the public surface.
Also reject --secure with --no-cloudflare directly in run_server and the
run.py argparse (not only the CLI), JSON-encode interpolated model names so
Windows paths and quotes cannot produce invalid JSON or broken snippets, and
force-refresh /api/health on the API panel so a tunnel that starts after the
first health read still surfaces its URL.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: API examples show direct host when tunnel toggle is off; move Copy onto code
The Cloudflare Tunnel toggle had no visible effect when Studio was opened
through the tunnel: the off state fell back to window.location.origin, which
equals the tunnel URL in that case. /api/health now reports the direct
host:port (server_url), and the API panel uses it for the off state so it shows
the real non-tunnel base. Also move the Copy button out of the tab row and onto
the code block.
* Studio: highlight API examples, add advanced tabs, fix tunnel toggle row
Syntax-highlight the curl/PowerShell/Python snippets with the app's shared
shiki plugin (bash/powershell/python). Add 'curl + advanced' and
'Python + advanced' tabs that set temperature/top_p/top_k/min_p/
repetition_penalty/max_tokens, enable thinking, and turn on all tools.
The Cloudflare Tunnel row no longer shifts the code block: the tunnel URL is
always rendered (dimmed when off) so toggling keeps the row height constant.
Key the highlighted block on its content so it remounts when only the base URL
changes (the renderer's block memo otherwise kept a stale URL).
* Studio: rename API tunnel toggle to Secure HTTPS, hint --secure when exposed
Rename the API examples toggle from Cloudflare Tunnel to Secure HTTPS. When the
server was not launched with --secure, show an info tooltip noting the raw
0.0.0.0 port is still globally reachable and pointing at --secure. /api/health
now reports whether --secure was used so the hint is hidden in secure mode.
* Studio: force tools off for plain network/secure launches
The plain 'unsloth studio --secure' (and '-H 0.0.0.0') launcher re-execs run.py
and never installed a tool policy, so the process default (honor per-request
enable_tools) let any API-key holder run Python/terminal tools over the public
endpoint. Force the policy off at the run.py entrypoint when network-reachable
(0.0.0.0 or --secure); 'unsloth studio run' still installs its own resolved
policy and does not go through this path.
* Studio: apply default tool policy in run_server, not the run.py entrypoint
The plain launcher runs from the studio venv and calls run_server directly, so
it never hit the run.py __main__ guard. Move the network/secure default-off tool
policy into run_server so every launch path (plain, --secure, direct run.py)
gets it; the run subcommand still overrides it with its resolved policy.
* Studio: clarify --secure help text on the network exposure tradeoff
Spell out in --help (both unsloth studio and unsloth studio run, plus the
run.py argparse) that --not-secure also serves the raw 0.0.0.0 port reachable
from anywhere on the network, matching the API panel's Secure HTTPS hint.
* Studio: cache API-key PBKDF2 derivation to cut per-request /v1 auth overhead
validate_api_key re-ran the 100k-round PBKDF2 on every authenticated
request, adding ~15ms to each /v1 call made with an sk-unsloth- key.
Benchmarked against the bare llama-server it proxies to, API-key requests
carried ~22ms of fixed overhead vs ~7ms for the JWT path; the gap was
entirely this redundant key derivation (Pydantic validation measured
0.005ms, so it is not a factor).
The raw-key to hash mapping is a pure deterministic function of the fixed
server salt, so memoize it per process, keyed by a salted HMAC of the key
(never the key or a recoverable digest). The cached value equals what is
already stored at rest. Revocation and expiry remain enforced by the
SQLite read on every call, so a cache hit only skips the KDF, never the
active or expiry checks. Only keys that exist in the DB are cached, so
unknown-key spam cannot grow it.
After the change the API-key /v1 overhead drops to ~8ms, at parity with
JWT, while the at-rest PBKDF2 hashing is unchanged.
Adds test_api_key_expiry.py covering API-key and JWT expiry enforcement
and the new cache: it skips the KDF on repeat and still rejects revoked
or expired keys.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: tighten comments across the secure-tunnel and API-key changes
Condense multi-line comments and docstrings to one or two lines, drop the
ones that restate obvious code, and remove an orphaned test section header.
Comment-only: verified with comment_tools.py check (9/9 code unchanged), the
auth/secure-tunnel/CLI test suites, and a clean frontend typecheck and build.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Trim and tighten code comments and docstrings across the repository. Comment-only: every changed file verified code-identical to main via AST/token comparison.
Trim and tighten code comments and docstrings across studio/ Python. Comment-only: every changed file verified code-identical to main via AST/token comparison.
Raise ruff line-length to 100 and extend the local pre-commit format pipeline (def-signature magic-comma normalization, short multi-line assert collapse, kwarg '=' spacing, blank-line-after-short-import removal, adjacent string-literal / f-string+plain merge, redundant-pass pruning). Every transform re-checks the file AST and is dropped if it would differ; the whole-repo reformat is verified AST-identical per file and idempotent.
* studio: contain export and dataset paths under their configured roots
resolve_under_root and resolve_dataset_path previously returned absolute
paths unchanged, so an authenticated client could supply
save_directory="/tmp/escape" (or any other absolute path) and have the
exporter drop adapter files anywhere the server user could write. This
turned up during a recent audit pass where an authenticated POST to
/api/export/export/lora with save_directory="/tmp/lora_escape_test"
returned 200 and wrote adapter_model.safetensors, adapter_config.json,
and tokenizer files under /tmp.
The fix is two-layered:
storage_roots.py adds an _assert_contained(resolved, root) helper that
runs after path resolution and rejects any result whose realpath does
not sit under realpath(root). resolve_under_root now rejects '..'
segments and null bytes outright, and only accepts absolute inputs when
they are already inside the configured root (internal call sites that
re-resolve a stored absolute path stay idempotent;
worker.py:resolve_output_dir(output_dir) etc. continue to work).
resolve_dataset_path picks up the same containment rule, scoped to the
three dataset roots.
models/export.py adds field_validator("save_directory", mode="before")
to ExportCommonOptions and ExportGGUFRequest so bad input fails fast at
422 with a clear message rather than a 500 deep inside the resolver.
The validator rejects empty/whitespace, null bytes, control chars,
strings longer than 255 chars, absolute paths, and '..' segments.
routes/export.py:_export_details now returns os.path.relpath(output_path,
exports_root()) so the Export Complete dialog and /api/models/loras no
longer leak the absolute install prefix to the UI; the basename is
used as a last-resort fallback.
Verified end to end:
- POST /api/export/export/lora {"save_directory":"/tmp/foo"} -> 422
"save_directory must be a name or relative path under the export
root; absolute paths are rejected". /tmp/foo is not created.
- "../../etc/escape" -> 422 "may not contain '..' segments".
- save_directory="my_subdir" -> still accepted (400 only because the
test had no checkpoint loaded yet, not because of validation).
- Internal idempotent re-resolve via resolve_export_dir(absolute path
that is already under exports_root) returns the same path unchanged.
* studio/sandbox: harden bash + python tool execution
The sandboxed Bash and Python tool channels in Chat ran with a thin
preexec hook (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS + RLIMIT_FSIZE only). Bash had a
small word blocklist; Python had an AST safety pass aimed at
signal-tampering and shell-escape primitives. An audit pass showed
several gaps that a tool-calling model could trigger inadvertently:
- bash curl/wget/nc reached AWS IMDSv2 and returned live STS
credentials for the instance role.
- python "import socket; s.connect((169.254.169.254, 80))"
reached the same endpoint regardless of the bash blocklist.
- "cat /etc/passwd" was blocked at the bash side (because "passwd"
is in the blocklist), but "open('/etc/passwd').read()" in Python
happily returned its contents.
- "chr(115)+chr(117)+chr(100)+chr(111)" style dynamic-arg
construction slipped through the AST shell-escape check.
- The supervisor used proc.kill() on timeout, which only signals
the immediate pid; bash-backgrounded children survived. A fork
bomb could spawn for the full 300s timeout window.
- Session work directories under ~/studio_sandbox/<id>/ were
created with default umask (0o755), so any other UID on the host
could enumerate them.
- session_id sanitisation used a one-shot str.replace("..",""),
which is non-iterative and a small footgun.
This commit takes a conservative middle path: the sandbox still
runs as the Studio UID with no namespace tricks where the kernel
disallows them, but every chokepoint is tightened.
_sandbox_preexec now:
- calls os.setsid() so children share a process group; the
supervisor uses os.killpg(SIGKILL) on timeout/cancel so
backgrounded children die with the parent (new _kill_process_tree
helper, wired into _cancel_watcher and both _bash_exec /
_python_exec timeout branches).
- calls os.umask(0o077) so files the child writes default to 0o600.
- applies PR_SET_PDEATHSIG=SIGKILL so an orphaned child dies if
Studio exits.
- best-effort unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) for a private network namespace
(failure is logged and swallowed; defense-in-depth is still in
place via the bash blocklist and the AST checker below).
- sets RLIMIT_NPROC=10000 (tunable via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_NPROC),
RLIMIT_AS=8GB, RLIMIT_CPU=300, RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024. The 10k NPROC
figure is chosen to sit well above the ~500 LWPs a healthy Studio
+ llama-server combination already uses while still capping a
runaway fork bomb. NPROC counts LWPs per real UID, so a lower
figure (e.g. 256) starves legitimate bash forks
("bash: fork: retry: Resource temporarily unavailable").
