diff --git a/studio/backend/main.py b/studio/backend/main.py
index 186422bc7f..be124bfe5e 100644
--- a/studio/backend/main.py
+++ b/studio/backend/main.py
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ from routes import (
     data_recipe_router,
     datasets_router,
     export_router,
+    html_preview_router,
     inference_router,
     inference_studio_router,
     models_router,
@@ -327,16 +328,14 @@ def _build_csp(script_nonce: "str | None" = None) -> str:
         "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
         f"{script_src}; "
         "font-src 'self' data:; "
-        # Restrict iframe sources to same-origin only. The assistant
-        # HTML/SVG previews use srcdoc (no URL fetch), so allowing
-        # data: / blob: here would not unlock interactive scripts
-        # anyway -- Chromium inherits the embedder CSP for srcdoc,
-        # data:, AND blob: iframes per HTML / CSP3, so the only way
-        # to escape ``script-src 'self'`` for the preview would be a
-        # same-origin backend route serving with overriding response
-        # CSP headers. Tracked as a follow-up; for now the explicit
-        # ``'self'`` setting leaves a visible directive that grep
-        # picks up if a future change tries to relax it.
+        # Restrict iframe sources to same-origin only. SVG previews still
+        # use a sandboxed ``srcdoc`` iframe (no URL fetch); interactive
+        # HTML previews go through the same-origin ``/api/preview/html/{id}``
+        # route in routes/html_preview.py, which serves the snippet with
+        # its own overriding ``script-src 'unsafe-inline'`` response CSP.
+        # Without the same-origin route, Chromium would inherit THIS
+        # ``script-src 'self'`` for srcdoc / data: / blob: iframes per
+        # HTML / CSP3 and inline scripts would be silently dead.
         "frame-src 'self'; "
         "frame-ancestors 'none'; "
         "form-action 'self'; "
@@ -539,6 +538,9 @@ app.include_router(export_router, prefix = "/api/export", tags = ["export"])
 app.include_router(
     training_history_router, prefix = "/api/train", tags = ["training-history"]
 )
+app.include_router(
+    html_preview_router, prefix = "/api/preview/html", tags = ["html-preview"]
+)
 
 
 # ============ Health and System Endpoints ============
diff --git a/studio/backend/routes/__init__.py b/studio/backend/routes/__init__.py
index 6bb5d15e8e..46d33e1b15 100644
--- a/studio/backend/routes/__init__.py
+++ b/studio/backend/routes/__init__.py
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from routes.export import router as export_router
 from routes.training_history import router as training_history_router
 from routes.chat_history import router as chat_history_router
 from routes.providers import router as providers_router
+from routes.html_preview import router as html_preview_router
 
