Studio: close remaining sandbox review gaps
- Freeze the runtime import guard's block decision in the non-removable audit hook so sandbox code cannot neutralise it by rebinding sitecustomize globals, restoring builtins.__import__, or detaching the meta-path finder. - Keep child interpreters guarded when sandbox code lowers UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED before spawning them (present-but-not-"1" flag + sandbox site dir on PYTHONPATH); bypass (flag removed) is unaffected. - Recurse into shells launched via find/fd -exec when scanning for Python startup-guard bypasses. - Treat optional-chained computed document.write and document.open().write() receivers as HTML sinks. - Honour a declared charset (or fail closed on an unknown one) when decoding active data: documents. - Add regression tests for each.
This commit is contained in:
Michael Han
parent
67d01e9cfb
commit
a37f225cd6
5 changed files with 176 additions and 15 deletions
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@ -279,14 +279,6 @@ def _guarded_import_module(name, package = None):
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return module
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def _network_import_audit(event, args):
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if event != "import" or not args:
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return
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root = _blocked_network_module(args[0])
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if root is not None:
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_raise_blocked_network_module(root)
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class _BlockedNetworkModuleFinder:
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_unsloth_blocked_network_guard = True
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@ -302,12 +294,73 @@ class _BlockedNetworkModuleFinder:
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return None
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def _loaded_from_sandbox_site():
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"""True when this shim is imported from the sandbox site dir on PYTHONPATH.
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The parent adds this directory to a sandbox child's PYTHONPATH, so its
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presence confirms the child is still running under the sandbox launcher even
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if ``UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED`` has been altered in ``os.environ``.
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"""
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try:
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module_dir = os.path.realpath(os.path.dirname(__file__))
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except (OSError, NameError, TypeError):
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return False
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for entry in os.environ.get("PYTHONPATH", "").split(os.pathsep):
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if not entry:
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continue
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try:
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if os.path.realpath(entry) == module_dir:
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return True
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except OSError:
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continue
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return False
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def _sandbox_guard_should_activate():
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"""Decide whether to install the runtime network guard.
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Normal sandbox children set ``UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED=1``. Bypass (full
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access) removes the variable entirely, so an absent flag means "do not
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guard". A flag that is PRESENT but not ``"1"`` (e.g. sandbox code running
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``os.environ['UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED']='0'`` before spawning a child to
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escape the guard) is tampering: keep the guard on as long as this shim was
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still loaded from the sandbox site dir the launcher put on PYTHONPATH.
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"""
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flag = os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED")
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if flag == "1":
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return True
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if flag is None:
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return False
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return _loaded_from_sandbox_site()
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def _install_import_guard():
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global _import_guard_installed
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if os.environ.get("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED") != "1":
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if not _sandbox_guard_should_activate():
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return
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if not _import_guard_installed:
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sys.addaudithook(_network_import_audit)
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# Capture the block sets and trust probe as closure locals. Audit hooks
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# cannot be removed once registered, so this hook is the backstop for the
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# import wrapper and meta-path finder (both of which sandbox code can
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# restore/detach). Reading globals here would let sandbox code neutralise
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# it by rebinding this module's attributes, so the decision is frozen.
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blocked_roots = frozenset(_BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODULES)
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direct_roots = frozenset(_DIRECT_BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODULES)
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sandbox_requested = _sandbox_code_requested_import
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def _immutable_network_import_audit(event, args):
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if event != "import" or not args:
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return
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name = args[0]
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if not isinstance(name, str):
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return
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root = name.split(".", 1)[0]
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if root in blocked_roots or (root in direct_roots and sandbox_requested()):
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raise ModuleNotFoundError(
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f"Blocked: low-level network module {root!r} is unavailable in sandboxed code"
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)
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sys.addaudithook(_immutable_network_import_audit)
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builtins.__import__ = _guarded_import
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importlib.import_module = _guarded_import_module
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_import_guard_installed = True
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@ -325,9 +325,18 @@ def _sandbox_python_startup_bypasses_guard(command: str, depth: int = 0) -> bool
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for segment in _shell_command_segments(command):
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first = os.path.basename(segment[0].replace("\\", "/")).lower()
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wrapper_context = first in _PYTHON_LAUNCH_WRAPPERS
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find_exec = first in {"find", "fd"}
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for shell_index, shell_token in enumerate(segment):
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shell = os.path.basename(shell_token.replace("\\", "/")).lower()
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if shell not in shell_names or (shell_index and not wrapper_context):
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# A shell after the first token is only a real launch when it follows
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# a launch wrapper (env/xargs/...) or a find/fd -exec flag; otherwise
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# it is an argument (e.g. a path) and is ignored.