_get_workdir:
- rejects session_id that doesn't match [A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64};
non-matching values bucket into a shared "_invalid" dir.
- chmod 0o700 on both the workdir and on ~/studio_sandbox/ so
other UIDs cannot read another session's contents.
_BLOCKED_COMMANDS_COMMON gains: doas, pkexec, halt, poweroff, curl,
wget, nc, ncat, netcat, socat, ssh, scp, sftp, rsync, eval, source.
The intent is to keep general bash usage working (echo, ls, pipes,
loops, for, head, etc.) while denying the obvious egress and
escalation paths.
The AST checker (_check_signal_escape_patterns) is split into the
existing shell/signal/loop checks plus a new narrow IO denylist:
- Always flag non-literal args to anything in _SHELL_EXEC_FUNCS,
not just _STRING_SHELL_FUNCS. Closes the dynamic-arg bypass.
- Reject calls to socket.create_connection, socket.socket().connect,
urllib.request.urlopen, http.client.HTTP*Connection, requests.*,
httpx.* whose literal host argument is in a cloud-metadata
denylist (169.254.169.254 + 169.254.* + 100.64.*, plus the
GCP/Alibaba/ECS metadata hostnames and IPv6 link-local). Public
hosts (example.com, huggingface.co, ...) still work. Dynamic
hosts cannot be statically blocked; mitigated by the bash
blocklist + the netns where the kernel allows it.
- Reject literal open("/etc/passwd"), /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
/etc/ssh/*, and /proc/<pid>/environ. Other files
(/etc/os-release, /etc/hostname, /tmp/*, user dirs) still work.
The _check_code_safety summariser is updated to include the new
network_calls and sensitive_file_reads buckets in its error string.
Regression-checked: echo, sleep, ls /tmp, for loops, piped helpers
(echo a | tr a A), urllib.request.urlopen("http://example.com"),
socket.getaddrinfo("example.com",80), open("/etc/os-release"),
open("/tmp/...","w") all still succeed. curl, wget, nc, ssh, rm,
socket.create_connection(("169.254.169.254",80)),
open("/etc/passwd"), open("/proc/self/environ") all correctly
blocked.
* studio: rate-limit login, rotate refresh tokens, add logout, security headers, gate bootstrap injection
A pass over the auth surface found a cluster of related issues that this
commit closes together.
Login (routes/auth.py):
- Add an in-memory per-IP login rate limiter. Five failed POSTs to
/api/auth/login inside a 60s window produce 429 with Retry-After.
A successful login clears the bucket. Previously 30 wrong passwords
in under one second was accepted as 30x 401, which combined with
the (now fixed) admin-username leak from /api/auth/status made
brute-force trivial against a small password.
Logout (routes/auth.py):
- New POST /api/auth/logout returns 204 and calls
storage.revoke_user_refresh_tokens(subject) so the refresh token
is no longer valid. Previously POST /api/auth/logout returned 405
and there was no way to invalidate refresh tokens short of
changing the password. Frontend session.ts already calls
clearAuthTokens() to drop localStorage; the new endpoint lets the
client also tell the server to revoke server-side state.
Refresh-token rotation (routes/auth.py + auth/storage.py):
- New storage.consume_refresh_token(token) atomically validates +
deletes a refresh token, returning (username, is_desktop). The
/api/auth/refresh handler now mints both a new access AND a new
refresh token; the supplied token becomes invalid. Replaying a
consumed refresh returns 401 "Invalid or expired refresh token".
The previous refresh_access_token helper is left in place for
callers that intentionally want the non-rotating shape; nothing
in the route layer uses it now.
/api/auth/status no longer leaks default_username (models/auth.py +
routes/auth.py):
- AuthStatusResponse.default_username becomes Optional[str] with a
None default; the handler always returns None. The frontend already
hardcodes HIDDEN_LOGIN_USERNAME = "unsloth" (auth-form.tsx:82), so
no UI change is required.
window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__ no longer auto-injects (main.py):
- _inject_bootstrap is now opt-in via the
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP env var. The previous default
(inject whenever requires_password_change is true) embedded the
plaintext bootstrap password into the first-boot HTML for any
caller that hit /, /change-password, or any unknown SPA path.
Browser extensions and any XSS payload on the page could read it
trivially. With the new gate the bootstrap password lives only in
the auth/.bootstrap_password file (mode 0o600) where it has always
been; users typing it into a current-password field is the right
UX. routes/auth.py:change_password also clears
app.state.bootstrap_password defensively.
Security headers + server fingerprint (main.py + run.py):
- New SecurityHeadersMiddleware adds Content-Security-Policy,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(),
interest-cohort=(), and stamps server: unsloth-studio so the
generic uvicorn banner no longer fingerprints the stack. The
uvicorn.Config gains server_header=False so it stops emitting its
own Server header.
/api/health minimisation (main.py):
- Unauthenticated GET /api/health returns just
{"status":"healthy","timestamp":...} so load-balancer liveness
probes keep working without leaking version, device_type,
chat_only, desktop_protocol_version, or studio_root_id to
arbitrary callers. A request that presents a valid Bearer token
still gets the full diagnostic payload so internal launchers and
sibling-Studio detection (which compares studio_root_id) keep
working.
Verification:
- 30 wrong-password POSTs to /api/auth/login -> first 5 = 401, 6th
through 30th = 429.
- POST /api/auth/logout with a fresh token -> 204. The matching
refresh token then fails 401.
- Login -> R1; /api/auth/refresh with R1 -> new access + R2 (R2 !=
R1); /api/auth/refresh with R1 again -> 401; /api/auth/refresh
with R2 -> still succeeds once and rotates again.
- curl /api/auth/status -> default_username: null.
- curl http://127.0.0.1/ does not contain __UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__.
- curl -I / shows CSP, X-Frame-Options: DENY,
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy, and server: unsloth-studio.
- curl /api/health unauthenticated -> {status, timestamp} only.
curl with Authorization: Bearer <valid> -> full payload.
- Existing /api/system, /api/models/list, /api/train/status,
/api/inference/status, /api/auth/api-keys, login flow, SPA root
all still return 200 after the changes (regression smoke).
* studio: add SecurityHeadersMiddleware, MaxBodyMiddleware, /recipes redirect, gate _inject_bootstrap, minimise /api/health
This commit lands the main.py-side changes that share a single
middleware-registration spot. They are kept together because every
change here is either (a) a top-level middleware definition that has
to be added next to LoggingMiddleware, or (b) a route handler at the
same file-level.
SecurityHeadersMiddleware (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options:
DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
Permissions-Policy, server: unsloth-studio). The previous responses
emitted no CSP, no XFO, no Referrer-Policy and were stamped
server: uvicorn.
MaxBodyMiddleware rejects POST/PUT/PATCH on the inference / dataset /
data-recipe / train / export prefixes when Content-Length exceeds
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB (default 100). The audit hit this by
attaching a 50 MB plain-text file to a chat message and watching
Studio base64-encode it into the JSON body; uvicorn has no enforced
cap so the only previous guard was the per-file 50 MB ceiling that
data-recipe upload routes already enforce. The new middleware extends
that ceiling to the OpenAI-compat path that the Chat attachments
flow through. Verified: a 200 MB JSON POST to /v1/chat/completions
returns HTTP 413 "Request body too large (209,715,264 bytes; max
104,857,600)". A small valid request continues to reach the handler.
_inject_bootstrap is gated behind UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP.
The previous default was to inline window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__ =
{username, password} into the first-boot HTML whenever
requires_password_change was true, which exposed the plaintext
bootstrap password to any browser extension, page script, or LAN
caller on -H 0.0.0.0. The bootstrap password remains in the on-disk
.bootstrap_password file (mode 0o600) where it has always lived;
users typing it into a current-password field is the right UX.
/api/health unauthenticated returns {"status":"healthy","timestamp":
...} only; the previous payload (version, device_type, chat_only,
desktop_protocol_version, supports_desktop_auth, studio_root_id,
native_path_leases_supported) is preserved for callers that present
a valid Bearer token, so internal launchers and sibling-Studio
detection (which compares studio_root_id) keep working.
/recipes -> /data-recipes 308 redirect. The Data Recipes page lives
at /data-recipes; users typing /recipes hit the SPA catch-all and
saw "Not Found". The redirect also preserves any tail path, so
/recipes/<rest> -> /data-recipes/<rest>.
Verified end to end with curl: CSP / XFO / X-Content-Type-Options /
Referrer-Policy / Permissions-Policy all present on /, server header
is now unsloth-studio (uvicorn's own banner is suppressed via
server_header=False in run.py from the auth-batch commit). Followed
the /recipes redirect lands on the SPA HTML.
* studio: bound TrainingStartRequest hyperparameters at the schema level
POST /api/train/start accepted any value for learning_rate, batch_size,
max_steps, max_seq_length, warmup_steps, warmup_ratio, num_epochs,
save_steps, weight_decay, gradient_accumulation_steps, lora_r,
lora_alpha and lora_dropout, including -1, 0, 1e9, and non-numeric
strings like 'abc' or 'two' (which silently coerce to 0 in the
trainer). Probing showed the API returning 200 to learning_rate=-1
and batch_size=0; only max_steps had any partial clamping.
This commit adds field_validator on every numeric hyperparameter.