 __all__ = [
     "training_router",
@@ -29,4 +30,5 @@ __all__ = [
     "training_history_router",
     "chat_history_router",
     "providers_router",
+    "html_preview_router",
 ]
diff --git a/studio/backend/routes/html_preview.py b/studio/backend/routes/html_preview.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e17ae5de53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/studio/backend/routes/html_preview.py
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
+
+"""HTML preview route for assistant ```html fences.
+
+Reason this route exists: when the chat renderer embeds the assistant's
+HTML via a ``srcdoc`` iframe, Chromium inherits the embedder CSP
+(``script-src 'self'``), so inline scripts and ``onclick`` handlers are
+silently blocked. Serving the same HTML from a same-origin URL with an
+overriding response-header CSP is the only way to let assistant-generated
+interactive HTML actually run while keeping the surrounding Studio CSP
+strict.
+
+Security shape:
+
+* POST is auth-gated (``get_current_subject``). Only an authenticated
+  caller can stash HTML into the in-memory store.
+* GET is intentionally NOT auth-gated -- browsers do not attach the
+  Authorization bearer to iframe subresource loads, so we instead make
+  the URL itself the secret: ``secrets.token_urlsafe(24)`` (192 bits of
+  entropy). The token leaves the server only in the POST response and
+  is then placed into the iframe ``src`` by the requesting page. It is
+  never persisted to disk, never logged, and is wiped on TTL expiry.
+* The response CSP is ``default-src 'none'`` + ``script-src
+  'unsafe-inline'`` so the preview is sandboxed from the network but
+  inline scripts and event-handler attributes execute as intended.
+* The iframe still has ``sandbox="allow-scripts allow-modals
+  allow-popups"`` (no ``allow-same-origin``), so even though the URL
+  is same-origin the document is treated as a unique opaque origin
+  for SOP purposes -- script in the preview cannot reach
+  ``window.parent`` storage, cookies, or DOM.
+* A size cap and TTL cap bound the in-memory footprint per Studio
+  process.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import secrets
+import sys
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
+from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+
+# Backend root on sys.path so ``auth`` imports resolve when this module
+# is loaded standalone (matches the pattern used by routes/export.py).
+_BACKEND_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+if str(_BACKEND_ROOT) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(_BACKEND_ROOT))
+
+from auth.authentication import get_current_subject  # noqa: E402
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Knobs (module-level so tests can monkeypatch).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# 1 MiB cap; assistant HTML previews are short snippets, not full SPAs.
+MAX_HTML_PREVIEW_BYTES = 1_000_000
+
+# 10 minutes. Long enough for a user to interact with the preview, short
+# enough that a forgotten tab does not pin the entry.
+PREVIEW_TTL_SECONDS = 10 * 60
+
+# Defensive cap so a runaway producer cannot exhaust the worker. New POSTs
+# evict the oldest entries past this watermark. Per-process, in-memory only.
+MAX_LIVE_PREVIEWS = 256
+
+
+_PREVIEWS: dict[str, tuple[float, str]] = {}
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Internal helpers.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _sweep_expired(now: float | None = None) -> None:
+    now = time.monotonic() if now is None else now
+    expired = [k for k, (t, _) in _PREVIEWS.items() if now - t > PREVIEW_TTL_SECONDS]
+    for k in expired:
+        _PREVIEWS.pop(k, None)
+
+
+def _evict_overflow() -> None:
+    if len(_PREVIEWS) <= MAX_LIVE_PREVIEWS:
+        return
+    # Evict oldest first.
+    sorted_keys = sorted(_PREVIEWS, key = lambda k: _PREVIEWS[k][0])
+    for k in sorted_keys[: len(_PREVIEWS) - MAX_LIVE_PREVIEWS]:
+        _PREVIEWS.pop(k, None)
+
+
+def _build_html_doc(source: str) -> str:
+    # ``<base target="_blank">`` mirrors the srcdoc fallback so any ``<a>``
+    # without an explicit target opens in a new tab rather than navigating
+    # the iframe (which would be UX-confusing).
+    return (
+        "<!doctype html>"
+        '<base target="_blank">'
+        + source
+    )
+
+
+_PREVIEW_CSP = "; ".join((
+    "default-src 'none'",
+    # ``script-src 'unsafe-inline'`` enables BOTH ``<script>`` blocks and
+    # ``onclick``-style attribute handlers. This is the entire reason the
+    # route exists -- the host page's ``script-src 'self'`` does not.
+    "script-src 'unsafe-inline'",
+    "style-src 'unsafe-inline'",
+    # ``data:`` / ``blob:`` only, NOT remote http(s). Inline JS cannot
+    # exfiltrate by fetching a remote pixel since ``connect-src 'none'``
+    # blocks fetch/XHR, but stripping remote ``img-src`` removes the
+    # other classic beacon vector too.
+    "img-src data: blob:",
+    "media-src data: blob:",
+    "font-src data:",
+    "connect-src 'none'",
+    "worker-src 'none'",
+    "frame-src 'none'",
+    "object-src 'none'",
+    "base-uri 'none'",
+    "form-action 'none'",
+    # Restrict who can embed THIS preview. The Studio host page is
+    # same-origin and is the only legitimate embedder. ``frame-ancestors
+    # 'self'`` also overrides any global X-Frame-Options on modern
+    # browsers, so a third-party site cannot iframe a leaked preview URL.
+    "frame-ancestors 'self'",
+))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Request / response models.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class HtmlPreviewCreate(BaseModel):
+    source: str = Field(..., max_length = MAX_HTML_PREVIEW_BYTES)
+
+
+class HtmlPreviewCreateResponse(BaseModel):
+    url: str
+    expires_in_seconds: int
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Endpoints.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@router.post("", response_model = HtmlPreviewCreateResponse)
+async def create_html_preview(
+    payload: HtmlPreviewCreate,
+    current_subject: str = Depends(get_current_subject),
+) -> HtmlPreviewCreateResponse:
+    """Stash an HTML snippet for same-origin iframe rendering.
+
+    Returns a same-origin URL whose path includes a 192-bit random token.
+    The token is the only authorisation for the subsequent GET.
+    """
+    _sweep_expired()
+    source = payload.source
+    if not isinstance(source, str):  # defensive; pydantic enforces str already
+        raise HTTPException(status_code = 400, detail = "source must be a string")
+    if len(source) > MAX_HTML_PREVIEW_BYTES:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code = 413, detail = "HTML preview too large")
+    token = secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
+    _PREVIEWS[token] = (time.monotonic(), source)
+    _evict_overflow()
+    return HtmlPreviewCreateResponse(
+        url = f"/api/preview/html/{token}",
+        expires_in_seconds = PREVIEW_TTL_SECONDS,
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/{preview_id}", response_class = HTMLResponse)
+async def get_html_preview(preview_id: str) -> HTMLResponse:
+    """Serve a stashed HTML snippet with an overriding response CSP.
+
+    Intentionally NOT auth-gated: the URL token IS the authorisation.
+    The iframe in the chat page has no Authorization header to send,
+    so making this require a bearer would break the only consumer.
+    """
+    _sweep_expired()
+    item = _PREVIEWS.get(preview_id)
+    if item is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code = 404, detail = "Preview expired or not found")
+    _, source = item
+    return HTMLResponse(
+        content = _build_html_doc(source),
+        headers = {
+            "Content-Security-Policy": _PREVIEW_CSP,
+            "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+            "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+            "Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
+            # Override the global SecurityHeadersMiddleware default of
+            # ``X-Frame-Options: DENY`` -- otherwise the preview page
+            # refuses to be iframed by the host chat view at all.
+            "X-Frame-Options": "SAMEORIGIN",
+        },
+    )
diff --git a/studio/backend/tests/test_html_preview.py b/studio/backend/tests/test_html_preview.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4206c15047
--- /dev/null
+++ b/studio/backend/tests/test_html_preview.py
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved.
+
+"""Tests for the /api/preview/html route (interactive HTML preview)."""
+
+import sys