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find_exec_context = find_exec and any(
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token in _FIND_EXEC_FLAGS for token in segment[:shell_index]
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)
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if shell not in shell_names or (
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shell_index and not wrapper_context and not find_exec_context
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):
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continue
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for index in range(shell_index + 1, len(segment) - 1):
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token = segment[index]
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@ -2596,7 +2605,11 @@ _RENDER_HTML_MARKUP_ASSIGNMENT_START_RE = re.compile(
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)
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_RENDER_HTML_MARKUP_CALL_START_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?:\.\s*(?P<insert>insertAdjacentHTML)|"
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r"\bdocument\s*(?:\?\.\s*|\.\s*)(?P<write>write|writeln))"
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# document.write / writeln, optionally reached through a document-valued
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# receiver such as document.open(): document.open().write('<img src=...>')
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# returns the same document and inserts the remote-loading markup.
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r"\bdocument\s*(?:(?:\?\.\s*|\.\s*)open\s*\([^()]*\)\s*)?"
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r"(?:\?\.\s*|\.\s*)(?P<write>write|writeln))"
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r"\s*(?:\?\.\s*)?\(",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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@ -2605,7 +2618,7 @@ _RENDER_HTML_COMPUTED_ASSIGNMENT_START_RE = re.compile(
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re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
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)
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_RENDER_HTML_COMPUTED_CALL_START_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?:(?P<document>\bdocument)\s*)?\[\s*(?P<member>[^\]]+)\s*\]\s*(?:\?\.\s*)?\(",
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r"(?:(?P<document>\bdocument)\s*(?:\?\.\s*)?)?\[\s*(?P<member>[^\]]+)\s*\]\s*(?:\?\.\s*)?\(",
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re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
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)
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_RENDER_HTML_REFLECT_SET_START_RE = re.compile(
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@ -2776,12 +2789,19 @@ def _render_html_data_document_reaches_network(value: str, depth: int) -> bool:
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media_type = (parts[0] or "text/plain").lower()
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if media_type not in _RENDER_HTML_ACTIVE_DATA_MIME_TYPES:
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return False
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# Honour a declared charset so a UTF-16/Latin-1 document decodes the same way
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# the browser would; an unknown/undecodable charset fails closed rather than
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# letting a mangled UTF-8 read hide a remote load.
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charset = "utf-8"
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for part in parts[1:]:
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if part.lower().startswith("charset="):
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charset = part.split("=", 1)[1].strip() or "utf-8"
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try:
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payload_bytes = urllib.parse.unquote_to_bytes(payload)
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if any(part.lower() == "base64" for part in parts[1:]):
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payload_bytes = base64.b64decode(b"".join(payload_bytes.split()), validate = True)
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markup = payload_bytes.decode("utf-8", errors = "replace")
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except (ValueError, binascii.Error):
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markup = payload_bytes.decode(charset, errors = "replace")
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except (ValueError, binascii.Error, LookupError):
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return True
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return _render_html_code_reaches_network(markup, depth + 1)
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@ -181,6 +181,10 @@ def test_bash_blocklist_enforced_when_sandboxed(captured_popen):
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'env -u PYTHONPATH sh -c "python -c import\\ boto3"',
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'command sh -c "python -I -c import\\ boto3"',
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'find . -exec python -S -c "import boto3" ;',
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# A find/fd -exec that hides the interpreter behind a nested shell must
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# still be recursed into, not left as an opaque exec target.
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'find . -exec sh -c "python -S -c import\\ boto3" ;',
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'find . -type f -execdir bash -c "python -I -c import\\ boto3" ;',
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],
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)
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def test_bash_blocks_python_startup_guard_bypasses(captured_popen, command):
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@ -1113,6 +1113,16 @@ def test_render_html_gated_only_when_networked():
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assert rh("<script>document.write('<img sr','c=https://evil/x>')</script>") is True
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assert rh("<script>document.writeln('<p>Local</p>')</script>") is False
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assert rh("<script>writer.write('<img src=https://evil/x>')</script>") is False
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# Optional-chained computed document.write still recurses into the markup.