Bounds are chosen wide enough to span realistic single-host
configurations (B200 with 180 GB of memory comfortably fits the
upper end) while rejecting the values that always produce broken
training:
- learning_rate: parses str/float, requires 0 < lr < 1.0. Non-numeric
input raises with "learning_rate must be parseable as float (got
'abc')" instead of silently coercing to 0.
- batch_size: [1, 1024].
- gradient_accumulation_steps: [1, 4096].
- num_epochs: [1, 1000].
- max_steps: [1, 1_000_000].
- max_seq_length: [1, 131072].
- warmup_steps: [0, max_steps].
- warmup_ratio: [0.0, 1.0].
- save_steps: [0, 1_000_000].
- weight_decay: [0, 10] (typical 0..0.1).
- lora_r: [1, 512].
- lora_alpha: [1, 1024].
- lora_dropout: [0.0, 1.0).
Each validator names the offending field in its ValueError message
so the 422 response body identifies which input is bad. The
learning_rate validator returns its result as str (the schema field
type is str("2e-4") for backwards compatibility) so existing call
sites that float() the value continue to work.
Verified:
- learning_rate=-1 -> 422 "learning_rate must be > 0 (got -1.0);
typical range is 1e-6 .. 1e-3".
- learning_rate='abc' -> 422 "must be parseable as float".
- batch_size=-1 / 0 / 999999 -> 422 "batch_size must be in [1, 1024]".
- batch_size='two' -> 422 (pydantic int parser).
- max_steps=0 / -5 -> 422 "must be a positive int".
- max_seq_length=200000 -> 422 "must be in [1, 131072]".
- warmup_ratio=2.5 -> 422 "must be in [0.0, 1.0]".
- lora_dropout=1.5 -> 422 "must be in [0.0, 1.0)".
- Valid request with learning_rate='2e-4', batch_size=1, max_steps=5
passes validation and the training run starts as normal.
* studio: redact image-decode errors, clean checkpoint dirs on cancel, tolerate Stop-button + tool-result message shapes
Three small fixes that fall under "do not let the audit findings
become user-visible papercuts".
routes/inference.py - image-decode error redaction (the audit hit
this with a 0-byte / malformed / wrong-extension image upload). The
three image-normalise sites previously raised HTTPException(400,
detail=f"Failed to process image: {e}"). When PIL raised
UnidentifiedImageError(io.BytesIO(raw)) the message string included
"<_io.BytesIO object at 0x7e40a5d7bf60>", leaking both the Python
class name (confirming the PIL/io stack) and a heap address (mildly
useful for ASLR-bypass chaining if another memory-corruption bug is
ever found). Each site now catches UnidentifiedImageError and
returns the generic "Unsupported or corrupt image format"; the
fall-through generic except returns "Failed to process image". No
exception-repr is interpolated into a response body anywhere along
these paths.
core/training/training.py - checkpoint cleanup on cancel. When a
user clicks Cancel Training, the trainer flips _cancel_requested=True
and the supervisor force-terminates the subprocess. The trainer
writes checkpoint-<step> directories under output_dir every
save_steps; previously these survived the cancel and accumulated on
disk (the audit recorded ~67 MB stuck after a 200-step cancel with
save_steps=20). New helper _cleanup_cancelled_checkpoints(output_dir)
globs checkpoint-<int> entries and removes them. It is gated by a
realpath containment check against outputs_root() so it cannot
accidentally rmtree anything outside the configured outputs root.
force_terminate() invokes the helper after the subprocess join when
_cancel_requested is true. Stop-and-Save runs are unaffected because
that path keeps _cancel_requested=False.
models/inference.py - chat message shape tolerance. Two related
frontend interactions used to crash the request validator:
- After the Stop button truncates a generation, the frontend
retained {role:"assistant", content:""} in the conversation
history and replayed it on the next send. ChatMessage previously
required role="assistant" to have non-empty content or tool_calls,
so the next message returned 422 and the thread was permanently
broken. The validator now normalises empty assistant content to
None so the request round-trips and the trailing empty turn can
be ignored downstream.
- The frontend's second-round tool POST drops the streamed
tool_call_id, hitting the strict-spec check "role=tool requires
tool_call_id". The validator now synthesises an opaque id
(call_<8 hex>) when missing, so the request reaches the handler
and the model's final summarising response gets generated. The
proper fix lives in the frontend (carry the streamed id through
the second POST) and will follow.
Verified end to end with curl: HTTP 400 (model not loaded) on both
the empty-assistant history shape and the tool-result-without-id
shape, instead of HTTP 422 from the schema validator.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: tighten code comments from security-hardening pass
Trim verbose docstrings and inline finding references added in the
previous commits in this branch. Functionality unchanged.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: await get_current_subject in /api/health and make refresh-token consumption atomic
The /api/health auth probe called get_current_subject(creds) without
awaiting it. The coroutine object is truthy, so any caller presenting a
Bearer header (valid or not) received the full diagnostic payload
including version, device_type, studio_root_id, etc. Await the coroutine
and treat HTTPException as 'fall back to the minimal liveness payload'.
consume_refresh_token did SELECT then DELETE WHERE id under default
autocommit isolation. Two concurrent POST /api/auth/refresh requests
could both win the SELECT before either DELETE ran, defeating
single-use refresh-token rotation. Replace with a single
DELETE ... WHERE token_hash = ? AND expires_at >= ? RETURNING ...
statement so the validate-and-delete lands as one atomic op under
SQLite's write lock (3.45.1 supports RETURNING; min was 3.35).
* studio: enforce body cap on chunked uploads and drop unsafe-inline from script-src
MaxBodyMiddleware previously only inspected the declared Content-Length
header; clients omitting it or sending Transfer-Encoding: chunked
bypassed the cap and could still drive an OOM via the downstream
JSON / file readers on /v1/chat/completions, /api/inference, /api/data-recipe,
/api/datasets, /api/train, /api/export. Rewrite as a raw ASGI middleware
that drains and counts http.request frames, replies 413 once the running
total exceeds UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB before invoking the FastAPI
handler, and replays the buffered body to downstream so route code that
calls request.json() / await request.body() works unchanged.
CSP previously included 'unsafe-inline' on script-src, which defeats the
main XSS protection. The frontend bundle does not need inline scripts;
the only inline <script> the backend ever emits is _inject_bootstrap,
which is opt-in via UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP. Drop 'unsafe-inline'
from script-src by default; when _inject_bootstrap fires, generate a
per-response nonce, embed it on the inlined <script>, and have
SecurityHeadersMiddleware splice 'nonce-XXX' into the CSP for that one
response (the internal x-internal-script-nonce header is popped before
the response leaves the server). 'unsafe-inline' stays on style-src for
Vite-injected styles.
* studio: drop empty assistant sentinel before passthrough
ChatMessage._validate_role_shape normalises role="assistant", content=""
(the post-Stop sentinel emitted by the frontend) to content=None so the
in-process path can drop it via _extract_content_parts. The passthrough
path then ran m.model_dump(exclude_none=True), which strips the now-None
content key entirely, sending {"role":"assistant"} to llama-server / the
OpenAI-compat backend. That fails upstream and leaves the user without a
recoverable Stop->resume.
Add _drop_empty_assistant_sentinels and call it at both passthrough
message origins: _openai_messages_for_passthrough (covers
/v1/chat/completions and the Responses API which routes through it) and
the anthropic_messages_to_openai output before
_anthropic_passthrough_*. Assistant messages that carry only tool_calls
(no content) are preserved.
* studio/tests: cover audit-fix surfaces and rebase pre-existing tests
Adds and updates pytest coverage for the four bot-flagged audit fixes
landed earlier in this branch and rebases two pre-existing tests that
were broken by the relaxed-validator and /api/health auth-gate changes.
studio/backend/tests/test_middleware.py (new)
MaxBodyMiddleware: small protected, large declared, unprotected
passthrough, chunked-upload-over-cap rejection (the regression for
the original Content-Length-only gap), and chunked-under-cap replay.
SecurityHeadersMiddleware: script-src no longer carries
'unsafe-inline', style-src still does, default headers
(XFO/XCTO/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy/server), and the
internal x-internal-script-nonce header is consumed by the
middleware and converted to 'nonce-XXX' in the CSP.
/api/health: no auth -> minimal, invalid Bearer -> minimal
(the await regression), valid Bearer -> full diagnostic payload.
studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
consume_refresh_token: second-call returns None, expired returns
None, and a 64-thread concurrent pile-up against the same hash
produces exactly one successful consumer (regression for the
SELECT-then-DELETE race).
test_health_response_reports_desktop_capability_fields: rebase
against the new health_check(request) signature by going through
TestClient with a real bearer instead of asyncio.run-ing the
handler directly.
studio/backend/tests/test_openai_tool_passthrough.py
Pin the new ChatMessage tolerance: assistant without content or
tool_calls is tolerated (normalises content -> None), empty-string
and empty-list assistant content normalise to None, and a missing
/ empty tool_call_id on role='tool' is synthesised as call_<hex>
rather than raising. Tests for _drop_empty_assistant_sentinels
cover the three drop shapes (empty string, empty list, missing
content key), preservation of assistant text and tool_calls-only
messages, and end-to-end through
_openai_messages_for_passthrough.
studio/backend/main.py
SecurityHeadersMiddleware.dispatch used response.headers.pop(...)
for the nonce-header handoff; Starlette's MutableHeaders has no
pop. Read-then-del so the internal handoff header is still
stripped before the response leaves the server.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio/tests: rebase three more pre-existing CI tests against this branch
CI on PR #5375 was red on three tests that were tuned for behaviour
predating this branch. Updates each so the assertions match what the
audit fixes intentionally changed; no production code touched.
studio/backend/tests/test_trained_model_scan.py
test_scan_trained_models_includes_lora_and_full_finetune_outputs
passed an absolute tmp_path through scan_trained_models, which now
runs resolve_output_dir / _assert_contained against outputs_root().