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import FastAPI
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+
+_BACKEND_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+if str(_BACKEND_ROOT) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(_BACKEND_ROOT))
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def preview_app(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Standalone app mounting only the html-preview router on a clean store."""
+    from auth import storage
+    from auth.authentication import create_access_token
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(storage, "DB_PATH", tmp_path / "auth.db")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(storage, "_BOOTSTRAP_PW_PATH", tmp_path / ".bootstrap_password")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(storage, "_bootstrap_password", None)
+
+    import secrets as _secrets
+    storage.create_initial_user(
+        username = storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME,
+        password = "human-password-123",
+        jwt_secret = _secrets.token_urlsafe(64),
+        must_change_password = False,
+    )
+
+    from routes.html_preview import router as html_preview_router
+    from routes import html_preview as html_preview_module
+
+    # Each test starts with an empty in-memory store.
+    html_preview_module._PREVIEWS.clear()
+
+    app = FastAPI()
+    app.include_router(
+        html_preview_router, prefix = "/api/preview/html", tags = ["html-preview"]
+    )
+    token = create_access_token(storage.DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME)
+    return app, token, html_preview_module
+
+
+class TestPostHtmlPreview:
+    def test_post_requires_auth(self, preview_app):
+        app, _token, _mod = preview_app
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        r = c.post("/api/preview/html", json = {"source": "<h1>hi</h1>"})
+        assert r.status_code in (401, 403)
+
+    def test_post_returns_same_origin_url_and_ttl(self, preview_app):
+        app, token, _mod = preview_app
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        r = c.post(
+            "/api/preview/html",
+            json = {"source": "<h1>hello</h1>"},
+            headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        body = r.json()
+        assert body["url"].startswith("/api/preview/html/")
+        assert isinstance(body["expires_in_seconds"], int)
+        assert body["expires_in_seconds"] > 0
+
+    def test_post_rejects_oversize_body(self, preview_app):
+        app, token, mod = preview_app
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        too_big = "x" * (mod.MAX_HTML_PREVIEW_BYTES + 1)
+        r = c.post(
+            "/api/preview/html",
+            json = {"source": too_big},
+            headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+        )
+        # Pydantic enforces the max_length so this is a 422 (validation),
+        # NOT a 413 -- but either is acceptable as long as it does not get
+        # stored. We assert non-2xx and an empty store.
+        assert r.status_code >= 400
+        assert mod._PREVIEWS == {}
+
+    def test_post_returns_unguessable_tokens(self, preview_app):
+        # Two POSTs of the same source must produce two distinct tokens.
+        app, token, _mod = preview_app
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        urls = set()
+        for _ in range(5):
+            r = c.post(
+                "/api/preview/html",
+                json = {"source": "<p>same</p>"},
+                headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+            )
+            assert r.status_code == 200
+            urls.add(r.json()["url"])
+        assert len(urls) == 5
+
+
+class TestGetHtmlPreview:
+    def _create(self, app, token, source):
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        r = c.post(
+            "/api/preview/html",
+            json = {"source": source},
+            headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+        )
+        return r.json()["url"]
+
+    def test_get_serves_stored_html_with_overriding_csp(self, preview_app):
+        app, token, _mod = preview_app
+        url = self._create(app, token, "<button onclick=\"alert('x')\">go</button>")
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        r = c.get(url)
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        body = r.text
+        # The doctype + base + body are present.
+        assert "<!doctype html>" in body.lower()
+        assert "<base target=\"_blank\">" in body
+        assert "<button onclick=\"alert('x')\">go</button>" in body
+        # The overriding CSP must permit inline script execution.
+        csp = r.headers["content-security-policy"]
+        directives = {
+            chunk.strip().split(" ", 1)[0]: chunk.strip()
+            for chunk in csp.split(";")
+            if chunk.strip()
+        }
+        assert "default-src" in directives
+        assert "'none'" in directives["default-src"]
+        assert "'unsafe-inline'" in directives["script-src"]
+        # Beacon paths are still closed.
+        assert "'none'" in directives["connect-src"]
+        assert "'none'" in directives["frame-src"]
+        # Only same-origin embedders may iframe the preview.
+        assert "frame-ancestors" in directives
+        assert "'self'" in directives["frame-ancestors"]
+        # X-Frame-Options is SAMEORIGIN so the host page can iframe us.
+        assert r.headers["x-frame-options"].upper() == "SAMEORIGIN"
+        # No caching of preview bodies.
+        assert "no-store" in r.headers["cache-control"]
+
+    def test_get_is_not_auth_gated(self, preview_app):
+        # Browsers do not attach Authorization to iframe subresource loads.
+        # The unguessable URL token IS the authorisation.
+        app, token, _mod = preview_app
+        url = self._create(app, token, "<p>nope</p>")
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        r = c.get(url)  # no Authorization header
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+
+    def test_get_unknown_token_is_404(self, preview_app):
+        app, _token, _mod = preview_app
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        r = c.get("/api/preview/html/totally-not-a-real-token")
+        assert r.status_code == 404
+
+    def test_get_expired_token_is_404(self, preview_app):
+        app, token, mod = preview_app
+        url = self._create(app, token, "<p>aging</p>")
+        # Force-age the stored entry past the TTL by rewinding monotonic.
+        token_id = url.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+        created, src = mod._PREVIEWS[token_id]
+        mod._PREVIEWS[token_id] = (created - (mod.PREVIEW_TTL_SECONDS + 5), src)
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        r = c.get(url)
+        assert r.status_code == 404
+        # And the entry is swept on access.
+        assert token_id not in mod._PREVIEWS
+
+
+class TestEviction:
+    def test_overflow_evicts_oldest_entries(self, preview_app):
+        app, token, mod = preview_app
+        c = TestClient(app)
+        # Pin the cap low so the test is cheap.
+        mod.MAX_LIVE_PREVIEWS = 4
+        urls = []
+        for i in range(6):
+            r = c.post(
+                "/api/preview/html",
+                json = {"source": f"<p>{i}</p>"},
+                headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+            )
+            urls.append(r.json()["url"])
+            # Force monotonic progression so eviction order is deterministic.
+            time.sleep(0.001)
+        assert len(mod._PREVIEWS) == mod.MAX_LIVE_PREVIEWS
+        # The two oldest tokens (urls[0], urls[1]) must have been evicted.
+        for old in urls[:2]:
+            token_id = old.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+            assert token_id not in mod._PREVIEWS
+        # Newer tokens are still present.
+        for fresh in urls[-mod.MAX_LIVE_PREVIEWS:]:
+            token_id = fresh.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+            assert token_id in mod._PREVIEWS
diff --git a/studio/frontend/src/components/assistant-ui/__tests__/html-svg-renderer.test.tsx b/studio/frontend/src/components/assistant-ui/__tests__/html-svg-renderer.test.tsx
index c74a3d0495..4db84e47c6 100644
--- a/studio/frontend/src/components/assistant-ui/__tests__/html-svg-renderer.test.tsx
+++ b/studio/frontend/src/components/assistant-ui/__tests__/html-svg-renderer.test.tsx
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
 // Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0
 