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assert rh("<script>document?.['write']('<img src=https://evil/x>')</script>") is True
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assert rh("<script>document?.['write']('<p>Local</p>')</script>") is False
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# document.open() returns the document, so a write through it is an HTML sink.
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assert rh("<script>document.open().write('<img src=https://evil/x>')</script>") is True
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assert (
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rh("<script>document.open('text/html').writeln('<img src=https://evil/x>')</script>")
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is True
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)
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assert rh("<script>document.open().write('<p>Local</p>')</script>") is False
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# A computed bracket key spliced from string fragments on a global host object.
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assert rh("<script>window['fet'+'ch']('https://attacker.example')</script>") is True
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assert rh("<script>self['open' + '']('https://x')</script>") is True
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@ -1142,6 +1152,25 @@ def test_render_html_gated_only_when_networked():
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assert rh('<img src="">') is False
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assert rh('<object data="-valid-***"></iframe>') is True
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# A declared charset is honoured so a UTF-16 document is decoded like the
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# browser would; an unknown charset fails closed instead of hiding the load.
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assert (
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rh(
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'<iframe src="data:text/html;charset=utf-16le;base64,'
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'PABpAG0AZwAgAHMAcgBjAD0AaAB0AHQAcABzADoALwAvAGUAdgBpAGwALwB4AD4A"></iframe>'
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)
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is True
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)
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assert (
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rh(
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'<iframe src="data:text/html;charset=utf-16le;base64,'
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'PABoADEAPgBMAG8AYwBhAGwAPAAvAGgAMQA+AA=="></iframe>'
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)
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is False
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)
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assert (
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rh('<iframe src="data:text/html;charset=nonesuch,%3Cimg%3E"></iframe>') is True
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) # unknown charset fails closed
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assert rh("<script>frame.src='data:text/html,<img src=https://evil/x>'</script>") is True
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assert (
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rh(
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@ -394,6 +394,61 @@ class TestSandboxEnvIsolation:
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assert bypass.returncode == 0, bypass.stderr
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assert bypass.stdout.strip() == "7"
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def test_runtime_import_guard_survives_global_tampering(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
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# Sandbox code can restore builtins.__import__, detach the meta-path
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# finder and rebind this module's globals, but the audit hook (which
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# cannot be removed) freezes its decision in a closure and still blocks.
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from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
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monkeypatch.setenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED", "1")
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code = (
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"import sys, builtins, sitecustomize\n"
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"sitecustomize._blocked_network_module = lambda _: None\n"
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"sitecustomize._BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODULES = frozenset()\n"
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"builtins.__import__ = sitecustomize._original_import\n"
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"sys.meta_path[:] = [f for f in sys.meta_path "
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"if not getattr(f, '_unsloth_blocked_network_guard', False)]\n"
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"name = ''.join(['bo', 'to3'])\n"
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"print(__import__(name).__name__)\n"
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)
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result = subprocess.run(
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[sys.executable, "-c", code],
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cwd = tmp_path,
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env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
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capture_output = True,
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text = True,
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check = False,
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)
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assert result.returncode != 0
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assert "Blocked: low-level network module 'boto3'" in result.stderr
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def test_runtime_import_guard_survives_env_flag_reset_for_children(self, tmp_path):
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# Clearing UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED before spawning a child must not
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# unguard the child: the child re-imports this shim from the sandbox site
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# dir still on PYTHONPATH, which is itself the sandbox signal.
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from core.inference.tools import _build_safe_env
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code = (
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"import os, subprocess, sys\n"
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"os.environ['UNSLOTH_STUDIO_SANDBOXED'] = '0'\n"
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"r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, '-c', 'import boto3'], "
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"capture_output=True, text=True)\n"
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"sys.stdout.write('RC=%d\\n' % r.returncode)\n"
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"sys.stdout.write('BLOCKED=%d\\n' % "
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"(\"low-level network module 'boto3'\" in r.stderr))\n"
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)
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result = subprocess.run(
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[sys.executable, "-c", code],
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cwd = tmp_path,
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env = _build_safe_env(str(tmp_path)),
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capture_output = True,
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text = True,
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check = False,
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)
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assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
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assert "RC=1" in result.stdout
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assert "BLOCKED=1" in result.stdout
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"code",
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[
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