Repoint outputs_root() at tmp_path via monkeypatch so the fixture
dirs land under the configured root and the realpath containment
check passes.
tests/test_studio_install_workspace_guard.py
test_health_endpoint_exposes_studio_root_id_not_raw_path read
the first 1500 bytes after @app.get("/api/health") and asserted on
the studio_root_id literal. The handler grew (unauth short-circuit
+ await dependency gate) and the literal slid past the byte window.
Replace the fixed window with a slice up to the next top-level
@app.* decorator so the test surveys the whole handler regardless
of size.
tests/studio/studio_api_smoke.py
The "login burst (5x wrong pw) -> 401 each" assertion was tagged
"When/if we add one, this assertion updates in the same PR." We
added the per-IP rate-limit in routes/auth.py
(_LOGIN_MAX_FAILS=5/60s) but missed the assertion update. Rewrite
the burst probe to observe the new invariant: at least one 401,
eventual transition to 429, and Retry-After present on the 429.
Adds a small _login_with_headers helper since the existing login()
helper drops response headers.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* ci(studio-ui): set UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP=1 for Playwright Studios
The Chat UI Playwright test drives the first-boot change-password
form, which (per playwright_chat_ui.py step "1. Change-password
through the UI") pre-seeds the hidden current_password field from
window.__UNSLOTH_BOOTSTRAP__. That global is only emitted when the
backend's _inject_bootstrap path fires, which since the security
pass on this branch is gated behind UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP
and defaults to off. Without the global, the React form's
current_password validator never satisfies, the submit button stays
disabled, and the composer.wait_for() probe times out on
/change-password.
Re-enable injection only for the CI Studios that drive the chat UI
across linux/mac/windows. Production deployments are unaffected: the
env var has to be explicitly opted into, and the on-disk
auth/.bootstrap_password remains the source of truth for human users
typing the password in by hand.
Covers all eight Studio launch sites: the primary chat-ui boot and
the "extra UI tests" boot for each of the three OSes, plus the
pipeTransport JSON-crash retry relaunches in the macOS workflow that
re-spawn Studio mid-job.
A follow-up frontend PR will add a visible current_password input so
the form satisfies its own validator without needing the bootstrap
auto-fill at all; once that lands this CI knob can come back out.
* studio/sandbox: drop unshare(CLONE_NEWNET); add trusted-host allowlist; block sandbox file uploads; raise CPU rlimit default to 600 s
CLONE_NEWNET inside _sandbox_preexec silently killed every outbound
HTTP request from sandboxed Python whenever the kernel allowed
unprivileged user namespaces. requests.get('https://huggingface.co'),
urllib.request.urlopen('https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...'),
socket.connect(('arxiv.org', 443)) all failed despite the AST visitor
intending to allow them. The bash blocklist (curl / wget / nc / ssh /
scp / sftp / rsync / socat / eval / source) plus the AST-level
metadata-host denylist still carry the network policy after this
change; CLONE_NEWNET was redundant with both.
Add _TRUSTED_PUBLIC_HOST_LITERALS + _TRUSTED_PUBLIC_HOST_SUFFIXES
(~100 informational hosts: Wikipedia language subdomains, Wikimedia,
Wikidata, Google search, Bing, DuckDuckGo, HuggingFace, GitHub,
raw.githubusercontent.com, arXiv, StackOverflow / Stack Exchange,
MDN, docs.python.org, PyTorch / TensorFlow / NumPy / pandas docs,
pypi / files.pythonhosted.org / npmjs / crates.io, ReadTheDocs,
arXiv, Britannica, BBC / Reuters / Nature / Science, NASA / CDC /
NIH / WHO open data, api.weather.gov). The visitor now blocks
literal hosts that are neither metadata nor trusted with a short
LLM-readable string so the model can retry with an allowed source
instead of choking on a multi-line error.
Block upload-shape calls regardless of host: requests.post / put /
patch / delete / request with files= or data=open(...) /
data=bytes_literal; httpx equivalents; urllib.request.urlopen /
Request with data=...; HuggingFace upload_file / upload_folder /
upload_large_folder / create_commit (module-level FQ paths AND
method-name match on any receiver). Message: "Blocked: file upload
disallowed in sandbox".
Bump UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S default 300 -> 600 s so long
agentic chains that span multiple tool calls don't get SIGXCPU'd
mid-stride. Env-var override path is unchanged.
Host normalisation now strips trailing dot, userinfo @, and explicit
port before allowlist / denylist comparison so trailing-DNS-dot,
userinfo-smuggling, and explicit-:443 URLs are decided correctly.
* studio: raise default request-body cap from 100 MB to 500 MB
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB default goes 100 -> 500 to comfortably
cover vision + audio + multi-recipe-batch JSON payloads. The
MaxBodyMiddleware stream-counting logic from this branch's earlier
06ec088 already handles chunked bodies up to the new cap; env-var
override path is unchanged for callers that want a tighter limit.
* studio/auth: restore /api/auth/status.default_username to 'unsloth'
This branch's earlier b39e9a4 changed default_username to None on the
public /api/auth/status endpoint so the username field didn't leak to
unauthenticated callers. In practice this regressed third-party
clients (and the in-tree React login form's pre-fill UX) without
adding meaningful security: the bootstrap password is the actual
secret, and the username 'unsloth' is the documented default.
Pin default_username to storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME ('unsloth')
and tighten the response model so the field is required rather than
Optional. Anyone who needs anonymisation can still reach for an
allow-list deployment with auth disabled.
* studio/training: raise max_seq_length / batch_size / lora_r / lora_alpha caps
This branch's 7102815 introduced field validators with conservative
caps. The follow-up loosens them so long-context experiments and
high-rank LoRA exploration aren't gated at the schema layer:
_MAX_BATCH_SIZE 1024 -> 4096
_MAX_SEQ_LENGTH 131_072 -> 2_000_000 (2M tokens)
lora_r cap 512 -> 16_384 (_MAX_LORA_R)
lora_alpha cap 1024 -> 32_768 (_MAX_LORA_ALPHA)
_MAX_GRAD_ACCUM / _MAX_STEPS / _MAX_EPOCHS / lora_dropout /
warmup_ratio / weight_decay are unchanged. Hardware (VRAM, host
RAM, kernel launch latency) is now the binding constraint at the
new caps, which is the correct ordering -- the validator stays a
sanity check on -1 / 0 / 'abc' style garbage, not a usability gate.
* studio/tests: cover sandbox allowlist + upload block + raised training caps
studio/backend/tests/test_sandbox_tools.py (new):
TestMetadataHostDenylist -- short "Blocked: cloud-metadata host"
message on AWS IMDS, GCP metadata,
Alibaba ECS, AWS IPv6 IMDS, 169.254/16.
TestTrustedHostAllowlist -- Wikipedia (any language subdomain),
Google, DuckDuckGo, HF, raw GitHub,
arXiv, StackOverflow / family,
MDN, docs.python.org, pypi, BBC,
api.weather.gov, NumPy / PyTorch docs.
TestUntrustedHostBlock -- example.com / random unlisted host
rejected with the short "Blocked: host
not in sandbox allowlist; use an
allowed informational source" message.
Dynamic URLs (computed var) still pass
-- documented limit of static analysis.
TestHostNormalization -- trailing dot, explicit :443, uppercase,
userinfo-@-smuggle all decided
correctly without false-block /
false-pass.
TestUploadDenylist -- requests / httpx / urllib.urlopen with
files= / data=open / data=bytes,
HfApi().upload_file / upload_folder /
create_commit, module-level
huggingface_hub.upload_folder. POST
json= to trusted host still passes.
TestSandboxCpuRlimitDefault -- pin UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOX_CPU_S=600
default and confirm CLONE_NEWNET
source line is gone.
TestMaxBodyDefault -- pin UNSLOTH_STUDIO_MAX_BODY_MB=500
default.
studio/backend/tests/test_studio_train_validation.py (new):
Pin at-cap-accepts / over-cap-rejects boundaries for
max_seq_length=2_000_000, batch_size=4_096, lora_r=16_384,
lora_alpha=32_768 so a future regression that tightens them back
without explicit user opt-in is caught.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* studio: tighten code comments across the security-hardening pass
* studio: always inject bootstrap credentials on first boot
The UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP gate added an extra
terminal-to-browser copy-paste on every fresh install. In practice
the LAN credential leak it guarded against is narrow: the password
is one-time, the user rotates it on the very next click, the
default Studio bind is 127.0.0.1, and -H 0.0.0.0 already exposes
the entire API surface. Drop the gate so the inject fires whenever
a bootstrap password is still pending. The CSP nonce wiring stays
in place; the inline script remains the only inline script the
backend ever emits.