-import { act, fireEvent, render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
-import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { act, fireEvent, render, screen, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import {
   HtmlSvgRenderer,
   isHtmlFence,
@@ -12,8 +12,37 @@ import {
   sanitizeSvgSource,
 } from "../html-svg-renderer";
 
+// HtmlPreview POSTs the source to /api/preview/html to obtain a same-origin
+// URL whose response CSP permits inline scripts. Tests fake this round-trip
+// so the iframe enters a deterministic post-load state.
+let _previewIdCounter = 0;
+function installFetchStub(): void {
+  globalThis.fetch = vi.fn(async (input: RequestInfo | URL) => {
+    if (typeof input === "string" && input === "/api/preview/html") {
+      const url = `/api/preview/html/test-token-${++_previewIdCounter}`;
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ url }), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      });
+    }
+    return new Response("not-found", { status: 404 });
+  }) as typeof fetch;
+}
+function installFailingFetchStub(): void {
+  globalThis.fetch = vi.fn(async () =>
+    new Response("server boom", { status: 500 }),
+  ) as typeof fetch;
+}
+
 describe("HtmlSvgRenderer", () => {
-  it("renders an HTML preview inside a sandboxed iframe by default", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    installFetchStub();
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it("renders an HTML preview inside a sandboxed iframe pointing at the same-origin preview route", async () => {
     const html = "<html><body><h1>hello</h1></body></html>";
     render(<HtmlSvgRenderer language="html" source={html} />);
 
@@ -25,14 +54,16 @@ describe("HtmlSvgRenderer", () => {
       "html-svg-renderer-iframe",
     ) as HTMLIFrameElement;
     expect(iframe.tagName).toBe("IFRAME");
-    // SECURITY: allow-scripts + allow-modals leave script / alert /
-    // confirm operative if the inherited host CSP ever permits inline.
-    // allow-popups lets ``<base target="_blank">`` links open without
-    // being silently dropped, BUT the popups INHERIT the sandbox
-    // (allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox is intentionally absent) so a
-    // tab opened from a malicious assistant link cannot use
+    // SECURITY: allow-scripts + allow-modals let assistant inline scripts
+    // / alert / confirm run in the backend-served preview, which carries
+    // a response CSP wide enough to execute them. allow-popups lets
+    // ``<base target="_blank">`` links open without being silently
+    // dropped; popups INHERIT the sandbox (allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox
+    // is intentionally absent) so an opened tab cannot use
     // window.opener.top.location.* to tabnab the Studio tab.
-    // allow-same-origin and allow-top-navigation are NEVER granted.
+    // allow-same-origin and allow-top-navigation are NEVER granted, so
+    // even though the URL is same-origin the iframe document is treated
+    // as a unique opaque origin and cannot reach window.parent.
     const sandbox = iframe.getAttribute("sandbox") ?? "";
     const sandboxTokens = sandbox.split(/\s+/);
     expect(sandboxTokens).toContain("allow-scripts");
@@ -41,17 +72,34 @@ describe("HtmlSvgRenderer", () => {
     expect(sandboxTokens).not.toContain("allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox");
     expect(sandbox).not.toContain("allow-same-origin");
     expect(sandbox).not.toContain("allow-top-navigation");
-    // srcdoc carries the assistant HTML plus a defense-in-depth meta
-    // CSP (connect-src 'none', frame-src 'none', img-src data: blob:
-    // only). Inline <script> / on* handlers do NOT execute today
-    // because Chromium inherits the host CSP for srcdoc iframes
-    // (also for blob: and data: -- empirically reproduced) and the
-    // host enforces ``script-src 'self'``. The preview is for layout
-    // / styles / images / source viewing; interactive demos are a
-    // documented follow-up that needs a same-origin backend route.
-    expect(iframe.getAttribute("src")).toBeNull();
+
+    // While the preview API call is in-flight the iframe holds
+    // about:blank rather than flashing the previous preview.
+    expect(["about:blank", null]).toContain(iframe.getAttribute("src"));
+
+    // After the POST resolves, the iframe src points at the same-origin
+    // preview URL the backend returned.
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(iframe.getAttribute("data-preview-state")).toBe("ready");
+    });
+    const src = iframe.getAttribute("src") ?? "";
+    expect(src.startsWith("/api/preview/html/")).toBe(true);
+    expect(iframe.getAttribute("srcdoc")).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("falls back to srcdoc with the defense-in-depth meta CSP when the preview API is unreachable", async () => {
+    installFailingFetchStub();
+    const html = "<html><body><h1>fallback</h1></body></html>";
+    render(<HtmlSvgRenderer language="html" source={html} />);
+
+    const iframe = screen.getByTestId(
+      "html-svg-renderer-iframe",
+    ) as HTMLIFrameElement;
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(iframe.getAttribute("data-preview-state")).toBe("error");
+    });
     const srcdoc = (iframe.getAttribute("srcdoc") ?? iframe.srcdoc) ?? "";
-    expect(srcdoc).toContain("hello");
+    expect(srcdoc).toContain("<h1>fallback</h1>");
     expect(srcdoc).toContain('http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"');
     expect(srcdoc).toContain("connect-src 'none'");
     expect(srcdoc).toContain("frame-src 'none'");
@@ -83,7 +131,7 @@ describe("HtmlSvgRenderer", () => {
     expect(srcdoc).toContain("default-src 'none'");
   });
 