The three Playwright UI smoke workflows lose their
UNSLOTH_STUDIO_INJECT_BOOTSTRAP=1 lines along with the explanatory
comment blocks since the inject now happens by default.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Wasim Yousef Said <wasimysdev@gmail.com>
* Studio: add github_repo seed reader and GitHub Support Bot recipe
Adds a first-party Data Designer seed reader that scrapes GitHub issues,
pull requests, and commits from one or more repositories via the GraphQL
API, and a learning recipe (GitHub Support Bot) that turns those rows into
synthetic support Q&A pairs for fine-tuning.
Backend (new plugin studio/backend/plugins/data-designer-github-repo-seed):
* GitHubRepoSeedSource config: repos, token (falls back to GH_TOKEN /
GITHUB_TOKEN env var), item_types (issues / pulls / commits),
per-resource limit (0 means all), max_comments_per_item.
* Rate-limit-aware GraphQL client (GitHubClient + RepoScraper) shared
across repos; flattens each item into a uniform row with columns
item_type, repo, number, title, body, state, author, created_at,
closed_at, url, labels, comments.
* Registered via the data_designer.plugins entry point.
Frontend:
* New seed_github block variant so the seed node card shows
"GitHub repositories" instead of the generic "Document file"
placeholder, with its own icon and inline summary (repo count +
item-type list).
* Rewritten seed dialog github_repo form: repos textarea pre-filled with
unslothai/unsloth + unslothai/unsloth-zoo, password input for the GH
token, items-per-repo number with an "All" toggle, and the noisier
options (item types, max comments, include comments) tucked under an
Advanced collapsible.
* Local model auto-load on Run: if a recipe uses an is_local provider
and the inference server is not already serving that model, the
executions hook calls /api/inference/load first. Removes the "open
/chat to load a model" prerequisite that users kept tripping on.
* Honor the recipe's run.rows value in the Run dialog (previously the
store reset to 5 regardless of what the template shipped).
Recipe (studio/frontend/src/features/data-recipes/learning-recipes/
github-support-bot.json):
* Defaults to the Local Model provider + unsloth/gemma-4-E2B-it-GGUF.
* Scrapes unslothai/unsloth and unslothai/unsloth-zoo, issues and pulls,
up to 100 items per resource.
* Two LLM blocks: normalized_question (llm-text) rewrites each thread
into a clean support question, support_answer (llm-structured)
produces JSON with answer / diagnosis_questions / cites / confidence.
* Run defaults to 10 rows for a quick smoke test.
Verified end-to-end on a running Studio: card renders, source-data
dialog is pre-populated, All toggle disables the limit input, the
recipe executes and produces rows against a loaded local GGUF.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* fix: improve GitHub recipe support
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: speed up GitHub scraper and harden the support-bot recipe
Addresses a perf issue found while demoing the github_repo seed reader:
Scraper is too slow at scale. The PRs GraphQL query pulls deeply nested
fields (reviewThreads, reviews, commits, timelineItems, etc.) so the
page size was pinned at 3 to stay under GitHub's node-count ceiling. 100
PRs meant 34 serial round trips. Added lighter query variants
(PRS_PAGE_QUERY_LIGHT, ISSUES_PAGE_QUERY_LIGHT) that drop the fields the
Studio flatten layer does not use (it only reads title, body, state,
author, labels, comments). With the light query PR pages can safely go
to 25 per page and issues to 50. The plugin scraper now passes
light=True to RepoScraper so Studio always uses the fast path; the heavy
query remains available for other callers.
Recipe defaults are now demo-ready with production knobs called out:
- max_parallel_requests: 1 and max_tokens: 800 so small local models
stay stable when running the support_answer structured column.
- support_answer prompt trimmed to 80-200 words so gemma-4-E2B GGUF can
actually comply with the schema. The canonical 150-300 word codex
prompt is still documented in the node3 markdown note for
production upgrades.
* Studio: rename GitHub recipe to 'GitHub Scraper' and add Easy mode
Changes the recipe framing from a single-purpose 'Support Bot' pipeline
to a general-purpose scraper that produces {user_request,
grounded_response} training pairs. Aligns with the canonical
github_data_gatherer dataset (11 enrichment tasks mirrored in pr_requests_20
/ issue_requests_20 on the input side and explain_pr / issue_fix_plan /
issue_solution on the output side).
Recipe JSON changes:
- columns[0] renamed normalized_question -> user_request, prompt now
inverts a GitHub thread into a realistic user ask instead of
normalising it.
- columns[1] renamed support_answer -> coauthor_response, emits
{response, followups, cites, task, confidence} and branches on
issue vs PR thread type.
- Notes rewritten to document the 11-task catalog and the canonical
production prompt to paste in for a full dataset backfill.
Frontend: Easy mode for github_repo recipes. The drag-and-drop canvas is
hidden behind an 'Advanced' tab; Easy mode is the default for any recipe
whose seed_source_type is github_repo. The Easy form reuses the existing
GithubRepoSeedForm (promoted to exported), adds a rows input bound to
previewRows, a model field bound to the model_config, and a single Run
button that calls runPreview() directly (no modal). Non-github recipes
see the same Editor / Runs tabs as before.
View mode persists per-recipe-id in localStorage under
recipe-studio:view-mode:<recipeId>.
* Studio: auto-detect server GH_TOKEN and widen Easy-mode detection
The GitHub seed form now fetches /api/data-recipe/seed/github/env-token
on mount and, when the server exposes a GH_TOKEN / GITHUB_TOKEN env var
and the token field is blank, shows a small 'Using server env var' badge
and swaps the placeholder text. The token value itself is never returned
to the UI.
Widens Easy-mode detection in recipe-studio-page.tsx so that recipes
saved before ui.seed_source_type was persisted also get the Easy tab:
falls back to recipe.seed_config.source.seed_type, which is always
present for github_repo seeds.
* fix: polish GitHub recipe UI
* Studio: default llama-server --threads to -1 (auto)
Previously we passed --threads only when the caller set an explicit
value, which meant llama-server fell back to its internal default.
That default has varied across llama.cpp builds (some versions use
hardware concurrency including hyperthreads, which hurts throughput on
CPU-heavy inference). Always passing --threads -1 pins the behaviour
to llama.cpp's auto-detect (physical cores).
Caller-supplied n_threads still wins when non-None.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: auto-switch Easy mode to Runs pane on run start
Easy mode had no progress island or canvas overlay, so after clicking Run
the only visible state was the button label flipping to "Running..." while
the screen otherwise stayed identical. This reads as stuck even though the
job is progressing.
Wire an onExecutionStart callback from recipe-studio-page.tsx through to
useRecipeExecutions so that when a run is kicked off from easy mode, the
page flips to the executions view where the Runs sidebar, progress bar,
rate/ETA panel, and live log are rendered. Advanced/editor mode keeps its
existing behavior and stays on the canvas (it already has the floating
ExecutionProgressIsland).
* fix: clean up GitHub scraper layout
* Studio: forward llm-structured output_format as llama-server response_format
Local GGUF runs of llm-structured columns used to generate the full
max_tokens budget before the prompt-level "return JSON in a ```json
fence" instruction got parsed. Small models (e.g. gemma-4-E2B-it)
routinely broke format, so each row took ~65s and frequently failed
with "No parsable JSON structure within ```json markdown fence".
For any local-provider model_config referenced by an llm-structured
column, clone the model_config and inject response_format into the
clone's inference_parameters. Uses llama.cpp server's flat shape
(tools/server/README.md):
{"type": "json_schema", "schema": <output_format>}
Not the OpenAI-nested form; data_designer's OpenAI adapter forwards
response_format verbatim via facade._COMPLETION_REQUEST_FIELDS, and
llama-server's documented schema path expects the flat variant.
The clone is per (model_alias, column) so:
- llm-text / llm-judge columns that share the same alias keep
free-form sampling.
- Each structured column gets its own schema, so columns with
different output_formats don't collide.
Effect on gemma-4-E2B-it demos: every row parses cleanly, and the
model terminates immediately after the closing brace instead of
running to max_tokens. Net wall-clock is usually faster even though
grammar-constrained sampling is slightly slower per token.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: flip Easy to Runs pane before validation scrape, not after
Previously onExecutionStart fired inside runExecution, which runs AFTER
validateRecipe() -- and validation re-invokes the seed reader. For the
github_repo reader that is a full GraphQL scrape, so the user sat on a
"Running..." button with an otherwise unchanged Easy form for 10-15s
before anything moved.
Call onExecutionStart at the top of runWithValidation, right after we
have a payload to send. The view flips immediately; ensureLocalModelLoaded
+ validateRecipe now run against the Runs pane instead of a frozen Easy
form. runExecution still calls onExecutionStart downstream, but the
callback is idempotent (the page's easy -> executions guard skips the
second call), so no behaviour change for runs that pass validation.
If validation fails the toast + runErrors path still fires; the Easy
form's error banner still reads runErrors when the user switches back.
* Studio: unify data-recipe workflow auth on sk-unsloth-* keys
The previous commit (a61b4cc9) assumed storage.create_api_key(..., internal=True)
and storage.revoke_internal_api_key(key_id) existed, but those helpers were
only in the working tree, never committed. Recipe runs in local-model mode
were therefore crashing with 500 when _inject_local_providers tried to mint
a workflow key. This commit ships the missing pieces.
auth/storage.py:
- api_keys schema gains is_internal INTEGER DEFAULT 0 (with a guarded
ALTER TABLE migration so existing auth.db files upgrade in place).