-  it("toggles between Preview and Code tabs", () => {
+  it("toggles between Preview and Code tabs", async () => {
     const html = "<html><body>hi</body></html>";
     render(
       <HtmlSvgRenderer
@@ -94,8 +142,16 @@ describe("HtmlSvgRenderer", () => {
     );
 
     // Default tab is preview.
-    expect(screen.getByTestId("html-svg-renderer-iframe")).toBeTruthy();
+    const iframe = screen.getByTestId(
+      "html-svg-renderer-iframe",
+    ) as HTMLIFrameElement;
+    expect(iframe).toBeTruthy();
     expect(screen.queryByTestId("custom-code-view")).toBeNull();
+    // Wait for the preview POST to settle so the act() warning that follows
+    // an async state update outside an act() block does not fire.
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(iframe.getAttribute("data-preview-state")).toBe("ready");
+    });
 
     const codeTab = screen.getByRole("tab", { name: /code/i });
     act(() => {
@@ -130,27 +186,42 @@ describe("HtmlSvgRenderer", () => {
     expect(previewTab.hasAttribute("disabled")).toBe(true);
   });
 
-  it("srcdoc payload carries the defense-in-depth meta CSP", () => {
+  it("HtmlPreview POSTs the assistant source to /api/preview/html before mounting the iframe src", async () => {
     const html = "<button onclick=\"alert('x')\">go</button>";
     render(<HtmlSvgRenderer language="html" source={html} />);
     const iframe = screen.getByTestId(
       "html-svg-renderer-iframe",
     ) as HTMLIFrameElement;
-    const doc = (iframe.getAttribute("srcdoc") ?? iframe.srcdoc) ?? "";
-    expect(doc).toContain("<button");
-    expect(doc).toContain('http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"');
-    // Network egress is blocked regardless of script execution.
-    expect(doc).toContain("connect-src 'none'");
-    expect(doc).toContain("frame-src 'none'");
-    // ``<base target="_blank">`` keeps link clicks from replacing the
-    // iframe content with a navigation away from the preview.
-    expect(doc).toContain('<base target="_blank">');
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(iframe.getAttribute("data-preview-state")).toBe("ready");
+    });
+    // The fetch stub installed in beforeEach captured exactly one call.
+    expect(globalThis.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    const [url, init] = (globalThis.fetch as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mock
+      .calls[0] as [string, RequestInit];
+    expect(url).toBe("/api/preview/html");
+    expect(init.method).toBe("POST");
+    expect(init.credentials).toBe("same-origin");
+    const parsedBody = JSON.parse(init.body as string) as { source: string };
+    expect(parsedBody.source).toBe(html);
+    // After the API returns, the iframe src holds the returned same-origin
+    // path (no srcdoc); the backend response CSP is what unlocks scripts.
+    const src = iframe.getAttribute("src") ?? "";
+    expect(src.startsWith("/api/preview/html/")).toBe(true);
+    expect(iframe.getAttribute("srcdoc")).toBeNull();
   });
 
-  it("wires tabs to their panels with aria-controls / aria-labelledby", () => {
+  it("wires tabs to their panels with aria-controls / aria-labelledby", async () => {
     const html = "<html><body>hi</body></html>";
     render(<HtmlSvgRenderer language="html" source={html} />);
 
+    const iframe = screen.getByTestId(
+      "html-svg-renderer-iframe",
+    ) as HTMLIFrameElement;
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(iframe.getAttribute("data-preview-state")).toBe("ready");
+    });
+
     const previewTab = screen.getByRole("tab", { name: /preview/i });
     const codeTab = screen.getByRole("tab", { name: /code/i });
     const panel = screen.getByRole("tabpanel");
diff --git a/studio/frontend/src/components/assistant-ui/html-svg-renderer.tsx b/studio/frontend/src/components/assistant-ui/html-svg-renderer.tsx
index 526c4f2a1a..07b05c4136 100644
--- a/studio/frontend/src/components/assistant-ui/html-svg-renderer.tsx
+++ b/studio/frontend/src/components/assistant-ui/html-svg-renderer.tsx
@@ -260,17 +260,11 @@ function SvgPreview({ source }: { source: string }) {
 const HTML_PREVIEW_HEIGHT_REPORTER =
   '<script>(()=>{const post=()=>parent.postMessage({htmlPreviewHeight:document.documentElement.scrollHeight},"*");window.addEventListener("load",post);new ResizeObserver(post).observe(document.documentElement);})();</script>';
 
-// Meta-CSP enforced INSIDE the srcdoc iframe. Chromium inherits the
-// embedder CSP into srcdoc, data:, AND blob: iframes per HTML / CSP3
-// § initialize-document-csp, so the host Studio ``script-src 'self'``
-// already blocks assistant inline scripts and on* handlers here --
-// confirmed empirically on the live Studio with a click-to-alert demo.
-// Until a same-origin backend route is added (response-header CSPs
-// do NOT inherit), the preview deliberately ships as a static-render
-// surface. The meta-CSP below is defense in depth: it adds
-// ``connect-src 'none'`` + ``frame-src 'none'`` so even if the host
-// CSP ever loosens enough to let inline scripts run, the preview
-// still cannot beacon out or nest tracking iframes.
+// Fallback for when the same-origin preview route is unreachable (offline,
+// 404, transport error). srcdoc inherits the host page's ``script-src
+// 'self'`` per HTML / CSP3, so this path is static-layout-only -- inline
+// ``<script>`` and ``onclick`` handlers will NOT execute. The interactive
+// surface is the /api/preview/html backend route below.
 const HTML_IFRAME_CSP = [
   "default-src 'none'",
   "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
@@ -290,14 +284,36 @@ function buildHtmlSrcDoc(source: string): string {
   return [
     "<!doctype html>",
     `<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${HTML_IFRAME_CSP}">`,
-    // Outbound links open in a new tab rather than navigating the
-    // sandboxed frame itself away from the preview.
     '<base target="_blank">',
     source,
     HTML_PREVIEW_HEIGHT_REPORTER,
   ].join("");
 }
 
+// Backend route that serves the HTML with a response-header CSP wide enough
+// to let ``<script>`` and ``onclick`` fire. Created on every source change
+// via POST; the returned random-token URL becomes the iframe ``src``.
+const HTML_PREVIEW_API = "/api/preview/html";
+
+function getStoredAccessToken(): string | null {
+  // Mirrors the bearer storage used by features/auth/. We avoid the import
+  // cycle by reading sessionStorage / localStorage directly.
+  if (typeof window === "undefined") return null;
+  try {
+    return (
+      window.sessionStorage.getItem("unsloth.access_token") ??
+      window.localStorage.getItem("unsloth.access_token")
+    );
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+type PreviewState =
+  | { kind: "loading" }
+  | { kind: "ready"; url: string }
+  | { kind: "error" };
+
 function HtmlPreview({
   source,
   popped,
@@ -308,24 +324,57 @@ function HtmlPreview({
   onHeightChange?: (h: number | null) => void;
 }) {
   const iframeRef = useRef<HTMLIFrameElement>(null);
-  // srcdoc, blob:, and data: all inherit the host CSP in Chromium, so
-  // the choice between them does not affect script execution today.
-  // srcdoc is the simplest and avoids URL.createObjectURL churn, so
-  // that is what we use. Inline <script> / on* handlers in the
-  // assistant HTML do NOT execute under the current host CSP; the
-  // preview is for layout, images, and styles. The auto-height
-  // postMessage reporter is appended for the future state where the
-  // host CSP is relaxed via a backend-served preview route.
-  const srcDoc = useMemo(() => buildHtmlSrcDoc(source), [source]);
+  // POST the source to the backend preview route. The backend stores it for
+  // 10 minutes and returns a same-origin URL whose ``script-src`` permits
+  // inline execution -- the only way to escape the host CSP for srcdoc /
+  // data: / blob: iframes (which all inherit the embedder policy per
+  // HTML / CSP3).
+  const [previewState, setPreviewState] = useState<PreviewState>({
+    kind: "loading",
+  });
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    let cancelled = false;
+    setPreviewState({ kind: "loading" });
+    onHeightChange?.(null);
+
+    const headers: Record<string, string> = {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+    };
+    const token = getStoredAccessToken();
+    if (token) headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${token}`;
+
+    void fetch(HTML_PREVIEW_API, {
+      method: "POST",
+      credentials: "same-origin",
+      headers,
+      body: JSON.stringify({ source }),
+    })
+      .then(async (r) => {
+        if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`HTML preview HTTP ${r.status}`);
+        return (await r.json()) as { url: string };
+      })
+      .then(({ url }) => {
+        if (cancelled) return;
+        if (typeof url !== "string" || !url.startsWith("/api/preview/html/")) {
+          throw new Error("HTML preview returned an unexpected URL shape");
+        }
+        setPreviewState({ kind: "ready", url });
+      })
+      .catch(() => {
+        if (cancelled) return;
+        setPreviewState({ kind: "error" });
+      });
+
+    return () => {
+      cancelled = true;
+    };
+  }, [source, onHeightChange]);
 