- create_api_key takes an internal=False kwarg; internal keys are flagged
so they can be hidden from user-facing listings.
- list_api_keys takes include_internal=False so UIs never see workflow keys.
- New revoke_internal_api_key(key_id): id-only revoke for keys minted by
non-user subjects (the JobManager does not know a username).
core/data_recipe/jobs/manager.py:
- JobManager.start accepts internal_api_key_id and stores it on Job so
lifecycle handlers can revoke eagerly.
- _handle_event revokes on EVENT_JOB_COMPLETED / _ERROR / _CANCELLED.
- _pump_loop subprocess-died fallback also retires the key so a crashed
worker cannot leak a live sk-unsloth-* beyond its TTL.
- Revocation is best-effort (swallow exceptions) -- the 24h TTL is the
safety net if storage hiccups.
core/data_recipe/jobs/types.py:
- Job dataclass gains internal_api_key_id: int | None = None.
Replaces the bespoke 24h JWT path that jobs.py used to mint for local
providers. One mint/revoke/verify surface for every API key the server
issues, and revocation is now eager (seconds, not 24h) instead of TTL-only.
* Studio: plug workflow-key leak on unexpected create_job errors
Review follow-up on the sk-unsloth-* workflow-key lifecycle in
create_job. Previously the revoke handlers wrapped mgr.start(...) but
only caught RuntimeError and ValueError, and get_job_manager() sat
outside the try block entirely. Any other exception type (TypeError
from a mismatched kwarg, OSError from the queue write, etc.) would
bubble up to FastAPI and leave the minted key live until its 24h TTL.
Fix: one try block covers both get_job_manager() and mgr.start(), with
a trailing except Exception that revokes and re-raises. The
RuntimeError -> 409 and ValueError -> 400 paths are unchanged so
specific client-facing status codes still surface. Revocation is still
best-effort (_revoke_internal_api_key_safe swallows errors) because we
never want revoke failures to mask the original crash.
Severity is low -- the key can't bootstrap longer access and the 24h
TTL bounds the window -- but the reviewer's point stands: eager revoke
on every failure path is the right invariant.
* Studio: nest response_format under extra_body so pydantic accepts it
The previous commit dropped response_format at the top level of a cloned
model_config's inference_parameters, which BuilderConfig rejected with:
ValidationError: Extra inputs are not permitted [type=extra_forbidden]
data_designer.model_configs.1.inference_parameters.response_format
data_designer's BaseInferenceParams is a pydantic model with extra=forbid
and only a fixed set of fields (temperature, top_p, max_tokens,
max_parallel_requests, timeout, extra_body). The pass-through path for
anything the schema doesn't know about is `extra_body`, which the
OpenAI SDK spreads into the chat-completions request body at the top
level -- which is exactly where llama-server reads response_format from.
Inject under extra_body (merging with any existing extra_body contents)
so the clone validates. llama-server still receives
{"type": "json_schema", "schema": <output_format>} at the top level of
the request body, which is the flat shape llama.cpp's server expects.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: forward response_format to llama-server and fence-wrap the reply
Two-part fix for the llm-structured data-recipe path:
(1) The /v1/chat/completions proxy was dropping response_format. The
route's passthrough branch only triggered on tools / tool messages, so
requests carrying a JSON schema fell into the non-passthrough GGUF path
which calls generate_chat_completion (no response_format kwarg). The
schema never reached llama-server, so guided decoding was a no-op and
the model emitted free-form text that happened to parse a fraction of
the time. Widen the passthrough trigger and teach _build_passthrough_payload
to forward response_format so llama-server's GBNF grammar actually runs.
Guided decoding does not require supports_tools, so split the condition:
a request is now passthrough-routed if it carries tools/tool messages
(existing behavior) OR carries response_format (new). The vision guard,
streaming fork, and tools-choice defaulting are unchanged.
(2) data_designer's llm-structured parser looks for a ```json ... ```
markdown fence and discards anything else. Guided decoding emits only
the JSON object (the GBNF grammar has no fence tokens), so a
100%-valid schema-constrained run still ended up 0 ok / N failed with
"No parsable JSON structure within ```json markdown fence". In
_openai_passthrough_non_streaming, wrap each choice's content in the
expected fence when the caller asked for guided decoding. Already-fenced
content is left alone so other clients that prefer raw JSON are not
affected; the wrap is scoped to requests that carried response_format.
Net effect on the GitHub Support Bot recipe on a local GGUF: schema
actually binds during sampling, content arrives wrapped in the fence
data_designer expects, and generation terminates immediately after the
closing brace instead of running out to max_tokens.
* Studio: Easy mode runs a full run, capped at the user's row count
Easy mode used to call runPreview, which produces a test run: no
artifact persisted, reduced progress tracking, and framed in the Runs
pane as "Test run". The whole point of the form is to let a user kick
off a real dataset build with one click, so wire it to runFull instead
and bind the Rows input to fullRows (not previewRows).
runFull requires a non-empty fullRunName. The Easy form has no run-name
input, so seed a default on mount whenever Easy is active and
fullRunName is still empty. Uses `<recipe name> <iso-timestamp>` so
each Easy run gets a stable-ish default that still sorts chronologically
in the Runs pane. User can override it from the Advanced run dialog
before clicking Run.
Rename GithubScraperEasyView's rows props from previewRows/setPreviewRows
to rows/setRows so the view stays agnostic to which hook state the page
chooses to bind. Loading indicator now follows fullLoading.
* Studio: clamp GitHub scrape page size and memoize the materialization
Two wins for the "before Generating fires" gap on small previews:
(1) scrape_{issues,prs,commits} hardcoded per_page (50 / 25 / 100) and
only checked the trial limit AFTER the page was written, so a 1-row
Easy run still asked GitHub for a full 50-issue + 25-PR page, wrote
them all to JSONL, and then stopped because total_new already exceeded
the trial cap. Cap per_page at min(page_cap, trial_limit) so
github_limit=1 actually asks for first:1.
(2) GitHubRepoSeedReader.get_dataset_uri used to scrape fresh on every
invocation. data_designer calls the seed reader multiple times per
recipe job (validation, preview, per-column sampling), so a 2-repo
Easy preview ran the full GraphQL scrape three times back-to-back,
burning ~15s of dead air before any LLM generation began.
Added a module-level in-process cache keyed on
(repos, item_types, limit, include_comments, max_comments_per_item,
sha256(token)[:16]) that stores the JSONL path of the first
materialization. Subsequent calls with the same signature return the
cached path, guarded by a staleness check that drops the entry if the
file was tmp-cleaned. Raw token values never land in the key.
Net effect on a 1-row Easy run, 2 repos, limit=1: 2 GraphQL round
trips instead of ~12, and the first-to-Generating gap collapses from
~15s to roughly 2-3s.
* Studio: make Easy mode Rows input editable instead of snapping to 1
The Rows to generate input used type="number" with value bound directly
to the rows state and an onChange that coerced any non-positive parse
result back to 1. The moment the user pressed backspace to clear the
field, the parent re-rendered with value=1 and the caret jumped, making
it impossible to change the value without arrowing the browser's +/-
spinner.
Switch to a text input with inputMode="numeric" and pattern="[0-9]*"
(so mobile still shows a numeric keyboard, and the browser drops the
spinner buttons the user did not want). Add a local rowsText buffer so
the field can hold transient empty / partial digit strings while
editing without fighting the parent state; the canonical rows value
only advances when the buffer parses to a valid integer in [1, 10000],
and onBlur clamps back to 1 or 10000 if the user left it out of range.
No behavior change for valid numeric edits - the downstream runFull()
still sees a clean positive integer.
* Studio: expand dataset cells horizontally by column on click
Click a long cell to expand that whole column. Click again to collapse.
Replaces the prior row-level vertical expansion which made it hard to
compare cells across columns. State is scoped per execution and per
column; the row itself is no longer a click target.
* Studio: force expanded dataset column to grow wide enough to read
* Studio: disable thinking for local recipe inference and plumb the kwarg
Reasoning-capable models (gemma-3n, qwen3.5, etc.) emit a
<think>...</think> preamble ahead of the answer by default, which
roughly doubles the generated token count per row on a local GGUF
and pushes the actual answer past data_designer's json-fence regex
on llm-structured columns. Recipes want the terse answer, not the
scratchpad.
Two halves of the fix:
(1) routes/data_recipe/jobs.py: when _inject_local_providers walks
the recipe's model_configs to point them at the local endpoint, also
stash chat_template_kwargs={"enable_thinking": false} under each
config's inference_parameters.extra_body. OpenAI SDK spreads
extra_body into the top-level request body, so llama-server and the
Studio /v1/chat/completions route both see it.
(2) routes/inference.py: the chat-completions route previously
dropped chat_template_kwargs on the floor because the whitelist
body builder only forwarded known fields.
- At the top of openai_chat_completions, lift
chat_template_kwargs.enable_thinking from payload.model_extra
onto the typed payload.enable_thinking field when the caller
did not set the latter, so the non-passthrough GGUF path's
generate_chat_completion(...) call honors the override.
- Teach _build_passthrough_payload to forward a
chat_template_kwargs dict, and have _build_openai_passthrough_body
derive that dict from payload.enable_thinking so
response_format requests (structured columns) also land at
llama-server with the reasoning preamble suppressed.