   const [autoHeight, setAutoHeight] = useState<number | null>(null);
-  // Reset auto-sizing whenever the source changes so we never show the
-  // previous message's iframe size during the gap before the new doc
-  // loads and posts its first height.
   useEffect(() => {
     setAutoHeight(null);
-    onHeightChange?.(null);
-  }, [source, onHeightChange]);
+  }, [previewState]);
 
   useEffect(() => {
     const handler = (e: MessageEvent) => {
@@ -342,35 +391,39 @@ function HtmlPreview({
     return () => window.removeEventListener("message", handler);
   }, [onHeightChange]);
 
-  // In the docked view we cap at DEFAULT_PREVIEW_HEIGHT; in the popout we
-  // let the iframe fill the modal panel.
   const iframeHeight = popped
     ? "100%"
     : Math.min(autoHeight ?? DEFAULT_PREVIEW_HEIGHT, DEFAULT_PREVIEW_HEIGHT);
 
+  // Error path: fall back to srcdoc so the preview still renders the layout
+  // (static-only -- scripts dead) instead of going blank.
+  const errorSrcDoc = useMemo(
+    () => (previewState.kind === "error" ? buildHtmlSrcDoc(source) : null),
+    [previewState.kind, source],
+  );
+
   return (
     <iframe
       ref={iframeRef}
       data-testid="html-svg-renderer-iframe"
+      data-preview-state={previewState.kind}
       title="HTML preview"
-      srcDoc={srcDoc}
+      src={previewState.kind === "ready" ? previewState.url : "about:blank"}
+      srcDoc={errorSrcDoc ?? undefined}
       // SECURITY:
-      //   allow-scripts        -- ready for the day the host CSP
-      //                           gives the preview a script-src
-      //                           that includes 'unsafe-inline'
-      //   allow-modals         -- alert/confirm/prompt are not no-ops
-      //                           when scripts do fire
-      //   allow-popups         -- the ``<base target="_blank">`` link
-      //                           rule can open a new tab instead of
-      //                           silently dropping the click
+      //   allow-scripts   -- inline <script> / on* handlers run in the
+      //                      backend-served preview, which carries
+      //                      ``script-src 'unsafe-inline'``
+      //   allow-modals    -- alert / confirm / prompt are not no-ops
+      //   allow-popups    -- ``<base target="_blank">`` links can open
+      //                      a new tab instead of silently dropping
       // We do NOT grant:
-      //   allow-same-origin / allow-top-navigation -- the iframe
-      //     cannot read parent.document or navigate the host page
+      //   allow-same-origin / allow-top-navigation -- preview JS cannot
+      //     read parent.document or navigate the host page even though
+      //     the URL is same-origin
       //   allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox -- popups INHERIT the sandbox
       //     so an opened tab cannot use ``window.opener.top.location``
-      //     to tabnab the Studio tab. The opened tab loads with an
-      //     opaque origin (some sites will render degraded) which is
-      //     the deliberate trade-off for tabnabbing safety.
+      //     to tabnab the Studio tab
       sandbox="allow-scripts allow-modals allow-popups"
       style={{
         width: "100%",