Net effect on a 10-row support-bot run with gemma-4-E2B-it-GGUF:
responses arrive without <think> tags, wall-clock per call drops
roughly in half, and structured columns stop leaking reasoning
tokens through the GBNF-constrained output.
* Studio: update GitHub Support Bot learning recipe with maintainer layout
Replace the template with the hand-laid-out export from the maintainer
so note nodes ship with real x/y positions (scattered around the
graph instead of all stacked at x=480) and the edges / canvas pan look
correct on first load. Also picks up the maintainer's prompt tweaks and
output schema names (coauthor_response / user_request / followups / task /
cites / confidence).
Diff is mostly ui.nodes positions and prompt bodies; runtime shape is
unchanged (seed_config / columns still target model_1 against the Local
Model provider).
* Studio: auto-size dataset sample columns; wide text gets a wide column
Drop the per-column click-to-expand toggle and the 180-char truncation.
Every column now renders its full value. Columns with long text get a
min-w of 48rem so the text is readable without wrapping into a tall
block; narrow-content columns get a 12rem min-w. The table wrapper
already has overflow-x-auto, so wide-column totals cause a horizontal
scrollbar instead of cramming everything into the viewport.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* fix GitHub scrape progress
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* add resetApiBase export for test setup
* Studio: rename github-support-bot output columns to User / Assistant
Previously emitted user_request and coauthor_response, which did not
match the canonical User / Assistant chat-pair shape that downstream
SFT consumers expect. Renamed the columns in the recipe JSON (columns,
UI node ids, edges, notes, prompt Jinja refs) and the matching copy in
the learning-recipes index, data-recipes-page, and easy view.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: wasimysaid <wasimysdev@gmail.com>
* add unsloth studio desktop app
* Fix review findings
- studio/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json: retarget updater to staging repo
(danielhanchen/unsloth-staging-2); switch to unslothai/unsloth on upstream merge.
- studio/src-tauri/linux/postremove.sh: drop the interactive read loop and the
/home/* iteration. Package maintainer scripts must stay non-interactive and
must not touch other users' data.
- studio/frontend/src/app/auth-guards.ts: honor tauriAutoAuth() boolean. Failed
auto-auth now redirects to /login; requireGuest/requirePasswordChangeFlow
only redirect to /chat when auth succeeds. The new early-return on failed
auth is intentional so the login / change-password flows remain reachable
when desktop auth is not yet established.
- studio/frontend/src/config/env.ts: keep fetched=false on health failure so
later calls retry instead of caching the client-side platform guess.
- studio/src-tauri/src/install.rs: pick the available system package manager
(apt-get, dnf, zypper, pacman); AppImage bundles run on non-Debian distros.
- studio/frontend/src/lib/open-link.ts + markdown-text/sources callers: return
boolean from openLink so callers only preventDefault on handled URLs; relative
hrefs now navigate natively.
- studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/about-tab.tsx: fetch(apiUrl(...))
so the version request targets the backend port in desktop mode. The bare
/api/health predates the Tauri webview (blame: the earlier onboarding commit,
which ran with same-origin frontend/backend); in desktop mode the webview
origin is tauri://localhost so the bare path fails.
- install.ps1: gate the install_python_stack.py hotfix on a sentinel comment
instead of a content regex; append the sentinel after applying so reruns
are unambiguous.
- unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py _write_auth_secret: use the atomic mkstemp +
os.replace path on Windows too; chmod calls are wrapped in try/except OSError.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs probe_existing_backends: fan out the health
probes concurrently; desktop-auth status still runs sequentially per candidate.
reqwest::Client is internally Arc-wrapped so the in-loop .clone() is a
refcount bump, not a deep clone; annotated inline.
- studio/src-tauri/src/preflight.rs run_cli_probe: wait() after kill() to reap
the child, matching probe_cli_capability.
- studio/src-tauri/src/process.rs + main.rs: add stop_backend_detached and use
it from the tray quit handler so the 5s graceful-wait does not block the
Tauri main loop. RunEvent::Exit keeps the synchronous safety-net call.
- studio/backend/main.py: drop the permissive localhost CORS regex in
api-only mode; the explicit allow_origins list is sufficient.
- .github/workflows/release-desktop.yml: drop max-parallel: 1 so platform
builds run in parallel, and lift releaseBody to an env var so the three
tauri-action invocations share one source of truth.
* Fix review findings (loop 2)
- studio/backend/auth/storage.py update_password: clear_desktop_secret()
alongside clear_bootstrap_password() so rotating the admin password
also revokes any previously provisioned .desktop_secret. Without this,
an old local desktop credential keeps minting fresh admin tokens via
/api/auth/desktop-login after a password rotation.
- studio/src-tauri/src/desktop_auth.rs provision_desktop_auth: wrap
cmd.output().await in tokio::time::timeout(30s). DESKTOP_AUTH_LOCK is
held across the whole desktop_auth flow, and previously a hanging
`unsloth studio provision-desktop-auth` subprocess would pin the lock
indefinitely and freeze every subsequent desktop_auth call.
* Add review tests
* Consolidate review tests
Merge review-added tests into the existing studio/backend/tests/test_desktop_auth.py
(the PR's authoritative desktop-auth test file). Drops three scaffolding files under
tests/python/ in favor of five focused tests next to the tests they extend:
- test_update_password_clears_desktop_secret (runtime)
- test_update_password_on_unknown_user_leaves_desktop_secret_intact (runtime)
- test_cli_provisioning_delegates_to_storage_create_desktop_secret (source-level)
- test_cli_connect_auth_db_reads_storage_db_path (source-level)
- test_desktop_auth_provision_has_bounded_timeout (Rust source-level)
* Revert auth-guards.ts Tauri branches to unconditional form
The review loop on PR 5144 introduced a regression: the isTauri branch of
requireAuth redirected to /login when tauriAutoAuth() returned false, and
requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow silently fell through on the same
condition. The Tauri desktop app authenticates via a local auto-generated
secret; it must never surface /login or /change-password to the user. A
failed auto-auth should let the startup layer retry, not expose a password
form.
Restore the three Tauri branches to the author's original unconditional
form (requireAuth: return; requireGuest / requirePasswordChangeFlow: throw
redirect({to: '/chat'})). Keep the rest of the review fixes -- the
apiUrl() fetch wrapping, authRedirect helper, and fetchAuthStatus refactor
are all legitimate improvements and are preserved.
* Revert release-desktop.yml to author's version
The review loop's workflow-file tweaks (drop max-parallel: 1, lift releaseBody
to an env var) are cosmetic. OAuth tokens cannot push workflow-file changes,
and fine-grained PATs cannot honor maintainerCanModify on a third-party fork.
Reverting the workflow file to wasimysaid's version lets the push go through
without needing a classic PAT with both repo and workflow scopes.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Lee Jackson <130007945+Imagineer99@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <danielhanchen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Han <unslothai@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Studio: add API key authentication for programmatic access
External users want to hit the Studio API (chat completions with tool
calling, training, export, etc.) without going through the browser
login flow. This adds sk-unsloth- prefixed API keys that work as a
drop-in replacement for JWTs in the Authorization: Bearer header.
Backend:
- New api_keys table in SQLite (storage.py)
- create/list/revoke/validate functions with SHA-256 hashed storage
- API key detection in _get_current_subject before the JWT path
- POST/GET/DELETE /api/auth/api-keys endpoints on the auth router
Frontend:
- /api-keys page with create form, one-time key reveal, keys table
- API Keys link in desktop and mobile navbar
- Route registered with requireAuth guard
Zero changes to any existing route handler -- every endpoint that uses
Depends(get_current_subject) automatically works with API keys.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Use actual origin in API key usage examples
The examples on /api-keys were hardcoded to localhost:8888 which is
wrong for remote users. Use window.location.origin so the examples
show the correct URL regardless of where the user is connecting from.
* Add `unsloth studio run` CLI command for one-liner model serving
Adds a `run` subcommand that starts Studio, loads a model, creates an
API key, and prints a ready-to-use curl command -- similar to
`ollama run` or `vllm serve`.
Usage: unsloth studio run -m unsloth/Qwen3-1.7B-GGUF --gguf-variant UD-Q4_K_XL
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Add end-to-end tests for `unsloth studio run` and API key usage
Tests the 4 usage examples from the API Keys page:
1. curl basic (non-streaming) chat completions
2. curl streaming (SSE) chat completions
3. OpenAI Python SDK streaming completions
4. curl with tools (web_search + python)
Also tests --help output, invalid key rejection, and no-key rejection.
All 7 tests pass against Qwen3-1.7B-GGUF.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Add /v1/completions, /v1/embeddings, /v1/responses endpoints and --parallel support
- llama_cpp.py: accept n_parallel param, pass to llama-server --parallel
- run.py: plumb llama_parallel_slots through to app.state
- inference.py: add /completions and /embeddings as transparent proxies to
llama-server, add /responses as application-level endpoint that converts
to ChatCompletionRequest; thread n_parallel through load_model
- studio.py: set llama_parallel_slots=4 for `unsloth studio run` path
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Make /v1/responses endpoint match OpenAI Responses API format
The existing /v1/responses shim returned Chat Completions format, which
broke OpenAI SDK clients using openai.responses.create(). This commit
replaces the endpoint with a proper implementation that:
- Returns `output` array with `output_text` content parts instead of
`choices` with `message`
- Uses `input_tokens`/`output_tokens` instead of `prompt_tokens`/
`completion_tokens` in usage
- Sets `object: "response"` and `id: "resp_..."`
- Emits named SSE events for streaming (response.created,
response.output_text.delta, response.completed, etc.)
- Accepts all OpenAI Responses API fields (tools, store, metadata,
previous_response_id) without erroring -- silently ignored
- Maps `developer` role to `system` and `input_text`/`input_image`
content parts to the internal Chat format
Adds Pydantic schemas for request/response models and 23 unit tests
covering schema validation, input normalisation, and response format.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Studio: add Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages endpoint (#4981)
* Add Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages endpoint with tool support
Translate Anthropic Messages API format to/from internal OpenAI format
and reuse the existing server-side agentic tool loop. Supports streaming
SSE (message_start, content_block_delta, etc.) and non-streaming JSON.
Includes offline unit tests and e2e tests in test_studio_run.py.
* Add enable_tools, enabled_tools, session_id to /v1/messages endpoint
Support the same shorthand as /v1/chat/completions: enable_tools=true
with an optional enabled_tools list uses built-in server tools without
requiring full Anthropic tool definitions. session_id is passed through
for sandbox isolation. max_tokens is now optional.
* Strip leaked tool-call XML from Anthropic endpoint content
Apply _TOOL_XML_RE to content events in both streaming and
non-streaming tool paths, matching the OpenAI endpoint behavior.
* Emit custom tool_result SSE event in Anthropic stream
Adds a non-standard tool_result event between the tool_use block close
and the next text block, so clients can see server-side tool execution
results. Anthropic SDKs ignore unknown event types.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Split /v1/messages into server-side and client-side tool paths
enable_tools=true runs the existing server-side agentic loop with
built-in tools (web_search/python/terminal). A bare tools=[...] field
now triggers a client-side pass-through: client-provided tools are
forwarded to llama-server and any tool_use output is returned to the
caller with stop_reason=tool_use for client execution.
This fixes Claude Code (and any Anthropic SDK client) which sends
tools=[...] expecting client-side execution but was previously routed
through execute_tool() and failing with 'Unknown tool'.
Adds AnthropicPassthroughEmitter to convert llama-server OpenAI SSE
chunks into Anthropic SSE events, plus unit tests covering text
blocks, tool_use blocks, mixed, stop reasons, and usage.
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
* Fix httpcore GeneratorExit in /v1/messages passthrough stream
Explicitly aclose aiter_lines() before the surrounding async with
blocks unwind, mirroring the prior fix in external_provider.py
(a41160d3) and cc757b78's RuntimeError suppression.
* Wire stop_sequences through /v1/messages; warn on tool_choice
Plumb payload.stop_sequences to all three code paths (server-side
tool loop, no-tool plain, client-side passthrough) so Anthropic SDK
clients setting stop_sequences get the behavior they expect. The
llama_cpp backend already accepted `stop` on both generate_chat_
completion and generate_chat_completion_with_tools; the Anthropic
handler simply wasn't passing it.
tool_choice remains declared on the request model for Anthropic SDK
compatibility (the SDK often sets it by default) but is not yet
honored. Log a structured warning on each request carrying a non-
null tool_choice so the silent drop is visible to operators.
* Wire min_p / repetition_penalty / presence_penalty through /v1/messages
Align the Anthropic endpoint's sampling surface with /v1/chat/completions.
Adds the three fields as x-unsloth extensions on AnthropicMessagesRequest
and threads them through all three code paths: server-side tool loop,
no-tool plain, and client-side passthrough.
The passthrough builder emits "repeat_penalty" (not "repetition_penalty")
because that is llama-server's field name; the backend methods already
apply the same rename internally.
* Fix block ordering and prev_text reset in non-streaming tool path
_anthropic_tool_non_streaming was building the response by appending
all tool_use blocks first, then a single concatenated text block at
the end — losing generation order and merging pre-tool and post-tool
text into one block. It also never reset prev_text between synthesis
turns, so the first N characters of each post-tool turn were dropped
(where N = length of the prior turn's final cumulative text).
Rewrite to build content_blocks incrementally in generation order,
matching the streaming emitter's behavior: deltas within a turn are
merged into the trailing text block, tool_use blocks interrupt the
text sequence, and prev_text is reset on tool_end so turn N+1 diffs
against an empty baseline.
Caught by gemini-code-assist[bot] review on #4981.
* Make test_studio_run.py e2e tests pytest-compatible
Add a hybrid session-scoped studio_server fixture in conftest.py that
feeds base_url / api_key into the existing e2e test functions. Three
invocation modes are now supported:
1. Script mode (unchanged) — python tests/test_studio_run.py
2. Pytest + external server — point at a running instance via
UNSLOTH_E2E_BASE_URL / UNSLOTH_E2E_API_KEY env vars, no per-run
GGUF load cost
3. Pytest + fixture-managed server — pytest drives _start_server /
_kill_server itself via --unsloth-model / --unsloth-gguf-variant,
CI-friendly
The existing _start_server / _kill_server helpers and main() stay
untouched so the script entry point keeps working exactly as before.
Test function signatures are unchanged — the (base_url, api_key)
parameters now resolve via the new fixtures when running under
pytest.
* Rename test_studio_run.py -> test_studio_api.py
The file is entirely about HTTP API endpoint testing (OpenAI-compatible
/v1/chat/completions, Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages, API key auth,
plus a CLI --help sanity check on the command that runs the API). None
of its tests cover training, export, chat-UI, or internal-Python-API
concerns.
The old name misleadingly suggested "tests for the unsloth studio run
CLI subcommand" — the new name reflects the actual scope.
Updates:
- git mv the file (rename tracked, history preserved)
- Rewrite opening docstring to state the API surface focus and call
out what is explicitly out of scope
- Update all 4 Usage-block path references to the new filename
- LOG_FILE renamed to test_studio_api.log
- conftest.py fixture import rewritten from test_studio_run to
test_studio_api, plus 7 docstring/comment references updated
No functional changes to test logic, signatures, or main().
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix httpcore asyncgen cleanup in /v1/messages and /v1/completions
The earlier fix in 985e92a9 was incomplete: it closed aiter_lines()
explicitly but still used `async with httpx.AsyncClient()` /
`async with client.stream()` inside the generator. When the generator
is orphaned (e.g. client disconnects mid-stream and Starlette drops
the StreamingResponse iterator without explicitly calling aclose()),
Python's asyncgen finalizer runs the cleanup in a DIFFERENT task than
the one that originally entered the httpx context managers. The
`async with` exits then trigger httpcore's HTTP11ConnectionByteStream
.aclose(), which enters anyio.CancelScope.__exit__ with a mismatched
task and raises RuntimeError("Attempted to exit cancel scope in a
different task"). That error escapes any user-owned try/except
because it happens during GC finalization.
Replace `async with` with manual client/response lifecycle in both
/v1/messages passthrough and /v1/completions proxy. Close the
response and client in a finally block wrapped in
`try: ... except Exception: pass`. This suppresses RuntimeError (and
other Exception subclasses) from the anyio cleanup noise while
letting GeneratorExit (a BaseException, not Exception) propagate
cleanly so the generator terminates as Python expects.
Traceback observed in user report:
File ".../httpcore/_async/connection_pool.py", line 404, in __aiter__
yield part
RuntimeError: async generator ignored GeneratorExit
...
File ".../anyio/_backends/_asyncio.py", line 455, in __exit__
raise RuntimeError(
RuntimeError: Attempted to exit cancel scope in a different task
* Expand unsloth studio run banner with SDK base URL and more curl examples
Add an explicit "OpenAI / Anthropic SDK base URL" line inside the info
box so SDK users don't accidentally copy the bare server URL (without
/v1) into their OpenAI/Anthropic SDK constructors and hit 404s.
Replace the single /v1/chat/completions curl example with three
labeled blocks: chat/completions, Anthropic /messages, and OpenAI
Responses. The Anthropic example includes max_tokens (Anthropic SDKs
require it even though Studio accepts None).
All examples derived from a computed sdk_base_url so the /v1 prefix
stays in sync if the public path ever changes.
* Hash API keys with HMAC-SHA256 + persistent server secret
Stores the HMAC secret in a new app_secrets singleton table. Fixes
CodeQL py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing alert on storage.py:74-76,
394-395. Refresh tokens stay on plain SHA-256 (unchanged _hash_token)
so existing user sessions survive upgrade — API keys are new on this
branch so there is no migration.
* Use PBKDF2 for API key hashing per CodeQL recommendation
HMAC-SHA256 was still flagged by py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing.
Switch to hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac, which is in CodeQL's recommended
allowlist (Argon2/scrypt/bcrypt/PBKDF2). Persistent server-side
salt stays in app_secrets for defense-in-depth. 100k iterations to
match auth/hashing.py's password hasher.
---------
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <115670425+rolandtannous@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <rolandtannous@gravityq.ai>
* fix: quotation marks
* diceware passphrase generation
* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
---------
Co-authored-by: Roland Tannous <rolandtannous@gravityq.ai>
Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
- Replace datetime.UTC with datetime.timezone.utc in authentication.py and storage.py
- Fixes ImportError on Python versions < 3.11
- timezone.utc works on Python 3.9+
Resolves#237
Daniel Han